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CHRISTOPHER DEV ANNY 
HISTORY AND HERME~EUTICS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF R. G. 
COLLINGWOOD AND ITS THEOLOGICAL APPLICATIO' 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph. D. 
ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the philosopher Robin George Collingwood. It proceeds along three 
avenues. First contrary to the received interpretation which sees Collingwood's later work. 
exemplified by the essay on Metaphysics, as accepting complete historical rclatiyism. I argue 
that the Metaphysics is better understood within the contcxt ofhcImcneutics. and how careful 
consideration of his henncneutics of history can havc helpful and Illuminating theological 
applications. Both 'absolute presuppositions' and the controversial notion of 'unconscious 
thought' function as a critique of subjectiyism. 
The second avenue investigates the status of the doctrine of re-enactment. In common 
with recent research I argue that the doctrine is best understood as a transcendental condition 
of history. Collingwood is, therefore, clarif)ing the conditions for an understanding of the 
past, rather than providing the historian \\1th a method. I argue that re-enactmcnt is a 
'grammatical' investigation into the nature of the historical object and 1 support this argument 
by a detailed account of the linguistic nature of Collingwood's philosophy. Following the 
school of anal~1ical philosophy of history, I argue that re-enactment is a thesis about 
historical explanation as opposed to explanation by general law s. 
An argument against the limitation of re-enactment to the bounds of historical 
explanation fonns the third avenue of research. While the doctrine is certainly an e:xample of 
historical explanation. there is too much evidence pointing to its henneneutical dimension to 
leave the issue there. 1 argue that Collingwood anticipates man~ of the themes common to the 
henneneutics of Hans-Georg Gadarner. and I attempt to systematize these using Gadarner as 
the yardstick. 
Finally. in a concluding chapter. I draw all these arguments together \\1thin a 
theological context I show that re-<!nactment is a valid modcl of historical explanation by 
appropriating Edward Schilkbccckx's account of the rejection and death of the historical 
Jesus. In an effort to demonstrate the henneneutical aspect of re-enactment I end with an 
account of Schillebecck:x's translation of Christ's diymity into tenns of uni\l~rsal significancc 
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INTRODlCTION 
Collingwood's polemic against the realism ofG. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and 1. Cook-
Wilson, the mainstream of British philosophy in his day, and his forthright. intemperate yet 
wonderful Autobiography, allowed his colleagues to write him off as an idealist or worse. an 
ancient historian who had wandered into philosophy under a misapprehension.· Yet unlike G. 
R. Mure, it was difficult to dismiss Collingwood as a mere follower of F. H. Bradley. He did 
not follow~ rather, he developed ideas in his personal 'laboratory of knowledge' until what \\as 
fertile in them came to fruition in his O\\n philosophy of history. moral philosophy and 
archaeology. Thus, in an academic world obsessed by 'schools'. such intellectual isolation. in 
part an outcome of Collingwood's character of self-reliance, cultivated the sense that if he 
was a philosopher then he must be some kind of quasi-idealist. Of course in a period obsessed 
by an epistemology based on perception the tradition of idealism spoke most certainly to those 
equally obsessed by historical existence. 
Yet if Collingwood attempted to show the realists the importance of history to the 
practice of philosophy, this was not because he had any particular allegiance to G. W. F. 
Hegel or W. Dilthey but because he believed that in studying the history of their O\\n 
'atomism', Moore and Russell would recognize the true conditions of philosophical activity. 
Such an emphasis discloses the hermeneutical tenor of Collingwood's philosophy even though 
he never llses the word 'hermeneutics'. 
The view that Collingwood was a systematic philosopher, while true, must not be 
overplayed. A basic objective of the present work is to demonstrate that systematic though his 
work is, Collingwood's sensitivity to historicity discloses an equally definite emphasis on 
historical pluralism. In this respect, Chapter I will review the 'received' interpretation which 
gained currency follO\\'ing the publication of the Autobiography and the Metaphysics. This 
interpretation sees Collingwood as someone who gave up idealism for complete relativism. In 
recent years Lionel Rubinoff has attempted to rehabilitate Collingwood by appealing to the 
idea that his thought is expressive of a single system. Yet if Rubinoff appeals to a dialectical 
monism in order to demonstrate Collingwood's credibility as a philosopher, I shall emphasize 
a pluralism that prevents any attempt to resolve the past or the historical agent into an all-
inclusive system. Within this context the Metaphysics. in its pursuit of the conditions of 
philosophical activity. loses its association \\ ith a thorough-going historical relativism and, 
paradoxically. mirrors the universal hermeneutic of Hans-Georg Gadamer. I shall argue that 
Collingwood anticipates themes found in Tmth and Method and it is a task of the present 
\\ ork to systematize these. using Gadamer as the measure. 
Together with this emphasis on historical pluralism. which makes Collingwood a 
more interesting and discriminating figure. I shall pursue. in Chapters 2 and 3. a detailed 
IS. Toulmin. 'Introduction' to All Autobiography, p. :xi. 
VIII 
investigation into the status of the doctrine of 're-enactment'. I devote considerable spac~ to 
the doctrine, because a major objective of the present work is to show that re-cnacting or re-
thinking the thoughts of historical agents can be pursued \\ithin a theological conte:\.1. Until 
recently the most persistent reading of the doctrine assumed that Collingwood believed 
historical method was intuitive. In common with more recent interpretation I reject the 
intuitive version of re-enactment and focus instead on its transcendental or conceptual 
character. While the intuitive interpretation divorced re-enactment from Collingwood's 
understanding of historical inference and causation, the conceptual interpretation affords the 
reader the opportunity to consider the proper relation between re-enactment and historical 
method. This relation will be pursued in Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, the conceptual 
interpretation discloses the linguistic nature of Collingwood's philosophy. The fact that the 
'linguistic tum' is part of his philosophy rescues re-enactment from an intuitive or Cartesian 
dualism, and demonstrates, perhaps surprisingly, that Collingwood was sensitive to the 
pursuit of the proper relation between thought and language. The emphasis on the semantic as 
opposed to the intuitive or psychological character of re-thinking legitimates the doctrine and 
secures it against attempts to take it too literally. 
While I pursue the historical intention of re-enactment in Chapters 2 to 5. the 
doctrine cannot be confined to this limit but escapes and overlaps into hermeneutics. Re-
enactment certainly receives its context within analytical philosophy of history and its pursuit 
of the logic of historical explanation, but there is too much evidence pointing to its 
hermeneutical intention to confine it to this limit. The key to this overlap is disclosed if we 
subject the conceptual nature of re-enactment to hermeneutical reflection. By pursuing a 
grammatical analysis of re-thinking, analytical philosophers of history, because they are 
sensitive to the thesis of historical explanation, fail to recognize that development must form a 
part of what is re-thought. Thus. Chapter 6, while systematizing the ideas found in Chapter 1. 
addresses Collingwood's recognition that, by re-thinking past thought in the present, the past 
thought develops because the situation in which it is thought has altered. 
In the conclusion, Chapter 7, I shall argue that Edward Schillebeeckx's account of the 
rejection and death of Jesus is an excellent illustration of re-enactment in its historical aspect. 
The pursuit of re-enactment as a model of historical explanation is especially relevant 
because in theological circles re-enactment has either been avoided on the grounds that the 
nature of the New Testament will not allow it. or has been understood by Bultmann and 
others as a thesis about historicity rather than historical explanation. Schillebeeckx's account 
is significant in this respect, because he, like Collingwood, appeals to the semantic nature of 
an historical agent's self-understanding, and offers a persuasive account which shO\\s that the 
Nc\\ Testament displays a more marked historical intention than Bultmann and his school 
allowed. While an emphasis on the historical intention of re-enactment is a major objective of 
,:\ 
Chapter 7, I shall also review, in the interests of systematic thought, Schillebeeckx's attempt 
to translate, in the light of hermeneutics, Christ's divinity into terms of universal significance. 
CHAPTERO~E 
Creative Tensions in Collingwood's Philosophy: Monism versus Pluralism 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter will fall upon Collingwood's controversial book the Essay on 
Metaphysics. Accusations of a conversion from idealism to complete historical relativism and 
scepticism accompanied the reception of the book and ha\e now become the 'received' 
interpretation of Collingwood's later work. In recent years Rubinoff, a name as intimately linked 
to Collingwood studies as W. H. Dray, attempted to annul such criticism by appealing to the 
systematic nature of Collingwood's philosophy. Rubinoff shares with T. M. Knox, whose views, 
ironically, became the most authoritative, the idea that Collingwood's philosophy ought to be 
expressive of a single system. For Knox, Collingwood's position in the f."xsay on Philosophical 
Method promised so much only to disappoint: the obsession with history spoiling the systematic 
ideal. Rubinoff, beginning with Collingwood's Speculum MentiS, a phenomcnological archetype 
of the essay on Method, attempts to demonstrate that Collingwood never wavered from thc 
system set forth in that essay: the Metaphysics is simply an example of the dialectic expounded in 
the essay on Method. 
In what follows I propose to challenge this "ic\\. While Collingwood was an advocate of 
systematic philosophy, the interpreter of his thought has to reckon \\ ith his acute sensitivity 
towards the problem of historical existence. There is, as it were, something irreducible about the 
Metaphysics that prevents the interpreter placing it alongside thc essay on Method. The 
Metaphysics is expressive of a pluralism, of an engagement \\ith thc past as it is in itself, which 
resists any submersion within an all-inclusive system. A living tension exists, in other words, 
between Collingwood's desire for unity, expressed so eloquently in the essay on Method, and his 
recognition of a pluralism that compelled him to write about historical existence in a way which 
contradicted the canons of dialectical logic as outlined in that essay. This is not to say that the 
accent on plurality means Collingwood acquiesced in that relativism so often proclaimed of him. 
Pluralism is not the same as relativism. I take relati"ism to mean, whether it is possible or not, 
the assumption of complete incommensurability between different cultural systems, such that no 
communication or understanding is possible because each speaks a language wholly private to 
itself. By contrast, I undcrstand pluralism to mean the recognition of a real difference between 
cultural systcms which ne"erthclcss can be appreciated or understood on the basis of our common 
humanity. Morc particularly, in Collingwood's "ie\\. this mcans the re-thinking of the 
fundamcntal assumptions of different cultures. and the adherence to the idea that thcre is one 
historical proccss. In vic\\ of this lattcr point, Collingwood's attempted rapprochement between 
philosophy and history is a continuous thread running through his work which absolves thc later 
work of any thorough-going relativism, without den~ing that relativity (in the sense of a rejection 
of an unconditional standpoint) is an important feature of that work. By giving historical 
pluralism its due the hermeneutical basis of Collingwood's philosophy "ill be disclosed. I offer no 
excursus on hermeneutics. A major objective of the present chapter is to indicate two areas of 
Collingwood's thought which can be taken as expressive of all good hermeneutics. First. I shall 
illustrate that Collingwood's rejection of superior understanding, a central feature of Gadamer's 
work, enables the interpreter to give a better account of Collingwood's hermeneutics than at 
present exists. Secondly, the focus falls upon the controversial notion of 'unconscious thought' 
from the Metaphysics. I shall argue that this notion is a s~non~m for 'tradition'. Before 
proceeding to the argument, I offer a brief excursus on Collingwood. 
( I ) 
Collingwood in his Wider Intellectual Context 
The official philosophy of the day is the realism of Moore and the rest; a YC~ bad philosophy it is. in my 
opinion, as in yours; but it prevails at present. and those who disagree with it are either abused or merely 
neglected. 1 
While serving to show the intellectual isolation he suffered in the Oxford of his day, these words 
disclose Collingwood's own particular way of doing philosophy. Recent British philosophy. 
always sensitive to its empiricist heritage, derives its inspiration from work on the foundations of 
mathematics as pursued by Russell and G. Frege. It is the method of analysis set in hand by both 
men which, in the main. is characteristic of philosophy in these islands. To those indebted to 
analysis, professional competence came to be identified with philosophical specialization. By 
contrast, Collingwood was a practitioner of his own peculiar style of systematic philosophy 
which he intended for the general public. He believed that philosophy should be written according 
to the rules of literature rather than attempt to approximate itself to the precision of a technical 
discipline. He did not as Dray describes, "exhibit that love of exact language which anal)1ic 
philosophers have since made de rigueur. "2 Thus, while rightly praised for the poetic sensibility 
of his prose, the literary character of Collingwood's work presents the reader with special 
difficulties of interpretation. 
§ I. A Problem of Interpretation: Collingwood's Style 
As an advocate of 'expressiveness'. 'flexibility' and 'dependence upon context'. three central 
features of his understanding of literary style3, his writings, when carefully read.. are not always 
lCollingwood. in letter to Guido de Ruggiero 4 October 1921. Bodleian. dcp. 27. 
2Dray. History as Re-enactment. 27. 
'~Fssay on Philosophical Jfethod. 207. 
easy to grasp. By adhering to his oVon call upon philosophers "to avoid the technical vocabulary 
proper to science"4 Collingwood has to fashion technical tenns out of his prose. Consequently. a 
tenn like 're-enactment', while certainly a technical tenn, "functions so little like a precisely 
defined technical tenn ... that there are upward of a dozen apparent s~ non)'ms for it in his 
writings."5 It is this peculiar amalgam of the almost free-play of his literary style \\ith the need 
for clarity independent of technical language, which allows, even demands. Collingwood's resort 
to metaphor. This is none more evident than in his adoption of the 'outside-inside' metaphor which 
will be discussed in Chapter 2. This metaphor is a prime example of the difficulty critics have 
when interpreting Collingwood's thought on history. Yet as I shall indicate. the resort to metaphor 
does raise the question of why this particular linguistic 'trope' is employed with such frequency. 
A further complication is that Collingwood's writings are not always careful in statement. 
and are often prone to exaggeration. In one place, for example, he identifies historical inference 
with the level of certainty gained in a mathematical demonstration,6 while in another he urges that 
science and history are idcntical disciplines simply because they both employ generalizations. 7 
Sometimes, therefore, due to this tendency towards exaggeration, my aim is to reconstruct 
Collingwood's considered position where elarity is absent. 
Another trait which makes the interpreter's task difficult is Colling\vood's tendency to 
contradict himself. At one point, for example, he says that the proper attitude to history is that of 
a spectator,8 while at another he declares that the historian must enter imaginatively into the 
past. 9 Again in one place he says that historical thinking is not perception while in another that it 
is the highest fonn of perception. 10 These contradictions can be soften somewhat if we take the 
rule of 'dependence upon context' to heart, and also bear in mind that Colling\vood's interpretation 
of historical studies has its 0\\ n history. As other critics have recognized,ll however, 
Collingwood did not ah\ays acknowledge his change of mind, and one therefore sometimes finds 
him criticizing others for what he had previously held himself. 
There is also the problem of his apparent intellectual arrogance. Collingwood had a 
peculiar sense of his O\\n gifts and capacities, and tended, it seems to me, to read this awareness 
into his writing about human nature in general. There is, I think, a connection to be made here 
between the sense of his O\\n abilities. and his consistent appeal to the concept of human agency. 
The consequences of this connection shall, in part, occupy the argument of Chapter 4. 
4EPM.207. 
5Dray. HR 28. 
61"e Idea aIHistory. 262. 
7Collingwood. 'Arc History and Science'l2. 
RCollingwood. The Nature and Aims'. -t7. 
9IH.218. 
101H. 222; 'The Nature and Aims'. -t9. 
11 MacKinnon 'R. G. Collingwood': Dray HR 29f. 
Furthennore, it is well-known that his lectures. while highly popular. did not make any allowance 
for the weaker student. The lecture on 're-enactment' included in The Idea of History is evidence 
enough for this. He also placed high demands on his readers. At one point he bids farewell to any 
reader who does not agree with him, complaining that the reader must know little of the subject 
and therefore "the best thing he can do is to stop [reading] here and now."12 In another place 
Collingwood snaps at an imaginary interlocutor who is bold enough to demand a justification for 
the view of historical inference he has taken: "I'm not arguing, I'm telling you. II l3 Knox. the first 
editor of Collingwood's writings, attempted to build these examples of uneven temper into an 
argument that purports to make sense of Collingwood's apparent fall into historical relativism. 
The supposed change of direction in thought is, according to Knox, the result of Collingwood's 
ill-health. The traces of irritability and arrogance are its s~ mptoms. Yet I believe the real context 
of such remarks is to be found not in a fall into historical relativism brought on by ill-health. but 
in what he saw as the disastrous influence of 'realism' on British philosophy coupled "ith the 
growing realization of his own impending death. In this situation, his supposed arrogance is better 
understood as the demeanour of someone conscious that he had something vital to say, but little 
time in which to say it. Consequently. he refrained from lengthy discussions of his own and 
critics' views. 14 
§ 2. The General Character of Collingwood's Philosophy 
The systematic nature of Collingwood's philosophy is derived from the 'Ruskinian' education 
imparted by his father. As William Johnston argues: "Collingwood did not dream up the ideal of 
a many-sided intellectual life; he inherited it."IS It is this principle, expressed in Speculum Mentis 
(1924) as 'the unity of mind' - "a general interpenetration of the various activities of the mind, in 
which each was influenced by all"16 - which he saw as the fundamental principle of Christianity. 
i.e. "that the only life worth living is the life of the whole man, every faculty of body and soul 
unified into a single organic system." 17 It is on behalf of this principle, together with an eye on 
the 'Greats' curriculum at Oxford, that he criticized Prichard and Russell, and by implication 
Moore, for reducing moral philosophy to a theory which had nothing to do with moral action. 18 
The accent on 'interpenetration', the necessary relation between thought and action,19 discloses 
the dialectical nature of Collingwood's philosophy. 
IlIH. 256. 
I3IH.263. 
14Collingwood . . -lu/ohiography. 118. 
15Johnston. The Forma/h'c rears. 28. 
16.';peculum .\fentis. 27. 
I7SM.36. 
18A. ~~-52 
1911 All thought exists for the sake of action." SM. 15. 
The concept of dialectic is exemplified in almost all of Collingwood's works after Religion and 
Philosophy (1916) although summarised in none. 20 It is ob\ 10us from Speculum Mentis \\ ith its 
progressive account of art, religion, science, history. and philosophy that Collingwood derived the 
impetus of his dialectical vision from Hegel's Phenomenology o..fSpirit and more distantly from 
Plato.21 The attempt to encompass reality within the confines of a single system, a feature of 
which was to illustrate that the ingestion of past thought by present thought implied the 
superiority of the present, shows that he was an advocate of Hegel's dialectical monism. Yet 
alongside this monistic conception of reality with "its resolute envisagement of the spirit as a 
single and indivisible whole"22 which allowed him, much to the irritation of his colleagues, to 
mount 'border raids' (lowe the phrase to D. MacKinnon) on other provinces of experience, 
Collingwood's appeal to dialectic discloses his obsession \\ith history: 
You say that philosophers must abandon their hostility to dialectic: I agree: but this hostility does not 
exist, I think, among the historical philosophers of Italy, but only among the scientific philosophers of 
England. Science is hostile to dialectic, history is not: and if a philosopher acquires a dialectical point of 
view this means that he is acquiring a historical point ofyiew. 23 
This appeal to the coincidence of dialectic and history appears at first sight confined to 
Collingwood's pursuit of dialectical monism. In The New Leviathan (1942), for example, which 
offers a philosophy of mind in dialectical development, an account of mind which underlies most 
of Collingwood's work, there is a section entitled 'Retrospect'. Here he resolves what mind is -
mind understood as the embodiment of European civilisation with its traditions - into what mind 
does. This means that a dialectical development, in general terms a movement from the implicit to 
the explicit, can only come to knO\\ what was implicit retrospectively. The attempt to understand 
a problem or a proposition necessitates, in other words, an inquiry into its history; into how it 
came to be what it is. Such an approach discloses the impetus behind Collingwood's criticism of 
'realism'. Nothing was more disheartening to Collingwood than the complete failure of Cook-
Wilson, Moore and Russell to engage with the historicity of understanding. Their pursuit of 
knowledge unmoved by considerations of temporality implied, in Collingwood's view, the 
impossibility of history. 24 Yet while these are dialectical ideas, it is nonetheless important to see 
that the pursuit of the antecedents of understanding \, ithin the contextual conditions of an 
historical text or evcnt discloses a sensitivity on Collingwood's part to a pluralism which resists 
any subsumption within a dialectical monism. He reveals such an attitude when in an article from 
20Sce Mink's. 'Collingwood's Historicism'. 
21 "Plato's discovery was how the intellect could find its way about in a Herac/itean world. The answer 
is: think dialectica/~v." The Vel\" Leviathan. 2~. 63. his emphases. 
22Collingwood. 'Ruskin's Philosophy'. ~ I. 
21ColJingwood. in a lctter to de Ruggerio 9 January 1931. Bodleian. dep. 27. 
24IH.233. 
1927 he criticizes O. Spengler for failing to see that "history deals \\ith the individual in all its 
individuality. "25 Offering a practical example from architecture in an article from 1929 
Collingwood asserts: "the buildings of one age are not more beautiful than those of another -
since each has its own beauty, not to be assessed in terms of any other - the aesthetic problem of 
any age's architecture is unique: that is to say. a particular age has the task of realising beauty in 
a particular way. "26 Yet this is not an appeal to an atomism like Spengler's which encloses cach 
culture within a hermetically sealed capsule with the consequence of complete relati"ism. On the 
contrary, in Collingwood's view, the historian can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand 
the thought of past cultures: "If history is possible, if we can understand other cultures, we can do 
so only by re-thinking for ourselves their thoughts. "27 Collingwood's appeal to thought, a central 
notion of his philosophy of history, is here understood as a S)TIon)m for the humanity (and 
inhumanity) which is common to us and which provides the bridge between past and present 
cultures. 
If Collingwood, in his appeal to systematic philosophy. dismayed his Oxford colleagues 
because he claimed all experience as his province, he was himself a good deal irritated at being 
"habitually labelled an Idealist". 28 But as he says in the Autobiography (1939), anyone who 
opposed the 'realists' was automatically classified as an idealist.29 The terms realism and idealism 
are not fixed and unchanging: what they mean to one is not what they mean to another. Idealism 
to MacKinnon, for example, is expressive of an attempt to avoid reckoning with inescapable fact. 
The idealist is one who takes refuge in a self-sufficiency creative of its own objects. 30 To 
Wittgenstein, we are told by F. Kerr, the idealist is "the man who has to have a reason for 
accepting the existence even of his own hands."31 His relation to the world is essentially 
cognitive. Consequently, it is better, I suspect, to take Collingwood's advice: "Why not see what a 
man's views are, before deciding to what class (if for some obscure reason you must classify 
them) you shall refer them?"32 
25'Oswald Spengler', 67. 
26'A Philosophy of Progress'. 116. my emphasis. 
270S.71. 
28Collingwood. in a letter dated 30 March 1935 to Samuel Alexander on the occasion of his election as 
Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy. It reads in full: "the electors were, Ileam, a good deal 
tickled that a candidate habitually labelled an Idealist should send in as his only testimonial. one from 
our leading Realist." Bodleian. dep. 26/ I. 
29 A. 56f Collingwood protests against G. Ryle in a letter. "I resent both the label lidealist]. and the 
irrcsponsible manner of attaching it" ... I hayc "no particular allegiance to Plato. Kant in his less 
Humian moods. and Hegel." This pertains to Ryle's article. 'Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological 
Argument' following the publication of Collingwood's EPM. Bodleian. dep. 26/3. 
30MacK.innon. Explorations. 2-t. 16-l . 
. H Kerr. 1heology. 119. his emphasis. 
31Collingwood in a letter to G. Ryle. his emphases. Bodleian. dcp. 26/3. 
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It is evident from his adoption of a systematic framework for his philosophy that Collingwood 
belongs more intimately to the continental tradition of philosophy characterized by HegeL Marx 
and Croce. Yet it would be a mistake to count him a disciple of any of the former. Furthermore. 
Gadamer's attempt to claim Collingwood as 'one of our own' in respect of German Romanticism 
does not quite ring true; he was too English and rational for that. 33 Nevertheless. it is true to say 
that the inspiration behind Collingwood and the aforementioned is what MacKinnon has called 'a 
sense of history'. 34 By this he means not "an achievement which inspired confidence in the 
methods that made it possible;" but rather "an awareness which seemed to set a question-mark 
against all work which tried to by-pass it. "35 
Unlike the realists and Russell in particular. who to the end of his life spoke of Kant's 
influence on philosophy as a disaster, Collingwood understood what had compelled Kant to 
undertake his three Critiques. "Kant", MacKinnon tells us, "had seen the necessity of justifying 
fundamental assumptions about the order of the physical universe; he steadfastly refused the 
escape offered by an appeal to intuitive self-evidence."36 Yet Collingwood saw that the critical 
question was raised less by physics and more by the problems of historical existence. While the 
critical problem was always with him, he believed the creation of a Critique of Historical 
Reason, as planned but never written by Dilthey, was still some way off: 
History occupies in the world of today a position analogous to that occupied by physics in the time of 
Locke: it is recognized as a special and autonomous form of thought lately established, whose 
possibilities have not yet been completely eXl>lored.37 
But while he offered the lectures on the idea of history as an example of the autonomy of history, 
Collingwood also attempted to anticipate "a philosophy of history in the wide sense, i.e., a 
complete philosophy conceived from an historical point of view. "38 Thus he saw the realists as a 
relic of a past age; they were in bondage to conceptions which were obsolete. He "regarded their 
33Gadamer writes: "Auf eine tiberraschende. fast rfitselhafte Weise ist dieser fremde Denker und 
SchriftstcIler fur UllS kein Fremder, und wenn er jetzt auf deutsch zu uns zu reden beginnt, ist er fast wie 
ein Heimgekehrter. der seine geistige Heimat draussen. wo er lebte und kampfte. nie vergass. Diese 
Hei mat ist die grosse weitraumige Landschaft der deutschen Romantik und der 'Historischen Schule'. 
Hegels und Schellings. Humboldts. Rankes und Droysens. Schleiermachers und Diltheys. von der das 
deutsche Philosophieren unserer lahrzehnte noch immer in Ullverkennbarer Weise zeugt." Denken, vii. 
\..lCollingwood exhibits the same idea: "Learning does not make the historian: there is a sense of historY 
which is not acquired through erudition. and for this historical sense we look to Spengler in vain." OS.' 
6 7. his emphasis. 
35MacKinnon. 'R. G. Collingwood'. 169f. Even though short and impressionistic. MacKinnon captures 
"ith unique penetration, the 'essential' Collingwood. Consequently. it is a great pity that of the studies of 
Collingwood that I havc seen not any know of its existence. 
36MacKinnon. 'R. G. Collingwood'. 171. 
.nIH. 209. 
38lH. 7. 
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methods as incapable of renewing effectively for their O\\n age the kind of deeply critical 
appreciation of the human significance of the changes taking place, which had [characterized] the 
eighteenth century. "39 Collingwood's polemic against realism is, in other words, not "concerned 
with a doctrine concerning the status of objects of perception" but "with an attempted flight from 
the besetting problems of men's historical existencc. "40 It would be a grave mistake, therefore, to 
judge Collingwood an idealist on such grounds. There is no doubt, however, that Collingwood's 
preference for a systematic philosophy like Hegel's discloses his use of identity-based thinking. 
Understood dialectically, the divergent philosophies in toto are a single philosophy of which 
particular historical philosophies are only components or critical moments. Be that as it may, 
throughout the thesis this resort to identity-based thinking will be treated as a 'recessive' doctrine 
in order to avoid its alignment with the idea that Collingwood believes 're-enactment' to be a 
thesis about numerical identity. Only in Chapter 6 will I treat of the problem of identity-based 
thinking. Yet in spite of this tendency towards identity. we have to reckon with the fact that 
Collingwood's exploration of the conditions of historical existence, and his appeal to the self as 
agent, disclose a plurality which refuses to be resolved without residue into any monistic or 
deterministic system. In fact this appeal to plurality in history becomes, in the sequel, the means 
of accounting for the place of the Essay on Metaphysics (1940) in Collingwood's oeuvre. 
( II ) 
The Conflict of Interpretations: Monist or Pluralist? 
§ 1. Collingwood's Supposed Historical Relativism 
The most enduring problem which afflicts any attempt to render Collingwood's philosophy 
intelligible as a whole is the problem of how to account for the Essay on Metaphysics. The 
parameters of the debate surrounding the Metaphysics can be described as follows. With the 
exception of Rubinoff, critics of Collingwood's philosophy see the Metaphysics as a fundamental 
departure from the type of philosophy that Collingwood had advocated earlier. Thus, whether one 
believes the Metaphysics is a departure from an earlier style, or whether \\ith RubinotI, one 
believes that it is of a piece with that work, some reason must be advanced to account for it. It is 
to be noted that both sides of this debate share the doctrine that the idea of an all-inclusive system 
defined the true character of Collingwood's philosophy. Thus, for the majority of critics the 
Metaphysics is an aberration. something totally out of character. By contrast, for Rubinoff, it is 
simply an example of systematic philosophy. In what follows I aim to show that this shared 
WMacKinnon. 'Faith and Reason'. 88. 
-l°MacKinnon. 'R. G. Collingwood', 171. 
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doctrine not only prevents a recognition of the real particularity of Collingwood's thought, but 
also obscures the henneneutical basis of his thought. 
In the Metaphysics Collingwood converts metaphysics into an historical science. He 
rejects the Aristotelian view that metaphysics is an account of being qua being. and the idea that 
metaphysics is concerned to give a comprehensive account of certain concepts, involved in 
discourse concerning any subject-matter whatsoever;H replacing this with an account of the 
fundamental assumptions or 'absolute presuppositions' that are presupposed \\ithin (European) 
civilisation; these presuppositions at the same time being the condition for intellectual innovation. 
Their 'logical efficacy' comes not from their being true - for they are absolute and cannot in this 
respect be referred to anything to determine their truth - but simply from their being supposed. 
On the strength of this, interpreters have understood Collingwood to be advocating an historical 
and cultural relativism. It is supposed that changes in absolute presuppositions, understood as 
"entirely independent and self-sufficient"42 principles determine changes in historical and cultural 
outlook leading to complete incommensurability between different conceptual systems. According 
to Knox, an advocate of such a view. the Metaphysics is evidence of a transition in Collingwood's 
thought from idealism to complete relativism which he believes occurred between 1936 and 
1938.43 Knox substantiates this view by citing a passage which he says comes from a manuscript 
written by Collingwood in 1936: 
St. Augustine looked at Roman history from the point of view of an early Christian; Tillemont, from that 
of a seventeenth-century Frenchman: Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman; 
Mommsen, from that of a nineteenth-century German. There is no point in asking which was the right 
point ofyicw. Each was the only one possible for the man who adopted it.44 
Such a statement, according to Knox. finds its counterpart in Collingwood's idea that "philosophy 
as a separate discipline is liquidated by being converted into history. "45 Thus, in coming to 
believe that human beings are prisoners of their 0\\11 contemporary circumstance, Collingwood 
renounced the possibility of a system of thought. This view implies that Collingwood rejected the 
dialectic expounded in the Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) which, as Knox declares, 
exhibited "a scale of fonns related to one another as lower is to higher in a process of 
development,"46 and replaced it \\ith self-sufficient 'absolute presuppositions', and in so doing 
"abandoned a philosophy of history. "47 This subsequently became the leading interpretative key 
-tIMacKinnon. Explorations. 1·0. 
-t2Toulmin. 'Conceptual Change'. 212. 
4-'Knox. tH. xi. 
-t-tKnox. lH. xii. 
-t5Cothngwood. 'Notes on Historiography', Bodleian. dep. 13/3. cited Knox. tH. x. 
46Knox. tH. ix. 
47Knox. tH. :wiii. 
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to Collingwood's later thought. 48 Alan Donagan goes so far as to say that this view "must be the 
foundation of any interpretation of his later works. It-l9 
More recently this account of Collingwood, propagated by Knox, Donagan and Stephen 
Toulrnin, has received fundamental criticism. I do not intend to review this criticism: instead I 
propose to deal with their arguments only in so far as they trespass on the problem in hand: the 
disclosure of the hermeneutical basis of Collingwood's thought. In what follows I shall 
demonstrate that there are two strands to Collingwood's thought: a monism, characterized by a 
dialectical movement towards the progressive realization of a genus, as expounded in An Essay 
on Philosophical Method; secondly, a pluralism, which in the light of his insight into historical 
existence, rejects the emphasis on a progressive realization of a genus. The Metaphysics belongs 
to this second strand. 
Along with the disclosure of this hermeneutical basis. the conclusion reached will show 
that the absence of a 'scale of forms' analysis in the Metaphysics is not proof of a conversion to 
historical relativism; but rather evidence for the fact that Collingwood's oeuvre is not the 
expression of a single system. On the contrary, Collingwood shows a marked concern for 
different levels of inquiry which cannot be enveloped within a 'scale of forms' analysis. 
§ 2. Monism: The Dialectic of the 'Overlap of Classes' and 'Scale of Forms' 
The idea of dialectic is such a pervasive feature of Collingwood's thought that it functions as the 
central key to his thought as a whole. Therefore, while I shall argue that Collingwood's thought 
on history rejects the idea of superior understanding which follows from the progressive 
realization of a genus, this does not rule out that his understanding of history partakes of a 
dialectical structure. There are, in other words, dialectical ideas which are common to every 
department of Collingwood's thought which are not dependent on the idea of superior 
understanding. 
The Essay on Philosophical Method is characterized by an attempt on Collingwood's 
part to differentiate 'scientific' (empirical rather than wissenschaftlich) concepts from 
'philosophical' concepts. The distinction was first made explicit by Collingwood in his 1925 
article 'Economics as a Philosophical Science'. Here he treats of empirical concepts, for example, 
money and credit as applying to specific classes of fact, but philosophical concepts, for example, 
labour and utility as tending to expand to apply to all rational actions. This distinction, between 
the 'empirical' and the 'philosophical', appears in all of Colling\\"ood's later work but none more so 
than in The Principles of Art (1937) where Colling\vood begins his book \\ith the problem of 
defining 'work of art' in the empirical sense, and ends by identifying art with language: "every 
48See MacKinnon. 'R. G Collingwood'. 170: Lash. Theology' on the Way. 63. 
49Donagan. The Later Philosophy. 12. my emphasis. 
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utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art. "50 The distinction between 
the empirical and philosophical concept is present in Collingwood's lectures on moral philosophy 
up to 1933, providing a clue to the ethical tenor of the essay on Method, and appears in that 
essay as the doctrine of the 'overlap of classes': 
when a concept has a dual significance, philosophical and non-philosophical. in its non-philosophical 
phase it qualifies a limited part of reality, whereas in its philosophical phase it leaks or escapes out of 
these limits and invades the neighbouring regions, tending at last to colour our thought of reality as a 
whole. As a non-philosophical concept it observes the rules of classification, its instances forming a 
class separate from other classes; as a philosophical concept it breaks those rules and the class of its 
instances overlaps those of its co-ordinate species. 51 
On the traditional theory of classification a genus is divisible into separate species so that every 
concept must have a group of instances to itself. However, a philosophical concept does not obey 
this rule: an action that is dutiful does not prevent it from being to my advantage. 52 
The basic point Collingwood makes when he introduces the analysis of a 'scale of forms' 
is that the scale is a combination of differences in kind and degree so that the genus is specified in 
a peculiar way: 
The species into which it is divided are so related that each not only embodies the generic essence in a 
specific manner, but also embodies some variable attribute in a specific degree. In respect of the 
variable, each specific form of the concept differs from the rest in degree; in respect of the manner in 
which the generic essence is specified, each differs from the rest in kind ... A system of this kind I 
propose to call a scale of forms. 53 
It is on this basis that Collingwood outlines his 'logic' of dialectic. In the first place the idea that 
the species of a genus not only expands a genus (in kind) via an overlap, but also alters the 
character of the genus means that Collingwood is not suggesting that there is something identical 
with regard to all the instances of a concept. Rather, on a scale, a concept like goodness in its 
lower form "is not only good in general~ it is good in a specific way: and if by comparison \\ith 
its neighbour it loses its goodness, what it loses cannot be merely goodness in general; it must be 
this specific kind of goodness. "54 While this may seem to have some superficial parallel with 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'family likeness'55 the difference is fundamental in so far as Collingwood 
identifies differences of kind \vith differences of degree. "The result of this identification is that 
every form, so far as it is low in the scale, is to that extent an imperfect or inadequate 
specification of the generic essence, which is realized \\ith progressive adequacy as the scale is 
50The Principles of Art. 285. 
5IEPM.35. 
52EPM.91. 
53EPM.57. 
54EPM.86. 
55Wittgenstein. The Blue and Brown Books. 17. 
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ascended. "56 This implies a difference between various forms in which the generic essence is 
embodied but, at the same time, a difference in the degree to which these forms embody it. 
Collingwood, as it were, rejects the logic of 'family likeness' because 'dialectical logic' does not 
recognize kind and degree or opposition and distinction to be mutually exclusive relations: 
The higher term is a species of the same genus as the lower, but it differs in degree as a more adequate 
embodiment of the generic essence, as well as in kind as a specifically different embodiment it follows 
from this that it must be not only distinct from it, as one specification from another. but opposed to it. as 
a higher specification to a lower, a relatively adequate to a relatively inadequate. a true embodiment of 
the generic essence to a false embodiment; as true, it possesses not only its O\\TI specific character. but 
also that which its rival falsely claimed. The higher thus negates the lower. and at the same time 
reaffirms it: negates it as a false embodiment of the generic essence. and reaffirms its content. that 
specific form of the essence. as part and parcel of itself. 57 
It should now be clear that Collingwood's dialectic as understood here is both descriptive and 
evaluative. It is in many respects a re-working of the dialectical monism of Hegel whereby each 
phase, as the scale is ascended, becomes a new phase while at the same time becoming a more 
adequate expression of the concept. In its adherence to the idea of superior understanding this 
view of reality is not sufficiently hermeneutical because it implies a single historical progress 
leading to the present. However, in what follows I want to broaden the above remarks somewhat 
by presenting a very brief summary which will serve to highlight some of the general features of 
Collingwood's dialectic. 58 
Collingwood does not intend to apply the doctrine of a scale of forms only to concepts, 
but extends it to cover philosophical systems in general. Understood dialectically, philosophical 
systems are related to each other in a connected series so that each should be a modification of 
the one before. 59 Collingwood expressed this idea by appealing to the concept of process, by 
which he means: "processes are things which do not begin and end but tum into one another."60 
In the first instance, this does not necessitate that each modification must be a better one. 
Furthermore, the idea that there is an overlap between forms, which is what the idea of 'turning 
into' expresses, does not necessitate betterment. Yet with the addition of the idea that the forms 
themselves 'tcIescope' into each other producing a culmination betterment is what is implied. 
Each phase in the scale, therefore. sums up the whole scale to that point "Wherever we stand in 
the scale, we stand at a culmination. "61 A dialectical scale is also retrospective; the later term in 
a relation makes explicit what was implicit in the earlier term: "terms A and B, in that order, are 
56EPM.6l. 
57EPM.88. 
581 rely on Mink's article 'Collingwood's Historicism' for the following paragraph. 
wNL. 9. 36. 
60 A. 97f. 
61EPM.89. 
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so related that B renders A necessary, 'presupposes' A as that out of which it develops."62 And 
finally, a dialectical series is not predictable. A lower form does not detennine its successor 
either logically or causally. Collingwood calls this the 'Law of Contingency': in a development of 
ABCD, "whether merely logical ... or temporal ... there is nothing in A to necessitate B: nothing 
in A+B to necessitate C; nothing in A+B+C to necessitate D. "63 It is tempting. according to L. 
Mink, to interpret this as meaning "that the earlier terms are necessary but not sufficient for the 
generation of the later." Yet contrary to Hegel's dialectic which, in Collingwood's view, was 
really an attempt to convert the development of phases into a theory of implication, thus taking 
away any understanding of the individual phase as it is an sich,64 it means rather "that the earlier 
terms are retrospectively and only retrospectively both necessary and sufficient. "65 This means 
that Collingwood not only wants to safeguard the individuality of phases, but also offers no 
theory to predict changes from one form to the next: the logic of his dialectic disallows the idea 
that changes are the result of conscious, as opposed to deliberate, agency. As Mink asserts, "the 
element of necessity in such a series itself comes into existence and hence can in principle be 
known only retrospectively. "66 In recognising an irreducible contingency in the development of 
mind Collingwood realizes that there can be no finality, no appeal to a Hegelian absolute: 
"however far up the scale he goes, he never comes to an absolute end of the series, because by 
reaching this point he already comes in sight of new problems; ... he is always at a relative 
end. "67 What is essential and necessary, for Collingwood, is only "the necessity of thinking 
systematically. "68 
It is evident, therefore, that while the Essay on Philosophical Method is an example of 
an evaluative philosophy which advocates the pursuit of superior understanding, many of the 
general features of Collingwood's dialectic. for example, the concept of process and the idea that 
necessity can only be known retrospectively. do not require an appeal to betterment. 
§ 3. Pluralism: The Metaphysics 
Collingwood begins the section 'Metaphysics as an Historical Science' by listing three absolute 
presuppositions about causation: the Ne\\10nian. 'some events have causes'; the Kantian, 'all 
events have causes'; the Einsteinian, 'no events have causes'. He then goes on to suggest that to 
ask 'Which of these absolute presuppositions is true?' is a nonsense question, because its logical 
62NL. 9 .. .n. 
6JNL. 9.48. 
64Collingwood. 'On the So-called Idea'. 100. 
65Mink. 'Collingwood's Historicism. 242. his emphasis. 
66'Collingwood's Historicism'. 242. his emphasis. 
67EPM. 191. "HegeL nailing to the counter in advance the lie that he regarded his own philosophy as 
final ... " The Idea of-Yature. 174. 
68EPM. 198. 
efficacy does not depend on its being true but only on its being supposed. The metaphysician's 
task is simply to discover what presuppositions have in fact been made.69 This indicates at once 
that Collingwood is not using the 'scale of forms' analysis as a structural principle. The idea of 
an ascending scale on which the presuppositions are evaluated, one a more adequate embodiment 
of the generic essence than the other, is not present. The metaphysician has a descriptive rather 
than evaluative role. As it stands, such a position suggests that the metaphysician merely makes a 
comparative study of absolute presuppositions noting resemblances and differences. It appears as 
if the problem of relativism prevented Collingwood from demonstrating any continuity between 
phases, believing they were merely successive. This is of course the received interpretation. Yet 
further into the book he says: 
The essential thing about historical 'phases' is that each of them giYes place to another; not because one 
is violently destroyed by alien forces impinging on its fabric from without ... but because each of them 
while it lives is working at turning itself into the nex1 ... The metaphysician's business, therefore, when 
he has identified several different constellations of absolute presuppositions, is not only to study their 
likenesses and unlikenesses but also to find out on what occasions and by what processes one of them 
has turned into another.70 
The appeal to a process which is 'turning itself into the next' is supplemented by the idea that the 
modification is a movement from the implicit to the explicit: "[olne phase changes into another 
because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium and had in itself the seeds of change, and 
indeed of that change. "71 There may be a suspicion that this 'concession' to the 'implicit-explicit' 
dialectic does actually presuppose the notion of superior understanding. Yet this suspicion can be 
removed if we cast our eyes upon a manuscript Collingwood wrote in preparation for the 
Metaphysics. The manuscript, entitled 'The Function of Metaphysics in Civilisation' (1937-38) 
uses the terminology of 'absolute presupposition' for the first time.72 Part of the argument is 
concerned with the question whether our science is superior to Greek science. Collingwood 
questions this superiority in two ways. First, he points out that there is no real standard of 
comparison between them, though there exists a continuity and devcIopment. Greek science has 
prepared "a soil out of which we modems are \\1ruring our harvests;" therefore "is not the 
richness of these harvests a proof, not of our superiority to the ancients, but of the excellence of 
their pioneering work?"73 Secondly, he questions whether the ability to decide bet\veen Greek and 
modem science can have any meaning, because we are not in a position to choose between our 
69An Essm' on .\/etaphysics. 5lr 
7oEM,73. 
7IEM,7.f. 
72But see IN, 30. However. this may not be the earliest because, according to Knox's 'Prefatory Note', 
this mention of 'absolute presupposition' occurs in a section Collingwood re"Tote in 1939. 
7.1'The Function of Metaphysics', 36. Bodleian. dep. 191"" 
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science and Greek science. To ask such a question is to ask "a nonsense question", because "to 
ask it presupposes the existence of a situation which does not exist. "74 While this last point 
obviously echoes the character of an absolute presupposition's logical efficacy, it also discloses 
Collingwood's agnosticism with regard to historical progress and his attitude to the past in 
general: "we are not called upon to choose it or reject it, to like it or to dislike it, to approve it or 
to condemn it, but simply to accept it. "75 There is, in other words, something irreducible about 
the past which cannot be subordinated to the status of a critical moment \\ithin an all-inclusive 
system. 
This resort to a development of 'absolute presuppositions' from which an appeal to 
superior understanding is removed echoes the ideas Collingwood had earlier advanced against 
Spengler and the idea of progress in history. In the article 'A Philosophy of Progress' (1929) 
Collingwood anticipates his rejection of the scale of forms analysis as applied to history. In his 
view, because every age has its own uniqueness, "it is idle to assess [each I in terms of a scale of 
degrees. "76 Thus, it would appear as if the linear model of development on which critics interpret 
Collingwood's philosophy is too blunt an instrument to capture with sufficient clarity the real 
particularity of his thought. There is, in other words, not a single line of development, but at least 
one permanent branch line to Collingwood's philosophy which though disused (until now) was 
but awaiting discovery. This means that there is a creative tension in Collingwood's philosophy, 
\vith on the one side, an emphasis on a unity of superior understanding in systematic philosophy, 
and on the other an emphasis on plurality when exploring the conditions of historical existence. 
Yet both the monistic and pluralistic aspects are enveloped within a developmental process. This 
is most clearly seen when Collingvvood contrasts atomism \\ -ith pluralism in his article on 
Spengler: the ability to re-think for ourselves the thoughts of past cultures "destroy[s) the idea of 
atomic cultures, and ... assert [ s] not a mere plurality of cultures but a unity of that plurality, a 
unity which is the present culture, the heir of all its past. "77 Thus, while he rejects the application 
of superior understanding to historical existence, Collingwood's commitment to the development 
of cultures whereby each 'turns into the next' tempers his pluralism and shows that he still 
adheres to the thesis of the oneness of time. This thesis of a single historical process (not 
progress), while removed from any commitment to betterment does retain, in common ,,-ith 
Gadamer's \vork, an adherence to that continuity necessary to hermeneutics. 
74'The Function of Metaphysics', 37. 
75'The Theory of Historical Cycles'. 85. 
7f:,'A Philosophy of Progress'. Ill. my emphasis. 
770S.71. 
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§ 4. A Critique of Rubinoff 
We are now in a position to explain why Rubinoffs impressive discussion of Collingwood is 
nonetheless inadequate. 
Rubinoffs massive study entitled, Collingvvood and the Reform o.f Metaphysics (1970) 
is an attempt to undennine the view that Collingwood's philosophy exhibits a radical conversion 
from idealism to complete relativism which is said to have occurred between 1936 and 1938. He 
wants to show that there is no thorough-going discontinuity in Colling\\'ood's thought and that a 
search for systematic unity provides the bridge between the earlier and later work. In this respect 
Rubinoffs book and Mink's Mind. History. and Dialectic (1969) which together disclose the 
central importance of the concept of dialectic are very valuable works. Yet Rubinoff goes further 
claiming that all of Collingwood's later work can be seen "as a projection of the programme 
outlined in Speculum Mentis"78 Thus, in his view, the scale of forms analysis implicit in 
Speculum Mentis and made explicit in the Essay on Philosophical Method is the central key to 
an understanding of the Metaphysics: "It is my contention that the doctrine of [absolute 
presuppositions I ... is an unfortunate and misleading attempt to expound. in neutral language, the 
implications of the dialectical logic as set forth in Speculum Mentis and An Essay on 
Phi losophical Method. "79 Yet I do not believe that Rubinoff is correct in this judgement. As I 
have shown Collingwood did not use a scale of forms analysis in the Metaphysics: his task was 
not to show the superiority of one complex of absolute presuppositions over against another, but 
simply to show that intellectual innovation depends upon them. In this sense, the Metaphysics is 
more descriptive in intention than evaluative. Rubinoffs work is, therefore, problematic on two 
counts: in the first place, it is unquestionably the case that at work in Rubinoff is the belief that 
Collingwood's credibility as a philosopher can be established only by sho" ing that his oeuvre is 
expressive of a single system. The attempt "to reconstruct Collingwood's philosophy into a 
system"80 using the scale of forms dialectic converts him into a Hegelian, bringing to mind 
Collingwood's critical observation: "German philosophers, when they die, it has been said, go to 
Oxford. "81 By this move, Rubinoff obliterates the real tension in Collingwood's work and 
perpetuates the 'Hegelian' label which is a substitute for the real task of interpretation. In 
attempting to rebut the suggestion of a radical conversion in Collingwood's later philosophy, 
Rubinoff seizes, too hastily in my vicw. upon the scale of forms analysis and in so doing 
obscures Collingwood's sensitivity to the past as it is in itself. By placing the emphasis on 
Collingwood's monism, which I do not doubt, Rubinoff is blind to the particularity that is 
78Rubinoff. C'ollinRwood and the Reform. 27. 
79CRM.217. 
8oCRM. v. 
81 'The Metaphysics ofF. H. Bradley'. Bodleian, dep. 29. 
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characteristic of Collingwood's historical sense. To echo Knox (without implying agreement \\ith 
his conclusions). Collingwood's writings make up not so much one system as a series of 
systems.82 The absence of a scale of forms analysis in the Metaphysics does not, in other words. 
necessitate a return to Knox's thesis of historical relativism. While this is perhaps the implication 
of Rubinofrs argument, I believe that the Metaphysics is about something else (what it is about 
v-,ill be explained in more detail below). Secondly, Rubinofrs exclusive emphasis on the 'scale of 
forms' obscures Collingwood's view of dialectical themes not dependent on the idea of superior 
understanding. 
§ 5. Knox: Too Loyal a Friend? 
After Collingwood's death in 1943 it was decided that his collected papers, including the lectures 
on nature, moral philosophy, history and the unfinished Principles of History, would be 
published together with a memoir written by someone who was s~mpathetic to him.83 A degree of 
hostility still existed in Oxford, due mainly to the views of the Autobiography,84 but it was hoped 
that someone could be found who would not use the memoir as an opportunity to get back at 
Collingwood. As a devoted disciple and friend. Knox was believed to be the best choice. For his 
part Knox saw it as his duty to edit Collingwood's work and write the memoir. What is now the 
preface to (the first edition of) The Idea of History should be seen as an attempt not merely to 
save Collingwood from possible oblivion, but also to place him within a wider context of thought 
by outlining some of his major ideas which at that time were not \\ idely known. In this respect 
Knox's preface became very influential and the starting-point for subsequent interpretations.85 
It was Knox's involvement that was the decisive factor in preventing the publication of 
all but a small number of manuscripts. Furthermore, he made it clear that he would be critical as 
well as appraisive of Collingwood. 86 
The fall into historical relativism which supposedly afflicts Collingwood's later work 
was, according to Knox, the result of ill-health. 87 It is true that Collingwood's last years were 
grievous to his friends. His frequent strokes took away his strength and speech~ this must have 
been particularly difficult for those who knew him as "one of the most learned men of his 
generation"88 Ill-health, then, becomes a convenient way of accounting for supposed lapses in his 
thought. Thus. Knox thinks the Essay on Philosophical Method expressive of the sununit of 
82Knox. IH. vii. 
83For an excellent account of this see D. Boucher's 'The Principles a/History'. 140-7-l 
84There was also the scandal surrounding his divorce. Sec Boucher. 144. 
85Sec van der Dussen's 'Introduction' to the rcvised cd. of IH. esp. xixf. 
86Boucher. 144. 
87Knox. IH. xxi. 
88Back covcr to IN. paperback edition. 1960. 
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Collingwood's powers, because it was composed in a period untouched by ill-health. Van der 
Dussen, however, has sho\\TI that the essay on Method was written after a period of serious 
illness not before, and "this fact seriously ,veakens [Knox's] suggestion that Collingwood's 
judgement was marred by his illness. "89 Furthermore, The New LeViathan, published in the year 
before his death, is not criticized on the grounds that its judgement is marred~ nor does it exhibit 
any lapse into thorough-going relativism. Yet more importantly for us: the re-appearance of the 
scale of forms analysis in The New Leviathan puts an immovable question-mark against the 
thesis that Collingwood had abandoned it. 
A further point on which Knox must be challenged concerns his rejection of 
Collingwood's claim that the elaboration of metaphysics as an historical science of absolute 
presuppositions precedes 1936.90 The seeds of such an approach are apparent from an early 
stage. In 'Ruskin's Philosophy' (1919) Collingwood declares: 
you generally find that there are certain central principles which [a 1 man takes as fundamental and 
incontrovertible, which he assumes as true in all his thinking and acting. These principles form, as it 
were, the nucleus of his whole mental life: they are the centre from which all his activities radiate ... But 
for the most part we do not know that we possess it: still less do we know what are the convictions 
which constitute it. The fact seems to be that a man's deepest convictions are precisely those which he 
never puts into words. Everything which he says and does is based upon his grasp of these convictions: 
but just because his grasp of them is so complete, so unquestioning, he never finds it necessary to 
express them at all. 91 
The idea of a nucleus of principles is carried over into Collingwood's philosophy of religion. The 
rubric fides quaerens intellectum is re-interpreted as 'Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself (1927); 
faith is that which achieves self-conscious possession of its O\\TI reality. Again in the article 'Faith 
and Reason' (1928), faith, in Collingwood's vie,\, "is the knowledge that the universe as a "hole 
is rational. It is only because we know that this is so, that we can be certain of finding in this or 
that detail of it a fit and possible object of scientific study. "92 It is the nature of this self-
authentication and its scientific consequences that forms the subject of Collingwood's early 
appeal to absolute presuppositions. In 1934 Collingwood delivered two lectures on metaphysics 
under the title 'The Nature of Metaphysical Study'. The second of these lectures is concerned with 
the question: "What are the problems with which metaphysics has specially to concern itself in 
European countries towards the middle of the twentieth century?"93 (Note the historical and 
geographical specificity of the question.) It is in answer to this question that the notion of 
absolute presuppositions is suggested. After noting the two basic principles of seventeenth 
89Yan der Dussen. IH. xxi. 
90Knox, IH. x. 
91 'Ruskin's Philosoph~ '. 1Of. 
92'Faith and Reason', l-t I. 
l)3'The Nature'. 15, Bodleian, dep. 18/2. 
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century science: (1) "that nature works according to fixed and definite laws": and (2) "that things 
in nature are really measurable and that whatever is not measurable is not real"94. he comments: 
These two principles are the assumptions on which 17th century natural science rested and if that 
science was to be regarded as real knowledge of the real world these assumptions must be true. But 
obviously physical science could not prove their truth: it could only begin to use its own methods when 
they had been assumed. Their truth was a matter for investigation by metaphysics.95 
It is evident that the account developed above bears a striking resemblance to the later doctrine of 
absolute presuppositions. The difference is that here, while the metaphysician is in the business of 
proving the assumptions of natural science, in the MetaphYSICS this task is rejected.96 
Knox appeals to Collingwood's declaration about the uselessness of asking whether 
Augustine's vicw of Roman history was correct and quotes Collingwood's note that 'philosophy as 
a separate discipline is liquidated by being converted into history' to sustain the idea that after 
1936 Collingwood acquicsced in a thorough-going relativism, but neither statements necessarily 
carry these connotations. In the first place. in the new edition to The Idea o.lHistory van der 
Dussen has cast doubt on the status of the passage concerning 'point ofvicw' in history. Knox 
says this came from a manuscript \\ Tittcn in 1936, but when questioned by van der Dussen, 
presumably because the passage could not be found, Knox said Collingwood had "Titten it in a 
letter to him. However. to van der Dussen's surprise, the passage does not appear in any of the 
lettcrs from Collingwood to Knox deposited in St. Andrew's University Library.97 But be that as 
it may, van der Dussen also cites a passage from Collingwood suggesting that the appeal to point 
of vicw does not reduce history to something wholly subjective: "Everyone brings his O\"n mind 
to the study of history, and approaches it from the point of view which is characteristic of himself 
and his generation ... this does not reduce history to something arbitrary or capricious. It remains 
genuine knowledge. "98 Thus, while every age is subject to the limitations of its O\\n historical 
conte~1., this does not rule out the possibility of an authentic sort of response. The focus on 'point 
of view' is, I suspect meant to suggest that each age understands the same reality in different 
\\ays. So perhaps the citation of the passage on 'point of\iew' says more about Knox than 
Colling\\ood: does Knox harbour thoughts of the possibility of unconditional knowledge? Does 
he, in other words, think our contcxtual limitations somehow a fai lure on our part? 
The passage about the liquidation of philosophy is, I believe, characteristic of Collingwood's 
thought from the first. It is important to note that what is liquidated is philosophy as a separate 
94'The Nature', 17. 
95'The Nature'. I7f. 
96EM.173. 
9:Van der Dusscn. IH. xxi if. 
9NCollingwood. 'The Philosophy of Histo~·'. I9~O. 15 Cited in van der Dussen. rH. :\\'Ii. n. 15 
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discipline.99 This is, I think, an example of the rapprochement between philosophy and history 
that Collingwood had always pursued. Consider, for example, the following passage from 
Collingwood's manuscript 'The Philosophy of the Christian Religion' \\Titten in 1920: 
It may be said in reply that I have done nothing but decry philosophy and praise history as a substitute. 
But this is not so. I have claimed that philosophy. to be properly fruitful. must study its own history and 
understand the growth of its own present problems before it can successfully solve them: and that in this 
way it is more likely to solve them than if it abstracts them from their historical setting and regards them 
- quite falsely and most discouragingly - as permanent problems. which all past philosopher's ha,'e tried 
to solve and failed. The philosophy of today has its own problems: these problems have been raised by 
the process of philosophical thought itself: grasp the history of the problem, and then you \\ill be in the 
best position to offer a solution. 100 
The point is that philosophy is not dispensed with altogether; it is, as it were, intenvoven \\ ith 
history. Philosophy, in other words, must become self-consciously historical. This passage, then, 
shows that such a programme, which presupposes that philosophical questions and their answers 
cannot be abstracted from their historical context - because they are embodied in and constitutive 
of their context - is characteristic of Collingwood's philosophy from the beginning and must not 
be appealed to as a position to which he finally succumbed. lOl 
Consequently, Knox's privileged position as the editor and interpreter of Collingwood's 
writings while fortuitous did in fact conspire against a more balanced assessment of 
Collingwood's philosophy. Knox's tendency to place the emphasis on systematic philosophy, 
obscuring the pluralistic nuances of Collingwood's historical sense, reveals a man not merely 
trying too hard to protect the reputation of a teacher and friend but also one who substitutes his 
own views for Collingwood's. The adoption of ill-health as a causal principle of alleged historical 
relativism is, therefore, in many respects a smoke screen used either to disguise a subtle 
disagreement between Knox and Collingwood on the question of the nature of philosophy or 
Knox's inability to understand his teacher. 102 Like Rufinus' translation ofOrigen's De Principiis, 
Knox expended too much love and not enough labour. 
So in conclusion: it is apparent that Collingwood's philosophy partakes of monism and 
pluralism. It is not, therefore, a matter of interpreting his thought along a linear line of 
development \\ hich can only either affirm a radical conversion or an enforced continuation. In 
other \\ords, the E,ssay on Philosophical Method is not the measure of Collingwood's philosophy 
99My attention was drawn to this by M. Hinz's, 'Process and Progress', 125. 
lOOCollingwood, 'The Philosophy of the Christian Religion', Bodleian, dep. 1/5, his emphasis. 
10lThe parallels between Collingwood and A. MacIntyre are significant in this respect. See esp. Ch. 1 of 
MacIntyre's A Short Histar.v. 
102It could also havc somcthing to do with Knox's suggestion (in a letter to Grace Simpson in 197~) that 
contrary to his public \iew. privatel~ he blamed Kathleen, Collingwood's second wife. for what he 
perceived to be Collingwood's change in personality and di recti on of thought. See Boucher 'The 
Principles afHistory', 1~5. 
as a whole; it is but one component, albeit an extremely important one. It is also clear that an 
appeal to a development between the phases of a process, whether absolute presuppositions. 
cultural systems or concepts, is common to both monistic and pluralistic aspects of his thought. 
Yet Collingwood's sensitivity towards the uniqueness of the past allowed him to break free of 
Hegel's dialectical monism and reject the idea of superior understanding which fo11o".s from the 
assumption of the progressive realization of a genus. 
( III ) 
Groundwork for Collingwood's Hermeneutics 
§ 1. The Nature of Absolute Presuppositions 
Before proceeding to investigate the controversial notion of 'unconscious thought' it would now be 
useful to say something about the nature of absolute presuppositions because they point to a 
recognition on Collingwood's part of the fallacy of the search for Cartesian 'foundations'. 
In the first place, I believe the phrase 'absolute presuppositions' was suggested to him by 
a reading of Bradley's essay 'The Presuppositions of Critical History'. Collingwood made a study 
of Bradley (beginning in 1932103) which culminated in the lectures on metaphysics (1934), a 
critical account of Bradley's essay on history which formed the basis for Collingwood's Inaugural 
Lecture on the 'Historical Imagination' (1935). and a section on Bradley in the lectures on the 
idea of history (1936). Reflection on the logical relation between method and presupposition 
pervades Bradley's essay on critical history. He writes: "Science, we may be told in answer, is 
founded on experiment and not on a presupposition. The fact of the existence of scientific 
experiment proves. we must return, the existence of an absolute presupposition, which it can be 
said to found, only because upon that itself is [it] already founded." 104 
Secondly, this emphasis on the relation between scientific method and presupposition 
characterizes the important work ofM. B. Foster. In an article published in Mind (1934) entitled, 
'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Natural Science', Foster 
demonstrates that classical physics depends for its existence on the doctrine of God. He declares: 
"What we have attempted to show is that the method of natural science depends upon the 
presuppositions which are held about nature. and the presuppositions about nature in tum upon 
the doctrine of God. "105 Though Collingwood worked independently on these themes prior to 
103 A copy of Bradley's essay was sent to Collingwood by the philosopher Joseph. In a letter to Joseph. 
dated 15 July 1932. Collingwood writes: "It is good of you to have lent me this rarity. which I have long 
wanted to see and have ncver seen before." See Dussen. IH. 437. 
104BradIey. 'The Prcsuppositions'. 2 L my emphasis. 1. S. Boys-Smith. then. was perhaps correct to see 
in this essay a sketch of the later presuppositions of the British Idealists. See MacKinnon. 'Some 
Aspects'. 56. 
105Foster. 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation'. 465. Today this claim about the doctrine of God 1S not 
anything to be proud of. Lash. who has distilled the insights of Michael 1. Buckley and Amos 
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1934, it is difficult to discount that he knew of Foster's work and took careful note of it. Foster 
himself refers approvingly to Collingwood's Metaphysics and The Idea of Nature in his own later 
work. 106 
This suggests that reflection upon the interplay between presupposition and method is 
what Collingwood has in mind when he talks of metaphysics as an historical science. But this 
equation of metaphysics with the absolute presuppositions of different cultural systems is, in my 
view, to limit metaphysics unnecessarily. While it is true to say that there is little agreement on a 
common definition of metaphysics, 107 by tying metaphysics to temporal development, 
Collingwood obscures our view of those fundamental categories and basic concepts "which," as 
P. Strawson declares, "in their most fundamental character, change not at all. "108 There is, in 
other words, a 'natural history' of basic concepts in the Wittgensteinian sense: that is, a synopsis 
of basic categories which are shown by analysis rather than arranged as a series in time. This 
conception of metaphysics, which in essence rejects temporal development, while anathema to 
Collingwood, gives the concept of analogy a valid place in metaphysical inquiry. That is to say. 
while I cannot follow Collingwood in his rejection of the idea of a valid science of the basic ways 
in which things are, I nonetheless take to heart his polemic against the vicw that metaphysics is a 
theoretical knowledge of objects: analogy is not a method, but a comment on our use of certain 
words. 
I therefore agree with Tariq Modood when he suggests that the Metaphysics is best 
understood as an account of the logic of the history of ideas~ 109 or as I prefer. the logic of 
intellectual innovation. For Modood the Idea of Nature and the Metaphysics form a unity, 
because their structure is not appropriate to a scale of forms analysis. This contradicts Knox's 
statement in his 'Prefatory Note' that Collingwood applied the scale of forms analysis to The Idea 
o..fNature. But be that as it may. it is better to see the manuscript entitled 'Notes Toward a 
Metaphysic' (1933-34) as the treatise on Nature which betrays the influence of a scale of forms 
analysis. What Collingwood "drastically revised" 1 10 in September 1939 became The Idea of 
Nature and thus, while containing material from the earlier 'Notes', came \\ithin the orbit of 
Collingwood's preoccupation with absolute presuppositions. So Modood's insight is very shrewd. 
Funkcnstcin into his most recent collection, shows that this God was not Christian i.e. not Trinitarian. 
but radicaJl~ monotheistic and sovereign. See his The Beginning. 
106Jarnes Connelly. Revic\\ of Creation, Vature, and Political Order, 230. It is also significant that 
Collingwood read Foster's the Political Philosophies for the Clarendon Press. Foster acknowledges 
Collingwood's help in the preface 
107See, for example. 1. Kim . .rl Companion to .\fetaphysics. 310-12. 
IORStrawson. Indil'iduals, 10. 
109Modood, 'Collingwood and the Idea'. 56f.; Skagestad . . \Jaking Sense. 82. 
IloKnox. 'Prefatory Note'. IN. 
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In The Idea of Nature Collingwood offers an account of three analogies on which nature IS 
understood: the analogy between macrocosm nature and microcosm man (Greek \iew of nature): 
the analogy between God's handiwork and the machines that are the handiwork of man 
(Renaissance view ofnature)~ the analogy between processes of nature as studied in natural 
science and the processes of human affairs as studied by historians (modem \iew of nature). 
These three analogies are offered as presuppositions of nature. Now while the~· develop, 
Collingwood is not concerned with showing how each developed out of the last as a superior 
analogy. Furthermore, Collingwood uses the terminology found in the Metaphysics: "They [the 
Ionians] did not consciously treat it [the idea that everything is made from one substance] as a 
'working hypothesis': [yet] it cannot be doubted that they accepted it as an absolute and 
unquestioned presupposition of all their thinking. "1 I 1 Together \\ith the re-appearance of the scale 
of forms analysis in The New Leviathan this, I think, shows that Collingwood was really after 
demonstrating something which could not be done by a dialectic which leads to superior 
understanding. 
Of course the immediate context of the Metaphysics is Collingwood's quarrel \\ith A. J. 
Ayer's attempt in Language, Truth and Logic to eliminate metaphysics. Collingwood agrees \\ith 
Ayer that the propositions of traditional metaphysics are unverifiable; but he does not fully 
endorse Ayer's view. Rather, the Metaphysics is an attempt to get round Ayer's elimination by, as 
it were, standing Ayer's argument on its head. Collingwood believes that Ayer's classification of 
all meaningful propositions into two exclusive classes, the analytic and the factual-empirical, is 
too restrictive. There is a third class which, though not verifiable, are not non-sensical either, 
because they are not propositions: "Absolute presuppositions are not propositions ... the 
distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that 
distinction being ... peculiar to propositions. "112 The thrust of Collingwood's argument is to show 
that Ayer's expulsion of metaphysics could be the root of the destruction of science and 
civilisation which, ironically, the latter's programme is meant to uphold. Ayer's verification 
principle and phenomenalism sought "to eliminate as metaphysical non-sense from scientific 
theories, any assumption of the unobservable."113 All claims, in Ayer's view, must be verified at 
the bar of experience. By contrast, while not advocating a traditional approach to metaphysics. 
Colling\vood sought to defend the spirit of that self-authentication which is characteristic of the 
metaphysical mind. So while there is a certain affinity between their two approaches - Ayer and 
Collingwood do after all in their own ways appear to reduce the metaphysical to something in the 
last resort, a matter of convention. Ayer by making the grammatical form of sentences the 
IIIIN.30. 
112EM. ~2 
Il't\1acKinnon. 'Ayer's Attack'. 52. 
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measure of logical necessity. and Collingwood by resolving what is necessary into fundamental 
yet historical presuppositions - Collingwood saw in the interplay between faith and reason. an 
appropriate example of that metaphysical impulse which, as MacKinnon reminds us, "seeks to 
come to rest in that which cannot be rejected or modified, in that which is suffused \\ ith its 0\\ n 
self-sufficiency ... "114 What, in the end, differentiates Ayer from Collingwood was the former's 
impatience, so characteristic of the utilitarian, towards any resort to radical innovation which is 
born out of an appeal to self-authenticity. So that while the approaches of Ayer and Collingwood 
are similar in the way I have described, Collingwood sought to disclose the underlying nature of 
this self-authenticity which has unleashed those explosive intellectual forces, i.e. the Christian 
Church, classical physics, and inductive logic, 115 that characterize Western history. Armed with a 
belief in the 'logical priority' of absolute presuppositions, Collingwood thought Ayer's appeal to 
radical empiricism deeply damaging to the interests of science and civilisation~ for is it not the 
case that an obsession with verification, with the need for positive evidence, imprisons intellectual 
innovation? And it was with the conditions of this intellectual innovation that Collingwood sought 
to engage in the Metaphysics: 
We do not acquire absolute presuppositions by arguing; on the contrary, unless we have them already 
arguing is impossible to us. Nor can we change them by arguing; unless they remained constant all our 
arguments would fall to pieces. We cannot confirm ourselves in them by 'proving' them; it is proof that 
depends on them, not they on proof. The only attitude towards them that can enable us to enjoy what 
they have given us (and that means science and civilisation, the life of rational animals) is an attitude of 
unquestioning acceptance. We must accept them and hold firmly to them; we must insist on 
presupposing them in all our thinking without asking why they should be thus accepted. 1 16 
Thus while Ayer wanted to place science under the complete control of sense-experience, 
Collingwood's appeal to that self-authentication which characterizes his understanding of the 
relation between faith and reason, sought to show that, in fact, neither the individual nor an 
appeal to experience can either exhaust our account of reality or provide the logical efficacy 
necessary for intellectual innovation. To presuppose does not linut the freedom of knowledge, but 
makcs it possible. Absolute presuppositions, then, are not the result of scepticism (pace Knox 
and MacKinnon)~ rather, it is rational to presuppose blindly. Unlike Ayer. in other words, 
everything does not have to be under our control. This brings to mind Wittgenstein's assertion 
"Presuppositions come to an end." 117 This is precisely what Collingwood points to \\ ith his 
distinction betwcen 'absolute' and 'relative' presuppositions. 1 18 In fact there are affinities between 
1) -t'Aycr's Attack', 55. 
I I 5 "Take away Christian theology, and the scientist has no longer any motive for doing what inductive 
thought givcs him permission to do." IH. 255. 
116EM, 173. 
117Wittgenstein. in Kerr. Theology, I D. 
118EM. 21-33. 
Wittgenstein's description of the 'foundations' of a language game and absolute 
presuppositions. 1 19 However, what I want to bring out of this discussion is the idea that 
Collingwood was, to some degree, alive to the notion that has become central to hermeneutics 
(and theology): it is destructive to search for starting-points, because we can never begin at the 
beginning. He was in this respect appealing to the traditions which preserve and perpetuate the 
absolute presuppositions which provide the fertile soil of intellectual innovation. 120 
§ 2. Unconscious Thought: A Critique of Subjectivism 
One of the questions Collingwood attempted to answer in the Metaphysics was how in the course 
of time absolute presuppositions change. Answering a friend who had asked him \\hether a 
change in absolute presuppositions was simply akin to a 'change in fashion' Collingwood, in a 
footnote, writes: 
A 'change of fashion' is a superficial change, ... A man adopts it merely because other men do so, or 
because advertisers, salesmen, etc., suggest it to him. My friend's formula 'if we like to start new dodges, 
we may' describes very well the somewhat frivolous type of consciousness with which we adopt or 
originate these superficial changes. But an absolute presupposition is not a 'dodge' and people who 'start' 
a new one do not start it because they 'like' to start it. People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute 
presuppositions, and are not, therefore, thus aware of changes in them: such a change, therefore, cannot 
be a matter of choice. [Absolute presuppositions change via] a modification not consciously devised but 
created by a process of unconscious thought. 121 
Interpreters have seized upon this passage as evidence that Collingwood was forced to introduce 
the idea of 'unconscious thought' because he could not account for change in rational terms: 
because we are not usually aware of our absolute presuppositions, a change in them could not be 
rationally devised by us. Both Knox and Donagan suggest, therefore, that Collingwood had to 
resort to psychology in order to explain how change occurs. For Knox, this means the doctrine of 
absolute presuppositions approximates to Dilthey's thesis that the philosophy a man adopts 
depends on his psychological make-up. 122 According to Donagan, Collingwood "interprets 
changes in what is presupposed along the lines of Freudian morbid psychology."123 The 
119"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain 
propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game." On Certainty § 20·t his emphases. Collingwood's 
attitude to moral e:\.'PCricnce expresses similar sentiments about action: Moral philosophy's "purpose is to 
enable you to improve your o\\n practice: and its appeal is an appeal by confirmation or disproved by 
rcference to your practical e:\.-perience." 'Goodness. Rightness, Duty'. Bodleian, dep. 8, 10. Despite these 
affinities, Fergus Kerr. that inquisitor par excellence of suspected dualism, reminds us that 
Wittgenstein's appeal to action was an attempt to rid us of the idea that our action depends on a web of 
beliefs taken for granted: we simply act. Theologv, 112-17. 
120EM. 196f. 
12IEM,48. 
122Knm:, IH, xiiif 
InDonagan. The Later Philosophy, 271. 
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implication is: because absolute presuppositions are dependent upon psychological factors they 
cannot be criteriological or normative and so lead to complete relativism. 
While I believe Donagan is right to point to the influence of FreU(l I think we need to go 
a good deal further and suggest that a better account of what Collingwood means by 'unconscious 
thought' can be given if it is understood as 'tradition', and hence, in complete opposition to Knox, 
as a critique of subjectivism. 124 
When Collingwood uses the phrase 'unconscious thought' he is using it in a special sense: 
the sense that Freud refers to when he talks about 'preconscious thought'. In The New LeViathan, 
Collingwood's discussion of unconscious thought and preconscious thought is meant to disclose 
the idea that though something is unconscious this does not mean that it is ineffective: "As Freud 
says, We learn by the analysis of neurotic phenomena that a latent or unconscious idea is not 
necessarily a weak one': in other words, that its strength is by no means 'latent or unconscious', 
even if everything else about it may be so described."125 Thus by preconscious is meant: "that 
which is latent but capable of becoming conscious ... The Preconscious is 'only unconscious in 
the descriptive sense, and not in the dynamic sense'."126 By using the terminology of Freudian 
psycho-analysis, Collingwood points to the presence of a horizon in which the individual is 
always and already situated. To ask a question, in other words, is already to presuppose 
something that goes beyond the questioner. In this sense, to question is to respond, whether or not 
we are conscious that this is so. By making thinking dependent upon absolute presuppositions, 
Collingwood shows that we cannot think these presuppositions through in themselves. 
Consequently, the 'logical priority' of absolute presuppositions corresponds to the situation in 
which we are always and already placed. When we begin to think, therefore, we never begin at 
the beginning. On this basis, it is evident that when Collingwood writes that absolute 
presuppositions change by a process of unconscious thought, and that changes are not a matter of 
chOice, he has in mind something very similar to Gadamer's distinction between judgements and 
prejudices. He declares: "In this kind of thinking, absolute presuppositions are certainly at work~ 
but they are doing their work in darkness, the light of consciousness never falling on them. It is 
only by analysis that anyone can come to know either that he is making any absolute 
presuppositions or what absolute presuppositions he is making. "127 The idea that necessity itself 
comes into existence which is central to his dialectic means, in other words, that change is 
unconscious in the sense that we can come to know it only retrospectively. It follows that changes 
in fundamental ideas are not always conSciously effected by historical agents even though agents 
12-t It is indeed difficult to accuse Collingwood of appealing to a non-criteriological explanation in view 
of the fact that a major aim of the .\fetaphysics was to criticize non-criteriological explanations. 
\25NL. 5. 88. 
126NL. 5. 9. 
I27EM . .t3. 
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act deliberately. That Collingwood is, in this connection, thinking of the concept of tradition is 
evident from the following: "The continuity of a cultural tradition is unconscious; those who live 
in it need not explicitly be aware of its existence. The continuity of a tradition is a continuity of a 
force by which past experience affects the future~ and this force does not depend on the conscious 
memory of those experiences." 128 
§ 3. Concluding Remarks 
While I have, perhaps, left this discussion at a tantalizing stage, I have achieved what I set out to 
do. The monistic and pluralistic aspects of Collingwood's philosophy have been outlined and the 
hermeneutical ideas of tradition and the rejection of superior understanding have been indicated. 
It is the purpose of Chapter 6 to carry the discussion forward by attempting to systematize 
Collingwood's ideas on hermeneutics using Gadamer's work as the measure. In particular, I shall 
go on to show that the rejection of superior understanding and the treatment of tradition as 
unconscious thought bear directly upon Gadamer's famous thesis of 'effective-history'. 
This work, however, cannot be undertaken \;vithout the mediation of the next four 
chapters. While hermeneutics is a major concern of the thesis, the historical intention of 
Collingwood's philosophy cannot be by-passed. This is why the chapters on re-enactment, 
causation and historical inference are necessary components of the argument. To the task of 
outlining this historical intention we now tum. 
12XCollingwood. Roman Britain and the English Settlements. 252. my emphasis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Inadequate Accounts of Re-enactment 
Introduction 
The doctrine of re-enactment is central to the interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy of 
history. The doctrine is discussed by Collingwood in The Idea of History in the section 'Histo~ 
as Re-enactment of Past Experience', and in An Autobiography in the chapter 'History as the 
Self-Knowledge of Mind'. Recently interpretations by M. H. Nielsen and Dray have taken into 
consideration the important lectures Collingwood delivered between 1926-28 in which the 
doctrine of re-enactment is first discussed. l These lectures are on deposit in the Bodleian Library. 
but since 1993 they have become generally available following the publication of a new edition of 
The Idea of History under the editorship of van der Dussen.2 Outlined above are the texts that 
specially deal with the doctrine of re-enactment. It would, however. be a mistake to assume that 
one could achieve a proper grasp of the doctrine by consulting these texts in isolation. In the past 
Collingwood's critics gave more attention to the Epilegomena of The Idea o.lHistory than to 
Collingwood's outline of history in its development, unaware that his account of the rise of 
history contained details essential to the interpretation of re-enactment and related ideas. A 
further complication is that The Idea of History was never written as a book, but is a 'scissors-
and-paste' affair that includes studies spanning the years 1935-40. As I have shown, Knox's 
design of The Idea of History was motivated by his attempt to rescue Collingwood's personal and 
philosophical reputation. This gives us the book we know today: it is a selection, bound together 
with the appearance of a systematic treatise, that supposedly gives us Collingwood at his best. 
But for all that, the book itself is an interpretation, probably the first. of Collingwood's 
philosophy of history. Had he lived, Collingwood's own book would have been different. It is not 
open to us to judge what, in Collingwood's hands The Idea of History would have looked like. 
Gradually, however, due to the important work of the Collingwood Society in co-operation with 
Oxford University Press and Collingwood's daughter Mrs. Teresa Smith, some details are 
emerging. The first thing to realize is that the title is an interpretative clue, going some way to 
resolve certain problems. David Boucher under the auspices of the Collingwood Society, has. in 
drawing upon information contained in the Oxford University Gazette, made it clear that. in some 
respects at least. The Idea o.lNature and The Idea o.fHistory form a unity of argument. 3 It is to 
be remembered that both books were originally a series of lectures. Boucher confirms that the 
I Nielsen. 'Re-enactment and Reconstruction'; Dray. 'Was Collingwood an Historical Constructionisf" 
2The Idea of History, 1993. (ed.) van der Dussen. The previously unpublished lectures are, 'Preliminary 
Discussion. The Idea of a Philosophy of Something. and, in particular, a Philosophy of History', 1927, 
'Lectures on the Philosophy of History'. 1926. and 'Outlines of a Philosophy of History', 1928 . 
.1Boucher. 'The Principles of His/ory', I52f. 
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lectures on the idea of history immediately followed the lectures on the idea of nature. This allows 
Boucher to assert that the concluding sentence of The Idea of Nature preserves Collingwood's 
lecture form: "And that is why I answer the question, 'Where do \\e go from here?' by saying, We 
go from the idea of nature to the idea of history. "'4 Collingwood credits A. N. Whitehead and S. 
Alexander with broadening the scope of historicity beyond its restriction to human affairs. 
Collingwood's own conception of his task in The Idea of History, is, therefore, to show that 
despite this supposed identity of all reality with history, there is a difference between nature and 
history to which the doctrine of re-enactment is an important heuristic key. It is clear, then, that a 
reading of the lectures on history, constituting parts I-IV of The Idea o.fHistory, are an essential 
contextualising device to further our understanding of re-enactment. 
The relation between the lectures on nature and history is made more explicit when 
Collingwood's essay entitled 'Reality as History' is brought into the picture. This essay. to be 
found in his unpublished manuscripts, was written "to test how far the thesis can be maintained 
that all reality is history and all knowledge historical knowledge. "5 It was written in 1935 and 
concludes by distinguishing nature from history. Nature is not historical in the way mind is 
historical, because nature cannot conserve its own past, i.e. nature has a dead past. Collingwood 
wrote the original lectures on the idea of nature between August 1933 and September 1934. The 
lectures on the idea of history followed in 1936. Collingwood's essay from 1935, then, sits very 
well as a preliminary attempt to distinguish nature from history. This might seem a somewhat 
insignificant point, since it is well known that Collingwood distinguished between nature and 
history. Perhaps this may be granted, but my point is significantly different: because Collingwood 
understood both nature and history in terms of process, the problem was how history as process 
could be distinguished from the process of nature. It is at this juncture that the doctrine of re-
enactment is crucial in establishing the difference. "My historical review of the idea of history has 
resulted in the emergence of an answer to this question: namely, that the historian must re-enact 
the past in his own mind. "6History, unlike nature, has a past that lives on in the present: that is, 
historical consciousness is central to present action in a way knowledge of nature, with its dead 
past, can never be.7 
4Collingwood. The Idea ofXature. 177. Cited in Boucher. 15·1. 
5'Realih as Histor,'. cited in van der Dussen History as a ."'cience. 165. 
6IH. 282. It is. of ~ourse. as an answer to the question. 'How. or on what conditions. can the historian 
know the past?' that the re-enactment doctrine is giyen. That said. my point is that bound up with the 
question of the condition for knowledge of the past is Collingwood's implicit distinction between nature 
and histol) . 
7'Goodness'. Bodleian. dep. 9, 75. 
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Turning our attention to the Epilegomena. we see that Knox's intention of providing a lasting 
testimony to Collingwood afforded him a reason to expand the Epilegomena. Its contents are as 
follows: 
§ 1. Human Nature and Human History: published in 1936 
§ 2. The Historical Imagination: published in 1935 
§ 3. Historical Evidence: chapter one of The Principles of History. written in 1939 
§ 4. History as Re-enactment of Past Experience: lectures of 1936 
§ 5. The Subject-matter of History: lectures of 1936 
§ 6. History and Freedom: part of chapter three of The Principles of History 
§ 7. Progress as created by Historical Thinking: lectures of 1936. 
It may be suggested that Knox acted with an honourable motive, but as so often in such situations 
there appeared unintended consequences. Principal among these is the distortion of Collingwood's 
projected desire to publish two books on history: the first concerning the idea of history, the 
second the principles of history. 8 The distinctive nature of these two projects must be taken 
seriously. Originally, Collingwood's lectures on the idea of history consisted of the historical 
sketch and only three sections of Epilegomena. In the original manuscripts which survive 
Collingwood pre-fixed the word Epilegomena with 'Metaphysical'Y What I contend is that 
sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Epilegomena are specifically concerned with the metaphysical aspect of 
history. By this I mean an investigation into the nature and reality of the objects of history. The 
essay on 'Historical Evidence' and to a certain extent the essay on 'Historical Imagination'that 
Knox included are out of place, since they are concerned to explore the methodological 
characteristics of history. Knox's way of grouping together both metaphysical and methodological 
texts, although in keeping with his intention, severely distorted the nature of the proposed thesis 
of The Idea of History. This thesis, as we have seen, embodied an attempt to distinguish history 
from nature in terms of re-enactment. In this light, the doctrine of re-enactment is an answer to a 
philosophical rather than empirical question: that is, re-enactment is an answer to the question of 
the possibility of historical knowledge as distinct from a knowledge of nature qua process. 
8Knox's contention that The Principles of History was not good enough to warrant publication because it 
was supposedly written in Collingwood's later hand i.e. was. in style and temper. out of key with his 
earlier work. makes a reading of Collingwood's note on the PH a yery sad affair: "To E. W. C. [Ethel. 
Collingwood's first wife] if this MS comes into your hands and I am prevented from finishing it, I 
authorize you to publish it with the above title. \\ith a preface by yourself explaining that it is a fragment 
of what I had. for 25 years at least. looked forward to writing as my chief work. " 
9'Lectures on the Philosophy of History.' 1936. There remain only 2-l or so pages of this manuscript. 
Knox left a note upon the fragments indicating the type of editing he carried out: 'Passages from the Ms. 
of the Idea of History. either not used or used in a different form in the published work' However. there 
remains a table of contents for Collingwood's 'Metaphysical Epilegomena'. Bodleian. dep 15 
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This questioning of Knox's editing is important, since it establishes a certain distance between 
Collingwood and Knox. In the past, the structure of The Idea of History went unquestioned and 
so obscured the important role Knox played in its constitution. Not only was his preface deemed 
authoritative, but his selection of texts for the Epilegomena encouraged vastly inaccurate 
interpretations of Collingwood's philosophy of history. In the first place, Knox selected texts from 
different places and different times. Secondly, he grouped together methodological and 
metaphysical texts which obscured the true bearing of the doctrine of re-enactment. As a 
consequence, though the doctrine of re-enactment received prominence, it was gained through a 
methodological interpretation. This is not, of course, surprising in so far as history is by tradition 
concerned with method. 
In Part I of this chapter I shall explore the main characteristics of re-enactment as an 
intuitive method. This will show that giving re-enactment a central methodological role 
demonstrates the distortion inherent in Knox's Epilegomena: that is, as method, re-enactment has 
no need, nor can it actually incorporate within itself, those parts of the Epilegomena that deal 
specifically with the method of history. The upholders of re-enactment as method actually oppose 
re-enactment to the reconstruction of the past in terms of evidence. This results in a polarisation 
of Collingwood's philosophy of history along two axes. On the first axis can be plotted the 
'received' interpretation which sees re-enactment as an intuitive method. 10 On the other axis are 
those who either discuss Collingwood's theory as a series of elements, such as evidence and 
imagination, which remain isolated from one another, 11 or those who specifically adopted 
Collingwood's methodological ideas on evidence to their own projects while ignoring the doctrine 
of re-enactment. 12 Along the first axis, (I shall only deal with the first axis as it is the most 
significant), common to critics was the belief that historical explanation should be characterized 
by the use of general laws. The prejudice that the concept of explanation only extended to 
explanation by general laws meant that re-enactment was understood to be a species of intuition. 
Part II of the chapter is concerned to demonstrate that the methodological interpretation 
of re-enactment was, in part, perpetuated by the vice-like grip of the general law thesis of 
explanation on the theory of history. The familiar idealist theme of the autonomy of history was 
suspect, because it seemed to give history over to a gnostic method for discovering the past. In 
the eyes of general law theorists the stress on autonomy masked a rejection of the need for a 
10 Along this axis we find: P. Bagby, Culture: G. BuchdahL 'Has Collingwood Been Unfortunate': L. B. 
Cebik. 'Collingwood: Action': L. 1. Cohen. 'Has Collingwood': W. B. Gallie. Philosophy: P. Gardiner, 
'The Objects' and The Vature: M. Ginsberg, 'The Character of: Austin van Harvey. The Historian: A. 
M. MacIver. 'The Character of, 1947: F. Olafson, The Dialectic: K. Popper. 'A Pluralist Approach': G. 
1. Renier. Hist01:L P. Skagestad. ;\faking Sense of History: A. Toynbee, A Study of History: Walsh. 
Introduction and 'The Character of. 
II See, for example, B. Lonergan. Jlethod. 
I2Ccbik, 'Collingwood: Action.' 
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logical analysis of explanation. If precision was required, then, it must be gained from the 
language of the natural sciences. It is in the adoption of explanation by general laws or what is 
now better know, following Dray's Laws and Explanation in History (1957), as the Co\cring-Iaw 
model of explanation, that there appears the deliberate eclipse of the concept of understanding in 
favour of the concept of explanation. 13 Understanding was believed to be an affective concept 
rather than something cognitive. 14 It had therefore to be rejected, since it was not amenable to 
measurement. What was needed, according to covering-law theorists, was a method which would 
establish the scientific credentials of history. The manifesto of this movement was Carl Hempel's 
paper, 'The Function of General Laws in History' (1942) which has a genealogy dra\\ing upon 
Hume's understanding of 'regularity'. Central to Hempel's paper is the idea that explanation is 
both a general i.e. 'covering' term for all science, and a precise term denoting what is explainable. 
At stake in the plea for general laws, always the mainstream of European philosophy at least 
since Aristotle, was a concern for the unity of science. The return of history from what was seen 
as its self-imposed idealist exile was conditional upon the assumption that history is part of a 
system of the sciences which speaks always of kinds rather than of individuals. 15 
I seek to show that the collapse of the covering-law model contributes to a new 
interpretation of re-enactment. In this light, the autonomy of history was a thesis that sought to 
rebut general law logic by pointing out that history is a science of the individual and not a science 
of kinds. It is as a logical contribution to this discovery that re-enactment should be understood. 
It was, ironically, the school of analytical philosophy which recognized the logical status of re-
enactment. This is important because it testifies to the breaking up of the covering-law model in 
the interests of historical explanation. 16 
13Collingwood recognizes no difference between the two terms, understanding being what explanation 
typically yields, and explanation what understanding typically requires. See Dray, History as Re-
enactment, 35; IH, 176-77. 
14This devaluing of supposedly affectiye concepts such as empathy has its counterpart within continental 
hermeneutics. The difference, however, is that in the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur understanding 
becomes divorced from affective concepts. 
15While recognizing history's appeal to the 'individual' judgement, Schopenhauer nevertheless declares 
it contradictory: "History lacks the fundamental characteristic of science, namely the subordination of 
the objects of consciousness; all it can do is to present a simple co-ordination of the facts it has 
registered. Hence there is no system in history as there is in the other sciences ... The sciences, being 
systems of cognitions, speak always of kinds; history always of indi'iduals. History, therefore. would be 
a science of individuals, which implies a self-contradiction." Cited in rH. 167. 
16By indicating that it is impossible to ask 'What is history?' without answering other questions of the 
type 'What such an inquiry is about?', 'How it proceeds?', and 'What is it for?' (lH, 7), Collingwood 
shows that his point of departure is history as an on-going discipline. Conscquentl~, R. Martin and R. F. 
Atkinson, two philosophers who share this point of departure and identify it "ith analytical philosophy 
of history, see Collingwood as both an early exponent of anal)1ical philosophy of history and its 
"intellectual founder." (R. Martin. Review of van der Dussen's History, 75. and Atkinson. Knowledge 
and Explanation, x.) At stake in the discussion of more contemporary anal~tical philosophers. mcluding 
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( I ) 
Re-enactment as Historical Method: A False Approach 
§ 1. Introduction 
In this part my main concern is to bring to light the principle which supports the intuitive 
interpretation of re-enactment. As a species of intuition, re-enactment is understood to be a 
method whereby the historian comes to know the thought of an historical agent by attributing, via 
an act of intuitive insight, his own thought to the agent. There is no appeal to an inferential 
process. Rather, by placing himself in the position of the agent, the historian, by the use of 
analogous reasoning, assumes an identity between his own thoughts and those of the agent. 
Hereafter I shall refer to this approach as the intuitive interpretation. There \\ ill be no sustained 
criticism of this interpretation in this part. I shall note in passing, however, that the intuitive 
interpretation is obsolete so far as informed interpretation goes. That might seem to indicate that 
any detailed analysis of the intuitive interpretation is unnecessary, but this is very far from being 
the case. Even though I offer a brief outline of re-enactment prior to a more detailed treatment, 
the real focus of this part is upon the principle underlying the intuitive interpretation, precisely 
because it is so embedded within the critique of re-enactment that it still functions after the 
intuitive interpretation is rejected. 
§ 2. The 'Outside-Inside' Metaphor 
Before proceeding to the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment a few remarks are required in 
order to provide the barest of frameworks which helps situate the doctrine of re-enactment. The 
principal text for the interpretation of re-enactment is as follows: 
The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the 
outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which 
can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain 
men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of blood on the floor of the senate-
house at another. By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be described in terms of 
thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy between himself and 
his assassins. The historian is never concerned \\ith either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is 
investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no 
inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event. .. His work may begin 
by discovering the outside of an event. but it can never end there; he must always remember that the 
event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action. to discern the thought of 
its agent. .. But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only 
one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his O\\TI mind. 17 
Dray. is the recognition. against covering-law theorists. that a different concept of c\planation operates 
in history. (See Dray. HR 75.) Collingwood is. therefore. seen as an ally in this di-;cussion. 
17IH. 21.1. 215. In Collingwood's terminology re-thinking is a synonym for re-enacting . 
..,.., , , 
The above passage comes from Collingwood's paper entitled 'Human Nature and Human History' 
written following his election to the British Academy in 1934 Collingwood read the paper to the 
Academy on 20 May 1936. 18 It is another example of the logical link between Collingwood's 
lectures on nature and history. One of the central tenets of the lecture is his attempt to outline the 
subject-matter of history in contra-distinction from the natural sciences. The quoted passage 
comes from a section devoted to outlining the field of historical thought. 19 The delimiting of this 
field (this subject-matter) not only reflects the historian's task, it also puts into relief the methods 
of natural science. The main point of this delimiting of history is to show that the evolutionary 
conception of nature which might seem at first sight to have abolished the difference between 
natural process and historical process, and to have dissolved nature into history, is unwarranted. 
If there is a similarity between nature and history it proceeds from the use of an analogy between 
"the processes of the natural world as studied by natural scientists and the vicissitudes of human 
affairs as studied by historians. "20 Collingwood again alludes to this analogy in 'Human Nature 
and Human History' when comparing the archaeologist'S and geologist's methods. The difference, 
however, is that archaeology, and by implication history, deal with human affairs which 
Collingwood conceives in terms of thought qua expressions of human purposes.21 He points to 
this in so far as the historian's "special technique, depending as it does on the interpretation of 
documents in which human beings of the past have expressed or betrayed their thoughts, cannot 
be applied just as it stands to the study of natural processes."22The analysis of the historian's 
methodology is not, however, enough, since it is the scope of this method that is at issue.23 What 
needs to be considered is the general nature of the problems this method is designed to solve. The 
text at issue is, then, Collingwood's attempt to demonstrate what it means to give an historical 
explanation. 
The 'outside-inside' passage, however, cannot stand as an adequate sketch of historical 
explanation without seeing it within the context of Collingwood's remarks about evidence. These 
remarks, concerning the historian's 'special technique', contextualise the 'outside-inside' metaphor. 
The historian is inquiring into events that have finished happening. Access to these events is given 
through 'documents' that the historian interprets. In so far as the data of events are concerned, it 
seems as if the natural scientist and historian work in the same way: that is, like the scientist, the 
historian apprehends the 'outside' of the event. Observation appears to be the mode of inquiry. 
While this is readily understood in the case of the scientist, it cannot, except in a very limited 
18KnoX. 'Preface', IH. 
19What is surprising is that the text does not come from the specific section on re-enactment. 
20IN,9. 
21 rH. 212. 
22IH. 212. 
23IH.213. 
sense, refer to the historian's work. Collingwood's understanding of the 'outside' of an historical 
event expressed as 'the passage of Caesar, accompanied b~ certain men, across a river called the 
Rubicon ... ' is not an example of observation. The historian does not see the passage of Caesar at 
all. In other words, the historical event cannot be what is observed, which strengthens the 
metaphorical status of the 'outside-inside' metaphor. Yet observation does have a place, though 
not the place some might suspect. I want to draw upon what Collingwood has to say about 
evidence in the recently discovered manuscript The PrinCiples of History in order to substantiate 
my claim. In the section entitled §3. 'Evidence and Language' (which is part of Chapter 2 entitled 
'Action') Collingwood makes a distinction within evidence between 'what it says' and 'what it 
means'.24 The emphasis on 'what it says' is, according to Collingwood, "an indispensable pre-
condition to any science of historical method."25 Collingwood is referring to the reading ofa 
'document' which "in its relation to history ... can be defined as apprehending or discerning the 
evidence. "26 The pre-condition of history is fulfilled, in other words, if the historian has in his 
possession a 'document' from which 'what it says' can be read off. As Collingwood states: "the 
historian's business is to discover what somebody thought: in order to do that. he must first find 
out what he said (where 'saying' covers not only expressive movements of the speech-organs, but 
expressive action of whatever kind); and the way to find out what somebody said is to 'read' the 
notation of it or a true copy of the notation of it. which you have before you. "27 The jurisdiction 
of the concept of observation in historical studies extends, therefore, only so far as the 'document' 
that the historian studies. Furthermore, the distinction between 'what it says' and 'what it means' 
provides a clue to the import of the 'outside-inside' metaphor. The discovery of the 'outside' ofan 
event, i.e. the passage of Caesar across the Rubicon, provides only the precondition of historical 
explanation. Together with this 'outside', the historian is in search of the 'inside', i.e. Caesar's 
defiance of Republican law, which completes the historical inquiry. It is debatable, however, 
whether Collingwood, as a Roman historian, believed that Caesar's defiance of Republican law 
explains Caesar's action. For, as Dray comments, this was not Caesar's reason for acting but only 
a consequence of his action.28 Collingwood in this instance has moved seamlessly from 'reason 
for action' to the 'significance of action'. Yet, as we shall see, this is not without importance, 
especially in view of the hermeneutical dimension of Collingwood's philosophy. 
24pH. 39. The manuscript was found and is housed in the archives of OxJord University Press. Oxford. 
The distinction between 'what it says' and 'what it means' is not meant as a provocation to the author of 
The Blue and Brown Books (5). Rather, it pertains to the distinction between 'source' and 'evidence'. 
See Chapter 5. 
25PH. 42. his emphasis. 
26pH. 42. 
27pH. 42. 
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Thus the main point of the 'outside-inside' metaphor is to characterise the type of explanation 
historians typically give. This leads to a number of consequences especially in relation to natural 
science. There is an important change within the 'outside-inside' passage from a sole emphasis on 
events to an emphasis on actions. The historian, Collingwood asserts, "is investigating not mere 
events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, 
and an action is the unity of the outside and the inside of an event. "29 The correct way to 
understand the 'outside-inside' metaphor is to place it in the context of action rather than event. 
This is clear from the example Collingwood gives of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon as the 
'outside' of an action. The emphasis on action becomes the heuristic key which accounts for the 
difference between natural science and history. In the first instance, though both scientist and 
historian appear to be concerned with the 'outside' of an event the direction of their respective 
inquiries demonstrates the nature of their respective subject-matter. The scientist goes beyond the 
event only so far as to observe its relation to others, and to bring it under a general law of nature. 
This reveals that for the scientist, "nature is always and merely a 'phenomenon', ... in the sense of 
being a spectacle presented to his intelligent observation. "30 This is an inadequate account of 
historical explanation, because the historian, when he has discovered the 'outside' of an action, in 
this case Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, moves on to discern the thought (the 'inside') which 
this action expresses. A simple report of what happened, therefore, does not count as an 
explanation. To take an example from The Principles of History: the difference between geology 
and archaeology is that when the stratification of a rock formation or site is settled "the 
archaeologist has not got history [unlike the geologist, the archaeologist has not finished his 
inquiryJ~ he has only got a chronological and topographical framework within which history is to 
be constructed. "31 This suggests that Collingwood distinguished science from history in so far as 
the former classifies events while the latter explains events. This does not mean that science only 
asks 'what happened' type questions rather than 'why it happened' type questions. It means, I 
think, that when transferred to history a general law cannot function as an explanation. A general 
law, in Collingwood's view, can never adequately answer the question 'why did the agent do x?' 
but only 'why did the agent do an act of this Idnd?' But instead of making this clear in the above 
passage, Collingwood obscures his point by conflating '"hat' type questions with 'why' type 
questions. He declares: "For the historian there is no difference between discovering what 
happened and discovering why it happened. "32 This paradox, while a t~ -pical piece of 
exaggeration on Collingwood's part, has its defenders. Mink, for example, thinks it basically 
29TH, 213, my emphases. 
30IR 21.f. 
31PR 50. 
321H. 21.f. 177. 
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sound, believing it to mean that a full description of an action is at the same time its 
explanation.33 Yet this is to obliterate the logical distinction between 'what' happened and 'why' it 
happened. On the face of it this conflation reads: "When the historian knows that Caesar was 
advancing against his enemies in Rome, he already knows why Caesar \\as advancing against his 
enemies in Rome."34 This is obviously false. Taking into account the context of the passage, it 
can only mean, it seems to me, that there are not two separate operations, one discovering facts 
and another applying causal laws, as positivism supposes. That is to say, the paradoxical 
conflation of 'what' with 'why' is useful, because history does not simply collate facts and then 
apply extraneous general laws to explain the facts: history, according to Collingwood, has a 
causal logic of its own. The agent's action, in other words, is 'determined' by the agent's beliefs 
and intentions not by a determining antecedent event. 
The emphasis on action loosens the definitiveness of the concept of 'event' and, as it were. 
subverts any allusion to observation. In other words, Collingwood is speaking metaphorically, 
and demonstrating that the historian does not observe at all. That is to say, the difference is not 
one of a move 'inward' in history to the move 'beyond' in science. The metaphor applies only to 
history conceived as action. This is not, then, understood as an empirical separation of the 
physical and mental, but as a unity of action and thought understood as 'purposive action'. This 
has consequences for a determination of the object of history. The scientist working \\ ith the 
concept of observation presupposes the object, the historian re-enacts it. The historical object "is 
therefore not an object at all. "35 It follows, then, that a thought cannot be discovered without at 
the same time re-thinking it. By appealing to a term like 'discernment' Collingwood is, therefore, 
referring to an inferential process wholly independent of the natural scientist's reliance on the 
concept of observation. 
In terms of historical explanation, Collingwood is attempting to make clear (although the 
history of the interpretation of 'outside-inside' metaphor demonstrates his failure) that history 
does not proceed via the classification of an event. It is not the events themselves that are central, 
but how these events are understood by the historical agents involved. Put simply, Collingwood is 
using the metaphor to show that general laws are neither sufficient nor necessary to the 
explanation of an historical action. The emphasis on thought is important, because it is the 
thought (intentions, motives, purposes) of an historical agent that explains an action. This is the 
point of distinguishing both the 'outside' of an action, i.e. Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, from 
the 'inside', i.e. Caesar's defiance of Republican law, and an 'event' from an 'action'. The fact that 
JJMink, .\find, 189. 
J4Dray. HR. 49. 
J5Coliingwood, 'Scheme for The Principles of History'. his emphasis. Cited in van der Dussen. HS. 
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action fonns the distinctive character of the historian's subject-matter, in Collingwood's view. 
makes the attempt to assimilate historical methodology to that of natural science misconceived in 
principle. But the appeal to metaphor shows that Collingwood, while not bound to the 
methodology of natural science, found it useful to parallel this methodology \\ith that of history: 
and by this demonstration, whereby the resistance of the words (outside-inside) in their ordinary 
use reveals their incompatibility at the literal level, 36 puts the distinctive character of historical 
explanation in relief. Collingwood appeals to metaphor in order to describe a 'procedure' 
inaccessible to direct description as given by the methodology of natural science. And it is this 
'procedure'that later analytical philosophers like Dray have re-described using the Neo-
Wittgensteinian procedure of linguistic analysis.37 In so doing Dray and others have given 
Collingwood's work a legitimacy it scarcely had, but surely deserves. 
The 'outside-inside' metaphor is adopted, then, not to answer a question \\ ith regard to 
temporal distance which dissociates an 'inner' thought from its 'outer' shell (leaving the historian 
free to extract or re-enact this 'inside' unmoved by considerations oftemporality). but rather to 
show the distinctive nature of historical explanation. 
§ 3. Re-enactment as Intuition 
The intuitive interpretation is the most well-kno\\TI and persistent reading of the doctrine of re-
enactment. Its power is formidable, because a reading of The Idea of History appears to lend 
itself to such an interpretation. Part of the problem is the language and the examples Collingwood 
uses to present his ideas. What far outweighs this problem, however. is the context \\ithin which 
Collingwood is placed. This, as I have already outlined, is the positioning of idealism with a 
discredited notion of 'understanding' by covering 1m, theorists. Re-enactment becomes a synonym 
for literally 're-living' or 're-experiencing' the past. This context not only exacerbates the intuitive 
interpretation, but allows its confinnation. 
In outlining the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment I shall draw upon the work of 
Patrick Gardiner, using his reading as representative of what might be called the 'methodological 
intuitionists'. Gardiner is an important choice, because his reading possesses a balance and clarity 
of argument absent from other critics. 
Gardiner's intention in The Nature of Historical Explanation is to demonstrate that the 
only valid approach to the past consists in the adoption of explanation by general la\\s. His 
36 At this point I am following Ricoeur: "The metaphor is alive as long as we can perceive. through the 
new semantic pertinence ... the resistance of the words in their ordinary use and therefore their 
incompatibility at the level of a literal interpretation of the sentence." Time and Yarralive 1. ix. 
371n using this parallel I am not suggesting that Wittgenstein's work is a species of idealism. The 
attempt to avoid the polemic between idealism and realism. which in many respects defines his later 
work. is shown in the type of inquiry he pursued. 
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critique of Collingwood centres upon illustrating the complete bankruptcy of any attempt to offer 
an alternative account. Furthermore, his confidence in explanation by general laws, combined 
with his correct assumption that Collingwood is attempting to offer an alternative model of 
explanation in terms of re-enactment, leads him to foist upon Collingwood an intuitive 
methodology. Gardiner's approach can be described as the application to the philosophy of 
history, and to Collingwood's philosophy of history in particular, of the main insights contained 
in Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind. We might say that his argument draws upon Ryle's 
important disposal of Descartes' dualism in order to provide a wholly negative reading of 
Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment. 
In his article 'The Objects of Historical Knowledge' (1952) Gardiner takes Collingwood's 
appeal to a 'thought-object' literally. Presupposing that Collingwood held to a kind of Cartesian 
dualism of the mental and the physical, he goes on in The Nature of Historical Explanation to 
consider what would constitute knowledge of this object. The focus of his interpretation is the 
passage encapsulating the 'outside-inside' metaphor quoted above. 
Gardiner recognizes the metaphorical status of the 'outside-inside' formula, but thinks 
that Collingwood carries it through so relentlessly in commending that events as 'things' should bc 
looked "not at, but through",38 that he moves away from metaphor toward literalism.39 He then 
makes the understandable step of attributing to Collingwood a mind-body dualism equivalent to 
the 'outside-inside' metaphor. He comments: "Collingwood describes human actions as divided 
into two separate compartments. "40 The 'outside' is equated with physical movements and the 
'inside' with mental contents. It must be said that Collingwood seems to give this impression, and 
it must have appeared even more marked to a philosopher schooled in the fallacy of Cartesian 
dualism. Furthermore, Gardiner criticizes Collingwood's use of the word 'thing' to denote an 
historical event, protesting that events are not things at all - they happen.41 It is apparent to 
Gardiner that Collingwood understands by 'thought' something that lies behind the physical event. 
Collingwood, then, according to Gardiner, is mainly concerned with how the historian can grasp 
this 'thought-object'. He offers the following schema to demonstrate that re-enactment is a 
methodological tool which supposedly enables the historian to grasp the historical agent's 
thought: 
a peculiar entity (a thought) ~ a peculiar container in which this entity is housed (a mind) ~ a peculiar 
technique by which this entity may be transferred from one mind to another (re-enactment).42 
381H. 214. 
39Gardiner. The Nature. 47. 
4oGardincr. 'The Objects of Historical Knowledge'. 2 13 . 
. HOHK.212. 
420HK. 2 11. The whole approach of the early interpreters of Collingwood is rerllJ niscent of what 
Bernard Lonergan castigated as the assumption that 'knowing consists in taking a look'. 'On this 
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Understanding re-enactment in this way, that is, giving priority to the notion of thought as an 
'entity' and mind as a 'container', made the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment inevitable. 
Gardiner comments: " ... the suggestion of some sort of telepathic communication \\ith past 
thoughts is too insistent to be entirely disregarded. "43 G. J. Renier states that Collingwood turns 
historical inquiry into "clairvoyance",44while M. Ginsberg thinks that re-enactment implies "a 
mystical unity and continuity of mental processes over-lapping individual personalities which". he 
comments, "I find it difficult even to grasp. "45 Collingwood's early interpreters were so fixated 
upon the idea of a 'thought' as an entity hidden behind a physical event, that they attributed to 
Collingwood the doctrine that an action was a thought's observable effect, furnishing the historian 
with a means of intuiting the existence of an unobservable mental cause, the thought itself. It is 
understandable that the argument for the autonomy of history is interpreted as a supposed 
justification of this intuitive methodology. The upshot of this approach was that it fostered the 
idea that Collingwood was attempting to by-pass the problem of temporal distance by an appeal 
to 'timeless entities'46 called 'thoughts'. This way of thinking allows Gardiner to state that "what is 
at least fairly clear is that in much of Collingwood's work the desire to assimilate the past to the 
present so that the requirements of the acquaintance theory of knowledge may be satisfied is in 
evidence. "47 This result appears paradoxical, because Gardiner places Colling\vood firmly in the 
subjectivist camp when claiming that he holds to a mind-body dualism. The move toward the 
acquaintance theory is not, however, unintelligible, because it brings to the surface the 
assumption upon which Collingwood's supposed subjectivism and theory of acquaintance rests. 
The emphasis on thought is taken as the usual idealist claim that the philosophy of history is 
constituted by a realm of ideas connected in a great chain of being which somehow forms the 
historical process. The historian, standing in the present, must grasp these ideas (thoughts), and 
the only way that this can be done, so Collingwood seems to insist, is by re-enacting or re-
thinking them. It follows, then, that in re-thinking the thought of an historical agent the historian 
has the same thought as the agent. Collingwood appears to confirm this line of argument when he 
comments: "I plunge beneath the surface of my mind. and there live a life in which I not merely 
think about Nelson but am Nelson ... "48 The assumption, therefore. that appears to underlie 
assumption, a term like 'thought' is taken to refer to a mysterious object which "needs an extraordinary 
language to articulate or a superior faculty to apprehend it. Possession of such a faculty then becomes 
the prerequisite for being a[nJ [historian]. Call it superior insight or the intuition of being"'. I have 
adapted this from Lonergan via Lash, see Theology on the Way. 108. 
,P'The Yature, 39. 
44Renier, History. 1950, 48. 
45Ginsberg, 'The Character of Historical Explanation'. 7-l. 
46Gardiner, OHK, 213. 
47Gardiner. The Yature, 39. 
4x.·ln Autobiography. 113. 
Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine, and Gardiner's ability to unite subjectivism \\ith the Realist 
theory of acquaintance, is the principle of numerical identity. In the context of Gardiner's 
interpretation, by numerical identity I am referring to the idea that the historian can achieve 
identification with a thought by an act of intuition rather than by the reconstruction of c\ idencc. 
The persuasive nature of this interpretation even infects Gadamer and P. Ricoeur. who 
place Collingwood firmly within the tradition of 'Romantic hermeneutics'. Bv this, Gadamer 
refers to the tradition of interpretation that "conceived understanding as the reproduction of an 
original production". 49 Gadamer sees this quest for numerical identity or 'original intention' 
embodied in the naive assumption of historicism that temporal distance is something that must be 
overcome. 50 Any such proposal would entail accepting the idea that the present is separated from 
the past. An understanding of the past, therefore, would require that historians shed their O\\n 
present context and plunge into the context of the past. It is as a method which advocates such an 
enterprise that re-enactment was understood. Thus, in their own ways Gardiner, Ricoeur and 
Gadamer think that Collingwood asks the question: 'How can temporal distance be overcome?' 
Ricoeur, unlike Gardiner, rejects the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment. and thinks. 
following recent practice, that re-enactment is better understood as a transcendental condition of 
history . Yet this is enough to show that a rejection of the intuitive interpretation is not sufficient 
to dislodge the principle of numerical identity. 
Following the assumption of numerical identity the concept of understanding becomes 
entangled with that of empathy. Central to the concept of empathy, understood as an affective 
concept, is the idea of individuality and uniqueness. This takes the form of insisting that in order 
to understand an historical agent, the historian must put himself, imaginatively, in the agent's 
place. The historian must 'become' the historical agent. There is, then, to be no residue. no 
distinction between the agent and the historian. What I take to be a classic account of empathy is 
given by Martin Buber in Between Man and Man. 
Empathy means, if anything, to glide with one's own feeling into the dynamic structure of an object. .. or 
a man. and as it were to trace it from within. understanding the formation and motoriality of the object 
with the perceptions of one's own muscles; it means to 'transpose' oneself over there and in there. Thus it 
means the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the ex1inguishing of the actual situation of life. the 
absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates. 51 
Explanation is. then, thought to be effected in isolation from the work of historical inference. It is 
the principle of numerical identity which drives the whole process. The principle appears 
methodological: i.e., the doctrine of re-enactment establishes understanding by appeal to identity. 
49Truth and .\fethod. 263. 
50TM.264. 
51 Betweel1 .\lan and .\.fan. l2.t. 
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This marks the intersection of the empathetic interpretation of re-enactment \\ith Gadamer's 
critique of romantic hermeneutics. Both methodologies presuppose that understanding is 
dependent upon establishing a numerical identity between the historical agent and historian. This 
reading of re-enactment appears to make sense even on Collingwood's examples. Collingwood 
recommends that the historian should envisage for himself what Caesar thought about the 
situation in which Caesar stood, and think what Caesar thought about the possible ways of 
dealing with it. 52 Understood as a methodological prescription, this appears to appeal to a literal 
identity between Caesar and the historian. To echo G. R. Elton, this would be like sa~ing: first 
imagine yourself in the position of the agent, and then attribute to him whatever you find yourself 
thinking. 53 This prescriptive version of re-enactment implicitly attributes a theory of analogy to 
Collingwood's doctrine. By this I refer to the way Descartes attempted to solve the problem of 
our knowledge of other people's thoughts. On his subjective view of language, Descartes saw that 
if we refer to other people's thoughts, we can do so only by analogy -with ourselves. Within 
(affective) empathy, then, there is a curious convergence of the principle of numerical identity 
with that of analogy. This convergence is embodied in the empathetic thesis that understanding 
requires the extinguishing of the actual situation in life (of the historian) in the interests of a total 
understanding of the agent's situation in life. The principle of numerical identity is the 
methodological presupposition of this procedure, while analogy forms its justification. This is the 
root, I suspect, of both W. H. Walsh and Gardiner's criticism of re-enactment as a form of 'self-
certification'. 54 In their view, to the question, 'How does the historian know that he thinks the 
same thought as the agent?' the answer, 'By positioning myself as the agent and attributing to the 
agent what I think' is given as a justification. But this justification cannot hold because it appeals 
to a subjective criterion that is not open to public scrutiny. 
It is clear, then, that the principle of numerical identity underlies the intuitionist 
interpretation of the doctrine of re-enactment. The result of this emphasis on numerical identity, 
especially in its methodological form, is to make the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment into a 
complete description of historical understanding. This occasions a gulf between re-enactment and 
Collingwood's understanding of inference, and leads to a situation in which critics like L. B. 
Cebik reject re-enactment as a hopeless doctrine but who fasten upon Collingwood's important 
521R215. 
53G. R. Elton. Political Historv. LB. 
54Walsh. 'The Character of. 59. "If the historical judgement is. as Collingwood implies. unique and self-
intelligible. there can be no question of the historian's ha\ing to make sense of the eyents "ith which he 
deals by exhibiting them in their context and connecting them up by means of a number of leadi ng 
ideas." Gardiner. 'Historical Understanding'. 276. It is to be noted that in this paper Gardiner recognises 
he was mistaken to attribute an intuiti\'c interpretation to the doctrine of re-enactment. 
discussion of inference. 55 This is certainly an unsatisfactory state of affairs, since Collingwood 
never intended the doctrine of re-enactment to be an alternative to inferential reconstruction. 
( II ) 
Towards a Reintegration of Collingwood's Philosophy 
§ 1. Some Introductory Remarks 
The integration of re-enactment with Collingwood's understanding of inference and causation 
begins with the advent of three developments: 
a). the collapse of the 'covering law' model 
b). the disclosure of the linguistic presuppositions of Collingwood's philosophy of 
history 
c). the interpretation of re-enactment as historical 'grammar' 
In this section I shall explore the nature of the first development. It is this that provides the 
appropriate context for the second and third which I shall outline in the next chapter. Attention to 
the covering law model will anticipate some of the arguments of Chapters 4 and 5. This is 
inevitable due to the close relation between the collapse of the covering-law model and the 
alternative model of explanation that replaces it. 
§ 2. The Collapse of the Covering-Law Model 
The primary motive for the following, if somewhat, brief exposition of the collapse of the 
covering law model (or more recently, the 'nomological' or 'law-subsumption' theory) is to 
demonstrate that the loosening of its vice-like grip upon history occasioned the advent of a new 
type of explanation sensitive to historical explanation. The phrase the 'covering law' model was 
coined by Dray in his book Laws and Explanation in History. His use of this phrase refers to the 
idea that an explanation "is achieved, and only achieved, by subsuming what is to be explained 
under a general law. "56 That is, explaining a particular case by 'covering' it with a law. In The 
Idea of History Collingwood traces this form of explanation to the Enlightenment's attempt to 
construct a science of human nature on principles analogous to natural science. This \\ay of 
conceiving explanation permeates Hempel's influential paper 'The Function of General Laws in 
History'. Hempel, following Hume, characterises explanation by general laws through such terms 
as 'regularity' and 'prediction'. He comments: "In view of the structural equality of explanation 
and prediction, it may be said that an explanation ... is not complete unless it might as well have 
functioned as a prediction: If the final event can be derived from the initial conditions and 
universal hypotheses stated in the explanation, then it might as well have been predicted, before it 
55Cebik. 'Collingwood: Action', 68-90. 
56Dra\. Laws and Explanation. I. 
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actually happened, on the basis ofa knowledge of initial conditions and generallaws."57 It is 
clear that for Hempel the main feature of explanation is to see "how things fall into general ~ -pes 
and how these general types are interrelated". 58 The correlation between explanation and 
prediction is not, however, in practice so tight. This is signified by the use of 'because" e.g. "a 
bam burnt down 'because' a burning cigarette was dropped in the hay."59 In drawing attention to 
natural science and its lack of complete predictive power, Hempel is attempting to bring natural 
science and history closer together in terms of their logical form. That is, there is an ideal 
scientific model of explanation - natural science is very close to it and history not so close - but 
both bear marks of the same ideal logical model. 60 Hempel uses this concession - the lack of a 
complete fit between theory (ideal scientific model) and practice (natural science and history) - to 
justify history's inclusion in general law logic. The main point is that Hempel still wants to apply 
the 'regularity' thesis to history in such a way that statements of the form 'x happened because of 
y' keep their validity: that is, in terms of general laws, x happened because of y is the same as, 
whenever y happens x will follow. 
Dray's intention in Laws and Explanation in History is to invert the relationship between 
general laws and history, and in so doing offer a critique of the general law thesis from the point 
of view of historical practice. It is no accident that Dray's dispute with the covering law model 
begins in the recognition that Hempel concedes ground to the pragmatic nature of historical 
inquiry. Hempel sought to play down history's lack of precision, even going so far as to show a 
similar lack on the part of natural science, in order to focus the reader on the logical relation 
between the two disciplines. This is why regularity rather than prediction is the focus of Hempel's 
attention. By contrast, Dray wants to show that the supposed lack of precision in history is a 
prejudice consequent upon using general law logic as the measure of historical explanation. 
While historical practice is unimportant to Hempel, Dray centres his account on it in order to 
show that this practice has its own logic. Furthermore, Dray shows that Gardiner departs from 
Hempel's general law thesis when he allows action of the purposive rather than the reactive kind 
to function within historical explanation. What was for Hempel termed 'pseudo' explanation, 
becomes legitimate for Gardiner. As Dray comments, this kind of explanation 
... far from being 'pseudo', is perfectly proper when we are concerned with human conduct of a purposiYe 
rather than a 'reactive' kind. Having denied that "an explanation of the form, 'x did y because he wanted 
z .. .', refers to the existence of a causal relation between two events", Gardiner goes on to argue that the 
"function of the 'because'" in such an eX1>lanation is to set the agent's action "within a pattern. the 
pattern of his normal behaviour". The particular action is explained in terms of a dispositional 
57HempcL 'The Function of General Laws', 348 . 
.'i8Collingwood, IH, 205. 
59'The Function of General Laws', 348. 
60"the difference between the historian's sketch and an ideal 'scientific' explanation is in the formers 
lack of precision. not in its logical form." LAE. 5. 
characteristic of the agent, and this, he admits. cannot strictly be regarded as subsuming what was done 
under a covering general law. 61 
On the one hand, Dray interprets Gardiner's introduction of the concept of 'disposItion' as a 
concession to historical practice. Gardiner derives the concept of disposition from Ryle's Concept 
of Mind where it relates to generality at the same time as to human action. As Ryle puts it: "A 
statement ascribing a dispositional property to a thing has much, though not evel) thing, in 
common with a statement subsuming the thing under a law. To possess a dispositional property is 
not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change~ it is to be bound or liable to be 
in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized. "62 
The notion of 'regularity' is still implied, because, according to Dray. "disposition is a spectator's 
word; it belongs to the language of observing and predicting ... "63 On the other hand. Dray finds 
the use of 'disposition' indicative of the collapse of the covering law model. Again we can glean 
this from Ryle's own account of 'higher-grade' dispositions. He comments: "When Jane Austen 
wished to show the specific kind of pride which characterized the heroine of Pride and Prejudice. 
she had to represent her actions, words, thoughts, and feelings in a thousand different situations. 
There is no one standard type of action or reaction such that Jane Austen could say 'My heroine's 
kind of pride was just the tendency to do this, whenever a situation of that sort arose."'64 If 
understood as an application of a law it would mean, according to Dray, that "the success of 
explanation in history depends on the historian having a sufficient stock of preformulated, 
empirically validated laws on hand - like methodological spanners which can be used to get a grip 
on events of various shapes and sizes." Historians. however, may not find themselves, due to the 
indefinite number at issue, "confronted with standard sizes. "65 Dray's argument, then, is that even 
in its exponents like Hempel and Gardiner, the collapse of the covering law model is already a 
feature. It is from this standpoint that he states: "this model [of general laws] is, in fact, so 
misleading that it ought to be abandoned as a basic account of what it is to give an 
explanation. "66 
The point to be gained from the preceding discussion is that in the work of Hempel and 
Gardiner there is a discernible shift away from prediction toward a sole emphasis on regularity. 
As such, the move from laws to rules (dispositions) is a symptom of this shift. It appears as if the 
application of generallav. logic to histol)· is inherently problematic because, unlike the former, 
history is wholly narrative in structure. That is to say. the change from prediction (law) to 
61LAE, 15f 
62The Concept oj.\find, ·n. 
63LAE, 1~9. 
64TCM, ~~. 
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regularity (disposition) is not symptomatic of history's compliance with general laws, but with the 
bending and eventual breaking of general laws in an effort to comply \\ith the demands of 
historical narrative. This is not a matter of presentation: narrative is not simply a writing up of 
results, it has a structural logic of its O\\TI. Ryle did not after all take his example of disposition 
from formal logic. 
Inverting the relationship between general laws and historical practice allows Dray to 
locate the problem of historical explanation not in any lack of precision, but in the logical form of 
the general law thesis. As Collingwood states: "The historian's failure to establish ... [general 
laws] results not from poverty of material or weakness of intellect. but from the nature of 
historical knowledge itself, whose business is the discovery and exposition of events in their 
individuality. "67 In terms of explaining the French Revolution all general laws can do, according 
to Dray, is explain it "qua revolution; whereas the historian will almost certainly want to take its 
peculiarities into account as well. "68 In history, then, covering laws. as I said earlier. do not really 
'explain', they simply 'classify'. This distinction is important, because it illustrates the inadequacy 
of the covering law model. 69 At the base of the model is the Humean idea that nothing but 
'regularity' can justify a because in 'x because y'. This has its origin in the natural sciences for 
which explanation is classification. This thesis, according to Dray, is too simple, because "it 
would appear that there is an essential complexity about what is ordinarily considered 
explanation; that once the demand for explanation arises, an answer which does no more than 
represent what is to be explained as what we always find happening in such circumstances fails 
to explain it at all. "70 In terms of the French Revolution. to say that we can classify it as 'what 
always happens' given its conditions, is only to classify it as a species of revolution. In order to 
explain it, the historian will need to go beyond this and investigate what makes it unique. This 
helps make sense of Collingwood's 'outside-inside' metaphor. Conceived as a rejection of the idea 
of classification, Collingwood's metaphor is a recommendation to the historian to always go 
beyond mere classification of an event by thinking of it in terms of action. This leads to the 
second assumption of the general law model. 
Dray shows that statements of the form 'x causes y' affirm that there is some reason or 
ground why, whenever the antecedent occurs, the consequent must follow. 71 This is a generalla\\ 
assertion in so far as it is understood that there must be a theoretical connection between cause 
67rH. 178. 
68LAE, .t8. his emphasis. 
69Thc distinction between 'classification' and 'explanation' is the logical equivalent that locates the 
supposed idealist expression of the autonomy of history. History is autonomous in so far as it must 
always go beyond classification in order to achieve an e'-l'lanation. 
70LAE. 72. his emphasis. 
7ILAE.87. 
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and effect. Dray has in mind Ryle's idea that general laws need not be completely predictive. only 
theoretical. Ryle comments: " ... to have a theory or plan is to be prepared either to tell it or to 
apply it, if occasion arises to do SO."72 This, however, presupposes an event of a particular type. 
which is recognized as such only in the application to it of a theory. Ryle admits as much when 
he states: "having a theory is being at one's destination."73 This is unacceptable. because the 
reference to theory cannot give a full account of an event since it lacks the pragmatic dimension. 
Analyzing the formula 'dirt causes disease' Dray concludes that the notion of 'theory' only applies 
to the idea of causal law: that is, the stress on 'being at one's destination' is too determinative The 
theoretical character of causal law is unhelpful, precisely because it may impede the 
determination ofa cause.74 Like the stress on disposition, the idea of 'theory' is a spectator's 
word. Dray moves away from 'causal laws' toward the more open position of 'causal analysis'. 
This brings explanation down from the heights of theorising and into the realm of action. It is, 
then, not enough to say that nurses in a hospital made the causal connection that 'dirt causes 
disease' from observation. What 'observation' makes clear is the passive nature of theorising. For 
Dray, "the causal connection drawn rested not just on what these women saw. but also on what 
they found themselves able to do. "75 Following Collingwood closely at this point, Dra~ thinks 
that agency rather than general law theory is a better model of historical explanation in respect of 
validating a causal connection involving historical agents. 
This analysis of the collapse of the covering law model has brought to light two 
significant points: 
i. agency is a condition of explanation 
ii. the defence of narrative structure 
i.) Laws do not go far enough, since classification cannot make sense of a particular event as 
distinct from another. With general laws one can never fully account for what comes after in 
terms of what precedes, without a reduction of the individuality of the later event. What Dray's 
account legitimates is the idea of seeing the past event from the position of the agent involved. He 
derives this from Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment. However, it is not meant as a method, 
which would render it open to Gadarner's critique of romantic hermeneutics, but as a condition of 
explanation. As Ricoeur states: "actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not to be 
confused with some foreseen or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action 
72TCM,270. 
73TCM,270. 
74Th is is not lost on Collingwood who in the A states: "If you act according to rules. you are not dealing 
with the situation in which you stand, you are only dealing with a certain type of situation under which 
you class it. The type is. admittedly, a useful handle with which to grasp the situation: but all the same, 
it ('omes between YOIl and the situation it enables you to grasp." lO·t my emphasis. 
75LAE, 93, his emphasis. 
depends. Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did something. 
in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event leads to another. "76 
ii.) With the accent upon human action the stress inevitably falls upon narrative as the 
appropriate form which renders action intelligible. Criticising the use of a 'leak-to-seizur~' 
sequence because it cannot explain the seizure of an engine when tied to general law logic, Dray 
comments: "reference to a series of facts constituting the story of what happened between the 
leakage of the oil and the seizure of the engine does explain the seizure. "77 Yet in spite of Dray's 
modification of this example, the problem with the arguments of covering-law theorists is that 
they are based on examples from logic rather than history. This observation alone illustrates the 
lack of a 'logical fit' between general laws and historical explanation. The logical operation of the 
covering-law model is, as it were, abstracted from the structure of narrative. 
The terms 'regularity' and 'prediction' function by way of securing the 'repeatability' of an 
event: an event is the thing that happens when conditions appear to warrant its appearance. There 
are obvious echoes of the Enlightenment programme, embodied in philosophers like Hume. which 
attempted to construct a science of human nature upon the basis of an unchanging human nature. 
This programme was constructed upon the presupposition that the 'individual' is unintelligible and 
hence the positivist principle of analogy became the overriding feature of historiography. The 
emphasis on human action, however, necessitates not an atemporal sequence but a narrative 
structure. It is only narrative that can embody temporality necessary to historical explanation. As 
Ricoeur states: "the world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world."78 
§ 3. Concluding Remarks 
The collapse of the covering law model brought with it a number of positive consequences. 
First, agency replaces causal law as the model for the explanation of historical action. 
This means that a legitimate space has been created for re-enactment to inhabit. In the four 
chapters that follow this space will be filled as I attempt to integrate the polarised elements of 
Collingwood's philosophy of history into a unity under the common theme of re-enactment. 
Secondly, the critique of the covering law thesis occasions the re-discovery that narrative 
has a structural rather than ornamental function. Collingwood identifies this structural capacity 
".ith the role imagination plays in history. This ,,,ill be reviewed in Chapter 5. At this point. 
however, it is evident that Collingwood would have agreed \\ith Dray when the latter states that 
"history is logically continuous with literature rather than social science."79 
76TN 3. I cannot now find the relevant page number. 
77LAE.70. 
78TN L 3. 
79LAE. 139. In this connection see Collingwood's Essay on Phi/osophica/.\lethod. 199-220 
Thirdly, the most important feature of this chapter is the disclosure of the principle of numerical 
identity as the most familiar, albeit erroneous, interpretative key of the doctrine of re-enactment. 
To say that Collingwood's philosophy of history does not \',!ork on the idealist understanding of 
identity would be untrue. The logic of question and answer, for example, presupposes successful 
historical action. However, up to and including Chapter 6 I shall argue against emphasizing this 
principle as long as there is a tendency to assume that Collingwood thought re-enactment to be 
I). a thesis about a numerical identity with the past, or 2). a thesis about establishing the 'original 
intentions' of historical agents. These two points are interconnected, but the second refers to 
Gadamer's criticism of Collingwood. This criticism will be explored in Chapter 6. The thesis that 
re-enactment is an attempt to establish a numerical identity with the past will be challenged in the 
following chapter and again in Chapter 6. The fault of this interpretation is that it does not take 
account of the conceptual nature of re-enactment. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Anticipation of Modern Insights 
( I ) 
§ 1. The Rejection of Cartesian Dualism 
Getting hold of the difficulty deep down is what is hard. Because if it is grasped near the surface it 
simply remains the difficulty it was. It has to be pulled out by the roots: and that involves our beginning 
to think about these things in a new way. 1 
It may be thought surprising that Collingwood's philosophy shares some of the conclusions 
reached by the modem linguistic tum in philosophy especially as he exhibits little detailed interest 
in the analysis of language, indeed, he speaks from within the tradition of idealism. Yet there is 
no doubt that he was sensitive to some of the issues at stake. But he did not, as Wittgenstein 
certainly did, devote much of his life's work to such a programme~ so the problems \\ hich lie 
deep, that demand an interrogative genius - "These thoughts I am now working on are as hard as 
granite"2 - were not Collingwood's real concern: his O\\TI concentrated intelligence pursued the 
problems of historical existence. Wittgenstein's method of working attempts to uncover the 
seductive nature of the modem picture of the self. Thus, naming the problem is, in Wittgenstein's 
view, not sufficient to overcome it. In this light, I think it is true to say that while Collingwood 
realized that the modem philosophy of the self had to be overcome, his philosophy in general did 
not, at its deepest level, embody the insights which characterize the work ofWittgenstein. In this 
respect, the way in which Collingwood sometimes frames his terminology gives the impression 
that he was not perfectly clear as to the nature of the self. However, there is plenty of evidence 
from all periods of his philosophical career that his considered position was much closer to Ryle's 
in The Concept of Mind than has been supposed. 
Let us begin by taking stock of some of Collingwood's pronouncements that are or 
appear problematic. In the Autobiography Collingwood asks the question, "On what conditions 
was it possible to know the history of a thought?" and answers by stating: "the thought must be 
expressed: either in what we call language or in one of the many other forms of expressin: 
activity."3 This seems to imply that thought is something independent of language, something the 
agent is privy to before language is used to make it public. Sa~ing, 'thought must be expressed,' 
encourages the idea of a physical-mental split between outward and visible expression and inner 
thought and intention. This is of course hO\\ it struck Gardiner. Again in lhe Principles of 
1 Wittgenstein, lulture, 48e, his emphasis. 
2Wittgenstein. in Monk. Ludwig Jrittgenstein. 514 . 
. 1An ...1 utobiography. 111. 
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History we find the follov. ing passage: "The deeds which historians study are therefore. 
according to the tradition, deeds embodying or expressing thoughts. "4 The implication here is that 
since a thought is somehow embodied within a deed or action the trick is to devise a method to 
extract the thought, which is perhaps the vital element, leaving the deed. the outer shell or casing. 
by the wayside. This brings to mind Wittgenstein's comment: "It is humiliating to have to appear 
like an empty tube which is simply inflated by a mind. "5 The tendency to believe that mind 
pertains to what is highest in man and the body to what is basest is the myth underlying such a 
way of thinking. While Collingwood's use of 'expression\ in itself a technical term from his 
philosophy of mind, can be absolved of the emphasis I have placed upon it (see below). it is mor~ 
difficult, though not impossible, to acquit his characterisation of art in The PrinCiples ofArt. 
In that book, Collingwood says that the 'work of art proper' "is an 'internal' or 'mental' 
thing', something ... 'existing in [the artist's] head' and there only ... Secondarily. it is a bodily or 
perceptible thing (a picture, statue, &c.) whose exact relation to this 'mental' thing will need very 
careful definition ... [This] second thing, the bodily and perceptible thing, I shall show to be only 
incidental to the first. "6 He gives the example of a tune which, despite its setting in notation, "is 
already complete and perfect when it exists merely as a tune in [the composer'sl head."7 This 
separation between the imaginative experience of art proper and the art object has. not 
unexpectedly, provoked criticism from anal}1ic philosophers who believe that Collingwood 
provides a contemporary example of the idea that mind takes precedence over body. 8 One of the 
basic theses of The Principles of Art is Collingwood's attempt to differentiate art from craft 
(n:x VTl) or from what he terms the 'technical theory of art'. He is attempting to express the idea 
that there is 'something more' in or to a work of art than its sensible form. This distinction is 
resolved into the question of significance or meaning, which is to say, he asks the question: What 
is the essence of art, if this essence is not to be identified with perceptible art objects, i.e. craft?9 
In other words, where does the significance or meaning lie? He comments: "But which of these 
two things [the imaginary tune and the notation played to an audience] is the work of art? Which 
of them is the music'? The answer is implied in what \\e have already said: the music, the \\ork of 
art, is not the collection of noises, it is the tune in the composer's head. The noises made by the 
performers, and heard by the audience, are not the music at all~ they are only the means by which 
the audience, ifthev listen intelligently, ... can reconstruct for themsehcs the imaginary tune that 
4The Principles of History. 39. 
5 Culture. lIe. 
6The Principles oI/rt. 37. 
7PA.139. 
8Wollheim. 'On an Alleged': N. Wolterstorff. Works and Worlds: M. Beardsley. Froblems in the 
Philosophy: P. Jones. 'A Critical Outline'. ., .., . 
90f course to a Wittgenstcinian this is an example of how not to thmk about art: essentIalism IS 
anathema to the notion of 'family resemblance'. 
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existed in the composer's head." 10 Thus it appears as if Collingwood thinks that the significance 
of a work of art, its meaning, both temporally precedes its performance and refers to a process 
which is parallel to the performance. Wittgenstein traces this problem (confusion) to the habit of 
conceiving 'saying' and 'meaning' as if they "refer to two parallel processes" 1 1 which "take place 
in two different spheres;"12 as if, for example, we "would be sa}ing one thing and at the same 
time seeing a picture before our mind's eye which is the meaning" which either "agrees or 
disagrees with what we say." 13 
On the evidence I have presented it is difficult to acquit Collingwood of the charge that 
he believes that there is a mental process of thinking independent of the process of expressing a 
thought. His use of the phrase 'existing in his head', while an ordinary way of speaking does 
suggest that, in this instance, literary convention corresponds exactly with his intended meaning 
rather than obscure what he meant to say. Yet part of the problem of The Principles of Art is that 
this is not Collingwood's considered position. The book is divided into three parts; while Part I 
reads like a provocation to the future author of The Concept of Mind, Part III in particular 
appears to contradict much of what was said in Part I. The problem, already recognized in 
Speculum Mentis, is the presence of two contradictory elements in art: "the paradox of art is that 
it is both intuitive (pure imagination) and expressive (revelatory of truth): two characteristics 
which contradict one another." 14 What is significant is that in The Principles of Art Collingwood 
united both elements in the thesis that art is language: "Language comes into existence with 
imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious level ... In its original or native state, 
language is imaginative or expressive: to call it imaginative is to describe what it is, to call it 
expressive is to describe what it does. It is an imaginative activity whose function is to express 
emotion. "15 This is important, because Collingwood annuls the idea that art as an imaginative 
experience temporally precedes expression; they are both elements of one experience. 
Furthermore, this means that what the artist accomplishes becomes an achievement: that is, the 
emotion, what art expresses, cannot be had independently of its expression: "Take away the 
language, and you take away what is expressed."16 Following such an emphasis, Collingwood 
realizes that there must be an intimate relationship between the imaginative experience and the 
perceptible art-object. To an imaginary painter he asks: "Are you painting that subject in order to 
lOPA.139. 
II Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown, 35. 
12The Blue. 33. 
13The Blue. 35. 
14Speculum .\/entis. 87. The accent on 'revelatory of truth' must mean public expression. otherwise what 
is truth? This is why I suspect N. Wolterstorffs separation of 'self-expression' (which he attributes to 
Collingwood) and 'self-revelation' cannot hold. See his Works and Worlds. 28. 
15PA. 225. my emphasis. 
16pA. 2~~. 
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enable other people ... to enjoy an aesthetic experience which. independently of painting it. you 
get completely from just looking at the subject itself; or are you painting it because the experience 
itself only develops and defines itself in your mind as you paint? ... The second, of course." 17 
Thus, Collingwood realizes that art proper while imaginative is also a perceptible achievement. 
All that is peculiar to [the artist] is the fact that he cannot formulate his problem: if he could formulate 
it, he would have expressed it; and the work of art would have been achieved ... There is therefore a 
history of art, but no history of artistic problems, as there is a history of scientific or philosophical 
problems. There is only the history of artistic achievements. 18 
The understanding of art, in other words, is not a matter of retrieving the particular problems 
associated with its creation, somewhat like the retrieval of a meaning 'behind' an expression but 
rather of resonating with the artist's achievement. The notion of achievement points to the se(f-
evident character of art. This does not mean art is easily understood, but that there is no 
distinction between 'saying' and 'meaning': "Language in its original imaginative form may be said 
to have expressiveness, but no meaning. About such language we cannot distinguish between 
what a speaker says and what he means. You may say that he means precisely what he says ... "19 
This echoes Wittgenstein's point in Culture and Value: "You might say: the work of art does not 
aim to convey something else, just itself. "20 Coming to understand a work of art. then, is not 
some mental process running alongside or prior to the expression, but is more akin to coming to 
appreciate the particular emotion which characterizes any expression. This emotion or feeling is 
carried in the tone and tempo of the expression, as Collingwood asserts: "If you don't know what 
tone to say them in [the words], you can't say them at all: they are not words, not even noises."21 
There is, he says. "no question of 'externalizing' an inward experience which is complete in itself 
and by itself."22 Rather, 'the artist paints in order to see'.23 In other words, while tEXVTl pertains 
to the power to produce a preconceived end, so that, for example. a wheelbarrow is intelligible 
apart from its construction, a work of art is not capable of being conceived apart from the 
sensible material in which it is expressed. 
It is evident that Collingwood's considered position which reverses the priority of 'seeing', 
and so annuls the idea that an expression is before the mind's eye and waits only to be translated 
from a mental into a verbal language, is in many respects consistent with the ehange in the 
17pA. 303. 
I81dea of History, 31~. 
I9pA.269. 
20Culture. 58e, his emphasis. 
21pA. 266. my emphasis: The Blue, 35. 
22PA. 30~. 
BpA. 303. 
picture of the relation between thought and language which characterizes \Vittgenstein's 
philosophy. In what follows I hope to cement this interpretation. 
As early as Religion and Philosophy (1916) Collingwood rejected Descartes' doctrine 
that the mind is a non-physical substance and resolves what mind is into what it does. He 
comments: "This idea of mind as a thing distinguishable from its own acti\1ties does not seem to 
be really tenable~ the mind is what it does~ it is not a thing that thinks, but a consciousness: not a 
thing that wills, but an activity. "24 In the same work he resists the idea that "first we think and 
then we act" declaring that "the thinking goes on all through the act-"25 We find the same 
argument against what Collingwood calls the 'metaphysical mind' in The Idea of History. In 
discussing A. Comte's distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'positive' science Collingwood says 
"mental science would be, to use Comte's famous distinction, 'metaphysical', depending on the 
conception of an occult substance underlying the facts of historical actiyity: the alternative idea 
would be 'positive', depending on the conception of similarities and uniformities among those 
facts themselves. "26 Collingwood opts for the latter conception up to a point. It is clear from what 
has gone before that Collingwood rejected the positivistic idea of regular and predictive general 
laws: however, being a dialectical thinker, Collingwood sa\\ some merit in the positive 
conception. The merit lies in the maintenance of a unity between what a mind is and what it does. 
In this context he praises Hume for his rejection of 'spiritual substance', because there is "nothing 
that a mind is, distinct from and underlying what it does. "27 
This idea has a central place in Collingwood's philosophy of mind canvassed in The New 
Leviathan (1942). In this connection, the basic point is that body and mind "are not two different 
things", but "one and the same thing, man himself, as known in two different ways-"28 So that the 
same methods by which you ask something must lead to the answering of it. The temptation 
(following the 17th century) is to think that while body and mind are different, one perhaps 
'mechanical' the other 'dynamic'. both are 'things': each share, as it were, the common framework 
of the category 'thing' . Yet to work in this \\ay is, despite appearances, to use the methods of 
natural science - mechanics - for mental science, so that 'minds' operate like extensions of 
machines. This is the source of what Ryle called the 'double-life' theory. "The representation ofa 
person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine. "29 Collingwood sought to show that such 
an idea resulted in "The Fallacy of Swapping Horses:"30 that is, using one method (or language) 
24Religion and Philosophy, 3-k his emphases. 
25RP, 30f. He was of course resisting the account of 'mind' given by William James. "The mind. 
regarded in this way, ceases to be a mind at all." A, 93. 
26IH,222. 
27IH.222. 
28Vew Leviathan, 2. ·B. 
2')RyIe, The Concept oj.\/ind, 19. 
30NL. 2. 71. 
to answer a question which requires another. It is important to note that this is none other than 
Ryle's notion of 'category mistake'31 which plays so central a part in The Concept of Mind. Ryle 
was given the chair of philosophy (in 1945) vacated by Collingwood in 1 G-ll . In his Inaugural 
Lecture Ryle recognizes that Collingwood had contributed to the exorcism of Descartes' ghost in 
the machine: "Professor Collingwood saw more clearly, I think, than did his more eminent 
predecessors in the philosophy of history that the appearance of a feud between Nature and 
Spirit, that is to say, between the objects of the natural sciences and those of the human sciences, 
is an illusion. These branches of inquiry are not giving rival answers to the same questions about 
the same world; nor are they giving separate answers to the same questions about rival worlds: 
they are giving their own answers to different questions about the same world. "32 While these 
comments read like a transcription of propositions 2.63 - 2.74 from The New Leviathan, I am not 
suggesting that the source of Ryle's phrase ('category mistake') came from Collingwood; rather 
that each understood the problem from within their own fields. Thus, like Ryle, for Collingwood 
the problem of the relation between the mind and body was a pseudo-problem: the relation 
between two modes of understanding constitutes the real problem. 
In this connection the manuscript 'Notes Toward A Metaphysic' (l933-3-l) is important. 
Here we find Collingwood saying: "my o\\n view is something like this:- I cannot admit the 
Cartesian dualism in which the realist contentions are largely based. Nor can I admit the 
separation of the intellect from other mind functions. "33 By 'realist contentions' he is referring to 
the problem of the relation between 'things' and 'ideas'. Descartes' dualism encourages a 
'phenomenalism' which thinks that our ideas, as things that happen in our minds, are more real 
than what can be observed in the world. This leads to the idea that physical things "are only 
logical constructions out of our sense-data. "34 Using the same model 'realism' believes the 
opposite: "Realism ... meant the doctrine that what mind knows is something other than itself, and 
that mind in itself, the activity of knowing, is immediate experience and therefore unknowable. "35 
Consequently in the case of an act of awareness, Moore claimed that "its object when we are 
aware of it is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware [of it]. "36 For the realist our 
knowing does not, as the idealist thought, fashion reality but finds it. Hence Collingwood's 
31" I t [the dogma of the 'Ghost in the Machine'] represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to 
one logical type or category ... when they actually belong to another." TCM. 17. The difference between 
Collingwood's litera~ style and Ryle's love of exact language is aptly demonstrated in the way each 
phrased the problem: i.e. 'fallacy of swapping horses' and 'catego~ mistake'. 
32Ryle. Philosophical Arguments. -l. 
33C~llingwood. 'Notes Toward a Metaphysic', Bodleian. dep. 18, 12. 
34Wittgenstein, Investigations, ~ 366. 
35IR 142. 
36Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', 29. 
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shorthand for realism: "knowing makes no difference to what is knO\\n."37 The separation of the 
intellect from the other mind functions is, in Collingwood's view, the immediate result of 
Bradley's Appearance and Reality. In that work, Bradley understood reality to be immediate 
experience and so wholly subjective, while his successors. Moore and Russell, thought reality 
wholly objective.38 Thus, we arrive at the same opposition between 'ideas' and 'things' from which 
we started. In historical thinking Collingwood sought to overcome this dilemma by his use of the 
term 'the self-knowledge of mind'. Self-knowledge, in Collingwood's view, dissolves the 
distinction between past and present, the historical equivalent of 'things' and 'ideas', because what 
mind is and what it does are its past and present respectively. 39 Yet the real context of 
Collingwood's refusal to accept the separation of intellect from the other mind functions is to be 
found in his understanding of language. 
In The Principles of Art Collingwood asserts that all language, by which he means any 
bodily movement not only speech, is originally imaginative: "[i]t is an imaginative activity whose 
function is to express emotion. "40 Intellectualised language, therefore. presupposes imagination or 
emotion. Collingwood states that the opposite is usually thought to be the case haying unfortunate 
consequences for the acquisition of language. If 'scientific' language is supposedly the original 
language, Collingwood asserts, a child learns through ostensive definition. However. "when the 
fact comes out that when the mother points to the fire she probably says 'pretty', when giving 
milk, 'nice', and when touching its toe, 'this little piggy went to market'. the conclusion can only 
be ... parents are the last people in the world who ought to be allO\\ed to have children"·H In 
other words, to speak a language is inseparable from the context integral to it. There is, as 
Collingwood describes, a 'community of language': "One does not first acquire a language and 
then use it. To possess it and to use it are the same. "42 He also shows awareness that the relation 
between thought and language is not temporal, such that a thought is already complete in the 
internal theatre of the mind before speaking: "the expression of emotion is not, as it were, a dress 
made to fit an emotion already existing, but is an activity without which the experience of that 
37A .U 
38IH, l-ll f. 
39'Notes on the History'. Bodleian. dep. 13/2. 
40PA.225 . 
. HpA, 227. It would. I think. be odd for a mother to say 'pretty' when pointing to the fire. She is more 
likely to warn of the dangers of fire. 
42pA. 250. It is here that Collingwood diverges from a Wittgensteinian point ohiew. Wittgenstein 
spoke oflanguage and its concepts as 'instruments' and 'tools' (Investigations. ~ 569. 16. 23). but 
according to Collingwood. such ideas presuppose that language has "certain properties or powers in 
itself and apart from the 'using' of it." A hammer. for example. remains a hammer even when it is not 
being used. Rather language "is an actiyity. not an instrument. It does not C"\lst save in bcmg 'used'." 
'Observations on Language' undated manuscript, Bodleian. dep. 16/13. 
emotion cannot exist. "43 This is carried over into The New Leviathan: "language is not a de\ice 
whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind is communicated to another's. but an 
activity prior to knowledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into existence. ".+.+ 
From this evidence I believe we can conclude that Collingwood's expression 'mind is what it docs' 
has its counterpart in Ryle's statement that "when \ye describe people as exercising qualities of 
mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects: 
we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves."45 From such a conte:\.1 the 
dualistic interpretation of the 'outside-inside' metaphor appears both erroneous and overly literal. 
Ryle, of course, knew this, but even so I believe he contributed to the Cartesian reading 
of re-enactment in The Concept of Mind. 46 It is understandable. then, given the contradictory 
signals coming from Ryle, that critics like Gardiner are not more sensitive to Collingwood's 
rejection of the 'metaphysical' view of mind coming as it does \\ithin the same lecture as the 
'outside-inside' metaphor. It is as if Gardiner is so obsessed by his knowledge of the fallacy of the 
'ghost in the machine' that he sees examples of it everywhere. 
From the standpoint of the mind's identity with its activities the 'outside-inside' metaphor 
loses its intuitive associations and assumes a retrospective character. Gardiner attributed an 
'acquaintance' theory of mind to Collingwood because intuition has an immediate grasp upon the 
object. Collingwood, however, is absolutely clear that 'thought proper' is not immediate 
experience but reflection. Re-enactment is not, according to Collingwood, concerned \\ith any 
purely subjective, affective or intuitive interpretation. The point of reflection is that a person 
cannot know what is thought without expressing it, i.e. making it explicit..+7 So far as historical 
knowledge is concerned, knowledge is obtained by placing interpretations upon actions after the 
fact. All knowledge of mind is historical, even of one's ovm mind, because it proceeds "by 
studying accomplished facts, ideas I have thought out and expressed, acts that I have done. On 
what I have only begun and am still doing, no judgement can yet be passed. "48 It is clear that, for 
Collingwood, the historian's method is not some form of intuitive introspection which attempts to 
have 'mystical communion' \\ith thoughts drifting around like 'timeless entities': the historian 
achieves historical knowledge inferentially. What Collingwood means is that the criterion of a 
43PA,244. 
44NL. 6.4. 
45TCM,26. 
46TCM. see esp. 55-9. 
47Collingwood's use of 'e:\.l>ression'. for example. when he says. "In thus penetrating to the inside of 
events and detecting the thought which they express." is. according to the Wittgenstein of the 'Blue and 
Brown'. a better way of characterising the nature of thought. He sa) s "If you are pualed about the 
nature of thought .. : substitute for the thought the e:\.l>ression of the thought.. The difficult~ which lies 
in this substitution. and at the same time the whole point of it. IS this: the expression of ... thought ... 1S 
just a sentence." See. tH. 214: The Blue. 42. all emphases mine. 
48IH. 219. 
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judgement must possess a public nature~ it must assume the character of evidence for. "The 
knowledge in virtue of which a man is an historian is a knowledge of what the e\ idence at his 
disposal proves about certain events. Ifhe or somebody else could have the very same knowledge 
of the very same events by way of memory, or second sight, or some Wells ian machine for 
looking backwards through time, this would not be historical knowledge~ and the proof would be 
that he could not produce, either to himself or to any critic of his claims, the evidence from which 
he had derived it. "49 In view of the synthesis between empathy as method and analogy as 
justification that characterizes the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment. Collingwood's rejection 
of Descartes' private conception of language is instructive. In Book D of 'Notes Toward a 
Metaphysic' Collingwood states: 
it is a complete mistake to argue, as many philosophers have argued, that we ascribe consciousness to 
other human beings as a result of analogical reasoning based on the resemblance between their 
behaviour and our own: and no less a mistake to suppose, as some have supposed in reaction against this 
view, that we enjoy a mystic communion with their consciousness ... Thus instead of discovering that 
there is a public world we begin by assuming that there is one ... 50 
There is, then, no truth in the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment at all. In the light of the 
evidence I have brought against it the whole idea appears non-sensical. There is. however, the 
matter of the principle upon which the intuitive interpretation rests. I have indicated already how 
the disposal of the intuitive interpretation leaves the principle of numerical identity intact. It is, 
perhaps, the logical interpretation that tends to confirm this. 
§ 2. Re-enactment as Historical 'Grammar' 
The emphasis on 'grammar' is perhaps justified in so far as it provides a relevant framework 
within which the heuristic import of re-enactment can be made habitable. Not that Collingwood 
was a Wittgensteinian in any sense. While Collingwood pursues a mainly confusing analysis of 
words like 're-enact' and 're-think' in the lecture on re-enactment. I am using the word 'grammar' 
in a somewhat extended sense. I wish by this use to draw attention to the distinction between the 
'philosophical' (formal) and 'empirical' (material) concept that is characteristic of Collingwood's 
work. The question which forms the first sentence of the lecture on re-enactment. 'HO\\, or on 
what conditions, can the historian knO\\ the past?' is not an empirical question but a philosophical 
question. Collingwood does not, therefore, equate re-enactment with method and the language of 
empirical objects which this implies, but attempts, however inadequately. to elicit through a use 
of metaphor what it is to possess historical knowledge. In many respects, this resort to metaphor 
was necessitated by the total dominance of the empirical language of science and its poverty of 
.NIH, 252. 
50Collingwood. 'Notcs Toward a Mctaphysic'. Bodleian. dep. 18. See also P A. 2~8. 
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expression when faced \\'ith a non-empirical subject-matter. Yet there was not, until after 
Collingwood, a publicly valid alternative language which could express \\ ith sufficient clarity 
what was at the stake in the logic of re-enactment. This meant, in many cases, that Collingwood's 
use of metaphor was deemed wholly inappropriate. However, this use of metaphor is meant to 
indicate the conceptual rather than methodological character of re-enactment. It is on these 
grounds that I adopt the word 'grammar' when speaking of re-enactment. 
The conceptual interpretation of re-enactment was put forward in opposition to the 
intuitive interpretation. This had the effect of emptying re-enactment of any methodological 
content. This outcome troubles Nielsen who makes the point that the supporters of the conceptual 
interpretation identify the intuitive interpretation with methodology as such. Nielsen regards the 
criticism of the intuitive version of re-enactment as justified, but thinks "criticism is carried too 
far if the methodological interpretation is rejected ... "51 Yet nowhere does Collingwood suggest 
that re-enactment is a synonym for "reconstruction by interpretation of evidence" 52 as Nielsen 
supposes. The real question is not whether re-enactment is methodological (but non-intuitive), but 
concerns how Collingwood incorporates both the conceptual and methodological under the sign of 
re-enactment. The acceptance of the conceptual interpretation, therefore, does not prejudice a 
resort to method (nor does it identify re-enactment \,ith method), because re-enactment in its 
'grammatical' guise does not take the place of method (it does not add anything to historical 
inquiry) it only indicates what, as I have said, it is to possess historical knowledge. There are, in 
other words, two distinct logical components to Collingwood's theory: (1) an inferential 
reconstruction of the agent's situation (method), and (2) the formulation of the condition of 
understanding this situation (re-enactment-empathy). Re-enactment is, therefore, the fe/os of 
history. 53 
The 'philosophical' nature of re-enactment corresponds exactly to Gadamer's assertion 
that hermeneutics "does not develop a procedure of understanding", but clarifies "the conditions 
in which understanding takes place. "54 Furthermore, as a 'grammatical' account of what 
constitutes historical understanding re-enactment gives an indication of how attention to the use 
of concepts like 're-thinking' or 're-enacting' can disclose something of the character of historical 
objects. This is indicated in Collingwood's report in January 1932 to the Faculty of Literae 
Humaniores that mentioned as one of his projects: 
51Nielsen. 'Re-enactment'. 5. 
52 'Re-enactment'. 5. 
53Donagan comments: "Both examples suggest that Collingwood's subject may be. not historical 
method. but what historical method achieves." 'The Verification'. 203. The 'philosophical' interpretation 
is also recognised by Dray. 'R. G. Collingwood and the Acquaintance'. ·02; Mink. 'Collingwood's 
Dialectic of History'. 2~8: R. G. Shoemaker. 'Inference and Intuition'. 112. 
54Gadamcr. Truth and ,\fethod. 263. 
A study of the philosophical problems arising out of history: especially a) logical and epistemological 
problems connected with the question 'how is historical knmvledge possible?', b) metaphysical problems 
concerned with the nature and reality of the objects of historical thought. 55 
In the original lectures on the idea of history the section on re-enactment is entitled, 'Re-
enactment of Past Experience the Essence of History.' The emphasis on 'essence' cannot be 
overestimated. It is tempting to think this is merely a statement illustrating the importance of re-
enactment to history, but I think it is more than this. I believe it is compatible \\ ith a grammatical 
reflection on the nature of the historical object. In 'Notes Towards a Metaphysic', Collingwood 
reveals his grammatical procedure when he states: "Concepts determine facts as their fonnal 
cause, as the essence of which they are existence. "56 That is not the clearest remark ever made, 
but I think that once its 'philosophical' nature is recognized it finds its counterpart in 
Wittgenstein's clearer and more famous expression: "Essence is expressed by grammar ... 
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. "57 Re-enactment, then, is meant to reveal the 
character of the object of history. Secondly, as 'grammar', re-enactment does not offer a method 
by which we can arrive at the object of history. Rather, it is a necessary condition of knowledge 
and understanding, not a method for achieving it. Collingwood is attempting to illustrate that the 
historian, to the extent to which he pursues his work successfully. is always involved in a re-
enactment. Re-enactment becomes a synonym for the achievement of understanding or the 
explanation of historical action. 
§ 3. The Re-Thinking of Thoughts and the Problem of 'Other Minds' 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the conceptual nature of Collingwood's discussion 
of re-thinking. I am opposed to the idea that his discussion appeals to any methodological 
procedure for securing a numerical identity between acts of thought. It is to be noted that this 
section comes under the sign of re-enactment as 'grammar'. This cannot be overemphasized 
because there is a strong impulse on the part of the interpreter to place an empirical status upon 
Collingwood's discussion of re-thinking. In part this temptation is very much alive because 
history is, on the common-sense view, preoccupied with method: that is, with evidence and 
inference. On the one hand, then, Collingwood's foray into conceptual analysis appears all the 
more tentative in direct proportion to its innovative charactec \\hile on the other hand, the 
interpretation of re-thinking as an empirical procedure is intelligible in so far as it is consistent 
with the supposed primacy of the methodological nature of history. The empirical character of re-
thinking, however, must be rejected as the way of conceiving what Collingwood is attempting to 
55Yan der Dusscn. IH. xxxiv. 
56Cited in a different context in van der Dussen. History as a ... \cience. 317, emphasis in original. 
57/m 'estigations L ~~ 371. 373. his emphasis. 
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say with regard to the re-enactment of thought. The burden of the lecture History as Re-
enactment of Past Experience' is to demonstrate that the re-thinking of a thought is conceptually 
possible. 
After dismissing the idea that the historian has knowledge of the past via testimony or 
observation, Collingwood states: " ... \vhat kind of knowledge has he: in other words, what must 
he do in order that he may know [the past]?"58 The historian cannot gain historical knowledge 
through observation or testimony, therefore, historical knowledge must be possible in some other 
way: that is, "The historian must re-enact the past in his o\\n mind. "59 This way of putting the 
matter appears to justify the intuitive interpretation of re-enactment. By rejecting the relation 
between historical knowledge and testimony, for example, Collingwood appears to open the door 
to knowledge via an act of intuitive insight. A further complication is that Collingwood's question 
sounds unmistakably methodological. Here the dependence upon his literary style has obvious 
shortcomings. The decision to "speak with the vulgar and think with the leamed"6o obscures the 
distinctive nature of his conception. Consequently, it is understandable why it took ten years of 
interpretation even to recognize what Collingwood was attempting to make clear~ for it is only in 
the application of linguistic analysis to history that Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment 
becomes more intelligible. Yet despite this lack of clarity, Collingwood is not making empirical 
statements but conceptual or 'philosophical' statements; he is discussing the 'grammar' of're-
think' or 're-enact a thought'. 61 
The argument of the lecture is complex, and due to its literary nature, confusing. He 
begins by exposing the conception of're-think a thought' to an imaginary objector. and spends the 
rest of the lecture developing a defence of it. The conception is not fully worked out at the 
beginning, but is gradually fleshed out as the lecture advances. Furthermore, the way he outlines 
the imaginary objector's criticism demands careful reading. On a first reading it appears as if 
what separates Collingwood from the objector is a quibble concerning whether certain acts of 
thought are or are not numerically identical. On reflection, however, he is rejecting the whole 
conception. Yet because he fails to make this sufficiently clear critics like Ricoeur can read the 
thesis of numerical identity into re-thinking. This is reinforced by Collingwood's cavalier attitude 
to precise expression; for while he constantly speaks of thinking the same thought, he also says 
that this thought, while the same, is different. Nevertheless, it is this ambiguity which, in my 
vicw, opens the way for the conceptual interpretation of re-thinking. 
581H. 282. 
59IH,282. 
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61 Donagan was the first to recognise the grammatical nature of Collingwood's procedure. Collingwood's 
"argument is not in contemporary idiom. but its import is plain. He is exploring what Wittgenstein 
would ha\ c called the 'grammar' of 'think a thought'." 'The Verification'. 20-t. 
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The imaginary objector argues that to 're-think a thought' could mean either of two things: "Either 
it means enacting an experience or performing an act of thought resembling the first, or it means 
enacting an experience or perfonning an act of thought literally identical \\ith the first. "62 No 
experience, according to the objector, can be literally identical with another. therefore, the 
relation intended is one of resemblance only. This latter relation is what is called the 'copy-theory' 
of knowledge, "which vainly professes to explain how a thing ... is knO\\ n by sa) ing that the 
knower has a copy of it in his mind. "63 The main point here is that Collingwood wants to reject 
both these possible explanations of to 're-think a thought'. Both positions, according to 
Collingwood, are based upon an empirical understanding of re-thinking and a defective 
philosophy of mind. 
Taking the 'copy-theory' first: Collingwood argues in the context of re-thinking Euclid's 
statement that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. that for the objector the 
relation between Euclid's act of thought and the historian's "is a relation of numerical difference 
and specific identity. "64 It follows from this that the historian's act of thinking 'the angles arc 
equal' is not a revival of Euclid's act, but the performance of another act of the same kind. The 
historian, then, cannot re-think the same thought as the historical agent but onl~· a copy of the 
agent's 'original' thought. Collingwood detects that the dogma behind this idea is that there is only 
one form of identity in difference, namely specific identity in numerical difference. 
The empirical nature of this type of identity in difference is, according to Collingwood, 
not how thought should be understood. As H. Saari has it: "Collingwood holds that the copy-
theory of identity is founded on the false assumption that acts of thought are numerically and 
temporally distinguishable mental entities in the agent's mind."65 The empirical nature of the 
copy-theory is demonstrated if we borrow an example from Saari's work who in tum borrows it 
from Norman Malcolm. The main import of this example is to show that Collingwood's 
imaginary objector is mistakenly conceiving thought as a physical entity. 
Assume that two fellows, Smith and Wilson, smoke the same cigarette after dinner. This claim can be 
interpreted in at least two ditTerent ways. First, it may be the case that Wilson and Smith actually 
smoked numerically the same cigarette in tum after dinner. i.e. there was only one cigarette at their 
disposal. This would be an instance of numerical identity. In the second case each smoked his cigarette 
of the same quality, that is, their cigarettes were specimens of the same brand or tokens of the same type. 
In this case we could say that even if they smoked numerically different cigarettes they smoked the same 
cigarettes after all, since their cigarettes were specimens of the same brand. 66 
62rn, 283f. 
63IH. 28-l. 
64IH.285. 
65Saari. Re-enactment, 67. 
66Re-enactmenl.65. 
In the second case, that which corresponds to the copy-theory of identity, the main point is that 
the two fellows, Smith and Wilson, smoke numerically distinct cigarettes but specifically 
identical brands. It follows, therefore, that Smith and Wilson do not smoke identical cigarettes at 
all. Furthermore, as Collingwood makes clear in the context of thinking the same thought. why 
the objector thinks the copy-theory is the only possible way of conceiving this situation is because 
an act cannot be repeated over again.67 Yet the imaginary objector is treating of thought in spatial 
and temporal terms. Collingwood rejects this, because it misses the point of his procedure. "Is it 
the case that when we speak of two persons performing the same act of thought or of one person 
as performing the same act at two different times, we mean that they are performing different acts 
of the same kind? It is, I t~ clear that we mean nothing of the sort ... "68 The way Collingwood 
substantiates his claim is by an explicit reference to his understanding of consciousness and an 
implicit reference to his conceptual view of mind. Both the explicit and the implicit c\ idence for 
Collingwood's claim derives from his rejection of the validity of the argument from space and 
time. The copy-theory understands mind as an entity or object of some kind. This understanding 
of mind, in Collingwood's view, is a form of solipsism since it "means denying that we have any 
right to speak of acts of thought at all, except such as take place in our 0\\11 minds ... "69 On this 
view one could never know what someone else is thinking. But as we have seen, thought, for 
Collingwood, is not a mere object. To know someone else's activity of thinking is possible only on 
the assumption that this same activity can be re-enacted in one's o\\TI mind. 
The problem for the supporters of the copy-theory is that they arc coming at the question 
from the wrong end. As Collingwood comments: "if he does not already know what constitutes 
the plurality of acts of thought, the psychological laboratory can never tell him. "70 The copy-
theorist is, therefore, working with a fallacious understanding of personal identity. That is to say, 
the copy-theorist is defining personal identity solely in empirical terms. The difference between. 
say, Euclid and the historian of his thought becomes the ground for denying the possibility of 
thought sharing. But on the conceptual understanding of thought "there is no tenable theory of 
personal identity that would justify such a doctrine. "71 This is because the emphasis on the 
empirical difference between Euclid and the historian is to miss the whole point. Euclid and the 
historian are not "two different type\\,riters which. just because they are not the same t~pewriter, 
can never perform the same act but only acts of the same kind. "72 Collingwood is clearly rejecting 
any empirical solution to this problem. But in rejecting an empirical understanding of mind 
67IH,285. 
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Collingwood is not, despite appearances, replacing this with a psychological understanding. 
Collingwood's view of mind is conceptual or philosophical. This is e, ident in a passage from his 
manuscript 'Notes Towards a Metaphysic': 
whereas my experience can only be mine, and nobody else's, the concepts exemplified in it may be 
exemplified in other experiences. No two people can have the same toothache, but they may both have 
toothache. Thus concepts provide a common ground on which diverse experiences can meet. Any world 
of thought is a public world, accessible not indeed to every mind in common, but accessible in common 
to any two minds which enjoy similar experiences. It is because they have similar experiences that they 
can share the same thoughts, and it is through sharing the same thoughts that they can know their 
experiences to be similar ... Experience is nothing but the existence-term of that dyad whose essence-
term is thought; consequently what is unified in thought must be dispersed in experience?3 
In the section on 'Re-enactment' Collingwood is, therefore, demonstrating the conceptual and 
public nature of thought. The use of spatial and temporal concepts is perhaps relevant in some 
other context, but in this instance the appeal to them takes the form of a denial of the public 
nature of thought. The copy-theorist places existence in logical priority to essence: that is, he is 
conceiving mind as an object, which because it has boundaries must be constituted by private 
acts of thought. Furthermore, the priority of existence over essence generates the idea that a 
thought can never be re-thought since a thought can only be thought if it exists. That is to say, a 
thought is identical with its own existence in so far as it is always an original act of thought. 
There can be no survival or revival of thought. This conclusion is. however. intolerable. since it 
would mean not only that there could be no continuity of thought. 
This brings us to Collingwood's explicit argument against the copy-theory of identity. 
Collingwood appeals to his theory of consciousness in order to demonstrate that we can draw a 
distinction between mere consciousness and thought proper. In so doing Collingwood is 
presupposing the conceptual or public nature of thought sketched above. The reason why the 
supporter of the copy-theory lacks an awareness of the conceptual identity between acts of 
thought is, because "he conceives an act of thought as something that has its place in the flow of 
consciousness. whose being is simply its occurrence in that flmv. Once it has happened, the flow 
carries it into the past, and nothing can recall it. Another of the same kind may happen, but not 
that again. "74 According to Collingwood, equating thought \\ith the flow of immediate 
consciousness is to admit that there is no such thing as knowledge as distinct from immediate 
experience. The fact that there is leads Collingwood to state that "the contention that an act 
cannot happen twice because the flow of consciousness carries it away is thus false. Its falsity 
arises from an ignoratio elenchi. So far as experience consists of mere consciousness. of 
sensations and feelings pure and simpk. it is true. But an act of thought is not a mere sensation or 
73Collingwood, 'Notes Toward a Metaphysic', cited in van der Dussen, HS. 317. 
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feeling. It is knowledge, and knowledge is something more than immediate consciousness. The 
process of knowledge is therefore not a mere flow of consciousness. "75 Thought is something that 
apprehends consciousness in its general structure: "something for which the past is not dead and 
gone, but can be envisaged together with the present and compared with it. "76 Collingwood then 
goes on to consider that the comparison of one act of thought "ith another can only be achieved, 
as we have see~ if one actually re-thinks the thought in question. 
To substantiate that an act of thought can be re-thought. Collingwood appeals to the idea 
that an act of thought 'somehow stands outside of time'. Gardiner detects in this terminology a 
desire on the part of Collingwood to understand an act of thought as a 'timeless entity'. 77 This is 
readily understood by Gardiner to be a species of acquaintance. Collingwood's O\\Jn definition of 
acquaintance is as follows: "acquaintance is a familiar English word denoting the kind of way in 
which we know individual persons or places or other things as permanent objects that recur, 
recognizably identical with themselves, in the course of our experience. "78 Acquaintance appears 
to be what Collingwood has in mind when he says: "The peculiarity of thought is that, in addition 
to occurring here and now in this context, it can sustain itself through a change of context and 
revive in a different one. "79 Yet Collingwood rejects the theory of acquaintance for 1\:\"0 main 
reasons. First, the 'permanent objects that recur' are objects perceptible here and now. 
Acquaintance makes sense only if the objects in question are existing here and now. even if we do 
not always observe them. But, according to Collingwood, "[h]istorica1 thought is of something 
which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have 
finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer 
perceptible do they become objects for historical thought. "80 This makes inferential 
reconstruction necessary and acquaintance impossible. Secondly. Collingwood argues against an 
understanding of history as the knowledge of atomic objects, and believes that "the individuality 
of perceived objects and natural facts and immediate experiences falls outside [history's I 
sphere. "81 Thus, whereas acquaintance relies on the presence of atomic objects, history is only 
possible because an 'act of thought' is not atomic but something which can occur in the past and 
again in the present on the basis of its conceptual rather than its empirical nature. This is not to 
say, as N. Rotenstreich suggests, that he does not take time seriously;82 rather, he is rejecting the 
underlying empiricism of such appeals to spatial and temporal concepts. Therefore, in spite of the 
75lH. 287. 
76IH.287. 
77See also N. Rotenstreich's 'From Facts to Thoughts'. 
78IH.291. 
79lH. 297. 
80IH. 233. 
8IIH.303. 
82Rotenstrcich. 'History and Time'. 69. 
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metaphorical reference, an act of thought does not really (empirically) stand outside of time: he 
is, despite lacking the appropriate tenninology, pointing to a thought's conceptual character. This 
is perhaps made clearer if it is recognized that the reference to 'standing outside time' is 
equivalent to the ability of thought to stand 'outside' the flow of immediate consciousness. 
Collingwood's argument is as follows: 
Thought itself is not involved in the flow of immediate consciousness; in some sense it stands outside 
that flow. Acts of thought certainly happen at definite times; Archimedes discovered the idea of specific 
gravity at a time when he was in the bath; but they are not related to time in the same way as mere 
feelings and sensations. [The act of thought] ... somehow stands outside time ... in this sense at least. that 
one and the same act of thought may endure through a lapse of time and revive after a time when it has 
been in abeyance. 83 
The import of Collingwood's argument is to demonstrate that the supporters of the copy-theory of 
identity are wrong to equate an act of thought only \\ ith what is immediate and therefore 
temporary. Time is not annulled by thought. On the contrary, thought is just as bound to time as 
sensation. But whereas sensation (the flow of immediate consciousness) is identified with the flux 
of time and so passes away with that flux, thought is not identified with this flux but is related to 
time in the same way as a tradition is related to the present. Temporal distance is not some kind 
of dead interval which must be annulled or overcome; rather, it is a process generative of 
meaning. Collingwood is, then, not asserting that acts of thought survive in some kind of Platonic 
heaven; the real point of the metaphor is twofold. First, it is meant to demonstrate a logical point 
from his theory of consciousness, and secondly a metaphysical thesis about how the past lives on 
in the present in the form of tradition. 84 Hence critics are wrong to interpret what Collingwood 
says about the 'survival' and 'revival' of thought as a psychological doctrine which is an attempt 
to leap over the boundaries of space and time. The essence of thought is its conceptual referent. 85 
That is to say, it is because persons share the same conceptual matrix that they can know they 
share the same thoughts. 
We now pass on to the second objection. The main concern of the imaginary objector is 
that an affirmation of identity between acts of thought would be an affirmation of a numerical 
identity between the historical agent and historian. This identity, however, would not amount to a 
knowledge of the past but would only be present knO\vledge. The imaginary objector states the 
83IH,287. 
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following argument: " ... so far as we re-enact [thought] it becomes our 0\\ n: it is merely as our 
own that we perform it and are aware of it in the performance; it has become subjecti\e, but for 
that very reason it has ceased to be objective; become present, and therefore ceased to be past. "86 
Collingwood's main concern is both to reject the thesis of a numerical identity between thoughts. 
and to affirm that a re-thinking is possible since thought is not wholly subjective nor wholly 
objective. Building upon the thesis of a conceptual identity between thoughts, Collingwood 
argues that re-thinking of a past thought is possible and can be certified if the historian has 
evidence for the past thought. In dealing with this argument I shall concentrate upon 
Collingwood's assertion that thought is both immediate (subjective) and mediate (objective). since 
it is this character as such that makes it knowable and knowable as a past thought. 
The origin of the objector's idea, in Collingwood's view, comes from equating subjectivity \\ith 
the immediate flow of consciousness. That is to say, an act of thought cannot be repeated because 
it is carried away by immediate consciousness. It follows. then, that in order to come to know this 
thought the historian would have to enter the immediate context of the historical agent and live 
over again the same. Collingwood is not arguing for the possibility of such an enterprise, he is 
only wanting to draw attention to the false identity between thought and subjectivity, This is 
demonstrated when he takes up the main characteristics of the arguments for and against the 
doctrines of 'internal' and 'external' relations. The doctrine of 'internal relations' denies the 
independence of thought from its immediate context because 
it has been said that anything tom from its context is thereby mutilated and falsified; and that in 
consequence, to know anyone thing, we must know the whole universe. I do not propose to discuss this 
doctrine in its whole bearing, but only to remind the reader of its connection \\ith the "iew that reality is 
immediate experience, and its corollary that thought which inevitably tears things out of their contex1, 
can never be true ... To say that because [Euclid's] theorem. as an act of thought, exists only in its context 
we cannot know it except in the contex1 in which he actually thought it, is to restrict the being of 
thought to its own immediacy, to reduce it to a case of merely immediate experience, and so to deny it as 
thought. 87 
The consequence of the doctrine of 'internal relations' is that historical knmvledge is impossible 
except on the spurious view that the historian must somehow plunge into the historical context of 
the agent and re-experience the agent's life. Collingwood then argues that others who ha\e taken 
\\'arning by this consequence, have embraced the opposite doctrine that all acts of thought are 
atomically distinct from one another. 88 
This makes it both easy and legitimate to detach them from their contex1; for their is no contex1; there is 
only a juxtaposition of things standing to one another in merely ex1emal relations". Once more I am not 
86IH.289. 
87IH. 298f. 
8xIH.299. 
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concerned with the whole bearing of such a doctrine, but only to point out that by substituting logical 
analysis for attention to experience (the constant appeal to which was the strength of the riyal doctrine) 
it overlooks the immediacy of thought, and converts the act of thinking, from a subjective e:x-perience. 
into an objective spectacle. The fact that Euclid performed a certain operation of thought becomes just a 
fact ... History is no more possible on this view than on the other. That Euclid performed a certain 
operation of thought may be called a fact, but it is an unknowable fact. We cannot know it. we can only 
at most believe it on testirnony.89 
The doctrines of internal and external relations leave the historian in a dilemma. Either thought is 
pure immediacy, in which case the historian must attempt to identify himself\\ith the immediate 
consciousness and context of the agent, or pure mediation, in which case thought exists as some 
kind of timeless entity in a vacuum outside experience. Collingwood refuses the dilemma and 
resolves to inhabit the middle distance between immediacy and mediation. That is to say, for 
Collingwood, thought is both immediate and mediate. He concedes that the 'idealists' are correct 
to emphasize the importance of context. Collingwood comments: "every act ofthoughL as it 
actually happens, happens in a context out of which it arises and in which it lives."9o But the 
identity of the occurrence of thought with its original context is \\ Tong in so far as thought "is 
capable of sustaining itself and being revived or repeated without loss of its identity"91 
Collingwood's point is that we can think the same thought in the present as was thought in the 
past, because the objectivity or the mediate nature of thought lies in its conceptual character not 
in its original context. So far, then, according to Collingwood, the 'realists' are correct to 
"maintain that what we think is not altered by alterations of the context in which we think it. "92 
However, the 'realists' push this too far failing to recognize that thought must happen in some 
context, and the new context must be just as appropriate as the old. 
By taking up the middle distance between the 'idealists' and the 'realists' Collingwood is 
attempting to elicit how immediacy and mediation refer to thought. In reference to Plato's 
thought, Collingwood's answer is as follows: "in their immediacy. as actual experiences 
organically united with the body of experience out of which they arise, Plato's thought and mine 
are different. But in their mediation they are the same. "93 Collingwood stresses that a vague 
appeal to the 'principle of identity in difference' is insufficient. What is at issue is the question of 
how exactly the two things are the same, and how exactly they differ. At this point Collingwood 
is referring to something explicitly stated in his Autobiography. Here he appeals to what he calls 
the 'incapsulation' of thought which is expressed as follows: "Historical knowledge is the re-
enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting 
89m, 299. 
90m, 300. 
91IH. 300. 
92IH. 300. 
9JIH. 30 l. 
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it, confine it to a plane different from theirs. "94 By this he is distinguishing between a conceptual 
identity of Plato's thought and the historian's re-enactment of it and a contextual difference 
between Plato and the historian. The historian does not, therefore, numerically become Plato, but 
remains himself. That is to say, Plato's thought can be re-thought by the historian \,ithout one 
context disappearing into the other. The two contexts are not divorced, but remain distinct~ and 
because of this allow understanding to take place. To understand is, then, not to annul the 
temporal distance between the past and present, but to give it full weight. 
But how is the idea of a conceptual identity understood? The conceptual identity between 
acts of thought safeguards the idea that acts of thought can be the same since they share a 
common conceptual matrix. "A person who failed to realize that thoughts are not private property 
might say that it is not [Plato's] thought that I understand, but only my O\\TI. That would be silly 
because, whatever subjective idealism may pretend, thought is always and everywhere de jure 
common property, and is de facto common property wherever people at large have the 
intelligence to think in common. "95 Yet Plato's thought and the historian's re-enactment are 
different, because the historian cannot re-enact the immediate context of Plato's thought: "The 
first discovery of a truth, for example, differs from any subsequent contemplation of it, not in that 
the truth contemplated is a different truth, nor in that the act of contemplating it is a different act: 
but in that the immediacy of the first occasion can never again be experienced."96 Therefore, 
Collingwood understands the identity between the agent and historian to be conceived in the 
context of a practical argument. This is revealed when Collingwood links the emphasis on 
identity with a re-arguing of a thesis. "If I not only read [Plato's] argument but understand it, 
follow it in my own mind by re-arguing it with and for myself, the process of argument which I 
go through is not a process resembling Plato's, it actually is Plato's, so far as I understand him 
rightly. "97 Therefore, as Dray has put it, the identity that exists between the thought of the agent 
and historian is contained in the rationalforce of the argument.98 
The emphasis on the rational force of the argument brings us to the question of the 
empirical criterion upon which it can be based. Collingwood is clear that the empirical criterion 
upon which the historian can match his re-enactment with the thought of the agent is his 
possession of evidence for it. As Ricoeur puts it in his discussion of Dray, "to reach this point of 
equilibrium, we must inductively gather evidence that allows us to evaluate the problem as the 
agent saw it. Only work with the documents allows this reconstruction. "99 This is not meant that 
94A, ll.t 
95Collingwood, 'Outlines of a Philosophy of History'. ~50. 
96IH.297f. 
97IH. 301. 
980ra\. 'Collingwood and the Acquaintance'. ~31. 
99Ric~ur. Time and Varrative L 129f. 
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suggest that re-enactment is an empirical methodology. Re-enactment is descriptive not 
prescriptive. In one very important sense it 'leaves e\e~thing as it is', for it is finally no more 
than a reminder of ",,'hat the historian always does. We must, therefore, keep in mind the two 
logically distinct components of Collingwood's theory. Re-enactment in toto does not provide the 
historian with any information or add an) thing to the historical inquiry. for the inferential process 
is only the first logical component of re-enactment. 
§ 4. Concluding Remarks 
I have demonstrated that Collingwood's philosophy is both genuinely anti-Cartesian and 
consistent, in its outline, with post-Romantic hermeneutics. Both these elements of Collingwood's 
philosophy inform his theory of action. This makes an understanding of action more 'semantic' 
than psychological. By this I mean that the rational force of an action is discovered by placing 
interpretations on an action after the fact. Acts of mind are, then, not effects of occult episodes of 
thought, but the overt and public actions themselves. We cannot, in Collingwood's view, separate 
thought from action in such a way that action expresses a thought which is complete prior to the 
action. 
Secondly, the emphasis on the grammatical nature of re-enactment finally discards the 
doctrine's methodological interpretation. 
In the final section on the identity of thought the idea that re-enactment was concerned 
with a numerical understanding of identity was rejected. Collingwood's understanding of identity 
is conceptual. On the one hand, this legitimates the possibility of historical knowledge, while on 
the other it shows that what the agent and historian have in common is an understanding of a text 
or situation etc. However, if this conceptual understanding is allowed to remain in the context of 
'what it means to re-think a thought' interpreters still tend to think of re-enactment in terms of the 
theory of 'acquaintance' or such like. This is because the lecture on re-enactment paid no real 
attention to temporality. Therefore, the conceptual interpretation of re-thinking needs to be 
brought into the context of Collingwood's understanding of process and its hermeneutical 
consequences in order to finally discard the thesis of numerical identity. This \\ill be carried out 
in Chapter 6. In the next chapter which continues the task of integrating the various aspects of 
Collingwood's philosophy ofhisto~, I shall explore Collingwood's concept of historical 
causation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Taking the Agent Seriously: Historical Causation 
Introduction 
The relationship between re-enactment and Collingwood's concept of historical causation fonns 
the focus of this chapter. In his later work such as the paper 'On the So-called Idea of Causation' 
(1937-38) Collingwood limits the applicability of causation to history. This may appear 
unnecessarily restrictive, but he wants to identify causation "ith historical agency. While there 
are, in his view, three senses of the word 'cause', the only proper sense is that which applies to the 
field of history. What he refers to as 'cause' in sense II and III, while most commonly found in the 
field of natural science are not species of causation but are understood better in the tenninology 
of 'means and end' (sense II) and 'laws and their instances' (sense III). Though he justifies his 
argument by appealing to the historical priority of 'sense 1'. judging sense II and III to be 
extensions of the fonner, the real motive for the restriction of causation to the field of history is 
found in Collingwood's attempted rapprochement between the theory of action and the theory of 
history. This rapprochement has two aspects: (1) a general manifesto-like programme which 
recommends that in the pursuit of a 'science of human nature' philosophers should substitute 
history for natural science I ~ and (2) a more specific polemic against any attempt to provide for 
the explanation of a historical action on the grounds of regularity or natural law . This latter point 
follows from the fact that, in Collingwood's view. a historical action is always an 'individual' 
action, hence it would be nonsense to inquire after the cause of a historical action on criteria 
derived from the principle of regularity or naturallaw.2 At stake in Colling\vood's polemic is the 
belief that causation can be applied only to a connection which preserves the free will of the agent 
at the same time as offering a complete explanation of an action. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part I provides a brief analysis of Collingwood's 
understanding of historical causation. Following the assumption that a historical action is always 
an individual action, Part II outlines Collingwood's attempt to identify historical action with the 
concept of duty. This most important development allows him to use the language of morality to 
sketch a 'logic' of explanation, thus converting moral language into causal language. The scope of 
re-enactment fonns the subject-matter of Part III. Collingwood's theory of re-enactive 
understanding has been criticized for being. among other things, too intellectual and too rational 
to be considered a general theory of historical understanding. While I shall concede that re-
enactment cannot stand as an overall theory of historical understanding. nonetheless, I shall 
demonstrate that in certain cases, his theory is not as restrictive as critics ha\"e supposed. 
1.1utobiography. esp. 77-106: The Idea (~rllisrory, 205-231. 
2'On the So-called Idea', 9~. 
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( I ) 
§ 1. The Centrality of the Agent's Perspective 
In what follows I shall restrict myself to the analysis of 'cause' in sense I. In Part II I shall refer to 
sense II in connection with Collingwood's polemic against the ethics of utility and right, but 
disregard sense III altogether since it is outside my purpose. 
The fundamental point about sense I (and II) is that a causal connection can be 
established only through agency. That is to say, it is not the situation in itself, but how the 
situation is understood by the agent that determines what is done.3 This does not mean that 
Collingwood rejects the event-like character of history in connection with these two senses: 
rather, he is pointing out that a causal connection can be applied to an event in so far as the event 
is seen from the point of view of the agent. Such a position was already a feature of 
Collingwood's lectures from 1928. He declares: "It is only because each is a free and intelligent 
agent that he acts as he does; what is said to determine his act only creates a situation in which he 
exercises his freedom and intelligence. "4 Yet in 1928 he did not believe this was an example of 
causal necessity. Such a move comes to fruition with sense I: 
that which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent and "causing" 
him to do it means affording him a motive for doing it. For "causing," we may substitute "making," 
"inducing," "persuading," "urging," "forcing," "compelling," according to the differences in the kind of 
motive in question. 5 
This sense of cause consists of two elements, a causa quod or efficient cause and a callsa lit or 
final cause. The causa quod is a situation, or state of things existing: the causa ut is a purpose, 
or state of things to be brought about.6 The causa quod is not, however, a situation which simply 
confronts the agent; it is not a situation that coerces the agent into an action and consequently 
extinguishes free will: rather, it is a situation "known or believed by the agent in question to 
exist".7 By causa ut Collingwood understands that to be 'caused' to act in a certain way is 
intentionally (meaning) to act in that way. It is not simply that the agent wants to act in that way, 
because wanting need not imply acting. Collingwood illustrates his understanding of historical 
causation by the use of a number of examples. "A headline in a newspaper in 1936 ran 'Mr. 
'~"Practical knowledge means knowledge of a certain thing not in itself but solely in its relation to 
someone who a) has to do with it practically. and b) is intellectuall~ capable of thinking about this 
practical acti, ity of his own and of understanding how the thing with which he has to do enters mto it as 
a factor." 'Goodness', Bodleian, dep. 8, 3. 
40utlines ofa Philosophy of History. ~75. 
50SIC. 86. 
60SIC. 87. 
70SIC. 87. 
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Baldwin's speech causes adjournment of House."'8 The important point to distinguish in this 
example is that Baldwin's speech did not compel the Speaker to adjourn the House whether or not 
this tallied with his o"n intentions; it meant that on hearing Baldwin's speech the Speaker freely 
made up his mind to adjourn the House.9 Furthermore, both the causa quod and causa ut must be 
present in any example of historical causation. As Collingwood shows "A man who tells his 
stockbroker to sell a certain holding may be caused to act thus by a rumour about the financial 
position of that company [causa quod]; but this rumour would not cause him to sell out unless he 
wanted to avoid being involved in the affairs of an unsound business" [causa ut]. 10 This tightens 
up the meaning of historical causation in so far as an act of free will can only be a 'caused' action. 
If an act were performed out of absolute coercion and detenninism, so far as this is possible, it 
would cease to be a 'caused' act. This is not to say that an act done in sense I is free of 
compulsion, but is a compulsion, so to speak, taken account of by the agent. Thc agent. in other 
words, is responsible for the consequences of his action. It may appear that the intersection 
between an act of free will and a necessary act is a rather lame formula that admits to a simple 
splitting of hairs. Perhaps Collingwood is distinguishing between things that in practice are not 
distinguished. It could be said that the example 'Mr. Baldwin's speech causes adjournment of 
House' ordinarily does mean Baldwin's speech compelled the Speaker to adjourn the House, i.e. 
there was no other action open to him. This is, however, precisely the position that Collingwood 
wants to deny. He rejects the idea, contained in the regularity thesis, that all action is fully 
determined by antecedent conditions actually obtaining. Action in sense I is contingent; that is, 'it 
admits of being otherwise'. This is opposed to an 'antecedent determinism' which extinguishes free 
will. Following Dray, this intersection can be made clearer if we distinguish between freedom of 
action and freedom of the will. 
Of course we should not say that a boy who creeps unwillingly to school under threat of punishment 
goes freely, for this is exactly the sort of situation (and not, for example, a situation in which he is 
carried or pushed, and thus does not act at all) in which it would be proper to speak of his action as 
compelled. But whether a person is forced to act in this sense, and therefore lacks freedom of action, is 
quite irrelevant to the question whether the action he performs is an exercise of free will. What is at 
stake in raising the latter question is whether, even if his action is compelled or constrained, the agent 
could ncyertheless have acted otherwise - and taken the consequences. 11 
At issue in sense I is the question: 'How can an action be necessitated except in terms of natural 
law'?' It is important to note that Collingwood is not arguing against the view that actions are 
necessitated, but is arguing for a different logic of necessity. The general law thesis is what we 
80SIC. 86. 
90SIC. 86 
lOOSIC. 87. 
11 Dray, 'Historical Causation', 358. 
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might call an example of natural necessity. An action is said to happen because the only way it 
can happen, is to argue: Whenever x then y'. This is to put the action under a law which 
subordinates the action to the principle of regularity. By contrast. according to Collingwood, 
actions are necessitated in so far as they are seen to be rationally required. That is to say. by 
denying that the historian needs to look beyond the action to its initial or determining conditions, 
Collingwood is affirming the sufficiency of agents' reasons for the explanation of why actions 
were performed. As I noted in Chapter 2, this was the meaning of Collingwood's conflation of 
'what happened' type questions with 'why it happened' type questions: the action was the thing to 
have done for the reasons given. 
This intersection of free will and necessity provides an answer to those critics who hold 
that his theory of historical causation cannot adequately take account of objective facts. Karl 
Popper, for example, thinks that the doctrine of re-enactment is too subjective, since it cannot 
distinguish between the situation as conceived by the agent and the situation as it really was. 12 
Popper thinks that history should be about situations as they really were. not as they were 
envisaged by agents. In an example of what he calls 'situational logic' Popper gives an 
explanation of his initial surprise as to why Galileo refused to accept the lunar theory of tides. In 
Galileo's time acceptance of the lunar theory of tides was. as Popper comments, 'part of 
astrological lore. ' Galileo had refused to accept the theory, even ignoring Kepler's letters detailing 
it. Popper also states that Galileo knew that Kepler was a professional astrologer. He concludes 
that Galileo was dissuaded from an acceptance of the lunar theory of tides because he rejected 
astrology. All these are objective facts of the situation and the logic of the case called for 
Galileo's rejection of Kepler's advances. 13 Collingwood's understanding of causation does not, 
however, exclude 'objective facts' from historical explanation. What Collingwood denies is the 
idea that the causal efficacy of the situation is derived from the objective facts rather than what 
the agent believed about the situation. 14 The difficulty of Popper's account is that it is not easy to 
see how objective facts of a situation could throw light on what historical agents decided to do in 
it if they believed their situation to be otherwise. Agency does not rely on the independent and 
objective nature of facts, but on how the agent envisages the facts. 15 This is why the projection 
I2Popper, 'A Pluralist Approach, 1~9. 
u'A Pluralist'. 1~8f. 
1411 Ifthe reason why it is hard for a man to cross the mountains is because he is frightened of the devils 
in them, it is folly for the historian. preaching at him across a gulf of centuries, to say This is sheer 
superstition. There are no devils at all. Face facts, and realize that there are no dangers in the mountains 
except rocks and water and snow, wolves perhaps. and bad men perhaps. but no devils' ... The historian 
thinks it a 'Hong way; but 'Hong ways of thinking arc just as much historical facts as right ones, and, no 
less than they, determine the situation (ah\ays a thought-situation) in which the man who shares them is 
placed. II IH. 3 17. 
J5"IN]o historian can ever find 'nature as it actually and indefeasibly is', or 'nature in itself, among the 
factors that influence the course of history. What influences the course of history is not nature in itself. 
7~ 
metaphor is still of use in history. On Collingwood's model of causation, Popper's example would 
not be undermined even if further research shows that astrological lore did not favour a lunar 
theory. Following Dray, Popper's explanation would still hold "so long as it could be maintained 
that Galileo believed that astrological lore favoured a lunar theory of tides."16 Collingwood's 
point is that whether or not an agent is wrong in his beliefs about a situation, it is irrelevant to the 
historian's attempt to display the rationale of what was done. He declares: "when the historian 
says that a man is in a certain situation this is the same as saying that he thinks he is in this 
situation. The hard facts of the situation, which it is so important for him to face, are the hard 
facts of the way in which he conceives the situation."17 In other words, to say that the agent was 
right or wrong to think or do what he did is not to offer an explanation of why it was done. This 
illustrates that what is important to Collingwood is the subjective rather than objective rationality 
of the agent. 
The problem with Popper is that he tends at best to set up a dualism between free \\ill 
and necessity. His approach consists of locating free will and determined behaviour in different 
worlds, so that the problem of their incompatibility does not arise. On this model, Popper's 
explanation of why Galileo rejected Kepler's advances is falsified if it is discovered that 
'astrological lore' did not contain a lunar theory of tides, i.e. irrespective of whether Galileo 
thought it did or not. This is consistent with Popper's theory that there is knowledge without a 
knowing subject, but it is difficult to see how this approach can provide an explanation of 
Galileo's action as opposed to what he ought to have done. In this respect, Popper's approach is 
reminiscent of Hempel's ideal scientific model. Like Hempel. Popper is attempting to restrict 
history to the concept of method, since this restriction defines history's scientific basis. But to try 
to characterise history as it ought to be at once undercuts historical practice. By contrast 
Collingwood's starting point is the Kantian question of transcendental possibility. Kant did not 
prescribe how the natural sciences ought to be, but sought to justify how they already were. 
Therefore, to ask the question of the possibility of history is to think beyond the question of 
method in the human sciences. 18 The ghost of positivism inhabits Popper's approach. The re-
enactment of an agent's beliefs is allowed a place but this re-enactment is at best a heuristic 
but the belief about nature. true or false entertained by the human beings whose actions are in question. 
It was not the eclipse. but the belief that days with eclipses on them were unlucky, that influenced so 
disastroush Nicias's siege of Syracuse." PH. 7.t. Much the same can be said of the relationship between 
the Lisbon' earthquake of 17.5.5 and the criticism of the metaphysics of 'the best of all possible worlds'. 
16Dray. History as Re-enactment. 51. his emphasis. 
171H,~ 17. 
18Gadamer. Truth and .\lerhod, .t66. 
device. 19 The applied criterion of rationality is an objective one. The historian is an observer 
searching for the objective structure of situations. In contrast. we have in Collingwood's 
interweaving of free will and necessity a sustained attempt to provide for the significance of an 
action on its own terms. Implicit in his treatment of historical causation is a sensitivity to the 
conflict between a freedom of open possibilities and a situation which stands over-against the 
agent, issuing in an action that is appropriate to the situation.2o This theme is echoed in 
Collingwood's understanding of duty. 
( II ) 
The Rapprochement between History and Action 
§ 1. 'Cause' in Sense II and the Concept of Right 
In sense II, no less than in sense I, the word cause expresses an idea relative to human action~ but 
the action in this case is one intended to control, not other human beings, but things in nature or 
physical things. "In this sense, the 'cause' of an event in nature is the handle. so to speak, by 
which we can manipulate it. "21 This sense is defined as follows: 
A cause is an event or state of things which it is in our power to produce or prevent, and by producing or 
preventing which we can produce and prevent that whose cause it is said to be.22 
The search for causes in sense II defines the methodology of natural science which is valued not 
for its truth pure and simple but for its utility. for the power over nature that it gives us. 
Collingwood derives this notion from Baconian science for which the declaration 'knowledge is 
power' announced a programme to extract from nature, by way of precise observation and 
experiment, the secrets it embodied in the cause of real explanation. Bacon's declaration is 
correctly understood as equivalent to 'nature is conquered by obeying her': that is, knowledge of 
nature provides the agent with power enabling the control of nature. If the agent were not able to 
produce or prevent something in nature this would signify a lack of knowledge (knowledge = 
power). Bacon was typical of the whole movement ofanti-Aristotelianism that substituted 
19Popper comments: "the process of re-enactment is inessentiaL though I admit that it can greatly help 
the historian, by providing a kind of intuitive check of the success of his situational analysis." 'A 
Pluralist'. I·t? 
2o"For a man about to act the situation is his master. his oracle. his god. Whether his action is to prove 
successful or not depends on whether he grasps the situation rightly or not. If he is a wise man. it is not 
until he has consulted his oracle. done evel)1hing in his power to find out what the situation is. that he 
will make even the most trivial plan. And if he neglects the situation, the situation will not neglect him. 
It is not one of those gods that lea,'e an insult unpunished." IH. 316. 
210SIC. 89. his emphasis. 
nOSIC. 89. 
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efficient causes23 for final causes in the explanation of nature. Collingwood's idea of the 'handle' 
is short-hand for this substitution: the 'handle' is that thing in our power by which we can produce 
or prevent things. 
Collingwood prohibits the extension of sense II to the field of history for two related 
reasons. In the first place, sense II provides the agent with 'general propositions' rather than 
'individual propositions'. As Collingwood puts it: "because the proposition 'x causes y' is a 
constituent part of practical science, it is essentially something that can be 'applied' to cases 
arising in practice; that is to say, '" 'any instance of x is a thing whose production or prevention is 
means respectively of producing or preventing some instance ofy."24 Secondly. a form of 
regularity is in operation in so far as any instance of x occasions the performance of some 
instance ofy. This performance is not quintessentially historical, because what is performed is 
always something of the same kind. With the rejection of teleology nothing new can be brought 
into existence: the world is a closed totality. On this schema the 'individual' action of history 
cannot be given its due. Such a schema is predicated on the idea that the future is closed, but free 
will means the future is open. 
Collingwood parallels the explanatory language of regularity with the ethics of utility and 
'right'. In fact one of the merits of his understanding of ethics was his unmasking of the 
relationship between classical physics and utilitarianism and the concept of 'right'. In the paper 
'On the So-called Idea of Causation' Collingwood describes sense II as a form of utility, but it is 
clear from The New Leviathan that while it corresponds to utility, in this work it is better 
characterized as a form of right. There are three kinds of practical reason outlined in The New 
Leviathan which are not mutually exclusive but form a scale, each in a sense interpenetrating the 
other. The scale begins with utility, through right, and ends v. ith duty. As a means-end form of 
reasoning sense II is an example of utility. but it is also a form of right because it is action 
according to rule. Like Ryle's notion of 'disposition', the concept of right is very law-like, because 
it possesses generality. That is to say, 'right' is the expression of the universal. Right action is a 
particular action in which the universal is realized.25 As examples of right he mentions, "the 
'right' key for a given lock is any key (not one key, but anyone ofa set o/right keys) which in the 
case of that lock obeys the rules, which a locksmith has to know, governing the relations between 
lock-form and key-form. The 'right' drug for a disease is a drug which conforms with the rules, 
\\hich physicians have to know. correlating diseases with drugs."26 Colling\vood's formula for 
23EtTicient causes are understood. not in the Aristotelian sense (their original sense). but in the 
mechanistic sense. as denoting impact. attraction. repulsion. and so forth. 
240SIC, 9.t. 
~~Collingwood refers to the concept of disposition as follows:" ... a person or disposition is called right in 
so far as the person is disposed to act according to rule." 'Goodness'. Bodleian. dep. 8 . .t6f. 
26Collingwood. The Sell' Leviathan. 16. 22. his emphasis. 
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this is y (R) x, which reads "x is chosen because it is right, i.e. because it confonns \\ith the rule 
y. "27 The rule y signifies that it is a general thing that is done whenever the conditions for its 
application recur. The generality of the concept of 'right' is brought out well in the follo\\ing. 
[Right] is a generalized purpose: not the purpose to do one thing on one occasioIl, ... but a purpose to do 
things of a certain kind on all occasions of a certain kind. This is a regularian principle or rule. To act 
on a regularian principle is to decide upon a general of behaving, defined as involving some act of a 
specified kind if and when some occasion of a specified kind arises ... Regularian action not only admits. 
but ordinarily at least implies, a different sort of time-distribution, namely the application of the rule to 
different occasions arising at different times. The y-purpose, or rule, in this case explicitly refers to a 
plurality of cases on which it is to be obeyed. Even if it is not known that any such occasions "ill 
actually arise, the rule provides for them if they do. 28 
If the historian worked with this model he would, by applying a generalisation such as 'x causes 
y', know the explanation of what he studied without investigation into the unique facts of the case. 
However, having discovered the cause of the English Revolution of 1688, the historian does not 
have a ready-made explanation that he can apply to the French Revolution of 1789. This is 
implied in The New Leviathan when Collingwood states: "Regularian explanations, like 
utilitarian explanations, are at best partial explanations. They never explain why a man does this 
act; they can only explain why he does an act of this kind. "29 The cause of a historical action, in 
other words, cannot be ascertained independently of an inquiry into the unique facts of the case. 
§ 2. 'Cause' in Sense I and the Concept of Duty 
The consciousness of duty is identical with the historical consciousness. 30 
The origins of Collingwood's attempted rapprochement between history and action are to be 
found in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, what he calls the 'free will 
controversy' of the seventeenth century was s) mptomatic of the collapse of , scissors-and-paste' 
history which can be traced to this time. "The desire to envisage human action as free was", 
according to Collingwood, "bound up with a desire to achieve autonomy for history as the study 
of human action. "31 The dominium of natural science over history was beginning to dissolve and 
in its wake arose the autonomy of history. On the other hand, he saw that the rise of the 
importance of individual action in historical interpretation began with Kant's conception of duty. 
Yet Collingwood did not believe that at the present time historical action could be dissolved 
without residue into duty. What he describes in The New Leviathan and his lectures on moral 
27NL. 16. 3. 
28NL. 16. 31-32. and 16. 51. his emphases. 
29NL. 16. 63. his emphases. 
]OCollingwood. 'Goodness'. Bodleian. dep. 8. 75. 
31lH. 319. 
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philosophy from 1940 is an ideal which he attempts to anticipate. For Collingwood, 
consciousness of duty is identical with historical consciousness: action based on the clearest sense 
of the situation one is in. It mirrors exactly the understanding of cause in sense I. 
There are, according to Collingwood, two special characteristics of duty (i) determinacy 
and (ii) possibility. By determinacy Collingwood means that duty admits of no alternatives. 
"There is only one of it; it is not one of a set of alternatives [right]; there is nothing that will do as 
well "32Any duty is, then, a duty to do 'this' act and only 'this', not 'an act of this kind'. This is 
important for Collingwood's understanding of historical explanation. Unlike utility and right, duty 
is completely rational in principle. That is to say, it is only rational explanation - that form of 
explanation that answers the question 'Why did the agent do x' by saying 'The agent did x because 
it was the appropriate thing to have done' - that completely explains an action. Both utility and 
right cannot explain why the agent did x, because they can only answer the general question, 
'Why did the agent do an act of this kind?' The explanation schema of utility and right is loose in 
so far as it fits a number of possibilities equally welP3 That is to say, both utility and right are 
forms of capricious action in so far as they afford no reason why among the many actions that 
might lead to a certain end, the agent chose the one he did.34 It would be a mistake, however, if 
duty was conceived as complete determinism. Such a result can only be supposed if freedom is 
identified with caprice. It is rather utility and right that are completely determinate (when 
transported to the field of history), because they legislate for the future by ensuring that what 
counts as rationality is accounted for in advance. The concept of right in its inability to explain 
an individual action actually restricts the rationality of actions to those which fall under the 
scheme of regularity. Duty has an infinitely wider understanding of rationality in so far as an 
action is conceived from the standpoint of the agent. Furthermore, and of most importance, it is 
the complete rationality of actions (as duty) which testifies to the element of free will that is a 
necessary component of causation in sense I. Paradoxically, the element of free will in an action 
is discovered in so far as the determinate nature of the situation is discovered. This is why 
Collingwood can say that the more rational an action becomes, the more completely it \\ ill 
undergo compulsion. The degree of free will and compulsion discovered is consequent upon how 
completely the agent faces the facts of the situation. What Collingwood is impl)ing is that in a 
32NL. 17. 51. 
33"If you act according to rules. you are not dealing with the situation in which you stand. ) ou are only 
dealing with a certain type of situation under which you class it." A, 104. 
34This contrast between the 'tight' explanation of duty and the 'loose' explanation of utility and right is 
what Collingwood was attempting to bring out in his idea that history is the science of the indi\idual. In 
his lectures on moral philosophy from 19~O Collingwood comments: " ... the answer 'because It is my 
duty' is a complete answer. What I do is an individual action: "hat it is my duty to do is an individ~I 
action ... I do this and no other action because this and no other is the action it is my duty to do." 
'Goodness', Bodleian. dep. 8. 70. 
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completely dutiful action there is a coincidence between free will and detenninacy. As he puts it 
in The New Leviathan: "A man's duty on a given occasion is the act which for him is both 
possible and necessary: the act which at that moment character and circumstance combine to 
make it inevitable, if he has a free \\ill, that he should freely will to do."35 The idea of facing the 
situation is important, because it is only by this process of exploring the situation and asking and 
answering successive questions in the fonn: 'Is it this?' 'Is it this?' 'Is it this')' that the agent can 
come to perfonn his duty. 
The second characteristic of duty is possibility. Collingwood follows Kant when he 
recommends that 'ought implies can'. To be under an obligation to perfonn an action is to do 
something that one is able to do. It may be that the agent does not know whether he can do it. but 
nobody knows what he can do until he tries. Collingwood does, however, criticize Kant for 
embedding this truth in a 'regularian' theory of duty. This not only denies the existence of duty. 
but 'ought' would never imply 'can' when the act in question meant acting in accordance with 
rules involving contradictions.36 To say that 'ought' implies 'can' does not mean that the 
identification of an action as my duty is wholly conclusive. Collingwood only allows an answer 
that is 'morally certain'; "an answer. roughly. in the fonn: 'I have considered x, y, and z as 
claimants for the title of my present duty: x is a better answer than y, and y than z; but there may 
be a better answer than any. which I have overlooked."'37 This is important because it leaves open 
the possibility that when the historian is studying the action of a historical agent he \\ ill have the 
benefit of hindsight enabling him to outline the consequences as yet unforeseen by the agent. 
This use of the ethics of obligation in order to render the distinctive nature of historical 
causation is astonishing. Yet it is the 'individuality' of dutiful action which is so attractive to 
Collingwood. The distinction between the question 'Why did the agent do x? (duty) and the 
question 'Why did the agent do an act of this kind? (utility and right) is all that matters. Together 
with the accent on the subjective rationality of the agent, such an emphasis, irrespective of the 
appeal to 'moral certainty', removes any moral import from the language of duty leaving only a 
causal language. This leads to an unfamiliar use of the concept of duty: for it is not only 
irrelevant to the historian's explanation whether an agent is right or wrong in his beliefs about a 
situation, but it is also irrelevant whether the agent's action was objectively irrational or \\lcked in 
the extrcmc. A. Hitler, for example, acted 'dutifully' when he engaged in "a systematic legal fight 
against the Jews .... remov[ing] ... their privileges," ... and in the end "remov[ing] the Jews"38 in 
so far as he "was convinced that the hidden principle of world history was the fight between a 
35NL. 17.8. 
~6NL. 17.62 - 17.7. 
17NL. 17.81 
38Hitlcr in a lettcr to Adolf Gemlich. 16 September 1919. In Scholder. Requiem. 170. 
80 
good and an evil race, between A)Tans and Jews"39 Thus. Hitler's ominous 'removal of the Jews' 
was appropriate knowing what we do know about his reasons for action. 40 ~ bile this use of 
ethical language may appear scandalous, nevertheless it draws attention to an important facet of 
Collingwood's understanding of rationality: seeing action from the point of vie\\ of the agent is 
the same as appreciating the agent's subjective rationality. 
This rapprochement between 'ethical' theory and history can be seen as Collingwood's 
attempt to separate history from the dominium of natural science. It is from such an angle that 
the reader can perhaps appreciate why it was that Ryle saw Collingwood in such an ambivalent 
light. In the previous chapter I sought to emphasize the similarity between Ryle and Collingwood 
in order to disclose the anti-Cartesian nature of Collingwood's understanding of mind. All the 
time, however, I was conscious that Collingwood was too much the champion of the self-creating 
individual to rest easy with the idea that the self is simply a 'logical construction' out of 
behaviour. What Ryle has in common with behaviourism is an almost obsessive distrust of the 
idea of the individual who stands in his own freedom. I am not denying the fundamental, probably 
final, critique of modernity's sovereign individual, nor do I want to identify Collingwood \\ ith 
belief in such an individual, instead I am drawing attention to the correlation that exists between 
the idea of the self and the idea of the self-subsistent. The tum to Kant which is characteristic of 
Collingwood's appeal to dutiful action, together with the obvious echo of Marx in the 
Autobiography and in the unfinished Principles o/History, reveal the conflict in his philosophy 
between an all-inclusive theoretical system which reduces the 'other' to a component part of the 
system and the recognition that in the end the self as agent is irreducible. It is the necessity of this 
latter view to which Collingwood points in his appeal to J. Butler's dictum: " 'that everything is 
what it is, and not another thing.' This means recognising that the subject-matter about which we 
are thinking consists of facts taken as facts, not of facts taken merely as instances. "41 My point is 
that to say the self is simply a 'logical construction' out of observed behaviour is to concede too 
much to a behaviourism that would dissolve the self altogether. 42 At this point the relation 
between the general law theory and the ethics of right is disclosed. In general law theory an event 
is explained solely in terms of its necessary antecedents, thus making free \\ ill redundant. This 
reveals the central truth of Collingwood's distinction between action and event. The agent's 
acknowledgement of personal responsibility for what he did corresponds to his realization of the 
39Requiem, 169. 
40 "'The abundance of sources at our disposal contain nothing to indicate that Hitler saw 'the final 
solution of the Jewish question' as an instrument in the senice of other aims. Rather. they lead 
inexorably to the conclusion that the Final Solution did not sen'e a further purpose for Hitler but was In 
keeping '~ith his values, specificaJIy his conviction that the Jews were the deadly enemies of Germany ... " 
E. Goldhagen, cited in Requiem, 169. 
41Collingwood, 'A Manuscript Concerning Fail} Tales', 13. Bodleian, dep. 21/6. 
42SCC MacKinnon's A .\·tU{~V for a good exploration of this. 
81 
distinction between action and event. The self is not constructed by mere external behaviour, 
rather, the self is discovered in the interweaving of possibility and necessity: that is, both freedom 
and necessity are aspects of the agent, not the problem of different worlds of discourse. 
In the essay 'Reality as History' Collingwood offers a way of conceiving the concept of 
action that distinguishes it from character which has a tendency to be conceived as a determinate 
state. He begins by distinguishing his view of knowledge and reality from its Greek and modem 
counterpart. The Greeks distinguished between a world of appearance and reality. The first is a 
constant flux of events, while the latter is a pennanent world of fixed forms. Only of the latter 
can there be real knowledge. In modem (classical) science a similar distinction is made, but this 
time that which is permanent is found not in a world of forms outside the flux but in it. Modem 
science discovers the permanent relations between the elements of the flux. The result is that a 
network of classifications is built up in the form of laws and uniformities. 43 
Collingwood rejects these conceptions because they presuppose something fixed and 
unchanging. This illuminates the reason for Collingwood's suspicion of the term 'human nature'. 
It is clear that the context of his suspicion is found in the Enlightenment's idea of a 'science of 
human nature' that conceived the development of a behavioural science analogous with the laws 
of physics. The Enlightenment was characterized by a sustained attempt to provide an 
anthropological foundation for political philosophy divorced in essentials from confessional 
Christianity. While in fundamental disagreement with this programme for its expulsion of 
confessional beliefs, in this instance, Collingwood only wants to point out that the methods 
employed by Enlightenment thinkers were ill-suited to the task. In fact, Collingwood states that, 
as a science, the term human nature derived its power from its analogy with the control of 
Nature. Furthermore, in his thinking about human nature Collingwood restricts its meaning to 
'mind', such that "a mind's nature is nothing but the ways in which it thinks and acts. "44 This gave 
him an historically conditioned and constituted view of human nature. As such he could collapse 
the 'science of human nature' into history in so far as history is the development of historical 
consciousness. This is the tenor of his British Academy lecture in which he argues that rationality 
can only be studied historically, since by setting up an 'object', naturalistic methods prevent 
understanding. This was a deliberate move on Collingwood's part and was meant to have far 
reaching consequences. He never lived to work them out systematically, but it is clear that he 
envisaged a wide ranging programme for the replacement of naturalistic methods with historicist 
methods in the social sciences. Donagan has put the matter well: Collingwood's "sole intention 
was to show that all the social sciences, so far as they have been fruitful. have employed the same 
.nCollingwood, 'Reality as History', cited in van der Dussen. History as a Science. 165. Pagination from 
HS. 
441H. 83. 
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methods as history. and that those methods are neither applications nor anticipations of a putative 
natural science of human behaviour."45 One may wish to quarrel \\ith Collingwood's restriction 
of human nature to agenc~.46. but the accent upon the imagined rather than the gi\'en is 
characteristic of Collingwood's belief that the future is open. His attack on substantialism. so 
pervasive a feature of all his work. displays a deep sensitivity towards the problem of 
determinism. He saw, quite clearly. that substantialism and determinism both tcnded toward an 
ontological acceptance of 'it could not be othernise' which he believed so destructi\c of personal 
responsibility. His attack on substantialism is crystallised in his understanding of mind as 
'actIvity': mind is what it does and nothing else. Character is. th~ not a fixed and unchangeable 
substance "from which ... actions flow automatically." On the contrary. it is modified by actions. 
and because these actions arc historical actions Collingwood can say. "his past and his character 
arc the same thing. "47 Collingwood does not. howe\cr. concein~ character as a 'store-house' of 
particular actions. This would be to faIl into regularian ethics whereby an emphasis on 
characteristic behaviour is made to bear the weight of explanation Such an idea is found in 
Gardiner's concept of 'disposition' (borrowed from Ryle) in so far as it attempts to restrict action 
\'ia regularity to what is to be expec(cd. Collingwood identifics the determinant of a situation 
\\ith character "hich is the past. But the past "as past... is dead and does not exist at all"48 It 
follows. then. that an agent's character is nothing more than the historically conditioned part of 
his present or. as Collingwood calls it. "history itself now living in the shape of fact. "49 Now the 
historical construction of a character is a fact. and as such it is unalterable: but this does not 
mean that it can legislate for the future. Along \\ith the detl.!rminant which can be likened to the 
force of circumstances. there is a non-deterrninate part corresponding to free will. 50 As we have 
seen \\ith causation in sense L it is the agent \\ith free \\ilL who. when facing the hard facts of a 
given situation. performs an action that is appropriate to it. It is this element of contingenc~ that 
disallo\\ s a completc subsumption of action under the concept of character. According to 
Collingwood. action is not primarily a matter of character but more about an agent's ability to 
perform an appropriate action. In contrast. Gardiner's usc of the concept of disposition is 
dctcrminati\e because it always understands an action to be a matter of character. "It represents. 
45Donagan. The Later Philosophy. 1"70. 
46He comments: "I do not deny that the phrase [human nature] may be loosely used as a collcctiYc name 
for those sets or patterns of hlilllan acti\"i~ which we regard. at any given moment. as permanent. and 
accept as things beyond our power to change" What he strongly obJects to is a definition of human 
nature as "a substantial and unchanging block of characteristics." Rather. "[i]n denying that there is 
such a thing as human nature. I am thus not denyIng the rcali~ of \\ hat goes by' that name: I am denYIng 
the implic..1tions of the name ... " RH. 171f. 
47RH. 170f. 
48RH. 171. 
49RH. 171 
50RH. 171. 
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if you like, an instance of how he can in general be expected to behave under certain conditions. 
It sets John's action within a pattern, the pattern of his normal behaviour. 115 I The problem "ith 
this is that it cannot always do justice to the point of the agent's action. The question 'Why did the 
agent do x?' is not always answered by saying 'This is what would be expected'. 52 This is 
reminiscent of Stanley Cavell's comment on the tendency of the literary critic to focus on a play's 
symbolic meaning rather than on the players and action. The idea that character supplies an agent 
with solutions to particular purposes, rather than 'space' within which those purposes are worked 
out, is, according to Cavell, as sensible as supposing that one has explained why a particular 
couple have decided to divorce by saying that divorce is a social form. 53 
Collingwood's emphasis on duty is, therefore, an attempt to distinguish between character 
and present action. While character understood historically may seem just as determinant and 
unalterable as a permanent nature Collingwood's point is that the former is open to the future 
while the latter is not. That is to say, while it is impossible to be delivered from what we have 
become, responsibility enables us to see that we are, in a sense, open to fundamental change. 
What history has produced is mere fact - unalterable, as fact must be, but nothing more than fact -
whereas 'nature' is something more than fact; it is compulsion. If I do actions of a certain kind because. 
as a matter of fact, I have acquired the habit of doing them, it is an unalterable fact that I acquired that 
habit: but it does not follow that, in the further course of my history, the habit cannot be modified or 
broken. On the contrary, since the habit is a mere fact, it falls away, like any other fact. into the past, 
unless it is constantly renewed by fresh action. 54 
Dutiful action will obviously emerge from character but the criterion for the performance of this 
duty is not character but the appropriateness of the action to the individual situation of the here 
and now. It follows from this that if a habit can be broken the actions performed by the agent 
wilL as a consequence, be new actions, or at least actions performed for different motives. These 
new actions are not to be understood as a function which rests on an unchanging superstructure: 
rather, if mind is what it does, the new action "ill completely constitute the identity of the agent. 
To assess this identity will necessarily involve giving an account of the agent's action. 
The emphasis on appropriate action rather than characteristic action discloses the 
individual. The Enlightenment programme of a science of human nature neglected this, because 
51Gardincr. The Yature, 12-t. my emphasis. 
52 11 You know a rule for dealing with situations of this kind, but you are not content '''ith applying it, 
because you know that action according to rules always inyolves a certain misfit between yourself and 
thc situation. If you act according to rules, you are not dealing \\ith the situation in which you stand, you 
are dealing with a certain type of situation under which you class it. The type is. admittedly, a useful 
handle with which to grasp the situation: but all the same. it comes between you and the situation it 
enables you to grasp. Often enough. that does not mattcr: but sometimes it matters ycry much." A. I O-t. 
53Ca\'ell, .\lust We .\lean. 276f. 
54RH. 171. 
its denial of historicity meant that human nature was assessed through regularity alone. But this 
claim to finality on behalf of the Enlightenment is, according to Collingwood, not only disastrous 
for history, but catastrophic for civilisation. By claiming to understand the other person in 
advance, 'objective rationality' diminishes the claim of the other person: the past is not allowed to 
speak of its own claim. Furthermore, this a priori understanding reveals a desire to dominate the 
other. Collingwood meant to outline the danger of such an approach in The Principles of History. 
but he was never able to finish this work. What we do have is a sketch of what he intended: "A 
scientific morality will start from the idea of human nature as a thing to be conquered or obeyed: 
a historical one will deny that there is such a thing, and will resolve what we are into what we do. 
A scientific society will tum on the idea of mastering people ... A historical society ,,,ill tum on 
the idea of understanding them. "55 The inductive logic that lies behind the emphasis on the 
typical and regular is an attempt to put the claim of the other at a distance. By resolving the 
unknown into the known the inductive scientist is actually denying that historicity is an essential 
aspect of understanding: induction leaves everything as it is. 
( III ) 
The Scope of Re-enactment56 
I now want to tum from an exposition of re-enactment and its corollaries to the question whether 
Collingwood's account is applicable to history as a whole. While the emphasis on agency and 
thought is plausible, critics believe such an emphasis fails to encompass the whole field of 
historiography. Consequently, I shall, without offering an exhaustive account, discuss such 
criticisms as that re-enactment is too intellectualistic and too rationalistic to be regarded as a 
sufficient model of historical understanding. 
§ 1. Collingwood's Supposed Intellectualism 
The contention that the historian must re-think the thoughts of historical agents has led Walsh 
and Gardiner to charge Collingwood with confining history to the study of man's "intellectual 
operations".57 P. Winch also believes that Collingwood's contention is "to some extent an 
intellectualistic distortion." 58 While I think such criticism is really the result of taking the whole 
conception of re-thinking too literally, critics have not simply misinterpreted it. Rather, in typical 
fashion, Collingwood gives credence to this criticism by the lack of care he exhibits in the 
expression of his views. He declares, for example, that only reflective thought can be re-enacted, 
55Scheme for PH. cited in van der Oussen, HS, App. L emphases in original. 
56For the following account of critics' views on the charge of intellectualism and rationalism I depend on 
Ora, 's. HR, 108-22. 
57Walsh.lntroduction. 50~ Gardiner. 'Historical Understanding'. 279. 
58Winch. The Idea, 11. 
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and goes on in 'The Subject-matter of History' to suggest what he means: a reflectiYe act is "one 
in which we know what it is that we are trying to do, so that when it is done we know that it is 
done by seeing that it has conformed to the standard or criterion which was our initial conception 
of it. "59 The emphasis on conscious calculation is then made explicit when, as an example. he 
says that if a politician "did the first thing that came into his head and merely waited to see the 
consequences, it would follow that such a man was no politician."6o A. To~nbee, surprised by the 
naIvety of such a comment suggests that Collingwood appears to have no conception of the 
"intellectually horrifying way" in which politicians in fact behave.61 If such statements are taken 
as Collingwood's considered position then it is clear that his conception of re-thinking is severely 
restrictive. Yet such a position does not tally with what Collingwood says elsewhere. Greco-
Roman historiography, for example, is criticized for over-intellectual ising history by attributing 
"far too much to the deliberate plan or policy of the agent. "62 In apparent contradiction of the 
emphasis on 'calculation' he comments: "to a very great extent people do not know what they are 
doing until they have done it, if then. "63 Again in the British Academy lecture he declares, quite 
rightly, that the historian can discover "what, until he discovered it, no one ever knew to have 
happened at a11"64- this being a consequence of the fact that, since all knowledge is historical 
knowledge, the historian has the capacity to discover in the record of what a person did various 
thoughts of which that person was quite unaware.65 Finally, because Collingwood like Ryle 
believes that thoughts have no existence apart from their expression in the agent's life,66 re-
thinking is a semantic rather than psychological category. On this model the agent need not have 
propositionally rehearsed his reasons for action, because in so far as an action is purposive at all 
there is a calculation which the historian could construct for it.67 
What then has gone wrong in the lecture on the 'Subject-matter of History'? Following 
Dray we can say that Collingwood has inadvertently confused his O\\TI technical use of 'reflective' 
with its ordinary sense.68 Collingwood's philosophy of mind employs the idea of levels of 
consciousness whereby each, excepting the first, is a reflection on the one below. Each level, in 
other words, generates a level higher than itself by becoming an object to itself. 69 There is a 
591H. 308. 
6oIH. 309f. 
6 I Toynbee. A Study of His!Of:r. 722. 
6.2IH . .t2. 
6JIH . .t2. 
64IH.238. 
65IH. 219. 
66"Human nature is mind ... \\ ith the proviso that mind always means embodied mind." 'Notes on the 
History of Historiography'. Bodleian. dep. 1312. my emphasis. 
670ray. Laws. 123. 
6XOnl\. HR. 112-I.t. 
69Sec ·Oonagan. The Later Philosoph.v. 25fL Mink . . \lind. 1 LHf. 
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lowest level, immediate experience, which Collingwood does not consider thought at all. An 
intermediate level which has feeling for its object, and which he does consider thinking, although 
not reflective thinking~ and finally, a level of reflection that has thinking rather than feeling for its 
object, this being what the historian thinks, since what the historian thinks about is the thought of 
the agent. Thus the historian's reflective thought will have for its object, not the agent's immediate 
experience, but his unreflective thought about that experience (i.e. perceptions and memories): 
however, the agent's 'unreflective' thought is nevertheless reflective (in Collingwood's technical 
sense), because it is a reflection on a lower level of consciousness. 
Therefore, "[i]t is only", as Dray suggests, "thinking at the level of the agent's responses 
to what he perceived and remembered which can be recovered by interpreting his actions as 
expressions of his thought. "70 Collingwood, howevec obscures this point by switching from the 
technical sense of 'reflective' to the ordinary sense. He comments: the historical agent's thought 
must be reflective in the sense of being "performed in the consciousness that it is being 
performed. "71 Such carelessness opens the door to the accusations of over-intellectualisation 
which I have outlined. Yet along with Dray we can say that such criticism does not follow from 
the analysis that preceded this error, nor does Collingwood's considered position warrant such 
criticism. 72 
§ 2. The Assumption of Rationality 
One of Collingwood's most consistent claims is that "all history is the history ofthought".73 In its 
most restrictive sense this means that a past action is understandable in so far as the historian 
discovers the agent's reasons for doing it. Yet, according to critics, this assumes that agents act 
much more rationally than usually supposed, and excludes from the field of history much of what 
engages historians.74 
The evidence of his manuscripts and published work suggests that Collingwood pursued 
the question of the rationality ofhistorica1 agents in conversation with Hegel. In 'Notes on the 
History of Historiography' (1936), for example, while he agrees \\ ith Hegel that "human nature = 
rationality" he concedes that the matter cannot be left at this juncture, but "must be worked out" 
in detai1. 75 In his published work this comes to fruition in two ways. In the first place, he argues 
that rationality like historicity is a matter of degree, and secondly, as we have seen, he makes an 
implicit distinction between subjective and objective rationality. 
700ray. H.R 113. 
71IH. 308. 
nOray. HR 113. 
7-"Outlines'. ~~5~ lB. 215: PH. 76. 
74Walsh. 'The Character'. 55~ Atkinson. J.:noH'ledge and Explanation. 26: Taylor. Bibliography. 235. 
75'Notcs'. Bodleian. dep. I J/2. 
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With regard to the first way, in the British Academy lecture he states: "The idea that man ... is 
different from the rest of creation in being a rational animal is a mere superstition. It is only by 
fits and starts, in a flickering and dubious manner, that human beings are rational at all. In 
quality, as well as in amount, their rationality is a matter of degree. "76 This suggests, against his 
critics, that Collingwood recommends that historians discover rather than assume rationality. 
This view is consolidated when later in the lecture he declares: "It is only in the historical process, 
the process of thoughts, that thought exists at all; and it is only in so far as this process is kno",n 
for a process of thoughts that it is one."77 
While the distinction between subjective and objective rationality is a feature of 
Collingwood's paper 'On the So-called Idea of Causation', the distinction also reveals itself in the 
section on Hegel in The Idea of History. 
If it is said that human thought is often or generally far from reasonable, Hegel \\ill reply that this is an 
error which comes from failing to apprehend the historical situation in which a gi\'en piece of thinking 
is done. Thinking is never done in vacuo; it is always done by a determinate person in a determinate 
situation; and every historical character in every historical situation thinks and acts as rationally as that 
person in that situation can think and act, and nobody can do more.78 
Collingwood calls this a "fertile principle",79 because it underpins his view that the historian's 
understanding of the agent's action is to be sought from the agent's point of view. The link 
between this passage and the emphasis on subjective rationality is strengthened if we reiterate 
that the 'historical situation' is simply the way the agent conceives it to be. While, therefore, the 
beliefs of the agent may have been erroneous, and his purposes perhaps foolish or alarming, "the 
claim to understand the action by grasping the soundness of its argument is clearly compatible 
with the judgement that, objectively speaking, the action is very irrational indeed. "80 This is 
exactly the issue in the example I gave of Hitler's action against the Jews. Drawing attention to 
the subjective rationality of the agent's action is, then, in no way meant to justify this action but 
only to make it intelligible from the perspective of the agent's reasons. 
Yet irrespective of such a defence, the criticism of the emphasis on rationality cannot be 
so easily annulled. On closer inspection there is a strong tendency on Collingwood's part to 
assume the rationality of agents. This lapse places restrictions on the applicability of re-thinking 
76IH. 227. 
77IH.227. 
78TH. 116, his emphasis. 
79IH. 116. 
80Dray. HR 116. Collingwood comments: "These [actions] include - is it necessary to add') - acts done 
by an ·unreasonable agent in pursuit of ends (or in the adoption of means) determined by his unreason: 
f~r what is meant by unreason. in a context of this kind. is not the absence of reasons but the presence of 
bad ones. and a bad reason is still a reason. "PH. 38. 
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which are not necessary in themselves. However, even if the assumption of rationality is rejected., 
by concentrating on actions Collingwood severely restricts the field of historiography. 
At the end of the essay on Method Collingwood declares that, despite its difficulties, the 
historian must assume the rationality of thought. This. in his view, makes a failure to make sense 
of thought a failure to understand it. 81 Such an attitude is carried over into The Idea o/History 
where he complains that historians who call certain periods dark ages "tell us nothing about those 
ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use [such phrases], 
namely that they are unable to re-think the thoughts which were fundamental to their life. "82 It 
follows that if the historian finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered the 
limit of his own mind rather than the limit of his approach or subject-matter. To add to the claim 
that understanding involves recognizing rationality, the thesis that all actions are understandable 
in this way, is, therefore, to restrict re-enactment in two ways at least. First, it makes it difficult 
to understand an agent's action if it were confused, because by assuming rationality Collingwood 
restricts re-enactment to confusion-free action.83 If every action expresses a sound practical 
argument, an action is invalidated if it is done on grounds which contradict the agent's own 
beliefs and purposes. 84 Secondly, the assumption of rationality completely rules out any action 
that is done for no reason at all. Donagan suggests that such action can only be explained by 
saying: "This is what rthe agent] chose to do."85 But since this means that the agent acted 
capriciously. it is equivalent to saying that it cannot be given a re-enactive explanation. To 
assume rationality is, therefore, to assume that dutiful action contains no element of caprice at 
all, which is to contradict the scale of forms analysis in The New Leviathan. 
While the above examples, with the exception of action done for no reason at alL can be 
corrected once the assumption of rationality is rejected it is impossible not to maintain that 
Collingwood's restriction of history to the understanding of action is an) thing but reductive. 
Even though the rapprochement between history and action is an ideal, to desire such a 
thing in the first place shows that Collingwood wants to identify history with agency in order to 
make history only one mode of the theory of action. This reflects, as W. B. GaBie declares, an 
excessively "activist" conception of human life, a tendency which Gallie sees in Collingwood's 
contention that problem-solving is the essence of historical work. 86 Of course such an attitude is 
expressive of the attempt to replace naturalistic methods \\ ith historicist methods in the 
construction of a science of human nature. But the e:\.1ent to which he believed agency accounted 
81 Fssay on Philosophical .\/ethod. 226. 
821H. 2ISf. 
83See Dray. HR 119f. 
84Dray. HR. 119. 
85The Later Philosophy. 230. 
86Gallie. Philosoph.v. 17: IH. 2S1. 
for the whole field of human affairs is captured in the Autobiography when he looks forward to a 
time when by the use of historical methods humanity shall "control human situations as natural 
science ha[s] taught [us] to control the forces of Nature. "87 This appeal to the coincidence of 
action and history is rejected by Ricoeur, because it fails to recognize that agents, while they 
perhaps produce history, are at the same time and more so affected by it. 88 It is here that the 
moral tenor of Collingwood's appeal to the ethics of obligation comes to the surface: for in so far 
as history is equated with agency, historical action is made a matter of will: "Man's life is a 
becoming; and not only a becoming, but self-creation. He does not grow under the direction and 
control of irresistible forces. The force that shapes him is his own will. "89 This conception allows 
the notion of responsibility to inhabit historical discourse, but it refuses a place to that which we 
suffer and undergo. Thus in spite of his anti-Cartesian understanding of mind, Collingwood, in 
this instance, appeals to an agent who stands outside his situation in the sense that he is 
unaffected by it. This agent is none other than Kant's individual 'who stands at the bar of 
judgement' . 
Such an emphasis on agency will undoubtedly place a limit on the hermeneutical scope of 
re-enactment. Yet, contrary to the above remarks, the limit ,..,-ill be found not in a failure to 
recognize that which we undergo, but in Collingwood's tendency to place the emphasis on 
intentionality to the detriment of language. While we can place agency under the concept of 
judgement, signifying a controlling agent who produces history. we must not forget the emphasis 
on prejudice that was so central to Chapter 1. To act is, therefore, always to respond, whether we 
are conscious of this or not. The agent is always and already placed in a situation so that it is not 
the agent's plan that determines its course, but the operation of history itself. As Collingwood 
declares: "Looking back over our actions, or over any stretch of past history, we see that 
something has taken shape as the actions went on which certainly was not present to our minds, 
or to the mind of anyone, when the actions which brought it into existence began. "90 In this 
respect, Collingwood recognizes that agency cannot encompass the whole movement of history, 
revealing an appreciation of Marx's famous declaration: "men make their own history, but not as 
they please. They do not choose for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they 
find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past."91 But along with this emphasis 
on the Sitz im Leben of the historical agent, Collingwood's avowal of tradition as aforce which 
a.trects the future discloses his sensitivity to the thesis that agents not only produce history but are 
significantly affected by it. 
87 A, 1 06. m~ cmphasis. 
88Time and Sarrative 3. 21~. 
89Collingwood. 'The Dc\JI'. 232. 
90IH. ~2. 
91l\1arx. cited in Ricoeur. TN 3. 2U. 
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§ 3. Concluding Remarks 
The great merit of Collingwood's appeal to historical agency is that it necessitates an open-ended 
understanding of history. The rejection of teleology in the concept of right leads to an overly 
theoretical conception of method. This is restrictive, because we can onh think about closed 
totalities and so exclude ourselves as agents capable of producing events. Echoing the reverse of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Ricoeur states: "if the world is the totality of what is the case. doing 
cannot be included in this totality. Better, doing means ... that reality is not totalizable. "92 It is no 
accident that both Collingwood and Gadamer agree on this criticism of method. This bodes well 
for the hermeneutical dimension of Collingwood's philosophy that I shall explore in Chapter 6. 
As for the problematic rapprochement between history and action, while it does restrict 
the scope of re-enactment this does not signal a complete collapse of the doctrine. My intention 
from the beginning was to concede a certain limit to the applicability of re-enactment by 
restricting it to the action of individuals. Such a restriction \\-ill, as I have indicated. necessitate a 
limit to the hermeneutical applicability of re-enactment. However, though Gadamer is the 
measure of sound hermeneutics, we shall discover that Collingwood's doctrine goes a long way to 
meet such a standard. 
Finally, the emphasis on 'appropriate action' which was such a pervasive feature of 
Collingwood's conception of historical causation secures historical reconstruction, because it 
relies on the unique facts of the case in question. It is best characterized as an investigation into 
the question 'did the agent face the facts of the situation at hand?' This question can be answered 
only with the help of historical inference. 
92Ricoeur. TN 3. 2.11. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Historical Imagination and Inference 
Introduction 
It will become evident as the chapter proceeds that Collingwood's de\ eloping understanding of 
historical inference has an increasing concern for narrative truth as against atomic facticity. He 
rejects a sole emphasis on 'critical history', believing that its preoccupation \\ith testimony 
prevents it from giving an account of the interweaving of character and circumstance which 
produces narrative identity. By contrast, with agency in the centre, Collingwood's understanding 
of historical inference seeks to give an account of the intelligibility of actions and thus goes 
beyond a purely empirical approach that is tied to inductive logic. At this point Collingwood 
reveals the importance of imagination to the whole enterprise. Within the lectures entitled 
'Outlines ofa Philosophy of History' (1928) we find the comment: "Historical imagination (i.e. 
[a] closer study of [the] nature of historical i1iference)."lln other words, Collingwood relativises 
the distinction between 'history' and 'fiction' in order to demonstrate that the aim of history to 
narrate the past is possible only on the condition that imagination is interwoven in the pursuit of 
this aim. 
The argument will proceed in two parts. After an analysis of Collingwood's 
understanding of inference, Part II will offer a brief account of how. not as a method but as an 
anal}'tic tool explaining success in historical research, the concept of re-enactment should be 
understood. 
( I ) 
Historical Inference 
§ 1. Introduction 
The merit of subsuming imagination and evidence under historical inference at once demonstrates 
Collingwood's belief that both these aspects of history are inseparable. It is, however, beyond the 
scope of this part to offer a full account of Collingwood's understanding of the historical 
imagination and evidence. Consequently, I shall focus on the intersection of these two aspects via 
an exploration of Collingwood's criticism of Bradley's understanding of critical history. 
Bradley's first academic publication was entitled 'The Presuppositions of Critical History' 
(1874). It is evident that reading Bradley's essay helped Collingwood formulate his own 
understanding of historical inference which he stated in his Inaugural Lecture and in the section 
on 'Historical Evidence' from The Principles o..lHistory (\939-40), but included by Knox in The 
line Idea o/lfislory. (rcY. cd.). ·B7. his cmphasis. 
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Idea of History. In lectures before his Inaugural. such as the two series from 1926 and 1928. 
Collingwood simply distinguished between 'dogmatic history' and 'critical history'.2 By contrast 
in his Inaugural. and in the section entitled 'Historical Evidence', he 'dO\\n-grades' critical history 
by distinguishing it from 'constructive' history (Inaugural) and 'scientific' history ('Historical 
Evidence'). 
Before proceeding to explore this important development a few comments with regard 
to Bradley's essay and Collingwood's understanding of its background are in order. 
§ 2. Bradley and the Principle of Analogy 
The situation out of which this essay grew was the condition of Biblical criticism as developed by the 
Ttibingen school, notably F. C. Baur and David Strauss. These Gennan theologians applied the nc", 
methods of historical criticism to the narratives ofthe New Testament, and the result was very 
destructive to belief in the credibility of those narratiYes. 3 
The intention of Strauss was to discover the solid rock of critically ascertained historical fact on 
which Christian faith could be based. This programme was. however, infected from the first with 
positivism. Now positivism, "though it actually was a philosophical system, refused to claim that 
title. It claimed only to be scientific. It was in fact nothing but the methodology of natural science 
raised to the level of a universal methodology. "4 The characteristic of positivism was a belief that 
objectivity was gained through neutrality. That is to say, the historian or scientist can get at the 
'facts' by divesting himself of all prejudices. This is clearly put by L Ranke when he states: "[I] 
extinguish my own self, as it were, to let the things speak and the mighty forces appear that have 
arisen in the course of the centuries. "5 On this method, positivism fails to understand the past 
since it is, to use Gadamer's phrase about the Enlightenment, "prejudice against prejudice itself'.6 
Strauss assumed on a positivistic basis that proof must be sought for faith before what faith 
professes can be believed. Collingwood rejects this approach and this is seen most clearly in his 
early work Religion and Philosophy. Historical positivism. conceived as 'pure' history. in 
Collingwood's view. fails to give any answer to theological questions. This is because the 
2Sce, for example, 'Lectures on the Philosophy of History' (1926).376-90, and 'Outlines ofa Philosophy 
of History' (1928), ~88-9 L pagination from IH (rev. ed.). A small correction is needed in van der 
Dussen's claim that Collingwood did not use the term 'scissors-and-paste history' in the early lectures 
from 1926 and 1928. Sec his History as a Science. 286f. A close reading of the lectures from 1928 \\ill 
come upon the following passage: "The historian's sources are, from this point of view. 'authorities', that 
is to say. places where he finds his statements ready-made: his equipment simply consists of a retentive 
memory, and his methods of work are comprised in scissors and paste." IH, (rev. ed.), 487f.. rn~ 
emphasis. 
3IH, US. 
41H, 13~. 
5Ranke, Uber die Fpochen der neueren Geschichte, in Ricoeur. Time and Yarrative 3, .~ 10. 
6Gadamcr, Truth and .\fethod, 2~O. 
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'historical Jesus' "can never solve the problem of Christianity. because there never was a 
'historical' Jesus pure and simple~ the real Jesus held definite beliefs about God and himself and 
the world~ his interest was not historical but theological. By considering him as a mere fact of 
history, instead of also an idea in theology, we may be simplifying our tas~ but we are cutting 
ourselves off from any true understanding and sharing of his consciousness. "7 The question that 
needs to be answered is, 'Does history have its o"n presuppositions, and if so, what form do they 
take?' It was this task that Bradley set himself in his first published work, to be followed sixty 
years later by Collingwood's own attempt to go beyond Bradley. 
Bradley was interested in the credibility of the New Testament narratives, but his main 
concern was to devise a criterion to serve the historian in the case of miracle. It is interesting to 
note that Bradley's essay in many important respects anticipates the later work of Ernst 
Troeltsch, especially in the latter's use of the principle of analogy. 8 
Bradley's essay is an attempt to state the presuppositions of critical history by which he 
means the grounds of historical credibility or authenticity. That is to say, critical history is 
concerned with the question 'Did such an event happen or not?' The subject-matter of critical 
history is testimony, and the critical historian is someone who has to decide whether the persons 
whose testimony he is using were, on this or that occasion, judging correctly or erroneously. 9 He 
asserts that the way to deal with this problem of authenticity is to correlate the statement of a 
witness with present experience since "the experience of others has no meaning for us except so 
far as it becomes our own~ the existence of others is no existence for us if it is not in our world 
that they live."l0 Bradley concludes that the criterion of present historical knowledge is best 
served by the principle of analogy. "It is plain from the whole of what has gone before that the 
ground of criticism is that which is the justification of inference~ and an inference, it will be 
admitted, is justified solely on the assumption of the essential uniformity of nature and the course 
of events ... a judgement based upon our own present state of things, upon the world personal in 
us; and that this is the sole means and Justification we possess for holding and regarding 
supposed events as real ... " 11 The autonomy of the historian, therefore, rests upon the principle of 
analogy. In one sense, Collingwood attributes the achievement of a Copernican revolution to 
Bradley's essay. in so far as the historian brings a criterion by which the 'authorities' themselves 
7 Reli~ion and Philosophy. oB. 
xThis is not to say that Bradley influenced Troeltsch, rather both sought to apply the world-view behind 
Mill's inductive logic to historical method. 
91H. 137. 
(OBradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History'. 19. This last point echoes Troeltsch's principle of 
correlation bv which he meant that howcn:r distinct. all historical events are of the same order and all 
.. , 
are explicable in terms of what is immanent in history itself On these grounds. miracles. understood as 
divine interventions. cannot be historical because they break the rules of immanent causality. 
IlpCH. 21. 2-t. 
are judged. 12 "The dead matter which was received on authority, and held true because it was so 
received, must", according to Bradley, "render an account of its claims. It is [now] true. ifat 
all, ... no longer as mere testimony, but because it has been examined and satisfactorily mediated 
with the critical object as at present existing."l3 In another sense, however, Bradley failed to 
discover the true criterion of history, because the historian is shackled to the principle of analogy. 
"The crux arises", Collingwood declares, "when our witness alleges a fact wholly \\ithout 
analogy in our own experience. Can we believe him or must we reject that part of his 
testimony."14 Bradley concludes that the testimony can be accepted on the conditions that "it must 
be equal in validity to our own most careful observation", and that "which was brought as a 
canon by the witnesses to the observation and to the subsumption of the mesmeric phenomena, 
was practically the same as that which we ourselves should have brought." 15 He bases this on 
two presuppositions which, in the light of historical knowledge, make his claim impossible. First, 
he assumes that for a witness to attest to the perfonnance of an event or miracle, the ",itness 
would be free from the influence of models of thought current at the time - especially religious 
models of thought. Secondly, Bradley's thought is further infected \\ith positivism because he 
regards the historian's scientific knowledge, as against historical knowledge, to be the mcans of 
distinguishing between what can and what cannot happen. In this context, Collingwood asserts 
that Bradley goes wrong because he does not appreciate that a "itness is always a son of his 
time. 16 Furthennore, Bradley's "proposed criterion is a criterion not of what did happen but of 
what could happen ... It does not serve, therefore, to distinguish history from fiction."17 In other 
words, "because it can never tell us what did happen. we are left to rely for that on the sheer 
authority of our infonnant. We undertake, when we apply it. to believe evcI)thing our informant 
tells us so long as it satisfies the merely negative criterion of being possible. "18 
On the epistemological level the principle of analogy fails because it assumes a crude 
picture-theory of correspondence. The question 'Did such an event happen or not'?' reveals 
Bradley's empirical approach to the problem of historical understanding. That is to say. his 
obsession with testimony, in particular his idea that history somehow exists ready-made in 
statements, fosters the belief that a true statement once deduced will correspond with the past like 
a reflection in a mirror. This use of the principle of analogy shows an ignorance of the problem of 
historical reconstruction. There is no real scnse in Bradley's treatment that the historian must go 
121H. 2-tO. 
l1PCH.27. 
141H. 137. 
15pCH. 29. 
l('IH. 138. 
17lH,239. 
18IH. 239. 
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beyond the immediately given. As a natural law, analogy is used to accuse \\1tnesses, not so much 
of lying about an event, as making a mistake about it. This is positivistic on two grounds: in the 
first place, it sets up a schema of 'objective fact' and its 'interpretation'. Witnesses interpret an 
'objective' fact erroneously. Thus 'interpretation' (a specifically religious model of thought) has 
nothing to do with the objective happening. Secondly, witnesses are mistaken because their ideas 
about it are 'primitive' and pseudo-scientific or such like. In other words, positi\ 1sm and the 
principle of analogy presuppose that past ideas are mistaken and henceforth only the ideas of the 
present time can be used as a criterion of what is authentic. This is, however. disastrous for 
history~ since it means that the past in-itself cannot be known. If the criterion of authenticity is 
weighted completely in favour of the principle of analogy it means that if the past happens to be 
unlike the present then the past cannot be true. We are left in the ludicrous situation where the 
historian's results, conclusions gained through historical research, are overruled by the principle 
of analogy. Analogy is, then, inherently naturalistic (unhistorical). It trades on the fiction of a 
view from 'nowhere in particular', but as such sees nothing that it is not filtered through its own 
spectacles. Evidently, it is the inductive logic of J. S. Mill which casts its shadow over Bradley's 
essay. His understanding of analogy is based on induction from observed facts on the principle 
that the future will resemble the past and the unknown the known. 19 
Collingwood argues that if the idea that the past must be judged solely from the present is 
given up, the past is allowed to tell its O\\TI tale. No argument from analogy then will hold, 
because the historical as distinct from the natural conditions of life differ so much at different 
times. As an illustration Collingwood offers the following wry comment: "that the Greeks and 
Romans exposed their new-born children in order to control the numbers of their population is no 
less true for being unlike anything that happens in the experience of contributors to the 
Cambridge Ancient History. "20 
Present experience, then, cannot be the criterion of historical truth, if present experience 
is understood in tenns of perception. Even though historical facts are not observed, Bradley's use 
of the positivistic principle of analogy discloses a desire on his part to treat historical facts as if 
they \\'ere of the same order as observed facts. He accepts the authenticity of unobserved past 
facts on observed conditions at present obtaining (the unknown to the known). This implicitly 
assumes, however, that an historical fact is an observable atomic entity. Collingwood wants to 
rebut this suggestion not only because it is a wholly inaccurate account of historical inference,21 
19IH. 139. 
2oIH. 2~O. 
21 "When it is said that science consists first in ascertaining facts and then in discovering laws, the facts. 
here. are facts directly observed by the scientist: for example. the fact that this guinea-pig, after 
receiving an injection of this culture. develops tetanus. If anyone doubts the fact he can repeat the 
experiment \\ith another guinea-pig. which will do just as well: and consequently. for the scientist. the 
96 
but because its underlying empiricism encourages the idea that history is contained in atomic 
statements of fact that correspond to the past. 
The criterion of historical truth can only be discovered, in Collingv,'ood's view, if we 
presuppose the autonomy of the historian. There are two ways of doing this: one is the critical 
way that Bradley analyzed but which was found wanting, the other is the constructive way which 
Collingwood proceeds to explore. 
§ 3. Historical Evidence 
In his introduction to the new edition of The Idea of History van der Dussen notes that 
Collingwood's treatment of historical inference in the Inaugural and 'Historical Evidence' "contain 
different arguments" and are even "contradictory in certain essential respects. "22 He is referring 
to the fact that, whereas in past treatments of historical inference Collingwood championed 
critical history, he abandoned it in 'Historical Evidence'. I believe. however, that what appears 
contradictory can be made intelligible. 
First, placing this discussion within the wider context of the lectures from 1926 and 1928 
is helpful, because it shows that Collingwood's understanding of evidence was always developing. 
We shall see that it was Collingwood's orientation towards archaeology which gradually 
influenced his understanding of evidence, until finally, in The Principles of History, it became the 
dominant vehicle for a correct account of evidence. The emphasis on the autonomy of the 
historian, arguably the central principle of Collingwood's understanding of historical inference, is 
directly related to the practice of archaeology. and makes the rejection of critical history 
intelligible. We might say that, in his later work on methodology. Collingwood emphasized the 
formal or conceptual side of interpretation rather than its material or empirical side. It is this, 
influenced as it was by the nature of archaeological research which, I believe, occasions his 
'down-grading' of critical history. 
Secondly, I shall show that what is rejected in 'Historical Evidence' is not the critical 
history outlined in the lectures from 1926 and 1928, but the understanding of critical history 
which, in Collingwood's view, is found in Bradley's essay, While perhaps unfair to Bradley, the 
point of making critical history simply one mode of , scissors-and-paste' history is to dra\\ 
attention to the distinction which follows from a thorough-going application of autonomy: the 
question whether the facts really are what they are said to be is never a vital question, because he can 
always reproduce the facts under his own eyes. In science, then. the facts are empirical facts, facts 
perceived as they occur, In history. the word 'fact' bears a vel) different meaning. The fact that in the 
second century the legions began to be recruited wholly outside Italy is not immediately given. It is 
arri\'ed at inferentially by a process of interpreting data according to a complicated system of rules and 
assumptions," IH. 132f. 
2lVan der Dusscn. IH. xli. 
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'critical' historian presupposes the ready-made 'source' and therefore limits his autonomy, whereas 
in 'scientific' history the historian's question is logically prior to the source. Consequently, this not 
only broadens the field of evidence, but also escapes Bradley's attempt to limit the bounds of 
historical authenticity to a correlation between fact and testimony. 
§ 4. The Lectures from 1926 and 1928 
At stake in the lectures from 1926 and 1928 is the attempt to disentangle historical inference from 
any idea that it is dependent upon ready-made statements. The questioning activity and historical 
sources are the two 'axioms' of this argument. Collingwood consistently applied both axioms until 
he wrote The Principles of History in which he rejected the emphasis on sources. Yet, as I shall 
indicate, the seeds of such a rejection were already apparent in his earlier work. 
Emphasising ready-made statements encourages the idea that the historian simply fits 
them into a narrative, but with sources it is different. The historian's attitude towards them must 
consist neither in acceptance nor in rejection, but in interpretation. This assumes that the truth of 
which the historian is in search was not possessed, ready-made, by the \\ Titer or witness whom he 
is studying.23 At this point in the lectures from 1926, Collingwood adopts the terminology of 
Bacon to show that critical history is not a passive surrender to the mind of another but 
autonomous and critical thinking. In critical history all witnesses are discredited, in the sense that 
all statements lack finality, because history is no longer ready-made but in need of the 
constructive skills of the historian. Statements and previous narratives are but "material out of 
which, by thinking for ourselves, we may hope to construct history. "24 Raymond Aron, a French 
contemporary of Collingwood, was pointing to the same idea in his thesis of the 'dissolution of the 
object'. For Aron, like Collingwood, no "such thing as a historical reality exists ready made, so 
that science merely has to reproduce it faithfully. "25 
It is evident that in 1926 Collingwood regarded critical history as both autonomous and 
scientific. Furthermore, he saw that critical history was concerned with the interpretation of 
sources and not their status as true or false accounts about states of affairs. In this respect his 
23LPR 377. 
24LPH. 382. 
25 Aron, Introduction. 118. In a brief discussion of Aron's notion of the 'dissolution of the object' Ricoeur 
states: "It meant no more than this: to the e~1ent that historians are implicated in the understanding and 
explanation of past cvcnts. an absolute event cannot be attested to by the historical discourse. 
Undcrstanding-even the undcrstanding of another person in evcryday life-is never a direct intuition but 
always a reconstruction". TN 1. 97. The rejection of intuition is a presupposition of the logic of question 
and answer. "My work in archaeology ... Impressed upon me the importance of the 'questioning activity' 
in knowledge: and this made it impossible for me to rest contented "ith the intuitionist theol} of . 
knowledge favoured by the 'realists'." Autobiography. 30. 
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own understanding of critical history goes beyond Bradley's. since it is constructive as well as 
critical. 
The treatment of evidence essentially remains the same in the lectures from 1928, but 
there is a change, which in the light of Collingwood's mature work is significant. In the lectures 
from 1928 Collingwood gives added emphasis to the logic of questioning and to what he calls 
'unwritten sources'. While it is important to note that the questioning activity and its correlate -
the use of 'unwritten sources' - are essential products of critical history. the real importance of 
this development lies in its disclosure of archaeology as Collingwood's model for historical 
inference. 
Collingwood's positive evaluation of what he calls 'unwritten sources' derives from his 
archaeological practice. The period of Roman Britain lacks substantive written sources, such as 
books and documents, but is rich in archaeological remains. It is easy to see how Collingwood 
gradually identified historical research with archaeological research, since it is in the history of 
Roman Britain, his own specialist field, that the two become one. In the lectures from 1928 
Collingwood saw that the distinction between written and unwritten sources was really a 
distinction between authorities and sources. In the former is found ready-made history in the 
ready-made statements of witnesses, while in the latter, history is to be constructed using 
questions concerning the purpose of remains, i.e. what they were for. But with critical history this 
distinction vanishes and the historian, following the lead of the archaeologist, treats both as 
sources. "The difference is that whereas an authority makes statements which we accept and 
repeat, a source is something which enables us to make a statement of our own. "26 The historian's 
question and the source are, therefore, the identifying marks of critical history. It is evident, 
however, that the emphasis on autonomy comes from the side of archaeology. "An historian 
innocent of all archaeology is an historian with no power of genuine historical thought, able only 
to accept what he finds his authorities saying. "27 This means that the practice of the 'logic of 
question and answer', which is proper to the realm of unwritten sources but extended to the realm 
of written, is the standard by which the historian is adjudged to be critical. However, it is not 
such a large step from this position to one which di\orces archaeological research (i.e. 'scientific' 
history) from critical history. He does this implicitly when. in the lectures from 1928. he makes a 
faint but discernible distinction between sources and evidence. "Practically. which means truly 
- -. 
evidence is only evidence when it is interpreted; and this means that someone must interpret it. 
But first of all he must look for it and this means that he must have in his mind a question which 
he is trying to answer. .. for evidence means facts relevant to a question, pointing towards an 
260PH.488. 
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answer. "28 Collingwood, therefore, had only to develop the implications of the principle of 
autonomy inherent in the emphasis on questioning and non-literary sources in order to do\\n-
grade critical history. 
§ 5. Collingwood's Critique of Critical History: Scissors-and-Paste 
While the account of inference in 'Historical Evidence' leans toward an emphasis on organised 
and reasoned knowledge which follows from the evidence, the main concern of Collingwood is 
with the reconstruction of the historical object. That is to say, like 'Historical Imagination', the 
section on evidence is concerned to show how the historian argues from the imaginary to the real 
in his attempt at reconstruction. This emphasis on construction provides the key to an 
understanding of scientific history or what I shall sometimes call 'post-critical' history. It is 
tempting to think that by scientific history Collingwood has in mind the exact minuteness of 
which Gallie is so critica1.29 Yet irrespective of his 'excessively activist' conception of history, 
this is not the case. Collingwood does not recommend the collection of every conceivable piece of 
data on the subject nor the collection of every possible artefact within the period under 
investigation. The model for Collingwood's historian is Hercule Poirot not Sherlock Holmes.3o By 
scientific history Collingwood has in mind the asking of specific questions, asked in the right 
order, which build up a picture of the past as the question-answer complex advances. This makes 
it clearer that Collingwood's rejection of ready-made history is identical with his rejection of 
testimony as the principle subject-matter of historical research. History-proper proceeds on the 
principle that no history exists ready-made and as such there is no point looking to testimony to 
seek a ready-made content that mirrors the past. The logic of question and answer presupposes 
that any statement from the past will not be understood unless the question to which the statement 
is an answer is known. It follows that the past, in important respects, will not resemble the 
present: that is, historical consciousness is a necessary feature of the logic of question and 
answer. This breaks right out of the circle drawn by Bradley's theory. The questions asked, 
280PH,485. 
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30"It was a correct understanding of this truth that underlay Lord Acton's great precept, 'Study problems, 
not periods'. Scissors-and-paste historians study periods; they collect all the extant testimony about a 
certain limited group of events, and hope in vain that something will come of it. Scientific historians 
study problems: they ask questions, and if they are good historians they ask questions which they see 
their way to answering. It was a correct understanding of the same truth that led Monsieur Hercule 
Poirot to pour scorn on the 'human blood-hound' who crawls about the floor trying to collect every 1hing, 
no matter what which might conceivably tum out to be a clue: and to insist that the secret of detection 
was to use what with possibly wearisome iteration, he called 'the little grey cells'. You can't collect your 
evidence before you begin thinking, he meant: because thinking means asking questions (logicians . 
please note). and nothing is evidence except III relation to some definite question. The difference 
between Poirot and Holmes in this respect is deeply significant. .. ' IH, 281. 
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therefore, will differ as thought advances in time, and so it would be a mistake to presume that 
the past as such corresponds with the self-evident. Unlike the scissors-and-paste historian. the 
scientific historian knows that the 'facts' are reached not, as Ranke believed, "when we have made 
our minds a perfect blank"31, but by asking intelligent questions about the subject. The question 
is logically prior to the source and so necessitates the act of construction. 
The emphasis on construction draws attention to an important feature of the logic of 
question and answer: since the process of historical inquiry is now set within a logic of question 
and answer, the historian's inquiry comes to an end when the question-and-ansv.·er complex 
reaches its tenninus. This means, of course, that testimony is decentred: it does not play the 
principal part in historical reconstruction; it is subordinated to the historian's question. 
Collingwood certainly goes too far when he states that an historian can prove his case "as 
conclusively as a demonstration in mathematics";32 but this might be a piece oft)pical 
exaggeration on his part, meant only to indicate that when a further question no longer 'arises' the 
scientific historian knows that he has proved his case. The historical nature of the logic of 
questioning does not, however, mean that the problem solved by the post-critical historian will be 
settled once for all. It only means that for present purposes it is regarded as settled. What re-
opens an historical subject is the realization that each generation asks new questions of the past in 
order to understand their own present. 33 
After describing scissors-and-paste history, Collingwood mentions two movements in 
historical method which herald its end. Both are recognisable from the lectures of 1928. One is 
the systematic examination of authorities to assess their credibility, and to establish critical 
principles according to which this assessment is to be carried out. The other is the use of non-
literary sources, such as archaeological remains. The first did not, according to Collingwood, 
overstep the limits of scissors-and-paste history, but permanently altered its character. Critical 
history turned authorities into sources by insisting that nothing is to be accepted until its 
credibility has been inquired into. The word 'source' indicates that it contains a statement. \\ithout 
any implication as to its value. The methods of historical criticism were intended to solve the 
problem of value: that is, critical principles were applied in order to see which statements were to 
be incorporated into the narrative and which left out. The second movement involving the use of 
non-literary sources was totally hostile to scissors-and-paste history. Not containing reliable 
statements, the question put to a non-literary source was not whether it is true or false - whether 
it mirrors or does not mirror the historical real it), in question - but what it means: that is. what 
purpose did the artefact serve, which is to say, what does it reveal about the beliefs, intentions 
31IH.274. 
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and motives of those who made or used it? "And to ask what it means is to step right outside the 
world of scissors-and-paste history into a world where history is not written by copying out the 
testimony of the best sources, but by coming to your own conclusions. "34 
It follows that the key to the difference between Collingwood's earlier account of critical 
history and his later account, is the distinction he makes between 'source' and 'evidence'. While in 
the earlier lectures he saw that the idea of the 'source' enabled the historian to make an 
autonomous statement, in 'Historical Evidence' he draws the conclusion that using the word 
'source' still demonstrates a 'scissors-and-paste' attitude to historical reconstruction. The word 
'source' is said to be misleading because a source "means something from which water or the like 
is drawn ready made" .35 Such a view, already implicit in the lectures from 1928, fosters the idea 
that "the books mentioned in a bibliography for the use of a scissors-and-paste historian will be, 
roughly speaking, valuable in direct proportion to their antiquity ... "36 In other words, the 
scissors-and-paste historian is interested in the antiquity of sources because it is believed that, 
being closer to the 'event', the testimony they contain will correspond to the reality as it once was 
(Ranke). 
This down-grading of critical history, \vhich is occasioned by working out the 
implications of the principle of autonomy, is at first sight contradictory. In 'Historical Evidence', 
for example, Collingwood equates 'sources' with what in 1928 he called 'authorities'. A further 
complication is that in the lectures from 1928 Collingwood distinguishes critical history from 
'scissors-and-paste' history,37 whereas in 'Historical Evidence' each is equated with the other. Yet 
such contradictions dissolve somewhat once they are seen in the light of Collingwood's critique of 
Bradley. 
The correlation between questioning and evidence in 'Historical Evidence' has the same 
status as the correlation between questioning and sources in the earlier lectures. In the lectures 
from 1928, for example, treating statements as sources enabled the historian to make autonomous 
statements. This means that what was understood as critical history in 1928 is what is meant by 
'scientific' history in 1939. So we can say with Collingv.rood that "[i]fhistory means scientific 
history, for 'source' we must read 'evidence'. "38 In other words, the critical history of 1928 is not 
the 'critical' history outlined in 'Historical Evidence' which "has to do \\ith ready-made 
statements", about which the historian asks "whether he shall accept them or not. "39 Rather, the 
34IH.260. 
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critical history which is rejected is that which. according to Collingwood, characterizes Bradley's 
essay. 
In the Inaugural Collingwood stated that Bradley's account of critical history, "ith its 
reliance on the principle of analogy, had only reached autonomy in principle not in practice. 4o In 
practice analogy fails, not only because it was a scientific criterion instead of an historical 
criterion but because it was used to enable the historian to differentiate between true and false 
statements. That is to say, it is not an autonomous criterion because once the credibility of 
testimony had been established the historian still accepted this testimony on its own authority. 
Collingwood's point, which is reiterated in 'Historical Evidence', is not that the historian cannot 
ever accept testimony, but that it can only be accepted in so far as it is used as evidence. The 
rejection of the 'source' because of its equation with the ready-made, makes the idea that the 
historian's question is logically prior to the source explicit. This not only broadens the field of 
evidence beyond its restriction to testimony (a point already made in the earlier lectures41 ), but 
also escapes the limitation of historical authenticity to the correlation between testimony and fact. 
The real question to ask, in Collingwood's view, is therefore, not whether a statement is true or 
false, nor 'On what conditions can testimony be accepted?', but What does it mean?' It follows 
that everything (not just testimony) we observe in relation to the problem under review can be 
used as evidence, and that testimony need not be discarded simply because it is not historically 
authentic. Rather, even statements which are obviously unauthentic can still be used as evidence 
for the historian's account of the past. The rejection of the word 'source' is, therefore, not to be 
understood as a rejection of history's necessary relation to empirical data~ on the contrary 
Collingwood is making a philosophical point: Bradley's understanding of historical criticism is 
empirical in so far as it assesses the content of a statement, i.e. whether it is true or not. The logic 
of question and answer is a philosophical activity which assesses the meaning of a statement or 
piece of evidence. It is the latter that presupposes the autonomy of the historian and corresponds 
to the distinction within evidence between 'what it says' (source) and 'what it means' (evidence). In 
other words, whereas for Bradley's critical historian, the constructive side of history has only 
ornamental value - a skeletal interpolation between ready-made statements of fact - for 
Collingwood's 'post-critical' historian, construction is by necessity structural. Autonomy has its 
basis within the presupposition that nothing exists ready-made. 
A statement such as the last has obvious benefits for historical science. The realization 
that unlike the poet, the historian always works toward his object via reconstruction means that 
there is a difference of 'catcgory' between poetry and history. While, as we shall see, each share 
common fictional elements, history must gi\c an account of how the past in its c\cnt-like 
40IH. 2~O. 
41LPH. 386. 
character, happened. On this score, Bradley's use of the principle of analogy is inadequate. 
because the appeal to what could happen as against what did happen fails to distinguish history 
from fiction. Secondly, to be independent of the ready-made is a positive development. because it 
means that the historical narrative is wholly the work of the historian not simply his interpolation 
of ready-made statements. This equates autonomy \\ith the creativity of narrative which goes 
beyond any simple resort to empirical methods. Post-critical history always goes beyond the 
immediately given through the use of a question-answer complex by which the historian attempts 
to substantiate his picture of the past. Such is the tenor of the fable Who killed John Doe?' 
canvassed in 'Historical Evidence'.42 This is where the empirical nature of critical history reaches 
its limits. In only asking the question, 'Is this statement true or false?', the critical historian 
mistakes the criticism of sources for the essence of history. 43 By contrast, to ask the question, 
What does this statement mean?' is to presuppose that the historian has a question of his 0\\ n 
which drives the inquiry beyond the statement at hand. History-proper, therefore, 'creates' an 
object which, independently of reconstruction, would not exist. The conclusion to draw from this 
is that, for Bradley, 'method' is being used in a metaphysical sense. History in its critical phase 
corresponds to knowledge of a closed totality of objects. This is what resolving the unknown into 
the known means. 
While advantageous to historical science, the opposition between autonomy and the 
ready-made is problematic for hermeneutics. In the first place, the epistemological caste which 
Collingwood imposes upon the logic of question and answer obscures hermeneutical themes. 
Even though each generation questions the past in order to understand their O\\TI present, 
Collingwood fails to give any indication that the past can also question us. He does realize that 
asking questions in the right order presupposes that a question 'arises' in so far as it based upon 
prior knowledge;44 however, he is so focused upon autonomy that the process of interpretation is 
characterized as a subjective act on the text. But in the realm of historical science this is 
legitimate. Take, for example, his rejection of the word 'source'. He dismisses such a word 
because it implies 'something from which water or the like is drawn ready made'. This is a perfect 
illustration of the critical attitude central to the Enlightenment. but it is also central and of 
genuine benefit to historical science. Gadamer, for his part, gives the word 'source' a positive 
meaning, because it presupposes the idea of the ready made or the text as a world of and to 
itself. 45 This 'poetic tum' of hermeneutics towards the givenness of tradition is, of course, crucial 
as a corrective of the 'disposal' of tradition encouraged by the Enlightenment's stress on the light 
-------------------------
42IH. 266-76. 
4JIn OPH Collingwood states: "These archaeological sciences are the sine qua non of critical history. 
They are not themselves history: they are only methods of dealing with sources ... ". 490. 
44IH. 273. 281: ,'-,peculum .\fentis. 79. 
45TM. 457. Gadamer detects this understanding of source in Plato's Phaedrus. 245c. 
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of reason. Yet this approach is short-circuited by historical science in its appeal to reconstruction. 
If the historian accepts the ready-made he must forfeit the name historian: at best he becomes a 
compiler of testimony. This is because historical criticism treats texts as sources (as fragments 
lacking finality) which are interpreted only in order to reach a conception of the historical object 
in question. The motive force of history is not the demonstration of present meaning. but the 
discovery of what really happened. And yet this submersion within epistemology restricts the 
historian's field of vision. The historian tends, on this view, to treat tradition as a text, as a 
'material object' that embodies meaning. The text, as a source, is then 'dissected' or 'atomised', 
indicating that the historian is the one who stands at the bar of judgement. This means that the 
historian stands 'outside' his subject-matter, in the centre perhaps, but with each text akin to an 
atom standing to him and each other in purely external relations. Such a view of interpretation 
fosters the idea that the subject exists in vacuo deciding between texts (traditions) willy-nilly. Yet 
the beauty of Gadamer's thesis of 'effective-history' is that tradition, following M. Heidegger, 
becomes an ontological force which carries all within itself. This is what makes hermeneutics, in 
so far as it is characterized as a reflection on historicality, a 'metacritical' comment upon the work 
of the historian. Together with the subjective process of interpretation as an act on the text, there 
is an objective process of tradition which is the act o/the text. As 'effective-history', tradition is 
not a 'material object'. but always notation standing in need of interpretation. 
Collingwood, for his part, has already revealed an acute sensitivity to the effective force 
of tradition. It is, therefore, only a question of how the relation between an autonomous historical 
science and hermeneutics is to be worked out. This is a task of the next chapter. Collingwood's 
bias towards historical science does, however, present the next chapter with two options. If we 
assume the general validity of hermeneutics, either there exists a dialectic between historical 
science and hermeneutics, or the intimate relationship that exists between historical science and 
the modem picture of the self needs to be abandoned. 
Let us tum now from a consideration of Chapter 6 back to the subject of the present 
chapter. 
§ 6. The Historical Imagination 
The main concern of Collingwood's Inaugural is to demonstrate that the criterion for the 
justification of an historical inference is the a priori imagination. That is to say, "neither the raw 
material of historical knowledge, the detail of the here-and-now as given him in perception. nor 
the various endo" ments that serve him as aids to interpreting this evidence, can give the historian 
his criterion of historical truth. That criterion is the idea of history itself: the idea of an imaginary 
picture of the past. "46 Critics of Collingwood suspect the influence of 'defective idealistic 
461H. 2.tS. 
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theories'47 in such a conception, especially when he reinforces it by saying that "the idea is. in 
Cartesian language, innate: in Kantian language, a priori. "48 Ricoeur, for example, describes the 
"idealism inherent in the thesis of an a priori imagination [as] break[ing] out"49 when 
Collingwood declares: "the ... historical imagination [is] a self-dependent, self-determining, and 
self-justifying form of thought. "50 
Such criticism is justified as soon as Collingwood extends the scope of imagination 
beyond its epistemological role in historical research. Even allowing for a distinction between an 
'empirical' concept of history and a 'philosophical', the idea that historical imagination is an innate 
idea which is imposed by nature from within, comes perilously near to an identification of man's 
historical existence with the actual work of the historian. 51 This is a consequence of the fact that 
history often means, in Collingwood's view, modem historical consciousness. 
Secondly, the demand for autonomy seems to give the historian a licence to 'make 
history'. P. Bagby, for example, complains of "extensive flights of the imagination" in 
Collingwood's historical works. He refers, in particular, to Collingwood's account of King 
Arthur, in which, "out ofa minimum of facts, he creates a new Arthurian Legend, worthy to 
stand beside the inventions of Tennyson and Geoffrey of Monmouth. "52 Even a friendly critic like 
Mink probably speaks for many readers when he expresses his concern that if imagination is the 
criterion of historical accounts, surely this destroys the distinction between history and fiction, 
and justifies subjectivity and idiosyncrasy. 53 Collingwood appears to advocate such when he 
states: "I am now driven to confess that there are for historical thought no fixed points thus given: 
in other words, that in history, just as there are properly speaking no authorities, so there are 
properly speaking no data. "54 On the strength of this statement C. A. 1. Coady has accused 
Collingwood of rejecting history's necessary relation to historical data. 48 But just as his rejection 
of the word 'source' does not mean he rejects empirical remains, so his rejection of data is best 
understood as a claim about the historian's autonomy: not an autonomy from historical remains, 
such that history is constructed solely via the a priori as with Hegel, but an autonomy with a 
basis in coming to your own conclusions. A datum is historically dumb, it is a source that is 
turned into evidence by historical thought. 
47Bagby, Culture, 68-9; Buchdahl. 'Logic and History, 106; Ricoeur, TN 3, U~-~7; Winch, The Idea, 
90. 
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49TN 3, 307 n. 13. 
50IH. 2~9. 
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4RCoady, 'Collingwood and Historical Testimony', ~21 
106 
When viewed as an epistemological device, the idea of an 'imaginary picture of the past' loses its 
metaphysical associations and becomes, in my view, a sound principle of historiography. The 
purpose of Collingwood's astonishing statements is to set out the grounds of historical inference. 
By describing the historical imagination as a priori he shows it to be a condition of history that 
the historian cannot call into question, because it serves as the means for gaining historical 
knowledge. What he means is that it is particularly suited to establish the continuity and 
coherence (in Gallie's terminology, 'followability'55) of a narrative. In the first place, the 
imagination fills the gaps, so to speak, between events by providing a narrative connection. 
Secondly, as a structural principle, 'the picture of the past' "has to justify the sources used in its 
construction ... credence is given to them, only because they are in this way justified. "56 In other 
words, the criterion of the historian's judgement is the coherence of his narrative. 
The most interesting feature of Collingwood's account of the historical imagination is 
how close he brings the historian's work to that of the novelist's. The distinction between history 
and fiction appears to vanish only to re-emerge when Collingwood introduces the concept of 
evidence. The analogy Collingwood draws between the historian and the novelist is intended to 
show that the historian is, like the novelist, free with regard to the construction of a narrative. 
Blurring the distinction between history and fiction is an audacious step in so far as it appears to 
contradict one of Collingwood's criticisms of the principle of analogy. Ever since Aristotle history 
has been the model for the realism of representation. The imaginary is defined in opposition to the 
real. That is to say, fiction concerns the possible, history has to do with the real. 57 However, 
contrary to Mink, Collingwood is sensitive to the distinction between fiction and history (his 
criticism of the principle of analogy demonstrates this). Nevertheless, in view of the importance 
of the historical imagination, he pushes in the opposite direction in the Inaugural. 
Collingwood focuses his account upon the 'imaginary' which is not opposed to the real or 
the unreal~ it is neither real nor unreal. By this step he blurs Aristotle's distinction between the 
real and the possible. Yet his immediate target is the empiricist account of history that too 
narrowly defined the real as the perceived. In so doing the 'empirical' historian simply by-passes 
the importance of narrative construction and moves straight on to the correspondence between 
fact and statement. But the historian is too implicated in the reconstruction to rest easy with such 
a nai've account of correspondence. Defining historical imagination as neither real nor unreal 
allows Collingwood to identify the a priori imagination \\ith the \vork of historical inference. His 
refusal to oppose the imaginary and the real not only broadens the notion of the 'real' to what can 
be reconstructed, but dissociates the imaginary from the fictitious and arbitrary. This in tum 
55Gallie. Philosophy. 22. 
56IH. 2.t5. 
57Ricocur. TN 1. 162f. 
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gives credibihty to his account of inference. When Collingwood says that "what is inferred is 
essentially something imagined"58, he means that the past, though neither perceptibly real nor 
purely fictitious, can be narrated. 
This appeal to the imagined which provides the historian \\ith his narrative structure or 
his 'picture of the past', has an important connection v.ith the logic of question and answer. 
Collingwood's critics, to my mind, have failed to notice this connection. The clue to the 
connection is found in Speculum Mentis. In a short but extremely illuminating section entitled 
'Knowledge as Question and Answer', Collingwood equates the asking of questions \\ith the 
activity of imagination: 
The activity of questioning is a puzzle to empiricist theories of knowledge because in it we seem to 
contemplate an object which does not necessarily exist, and empiricism believes that it is only because 
an object really exists that it has, so to speak, the force to imprint itself upon our mind or engage our 
attention. But we never ask a question without to some degree contemplating the non-existent for 
asking a question means envisaging alternatives. and only one at most of these alternatives can really 
exist. Thus questioning is essentially a suspension of the activity of asserting. and that is how we have 
defined the aesthetic experience or imagination. 59 
This fits well with the stress on 'scientific' history as a constructive enterprise building up a 
picture of the past via a question-answer complex~ for in Speculum Mentis, the questioning 
activity is only true questioning when it "looks forward to a renewal of ... assertion ... in the form 
of an answer. "60 The identification of questioning with imagination means, therefore, that 
Collingwood's appeal to the imagination as the ground of historical inference, and his account of 
the logic of question and answer are compatible in themselves~ for while the correlation between 
question and answer pertains to the progressive construction of a picture of the past, the a priori 
imagination simply provides the overall structure \\ithin which this is carried out. But this is not 
wholly adequate, because a general question like 'Who killed John Doe?' can stand as the 
principle of structure which is then fleshed out by other questions. As Collingwood declares: "No 
one with any grasp of method will go on asking the same question all the time, 'Who killed John 
Doe?' He asks a new question everytime. "61 As he says elsewhere, the question, 'Who killed John 
Doe?' "is only a summary of all these [questions] taken together. It is not a separate question 
asked at a separate time, nor is it a sustained question which I continue to ask ... "62 The use of a 
general question provides an even tighter fit between the a priori imagination and the logic of 
581H. 2oll. 
59SM.78. 
60SM.78-9. 
611H. 27~. 
62A, ~2 
108 
question and answer. because it has a structural capacity that can be used as a guide in historical 
research. 
Bringing fiction and history so close, such that the latter is sho"m to possess the same 
structure as the fonner, means that, for Collingw<><XL there is an 'overlap of class' between fiction 
and history in tenns of narrative structure. The gap between the real and the possible is bridged 
once the identity between testimony (as ready-made history) and naive correspondence is 
abandoned. It follows that the justification of historical inference is to be found in the structure 
that history shares with fiction. 
§ 7. History and Fiction 
At the outset, it is clear that once the naive opposition between the real and the imaginary is 
removed, a difficulty presents itself with regard to establishing the proper relationship between 
history and fiction. The problem is made more complex if both history and fiction are subsumed 
without residue under the concept of narrative. After this step has been taken the referential 
dimension of history - its relation to the real past - is in danger of disappearing, because once 
bound to the narrative mode it becomes increasingly difficult to escape the idea that history is 
about 'sense' rather than 'reference'. If narrative is allowed to encompass the whole field of 
historical discourse, the problematic of reference becomes synonymous with the lack of a 
vocabulary able to describe history's relation to the past. This latter difficulty is consequent upon 
collapsing history's referential element into the dimension of sense that history shares with 
fictional narrative. It is, however, impossible to extinguish history's relation to narrative: it is at 
all points a necessary characteristic. Be that as it may, it is, I think, clear that a complete 
description of history cannot be achieved if history is simply understood as a species of the genus 
story.63 A sole emphasis on narrative is insufficient~ it will not silence historians adamant that the 
narratives they write refer to the past. This is not to be taken as an apology for anal)1ical 
philosophy of history with its laudable concern for the epistemological structure of historical 
explanation. The emphasis on epistemology does, of course. testify to a distinction between 
narrative and history that I believe fundamental~ but I do not want to oppose a 'scientific' account 
to a 'narrative' account, because this assumes that only 'science' can deliver a referential intention. 
This would be to take a step back, acquiescing in the idea that the logic of historical explanation 
is independent of narrative fonn. The real intention is to testify to the 'interweaving of history and 
fiction'64 while emphasising the ontological import (the 'givenness') of the past. 
The ambiguous relationship between history and fiction is captured by Collingwood in 
his Inaugural Lecture. To begin with he emphasizes the quasi-identity between fiction and history 
63Gallie. Philosophy. 66. 
64See Ricocur TN 1- 1. passim. 
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in order to demonstrate their resemblance as narrative fonns. At the end of the lecture, however. 
he introduces history's relation to the past via the use of evidence in order to safeguard Aristotle's 
criterion. Collingwood's own attempt to distinguish 'what could happen' (the possible) from 'what 
did happen' (the real) is suggestive of the problems encountered when an attempt is made to 
distinguish fiction and history on narrative grounds alone. He criticizes Bradley's use of the 
principle of analogy because it cannot tell us what did happen, but only what could happen. Yet 
on more than one occasion Collingwood identifies 'what did happen' with the idea of necessity 
borrowed from fictional narrative. The idea of 'what did happen' is equivalent to the internal 
necessity of a narrative. Collingwood comments: 
the historian's picture of the past is thus in every detail an imaginary picture, and its necessity is at every 
point the necessity of the a priori imagination. Whatever goes into it. goes into it not because his 
imagination passively accepts it, but because it actively demands it. The resemblance between the 
historian and the novelist, to which I have referred, here reaches its culmination. Each of them makes it 
his business to construct a picture which is partly a narrative of events, partly a description of situations, 
exhibition of motives, analysis of characters. Each aims at making his picture a coherent whole, where 
every character and every situation is so bound up with the rest that this character in this situation 
cannot but act in this way, and we cannot imagine him as acting otherwise.65 
The idea of necessity cannot, then, be the criterion that serves to distinguish history from fiction. 
Not only does it serve to illustrate the peculiar identity between history and fiction as modes of 
narrative, it also shows that fiction cannot be strictly opposed to history. The imaginary is the 
mode of presentation rather than the 'purely' fictitious or the wholly 'real'. History and fiction, 
then, cannot be distinguished on criteria internal to narrative because both history and fiction are 
being classified from within that genre. But if we are to speak of the referential function of 
history without jettisoning its character as narrative, then it must be approached, if possible, via 
its established parameters rather than by any recourse to direct correspondence. Collingwood, I 
think, demonstrates his sensitivity to this in his use of the phrase the 'historian's picture of the 
past'. A clue to what I have in mind is suggested by Collingwood's comparison between a 
painting and the historian's picture. 
The historian who tries to work on the common-sense theory. and accurately reproduce what he finds in 
his authorities, resembles a landscape-painter who tries to work on that theory of art which bids the 
artist copy nature. He may fancy that he is reproducing in his own medium the actual shapes and colours 
of natural things; but however hard he tries to do this he is always selecting. simplifying, schematizing, 
leaving out what he thinks unimportant and putting in what he regards as essential. It is the artist. and 
not nature. that is responsible for what goes into the picture. 66 
65IH. 2.J5. 
66IH.236. 
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By emphasizing the similarity between the artist's picture and the historian's 'picture of the past' 
Collingwood is drawing attention to the fact that there is no original with which to compare either 
picture. The artist is not providing his audience with a copy by which to make a comparison. In 
advancing a 'picture of the past' prior to verification, Collingwood wants to show that it is the 
'picture' that provides the medium by which the historian comes to verify his construction It is 
with this 'picture' that the historian 'does the entire work of historical construction'. Here the idea 
of 'internal necessity' is at its most significant both with regard to history and fiction. By 
emphasizing the necessity that governs a construction, Collingwood is appealing to the idea of 
implication expressed earlier: it is the historian who constitutes his subject as a possible object of 
thought by the construction of his 'picture of the past'. While the criterion of internal necessity 
cannot be used to distinguish history from fiction, Collingwood is, therefore, right to stress 
narrative necessity, because it draws attention to the peculiar relation between historical narrative 
and the past. Like the novelist, the historian's (re)construction is a fiction in the sense that it has 
no original from which to make a comparison. But this is not the whole story. While it can be 
said that history is a fonn of fiction, it does not follow that history can be collapsed into fiction. 
The aim is not to democratize fictional narrative and historical narrative so that each can be said 
to be equally valid ways of envisaging the historical past. Yet the real issue is not so much how 
history and fiction are to be absolutely distinguished, but how history is to understand its own 
referential intention above and beyond the fictional resources it employs. 
In consequence, is it possible to say that bereft of any original, history's referential 
dimension is best described along the lines of convention? In the case of historical narrative. 
convention establishes that "things must have happened as they are told in a narrative such as this 
one."67 Readers, then, have quite definite empirical expectations of historical narratives. 
However, there are two possible ways of interpreting such a remark: a 'strong' sense and a 'weak' 
sense. The 'strong' sense is a 'linguistic idealism' which, while certainly seductive, is in danger of 
reducing the past to its interpretation and appropriation. Such a strategy, at work in Hayden 
White but more so in the school ofpost-structuralism,68 replaces the 'real' with the 'trace' and 
therefore puts the emphasis on an infinite telling which displaces or even destroys the element of 
gi\'cnncss in history. This 'strong' sense lacks the ontological dimension that many historians 
would want to safeguard. Furthennore, it is, I think, an attempt to 'democratize' the methods of 
representation through the insinuation of fiction into historical methods, in order to provide 
(obviously with explosive social and political consequences for good or ill) a commonality of 
expectation for all literary constructions. That is to say, the empirical expectations of a historical 
narrative. while perhaps legitimate. are reduced to another fonn of/ic(ion. There are no criteria 
67Ricoeur. TN 3. 15 ... Ricoeur is commenting upon the work of Hayden White. 
68 J. Derrida. 'Structure. Sign and Pia)'. 
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for saying one is better than another apart from a preference which veils an 'interested' party or 
power. But in an age of 'popular culture' why then bother to write academic history at all if it is 
simply an expression of 'power', since its impact is perhaps weaker than the power of film or 
television? Implicit in such a scheme is the move away from accounts with differing legitimacy 
and justification, to the position of saying that all 'interests' have an equal right to be heard. The 
end result of this 'tyranny of fiction' is the denial that the text refers to something outside itself. In 
older parlance, it is a denial of 'objectivity'. Objectivity, if anything, is simply equivalent to the 
representation of group 'interest'. In other words, what the historian's research represents is 
present 'interest' not past reality. Therefore. the end result of historical research is the new reality 
of the historian's text and not objective knowledge of a past reality. 69 
The 'weak' sense can be evinced from Ricoeur's emphasis upon historical narrative as the 
'method' of 'representing' the past.70 In other words, in the 'weak' sense the phrase can be made to 
encapsulate the 'givenness' appropriate to history. While the 'object' of history is the past, this 
past is not an object at all in the sense understood in perception. The 'weak' sense is flexible 
enough to show that while it may be the case that the 'picture of the past' is the historian's. unlike 
in art, the historical imagination is subordinated to the pursuit of the past: the imagination 
discloses what has been. The emphasis, then. is not simply upon the narrative but upon the 
methods governing the use of evidence. While, in other words, the work of present construction is 
essential, it must not be forgotten that the past itself, in the form of evidence in the present, 
exercises a 'gravitational pull' on the historian's inquiry_ 
Perhaps from this angle Collingwood's understanding of autonomy can be appealed to. 
Collingwood places the burden of responsibility upon the historian. Autonomy must not be 
understood as an arbitrary measure, but is a direct criticism of the notion of imitation. Imitation 
presupposes some 'original' and as such leads to the idea of 'authorities'. But since Collingwood 
has exploded the idea of ready-made history the idea of imitation loses its foothold. Re-enactment 
does not presuppose an 'original', because until the historian has reconstructed the past no object 
exists.71 It follows from this that autonomy bids the historian plunge into the work of 
69For YCI} forceful arguments against such ideas see. D. Shemilt 'Review Essay of Learning History'. 
70Compare Ricoeur's way of characterising historical narrative with Wittgenstein's remark: "We 
predicate ofthe thing what lies in the method of representing it." Philosophical Investigations. § lO·t 
White is on to the same idea: "I will consider the historical work as what it most manifestly is - that is to 
say. a ycrbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon. of 
past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them" . 
. \/etahistory. 2. his emphasis. Collingwood's 'picture of the past' is a 'prototype' of this argument. 
71 "This acth-ity is a free activity _ It differs toto caelo from the imitativeness which may induce a man __ . 
to do what others do because these others are observed to be doing it. For the historian does not observe 
others to be doing the things he does over again. Until he has done them over again he docs not know 
what thc, arc. It is only after I have grasped the idea of specific gravit~ that I can sec what it was that 
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construction. However, this is only one side of the concept of autonomy. Having no authorities. 
the historian does not simply invent something wholly without reference to reality. The burden of 
responsibility that rests upon the historian's shoulders is such that he must be attentive to the 
'gravitational pull' of the reality of the past, correlating his construction to what the evidence 
obliges him to believe. From the sources the historian must reconstruct the reality they seek to 
unfold, obscure, misrepresent. In fact, it is Collingwood's belief that the object of the sources is 
not some passive individual or dead action. On the contrary, the action or individual represented 
in the sources is that which actively shapes and controls the interpretation.72 It is from this angle 
that the idea of the past living on in the present receives added significance. 
The idea of 'what did happen', then, has a dual function in history. On the one hand, it 
corresponds to the internal necessity of the narrative that constructs characters and situations. 
developing them in the only wa:y they can develop, while on the other. it refers to the necessary 
correlation between the historian's construction and the evidence at his disposal. The historian is. 
as Collingwood so well brought out, in the position of a judge. As such he must prove that one 
explanation is better than another. Collingwood expresses this by saying that, unlike purely 
imaginary worlds that cannot clash and need not agree, each being a world to itself, there is only 
one historical world in which everything stands in relation to something else.73 In other words, the 
historian's most important task is to seek evidence for a historical reconstruction. Here 
Collingwood reveals a deep sensitivity to historical method. While he emphasizes the continuity 
and coherence of the historian's narrative, Collingwood has in view the problem of 
reconstruction. Following the assumption of a logic of question and answer whereby 
"propositions about the past are tested against rather thanfounded upon historical sources"74 it 
is ill conceived to think that a theory of correspondence characterizes historical accounts. Rather, 
thejustification of historical accounts is related to "what the evidence obliges us to believe"75 
where the accent on 'oblige' brings to mind the past participle debitum.16 The thesis of the 'picture 
of the past' refers to the interweaving of imagination (qua coherence and continuity) with the 
referential nature of the evidence which the historian is obliged to recognize. It is an inquiry set 
within such parameters that Collingwood has in mind when he says: "The novelist has a single 
task only: to construct a coherent picture, one that makes sense. The historian has a double task: 
he has both to do this, and to construct a picture of things as they really \vere and of events as 
Archimedes had done when he shouted [Eureka]: I am therefore in no sense imitating Archimedes" 
OPH. .J.J5. 
72"All historical evidence is a medium through which past events have an impact on the mind of the 
historian." PH. 85. 
73IH. 2.J6. 
74Shemilt 'Review Essay', 267. 
75IH. 15-l. 
76The Yew l.c\"Iothan, 17. Ilf. 
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they really happened. "77 In this respect, perhaps the verb invenio captures the essence of 
historical work. 
It is evident that Collingwood's Inaugural Lecture anticipates a number of concerns that 
animate the discussions ofnarrativist-philosophers who have come after him.78 In particular, 
Collingwood relativises the distinction between the real and the possible by situating historical 
reconstruction within an imagination which is neither real (perceptible as such) nor unreal 
(fictitious in the prejudicial sense). Consequently, the a priori imagination broadens the field of 
the real to what can be narrated, and successfully combats the prejudice that fiction has no hold 
upon reality. The imagination becomes the fundamental principle of historical reconstruction. Its 
peculiar nature - neither wholly real nor purely fictitious - captures the problematic of history 
exactly: it is necessary both for continuity, and to render the past explicit. Furthermore, 
Collingwood's understanding of the historical imagination testifies to the past as an absence (in 
the sense of 'conspicuous by its absence') which generates a 'gravitional pull' that must be given 
its due. 
Agency and the Concept of Empathy 
§ I. The Rationale of Actions 
( II ) 
In this and the two previous chapters I have tried to show that the doctrine of re-enactment 
incapsulates the central elements of Collingwood's idea of historical understanding. That is to 
say, while it would be a mistake to interpret the doctrine as a methodological procedure, in its 
capacity as the telos of history, re-enactment incorporates a methodology. Re-enactment is not to 
be identified with reconstruction from evidence, but forms a two-sided protocol that on the one 
hand, directs the reconstruction of the historical agent's situation, and on the other, provides the 
means for judging whether the account of the agent's action is appropriate. Both these elements 
form two distinct, but inseparable, logical components of re-enactment. 
The main objection to the use of the concept of empathy in historical understanding is 
that it does not belong to the logic of historical explanation. In the first place, it is described as a 
species of intuition whereby the historian uncovers facts about an historical event that cannot be 
gained from the reconstruction of evidence. Empathy is not, however. an alternative to the 
acquisition of facts via historical reconstruction. A second account of empathy bids the historian 
imagine himself in the place of the agent and via this imaginary identification attribute his o\\n 
view of the situation to the agent. This account of re-enactment has the merit of not confusing it 
with historical reconstruction, but it fails to distinguish the distinct logical elements involved. The 
77IH. 2~6. 
78Ricoeur. TN 3 Vois.: White . . \letahistory. 
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failure to distinguish between the logical elements is consequent upon the prejudice. recently 
overthrown, that the only valid fonn of explanation was explanation by general laws. For 
theorists like Hempel and Popper re-enactment is, at best, a heuristic dey 'ice, that provides a kind 
of intuitive check of the success of explanation by general laws .79 The same failure to distinguish 
between the logical elements is true of Gadamer's dissociation of understanding from 'empathy'. 
This dissociation is predicated on the assumption that understanding is a 'semantic' category 
while empathy is a 'psychological' category. 80 However, this dissociation has its basis \\'ithin a 
mistaken assumption about the particular role re-enactment is thought to play in the constitution 
of understanding. 
Distinguishing between the logical components of re-enactment has the merit of 
separating the first stage of historical explanation from the second. In the first stage, the 
historian, by the interpretation of evidence, reconstructs how the historical agent saw the situation 
in which he was placed. In the second stage, having reconstructed the situation of the agent, the 
historian 'displays the rationale of what was done' by showing that the action in question was the 
most appropriate given what is known about the agent's beliefs about the situation. It is this 
second stage which corresponds to the use of empathy. Here the real point of emphasising the 
standpoint of the agent becomes apparent. The historian does not envisage the agent's situation in 
order to find out new information corresponding to the agent's motives and reasons for acting. 
Rather, the projection metaphor is drawing attention to a point of logic: 
Only by putting yourself in the agent's position can you understand why he did what he did ... Its 
function is not to remind us of how we come to know certain facts, but to formulate, however tentatively, 
certain conditions which must be satisfied before the historian is prepared to say: 'Now I have the 
explanation. ,81 
To accept the thesis that empathy is a psychological doctrine and hence simply a heuristic device 
is, according to Dray, to obliterate a distinction between explanation types: "a distinction between 
representing something as the thing generally done, and representing it as the appropriate thing to 
have done. "82 Understood semantically rather than psychologically, the projection metaphor is an 
attempt to illustrate that the supposed choice between a literal identity and neutral observation is 
fallacious. In tenns of the two explanation types sketched above, the choice is between seeking 
the most appropriate language depending upon what it is that you want to explain. To think of the 
projection metaphor in this way dissociates empathy, and by implication. re-enactment from a 
79HempcL 'The Function of. 352; Popper. 'A Pluralist Approach'. l·n. 
8oTM.W. Despite Gadamcr. the understanding of empath~ advanced in this thesis is derived from 
analytical philosophy's preoccupation \\ ith establishing the logic of explanation by re-enactment. As 
such empathy is a semantic catcgory rather than a psychological category. 
81Dra\. Laws and Explanation. 128. his emphasis. 
82LAE. 128. 
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preoccupation with numerical identity. The point of the identification metaphor is not to prO\ide 
the historian with an identical 'image' of the agent's situation which he then proceeds to play out 
in his O\\TI 'internal theatre', but is an invitation to relate this metaphor to a certain type of 
language used in the explanation of purposive actions. Such language is exemplified by the 
second of Dray's explanation types. What the projection metaphor seeks to comprehend is the 
rational force of an action~ it does not seek to discover the internal motives and reasons of an 
agent as things existing independently of and prior to an action. The historian displays the 
historical agent's action through the interweaving of narrative necessity and evidence and in so 
doing will hopefully, if it is a coherent and continuous narrative. enable the reader to emisage the 
situation in which the agent stood. 
Collingwood gives as an example the account of an historian reading the Theodosian 
Code. In order to understand it more is needed than the mere reading and translating of certain 
edicts of the emperor. In order to understand its significance. the historian "must emisage the 
situation with which the emperor is trying to deal, and he must envisage it as that emperor 
envisaged it. "83 In other words, through the interpretation of evidence, the historian has to re-
create the emperor's thought, in particular, the element of situational awareness in it. "Then he 
must see for himself, just as if the emperor's situation were his 0\\ TI. how such a situation might 
be dealt with; he must see the possible alternatives, and the reasons for choosing one rather than 
another. "84 This second stage ofre-thinking is what Collingwood conceived as empathetic. This 
version of empathy does not recommend that the historian imagine reasons for a course of action; 
rather, the historian is to imagine alternative courses of action and to measure these against the 
reasons which the agent presumably had, as indicated by the evidence.85 That is to say, what we 
very often want is a reconstruction of the agent's calculation of means to be adopted toward his 
chosen end in the light of the circumstances in which he found himself.86 To explain the action we 
need to knO\v what considerations convinced him that he should act as he did. However, what is 
important to reiterate is that the agent need not have, on this model, propositionally rehearsed, 
either aloud or silently, alternative courses of action and reasons for action before he acted. But, 
according to Dray, such an admission need not affect the main point~ "for in so far as we sayan 
action is purposive at all, no matter at what level of conscious deliberation, there is a calculation 
which could be constructed for it. .. And it is by eliciting some such calculation that we explain 
the action. "87 Re-enactment, in other words, is a semantic rather than psychological categof): but 
this does not exclude the crucial importance of the agent's o\\TI beliefs, purposes and principles. It 
83IH.283. 
84IH. 283. 
85Martin. Historical Explanation. 53. 
86LAE. 122. 
87LAE. 121. 
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is from such a standpoint that the historian is provided with the means by which he can make an 
action intelligible. 
§ 2. Concluding Remarks 
This completes the attempted integration of the doctrine of re-enactment \\ ith historical causation 
and inference. The focus of this chapter has been on what we might call the historical intention of 
re-enactment. I expressed this by saying that the historian, using the traces of the past in the 
present, argues from the imaginary to the real. That is to say, the imagination discloses what has 
been. This is a necessary characteristic of history. All the same, simply focusing upon the 
historical intention of re-enactment, as in the analytic school, is not enough. Collingwood's 
understanding of re-enactment cannot be placed wholly within the confines of a concern for 
historical explanation. There is too much evidence pointing to its hermeneutical dimension. This 
discloses the polarity between analytical philosophy of history and hermeneutics in general. 
Nothing is more noticeable than the failure of anal)1ical philosophy of history to engage with 
contemporary hermeneutics. Such is the case with Dray. In his recent book on Collingwood 
entitled History as Re-enactment, there is no attempt to engage with any criticism of Collingwood 
from a hermeneutical perspective. Furthermore, he appears oblivious to the criticism of his own 
position in Ricoeur's Time and Narrative. It is true that there is a most important convergence 
between the two disciplines on the question of language, but curiously. anal) tical philosophy of 
history avoids ontological assumptions preferring theoretical certainty.88 Therefore, to allO\\ 
analytical philosophy of history to define re-enactment \\ill only exacerbate the criticism ofre-
enactment from a hermeneutical perspective. It cannot be wholly encompassed within a model of 
retrospective reconstruction. Re-enactment would then simply display an intention towards the 
past without any idea that understanding must exhibit itself in application to the present. 
This polarity between anal)1ical philosophy of history and hermeneutics necessitates the 
attempt of the next chapter to broaden the applicability of re-enactment to include the latter. At 
the same time we must preserve the historical intention of re-enactment that was the strength of 
the analytical interpretation. This and the follo\\ing chapter, in other words, must be understood 
as two phases of the same process. Each constrains the other to an act of recognition. 
88This is demonstrated in Shemilt's 'Re\·icw Essay': "History is important to ciyilization and culturc 
because of what it is. not because of the stories it tells. It pro.. ides the touchstone whereby we distinguish 
what we are entitled to belicye from what we are entitled to doubt. It makes usc of e,idence and logic 
not because either is unproblematic but because these arc the best materials and instruments to hand." 
269. Shemilt's appeal to method is understandable in so far as he is attempting to show that postrnodern 
approaches to history lack logical rigour and are therefore prone to dishonesty. Echoing Piaget (perhaps 
ironically in \iew of post-structuralism). Shemilt describes logic as "the morality of mind." (269.) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Re-enactment: the Intersection of History with Hermeneutics 
It is enough to say that we understand in a different way. if we understand at all. 1 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter, following the preliminary remarks in Chapter One, is to explore 
whether, or to what extent, Collingwood's understanding of history goes beyond the confines of 
Romantic hermeneutics. As the argument proceeds, the hermeneutical dimension of re-enactment 
will be unravelled. That there is both an historical and hermeneutical dimension to re-enactment 
is important. In other words, the tendency to place history in opposition to hermeneutics must be 
resisted. To drive a wedge between them only repeats the dualism that philosophical and 
theological thought should be working against. Re-enactment was described in the previous 
chapter as the telos of history. In this chapter I shall describe it as the telos of understanding. 
This is not a polarisation; rather, re-enactment is one single process containing two intentions, 
one towards the past, the other towards the present. 
The hermeneutical dimension of re-enactment cannot even be contemplated \\ ithout 
reference to Gadamer. In its scope the work of Gadamer is 'totalitarian' like Hegel's: a partial 
critique of Gadamer, given in the hope that a door may open enabling escape, does not touch the 
essence of his system. As with Hegel, all partial criticism is taken account of in an Aujhebung of 
consciousness. One has either to renounce Truth and Method or accept it. The question then 
might be: 'If Gadamer offers a totality, is Collingwood nothing more than a precursor, a verse in 
comparison "ith Gadamer's poem?' This is not the case. Rather, both philosophers contribute a 
verse to the poem that is human understanding. 
The fact that Gadamer was instrumental in the translation of the Autobiography into 
German, and his praise for Collingwood's discovery of the logic of question and answer. may give 
the impression that he saw something of supreme importance in Collingwood. 2 But when you 
read what he has to say. Collingwood is - as is the case ".ith any system - assigned a place along 
the evolutionary line of hermeneutical theory. It comes as no surprise that Collingwood is 'placed' 
in the realm of Romantic hermeneutics. I say this, because it is only in his own work that 
Gadamer thinks a true hermeneutics of historical consciousness is achieved. Certainly. any 
philosopher attracted. seduced even, by Hegel's dialectic will gravitate to such a position. The 
Idea o..lHistory bears the marks of a culmination of consciousness: Collingwood appears as the 
IGadamcr. TnJth and .\fethod. 264. 
2TM.467. 
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one true 'scientific' historian.3 As Richard Rorty has said, the philosophical use of history 
becomes, following Hegel, a kind of self-justification of the philosophical concerns of the author 
of that history.4 That apart, my concern here is to explore whether Collingwood is entangled in 
the problem of Romantic hermeneutics. 
To be brief, what distinguishes Romantic hermeneutics from the hermeneutics of 
Gadamer is the recognition by the latter that understanding involves a 'fusion of horizons' 
(Horizontverschmelzung). 5 Romantic hermeneutics "ith its sensitivity towards historical 
consciousness discovered the problem of temporal distance (Zeifabstand). The meaning ofa text 
is not simply 'at-hand', rather, understanding is conditioned by the text's historical context. To 
understand means that the interpreter must reconstruct this context. The meaning of a text on this 
model is its original meaning. It is evident that Romantic hermeneutics displays an intention 
towards the past. In contrast, Gadamer has sho\\TI that understanding does not ha\'e one horizon. 
but two. Hermeneutics in this sense recognizes that historical conditioning is two-sided: both text 
and interpreter stand in their own historical horizon. The basic idea here is not that the text (as 
past) and the interpreter (as present) are divorced one from the other by a gulf of temporal 
distance, but that each is related to the other in the continuity of tradition. Each horizon, in other 
words, is part of one greater horizon in which the text and interpreter move. Gadamer expresses 
this with his principle of 'effective-history' (Wirkungsgeschichte), by which he means that the 
interpreter cannot ignore the 'operation of history' on the process of understanding. This is 
because the interpreter forms a part of the process that he is studying. "The horizon is, rather, 
something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is 
moving. Thus the horizon of the past .,. which exists in the form of tradition, is always in 
motion. "6 This is a very important point, because this movement of 'effective-history' carries us 
with it whether we are conscious of it so doing or not: "the power of effective-history", Gadamer 
declares, "does not depend on its being recognized. "7 When combined with the idea of a 'fusion' 
between horizons, the principle of effective-history leads to the following conclusion: because 
both horizons of the past and present are elements in understanding, the understanding that is 
achieved, while in continuity with a developing tradition, will differ from the self-understanding 
of the past. Gadamer, therefore, unlike Romantic hermeneutics, displays an intention to\\ards the 
present. This does not, however, ignore the past; rather, the past becomes a necessary element in 
the achievement of understanding. What is at issue in Gadamer's criticism of Romantic 
JCollingwood does sa)'. however. that scientific historians can be found in the past. but only in the work 
of outstanding thinkers. and then only fleetingly. The Idea of History;. 320. 
4Rorty. 'The Historiography'. 56-61. 
5TM.267-74. 
6TM.271 
7TM.268. 
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hermeneutics is the latter's failure to relate understanding to application (Anwendung).8 To think 
that the essence of understanding is the reconstruction of original meaning is to fail to see that 
understanding must involve "something like the application of the text ... to the present situation of 
the interpreter. "9 In other words, by robbing tradition of its power. Romantic hermeneutics leaves 
everything as it is. But to do so is to fall under the illusion that retrieving an original meaning 
corresponds to understanding; rather, understanding is measured by the yardstick of appropriate 
practice. 
Ricoeur follows Gadamer's lead and places Collingwood's philosophy of history \\ ithin 
the confines of Romantic hermeneutics. For Gadamer this shortcoming is the result of 
Collingwood's failure to learn the lessons of Hegel's dialectic, thus succumbing to the idea that a 
'thought' can be re-thought without loss of its identity . Yet this lapse is itself based upon Hegel's 
doctrine of the Absolute. 10 Like Dilthey, Collingwood attempts to escape the problem of radical 
historicity by succumbing to Hegel's doctrine of absolute mind. This allows Collingwood the 
possibility of a standpoint 'above' history where a thought can be re-thought 'outside' time. 
Ricoeur reaches the same conclusion, but draws out the supposed consequences of the doctrine of 
the self-knowledge of mind. There is a complete identity between the historian's consciousness 
and the object such that one cannot distinguish between the past and thought about the past. Re-
enactment is simply an achronic logical structure devised to annul temporal distance. I I As a 
result, in his pursuit of a complete identity between consciousness and object, Collingwood 
succumbs to the seduction of Romantic hermeneutics. Re-enactment is reduced to the thesis of 
'original intention', such that history must always correspond to the intentions of its protagonists 
and the meaning of texts to authorial intention. 
In Part I of this chapter I shall begin the argument against such an interpretation of re-
enactment. This will involve an outline of Collingwood's idea of process which is the first 
principle of his philosophy of history. In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that the lectures on the idea of 
nature and the idea of history form a single argument. As a consequence, it is right that the idea 
of process should be taken as the proper background of re-enactment. This \\-ill provide an 
alternative reading of re-thinking which builds on ideas voiced in Chapter 3. The argument in this 
part will proceed via an analysis of The Idea of Nature, and show that what Collingwood called 
'Renaissance' cosmology provided an analogy for \vork in the human sciences. It \\ill become 
evident that the theory of matter that governs classical physics is transferred to the study of the 
past and results in what is kno\\n as Romantic hermeneutics. I shall then show that Collingwood's 
8TM.274ff. 
9TM.274. 
iOTM.467-69. 
I I Ricoeur. Time and Sarrative 3. 144-n. 
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attack on Bradley and the Realists' understanding of knowledge, that focuses on the doctrines of 
'internal' and 'external' relations, belongs to this problematic. 
Following this outline of classical physics and its theory of matter, I shall reiterate that 
Collingwood's understanding of process is governed by the idea of becoming. Like Gadamcr. 
Collingwood's understanding of being is projective. This is a consequence of his rejection of the 
concept of substance. Collingwood realizes that the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind which 
governed classical physics must be overcome, and he sees that this is accomplished in the concept 
of process. This new conception enlivens the dead matter of classical physics by making time and 
movement fundamental rather than accidental. Motion is, in other words, seen not in relation to 
an observer, but relative to a horizon which includes the observer. To regard history as process. 
then, means that historical consciousness does not make the process, it only makes this process 
conscious. Placing this distance between Collingwood and Romantic hermeneutics will allow his 
doctrine that history is the self-knowledge of mind its proper perspective. Seen in this new light. 
Collingwood's doctrine, although Hegelian in origin, is similar to Gadamer's understanding of the 
'fusion of horizons' which is part of the principle of effective history. Collingwood, then, as much 
as Gadamer, thinks that the telos of understanding is application. 
With the emphasis now on appropriate action Collingwood is able to loosen his previous 
ties to superior knowledge and stress an understanding that mirrors contemporary needs. Thus 
Part II is concerned with a positive re-description of relativity. Relativity now forms the 
inescapable condition of understanding. In the final section of this part I shall concentrate on a 
specific analysis of re-thinking. Building upon the argument of Chapter 3 and part one of the 
present chapter, I shall argue that re-thinking past thought need not be interpreted as an attempt 
to achieve, in the words of Ricoeur, 'a numerical identity' between a past thought and its present 
re-thinking. Drawing upon an unpublished manuscript in which Collingwood discusses different 
senses of 're-thinking', I shall illustrate that development is essential to the doctrine of re-
enactment. 
In Part III I shall explore the difficult question of the relationship between history and 
hermeneutics. While advocating a split between them would reveal a failure to recognize that the 
problem of understanding has moved away from 'meaning' towards patterns of action, there does 
appear to be a tension between history and hermeneutics. The emphasis on present application 
has led W. Pannenberg to question whether Gadamer is attempting to relieve interpretation of the 
awkward questions associated with historical factuality. 12 Notwithstanding Pannenbcrg's m\n 
rather startling empiricism, the unease this mme towards present meaning creates in the 
empirically minded is. perhaps, indicated in so far as it reawakens the older arguments against a 
12Panncnberg. Theology and the Philosophy of Science. 169. 
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theologian like Bultmann. But in the wake of Gadamer, the defence of 'factuality' loses its power. 
Philosophy and theology in their emergence from modernity are passing from a critical to a 
constructive phase. The displacement of criticism from absolute ascendancy of \vhich 
Collingwood's philosophy is a part, brings to mind the power of narrati\e as a force of unity. The 
critical method advanced by Kant on the basis of Descartes' method of doubt, cuts off our access 
to tradition and so robs it of the power to articulate its own claim. Yet the suspicion is that 
Gadamer has, perhaps inadvertently, reduced the past simply to the status of a critical moment 
within an all-inclusive system. Furthermore. the abrupt transition in Troth and Method from 
history to linguisticality occasions the question: 'do we now need historical method?' 
( I ) 
The Concept of Process and its Hermeneutical Consequences 
§ I. Renaissance Cosmology and Romantic Hermeneutics 
Collingwood's insight into the historicity of understanding has been confirmed by Gadamer's 
approach in so far as Collingwood, like Gadamer, follows Hegel rather than Schleiermachcr or 
Dilthey.13 But at stake is the question whether Collingwood detached thc problem of an historical 
hermeneutics from the consequences of Hegel's reflective philosophy. I have, to some extent, 
taken care of this question in so far as Collingwood's dialectic, canvassed in Chapter I. rejects 
Hegel's concept of the Absolute. What I want to do in the following is draw out some of the 
consequences of such a rejection. 
Fundamental to the achievement of a hermeneutics of historical consciousness is a 
thorough criticism of the concept of substance. Collingwood saw that the use of substance as a 
description of the historicity of existence was inadequate. Like Gadamer - v .. ·ho mentions that 
Heidegger was the first to recognize the challenge its rejection posed to historical being 14 - he 
realized that a criticism of substance meant an ovcrhaul of thc logical basis of knowledge 
hitherto. This is why Collingwood called the process of question and answer a logic, since the 
recognition of the radical historicity of understanding necessitated a ne\\ logic of thought. 15 He 
understood substance to be a 'substratum' in the Lockian tradition. In what follows, therefore, I 
13TM. 1~7-50. 153. 
14TM.214. 
15"In logic I am a rcyolutionary ... " All Autobiography. 52. In an unpublished manuscript he states: 
"Aristotelian logic recognises the singular judgement as one of the three kinds. universal (all S is P) 
particular (some S IS P) and singular (this S is P). But although the singular form is recognised. its 
special function in history is not for, when we come on to deal with inference. we find that this theory 
of the syllogism ignores the singular judgement as a special kind of judgement. and assimilates it to the 
uni\crsal: the judgement this S is P is treated by syllogistic theory as if it were All S is P. Hence we ma."· 
sav with perJect certainty that. if there are any special logical problems attached to historical thinking. 
th~ .lristotelian logic has nothing to tell us about them" 'The Philosophy of HistOI} 1932'. Bodleian. 
dep. 15. m~ emphasis. 
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shall follow this usage. This is legitimate because the 'substratum' is the idea behind the question 
What can be kno\\'TI?' F urthennore, the concept of induction. the rejection of final causes in 
Renaissance natural science, and the realists' insistence that 'knowing makes no difference to 
what is knO\vn' carry the same intention towards the fixed and unchanging. The substratum 
becomes a tenn which moves between two poles~ the first approximates to an object. the second 
to a metaphysical idea about unconditional knowledge. 
The question at issue in the conception of nature as it has come do\\TI to us is a far 
reaching one: 'under what conditions is knowledge possible,?'i6 Common to both Greek and 
Renaissance cosmology was the separation of appearance from reality. The first is a constant 
flux which cannot be known, while the latter is a pennanency which can. The Greeks sought the 
unchanging in a world of pennanently fixed fonns, while Renaissance thinkers sought 
pennanence in their conception of matter and in unifonn laws. For the purposes of this chapter ( 
shall restrict the inquiry to the latter. 
The most significant aspect of the distinction between appearance and reality. as it \\as 
worked out in the Renaissance cosmology associated \\lth scientists like Galileo and Nc\\ton, was 
the rejection of teleology, and the confinement of understanding to efficient causality understood 
as immanent in nature. This had the effect of expelling life (the soul) from the world, and created 
classical physics by conceiving the orderly movements of nature as dead matter. Accordingly, 
Renaissance natural science was based on the analogy of the machine. 17 This created the idea that 
the world is a closed totality open to quantitative measurement alone. Such a picture of nature 
found classic expression in Spinoza's Ethics: 'in suo esse perseverare conatur'.18 This may appear 
teleological, but in fact it is not. To say that eveIYthing in nature endeavours to preserve itself in 
its own being is to presuppose that being is simply what it is now. (fnature is regarded as a 
machine, then teleology or final causation, with the attendant idea of effort on the part of nature 
or something in nature towards the realization of something not yet existing, must be ruled out of 
natural science altogether. 19 The construction of the human sciences on analogy with the natural 
sciences that reaches its culmination at the end of the nineteenth century extended this principle 
still further. The inductive logic of Mill, with its principle of reducing the unknO\\n to the kno\\n 
via Hume's regularity thesis, becomes the essence of the historical-critical method. The conditions 
of Renaissance cosmology that prevented a proper henneneutics of historical consciousness were. 
in other words, the same conditions that made possible the application of the critical method to 
history. As ( demonstrated in prcvious chapters \\lth regard to efficient causality (in thc 
161he Idea ofVature. 11. 
17IN. 8. 95. 
18Spinoza. Ethics. iii. prop. 6. cited in IN, 15. 
19IN. 15. 
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mechanistic sense) and induction, the concept of substratum is at work in so far as what is 
produced is always something of the same kind. 
Drawing upon the analogy between Renaissance cosmology and historical understanding 
allows the hermeneutical dimension of this understanding to be made clear. The connection 
between them is to be found in the conception of matter held by Renaissance natural science. 
Matter was conceived, Collingwood tells us, 
as divided into solid particles moving in space. Each particle, physically considered was atomic: that is 
to say. physically indivisible and indestructible ... In virtue of its impenetrability it could never occupy 
the same place as any other particle: that is. at any given moment it had a place of its own. in which it 
was entirely situated and in which no other particle was contained. 20 
That a particle moves is not important to its being; rather, as atomic, a particle acts becausc first 
of all, independently of this action, it is what it is. On this view, movement is merelv an accident 
that happens to a body.21 This view made it difficult to conceive the proper relation between 
nature and mind. That is to say, if nature is a machine composed of dead matter how is mind 
related to it? According to Collingwood, Galileo, whose views on this subject were adopted by 
Descartes and Locke and became what may be called the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. 
said minds form a class of beings outside nature. and the qualities of nature are explained as 
appearances to minds.22 However, such a doctrine really made the problem of relation insoluble, 
because it was impossible to see any connection between mind and matter as thus conceived. 
"The corollary of such theories". Collingwood declares, "was their reductio ad absurdum in the 
view that mind could know nothing but its O\\TI states, and ex hypothesi the material world is not 
a state of mind. "23 This two-substance doctrine, and its presupposition, the principle of dead 
matter, infect Romantic hermeneutics. 
The idea that the past (matter) was atomic and entirely situated in its O\m place meant 
that understanding was 'achieved' in the attempt to see the past on its o\\n terms. The goal of 
Romantic hermeneutics was the achievement of complete contemporaneity with the past. 
Alternatively, if the consequences of the Renaissance understanding of the atom are thought out, 
the idea that knowledge of the past is inaccessible is the result. This supposed dilemma of either 
annulment of temporal distance or the recognition of uncrossable distance. forms the background 
of Collingwood's own philosophy of history. 
Collingwood saw that. in his own time. this failure to recognize the historicity of 
understanding was rooted in Bradley's Appearance and Reality The impetus of his work in the 
20IN. 142. 
21IN. 147. 
22IN. 10.1. 
2·~IN. 112. 
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philosophy of history has its origin in the polemic that existed in British philosophy between 
Bradley on the one side, and Moore, Russell, and Cook-Wilson on the other. The important point 
about this polemic, according to Collingwood, was not that Moore and company relented from 
the doctrines contained in Appearance and Reality. but that Bradley bequeathed to his successors 
a dilemma. The difference between them was simply Bradley's acceptance of one hom of the 
dilemma, and Moore, Russell and Cook-Wilson's acceptance of the opposite hom. Both Bradley 
and his successors, in other words, defined their respective philosophies on the grounds of a 
shared doctrine. 
Reality for Bradley was immediate experience: it has the immediacy of feeling. But 
thought divides; therefore, just so far as we think about reality. we deform it by destro)<ing its 
immediacy, and thus thought can never grasp reality.24 This, in Collingwood's view. bequeathed 
the following dilemma, a mirror image of the two-substance doctrine of the seventeenth century. 
to Bradley's successors: 
Either reality is the immediate flow of subjective life, in which case it is subjective and not objective. it 
is enjoyed but cannot be known, or else it is that which we can know, in which case it is objective and 
not subjective, it is a world of real things outside the subjective life of our mind and outside each 
other. 25 
Bradley accepted the first hom of the dilemma and the 'realists' the second hom. It is on the 
grounds of this shared error that Collingwood called Appearance and Realit)' "the manifesto of a 
new Realism".26 Realism was not an advance on Bradley's position. only a reaction against it, 
due in the last resort to Bradley's own faults. In other words, Collingwood is actually attempting 
to go beyond idealism and realism~ and he does this by rejecting the notion of dead matter. In fact 
Part IV of The Idea o/History, is simply a sketch of the various attempts to achieve an adequate 
theory of history which all come to grief upon the principle of dead matter. Thus, for example, 
the doctrines behind the dichotomous positions of Bradley and the 'realists', what Moore 
described as the doctrines of 'internal' and 'external' relations,27 are based on the principle, when 
used historically, that the past is an atom-like substance that exists entirely in its original conte~1. 
Just as the positivism Collingwood so despised separated 'fact' from 'interpretation', such that the 
lattcr had nothing to do with the former, so these doctrines separated the past, as substratum. 
from timc. Bradley with his doctrine of 'internal' relations did take time more seriously, but time 
was always something to be overcome. This is why Gadamer says that historical consciousness 
by itself cannot provide an adequate hermeneutics. This consciousness is an element within thc 
HIH. 1 .. 1 
25IH. l.tI. 
26'Thc Metaphysics ofF. H Bradley', Bodleian, dep. 29. 
27Moorc, 'E\.1emal and Internal Relations', 276-309. 
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historical process, and is not to be equated with the overcoming of temporal distance. 28 In 
thinking that a work tom from its context loses its meaning, the former doctrine prevents any 
form of mediation between past and present; while the latter's purely theoretical spirit divorces 
the known from the knower so completely that knowing makes no difference to present action. 29 
The problem of dead matter which overshadowed the philosophy of history up until the 
early decades of the twentieth century meant that philosophers, protests non\ ithstanding, worked 
on analogy with the natural scientist. This is the essence of Collingwood's quarrel with the 
German school of Geschichtsphilosophie which included Dilthey: 
It has always regarded history as an object confronting the historian in the same way in which nature 
confronts the scientist: the task of understanding ... is not done by itself for itself. it is done to it by the 
historian standing outside it. The result of this is that the spirituality or subjecthity which properly 
belongs to the historical life o/mind itselfis taken away from it and given to the historian.3o 
The historian, in other words, stands outside the object, as if observing a piece of dead matter, 
and attempts to enliven it with his own subjectivity. Yet such an approach betrays the idea that 
the historical process has no meaning (subjectivity) in itself; rather. the historian is the one who 
imparts it. Understanding on this view will always be restricted to the idea that one must 
'reactivate' dead matter by seeing it within its original context. Collingwood's pursuit of the 
question of the possibility of history is, therefore, an attempt to go beyond the question of 
method, the question of how understanding can be achieved - either by reproduction or the 
collection of facts - and to recognize, in Gadamer's words, 'what alwa)'s happens'.3! 
The source of this approach is found in the essay on Bradley which Collingwood wrote at 
the end of 1933. In the essay, Collingwood suggests that Bradley's Appearance and Reality, 
contrary to the received interpretation, was an attempt to resolve appearance into reality. 
Collingwood then shows that this idea combines with Einstein's theory of relativity: 
just as Bradley found the reality of appearances not in their appearing to a mind, but in their relation to 
a Reali!)' of which the human mind is itself only another appearance, thus rejecting all subjecthism and 
all substitution of psychology for metaphysics, so the relativistic physics. instead of making motions 
relatiye to the mind of an observer - that is a misunderstanding of it in phenomenalistic terms, rightly 
28TM.268. 
29 A 147. 
~oIH. 175f.. my emphases. Gadarner says of this school. "Someone who understands tradition in this way 
(through method] makes it an object. ie he confronts it in a free and uninvolved way, and, by 
methodically excluding all subjective elements in regard to it. he discovers what it contains. We saw 
that he thereby detaches himself from the continuing action of tradition, in which he himself has his 
historical rea Ii !) .. It is the method of the social sciences, following the methodological ideas of the 
eighteenth century and their programmatic formulation by Hume, ideas that are an imitation of scientific 
method." TM. 322, my emphases. 
31TM, 466, his emphasis. 
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rejected by its exponents - makes them relative to a frame of reference which an observer may focus if he 
likes on his own body.32 
Thus, Collingwood's transcendental question goes beyond the problem of the relation between 
dead matter and mind and realizes that this question can be asked correctly only if it is realized 
that what creates the meaning of the historical process is not the historian standing outside it but 
the process itself of which the historian is a part: 
the historian himself, together with the here-and-now which fonns the total body of e'·ldence available 
to him, is a part of the process he is studying, has his own place in that process, and can see it only from 
the point of view which at this present moment he occupies within it. 33 
Collingwood annuls the divorce of appearance and reality. appealing instead to the idea that 
reality is to be found in the flux itself: not in its recurring uniformities like Renaissance 
cosmology, "but in the actual sequence of the elements which make it up." Adding, "this is the 
principle of history, in the wider sense of that word: where history means process in time."34 This 
converts the dead past into 'process'. which means that the dilemma of the annulment of temporal 
distance or uncrossable distance is dissolved: "the past", in other words, "is not a dead past but 
lives on in the present. "35 
It remains to be seen whether Collingwood understood enough of these ideas to see that 
understanding is not achieved by plunging into the horizon of the past, but by a fusion between 
past and present horizons. In other words, the question is not so much whether consciousness and 
object are unified, because as we shall see, Gadamer believes as much: rather, at issue is whether 
Collingwood allows any difference to inhabit this unity. It has to be demonstrated that 
Collingwood thought that understanding was not telling a different story. but telling the same 
story differently.36 
§ 2. The Self-Knowledge of Mind 
The fundamental axiom of classical physics was the idea that matter was an atomic substratum 
for which motion was something external, something added to matter which already enjoyed its 
O\\TI proper attributes independently of such additions. But following the inclusion of life or 
process into the picture of nature, the dualism of matter and motion disappears. Modem physics 
regards matter as "possessing its m\ TI characteristics ... only because it moves: time is therefore a 
factor In its very being, and that being is fundamentally motion. "37 This new theory of the atom, 
32Collingwood. 'The Metaphysics of Bradley', dep. 29 . 
. BIB. 2~8. 
34Collingwood. 'Reality as History' . 
. ~51B. 175. 
36Lash. Theology on the Jr(~\'. 183. 
nlN. 151. 
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like history, resolves substance into function. The being of matter is simply activity. This 
reintroduces the concept of teleology into nature. The conatus of which Spinoza spoke is not 
directed towards the realization of anything not yet existing. Collingwood, therefore. replaces 
Spinoza's proposition with: "everything in nature tries to persevere in its O\\TI becoming: to 
continue the process of development in which, so far as it exists at all, it is already engaged. "38 
This contradicts what Spinoza meant to say~ for the 'being' of a thing, in Spinoza. means what it 
is now: and a thing engaged in a process of development is engaged in ceasing to be what it now 
IS. 
It is evident that the idea of process (activity or becoming) is appealed to in order to solve 
the problem of the divorce between past and present consequent upon subscribing to the concept 
of dead matter. This doctrine of becoming, as it applies to history, is given clear statement in the 
Autobiography. 
By about 1920 this was my first principle of a philosophy of history: that the past which an historian 
studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is stillihing in the present. At the time. I 
expressed this by saying that history is concerned not with 'events' but with 'processes'; that 'processes' 
are things which do not begin and end but tum into one another; and that if a process pi turns into 
process p2, there is no dividing line at which pi stops and p2 begins: pi never stops, it goes on in the 
changed form p2, and p2 never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form pl. 39 
The past and present are united in one process \ .... hich is always in motion: always, that is, in 
process of'tuming into' something else.4o This idea is summed up by Collingwood when he says: 
"in history the object is enacted and is therefore not an object at all. "41 What is striking about this 
is how Gadamer focuses upon the same idea. "We must here appeal from a badly understood 
historical thinking to one that can better perform the task of understanding. True historical 
thinking must take account of its own historicality. Only then will it oot chase the phantom of an 
historical object ... but learn to see in the object the counterpart of itself and hence understand 
both. The true historical object is not an object at alL but the unity of the one and the other, a 
relationship in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of historical 
understanding. "42 Like Collingwood, Gadamer sees that the atomic past can never lead to 
understanding because "this acknowledgement of the otherness of the other, which makes him 
381N. 16. his emphasis. 
39 A. 97f. 
4o"The essence of history lies not in its consisting of indh idual facts ... but in the process or 
development leading from one to another". IH. 169. 
-lIColliogwood's 'Scheme for The Principles of History'. in Dussen. History as a Science. App. I. 
emphasis in original. 
42TM. 267. my emphasis 
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the object of objective knowledge, invites the fundamental suspension of his claim to truth."·n If 
we follow Ricoeur, we should say that while Gadamer and Collingwood agree that self-
knowledge occasions a unity between consciousness and object, Gadamer, unlike Collingwood. 
preserves the otherness of the past in his thesis of the 'fusion of horizons'. Yet Collingwood is 
closer to Gadamer than Ricoeur supposes. Collingwood was aware that the problem of 
distinguishing past from present without divorcing them was of supreme importance. In the 
Autobiography he states: "No question in my study of historical method ever gave me so much 
trouble~ and the answer was not complete until some years later [i.e. after 1928]."44 He goes on 
to give the principle of incapsulation as the solution. There is a fusion between the past and 
present, but the principle that past life "is prevented from overflowing into" present life because it 
is incapsulated in this present life, means that past and present while fused are not confused. 45 
The result of this fusion is history as the self-knowledge of mind (application) which he then goes 
on to outline.46 Furthennore, in the preceding section of this first part it was made clear that the 
whole direction of Collingwood's thought was focused on overcoming the problem of a divorce 
between past and present. The doctrine of the self-knowledge of mind was adopted by 
Collingwood to show that the historian can have knowledge of the past in the present and know 
that it is knowledge of the past.47 It follO\\"s that two things need to be demonstrated. First, 
Collingwood's idea that the past lives on in the present must mean more than that the remains of 
the past can be observed in the present. Secondly, more evidence needs to be gathered shO\\ing 
that Collingwood thought that understanding consisted of a 'fusion of horizons'. 
If one followed a constructionist interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy of history, 
whereby the past is nothing more than an intellectual construction in the present, the conclusion 
that history was the explanation of present evidence would be inevitable: "Collingwood differs 
from most philosophers of history in that he was not concerned with explaining history~ he was. 
however, concerned with explaining evidence. "48 On this interpretation, 1. P. Hogan's, the only 
view open to us would be to align Collingwood's understanding to Dilthey's, and apply Gadamer's 
criticism of the latter to the fonner.49 This is why I believe Hogan's attempt to demonstrate the 
henncneutical basis of Collingwood's philosophy is doomed from the start. Beginning from the 
concept of , ideality' 50 the historian reconstitutes the past from the observable remains in the 
43TM,270. 
44A, 112. 
45 A. 113f. 
46A, 11-t-19. 
47See IH, 151-59. 
48Hogan. Collingwood. 116. 
49TM. 192-23-t, esp. 230. 
50Scc Collingwood's article 'Some Perplexities about Time', and his lectures 'Outlines of a Philosophy of 
History' (1928) in IH (rev. cd.). 
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present. Because the remains are 'dead' they cannot speak for themselves. and so are totally 
dependent upon the historian's act of imagination. On this view, the past is dead and gone and 
what we call the past is simply a construction in the present. It follows that a constructionist is 
unable (or better, unwilling) to distinguish the past from his thought about the past. Ricoeur 
reaches the same conclusion about Collingwood, because for him what survives in the present is 
nothing but the act of re-enactment. "We might even go so far as to say, paradoxically, that a 
trace only becomes a trace of the past at the moment when its character of pastness is abolished 
by the atemporal act of rethinking the event in its internal thought."51 Collingwood's thesis that 
the past lives on in the present, however, cannot be reduced to either of these ideas. The tendency 
to attribute this thesis to a thorough-going idealism does, of course. appear plausible, but it 
misses an essential aspect of Collingwood's understanding of process: the concept of tradition. 
For Collingwood a process is a dialectic in which one phase gives way to another, but 
with the added notion that the previous stage conserves itself in the latter. This leads to what 
Collingwood calls an accumulation or enrichment of the process. In an unpublished manuscript 
he displays the scope of this idea: "For mind in general, this accumulation is called experience: 
for consciousness, it is called memory, for a social unity, it is called tradition; for knO\\ ledge, it 
is called history. "52 In this light, the concept of ideality takes on another dimension. It is, in fact, 
Collingwood's way of saying that while the past is not an actuality. it remains in the present. 
Things, in other words, come into existence and go out of existence, but they do not cease to be. 
That Collingwood is thinking of tradition when he uses the concept of ideality is made clear in the 
following: 
the historical past is that which not only was, but remains historically knowable, which it does only 
because it remains: remains not in its actuality (as form embodied in matter) but in its ideality (as pure 
form) ... We can know the Norman Conquest because, being its heirs, we have it in our own minds (in 
our actual political consciousness) as an integral element. Its eternity is therefore nothing but a 
grandiloquent (and inaccurate) way of stating its survival as an effective force down to the present. On 
this showing the eternity of historical fact is only the continuity of historical tradition: the continued 
embodiment of the past in the present. 53 
The emphasis on tradition annuls the idea that the 'remains' of the past in the present are purely 
empirical remains. A 'trace' "must be something more than any material body. or any state of a 
material body "54 Whether, in other words, material sources do survive in the present 
Collingwood realizes that by themselves they are not enough. "In general terms, the modem 
historian can study the Middle Ages, in the way in which he actually does study them. only 
51 Ricocur, TN ). 1~6. 
S2'Notcs Toward a Metaphysic'. Bodleian. dep. 18/~. 15. my emphases. 
S]'Notes on the History', Bodleian. dep. 13/2. 
S4A, 96. 
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because they are not dead. By that I mean not that their writings and so forth are still in existence 
as material objects, but that their ways of thinking are still in existence as ways in which people 
still think."55 Two things follow from this: first, since the historian is part of this process. 
historical consciousness cannot create this process. Behind the constructionist argument (and 
Ricoeur's criticism) is the idea that the subject is master of history. Nothing escapes the subject: 
rather, everything is constituted through its creative action. Collingwood, howcver, does not 
believe this. Echoing what I put forward in Chapter 1 he asserts: "Tradition here does not mean 
conscious knowledge of the past. "56 On the contrary, tradition, in Collingwood's vicw, is 
'objective' because it remains. 57 He represents historical consciousness as a 'subjective' act of 
interpretation on the past, while tradition is the 'objective' act of the past itself. We are, therefore, 
able to say that without historical consciousness we have no medium which can give us a view of 
the historical past. But conversely: \\ithout a tradition of unconscious thought there can be no 
historical consciousness. In the second place, the recognition that the esse of the past is not to be 
equated with what is historically known reveals Collingwood's insight into Gadamer's principle of 
'effective-history'. Let me now repeat the important citation from Chapter 1 as e\idcnce for this: 
"The continuity of a cultural tradition is unconscious: those who live in it need not be explicitly 
aware of its existence. The continuity of a tradition is a continuity of a force by which past 
experience affects the future; and this force does not depend on the conscious memory of those 
experiences. "58 
Gadamer's statement, cited earlier, that the 'power of effective-history does not depend on 
its being recognized' leads to an important critique of subjectivism. Developing Heidegger's 
principle of'thrownness' (and Dasein) in terms of tradition, Gadamer realizes that the important 
thing is not a person's judgements but their prejudices. As agents, in other words, we are situated 
in a tradition that determines the questions we ask. It has been a common assumption that 
Collingwood was too subjectivist to come to such a conclusion. As with much Collingwood has 
\\TItten there is some truth in this. The polemic in The Idea of History against scissors-and-paste 
history that ends with Collingwood's important idea that the historian is his own authority, 
obscures the consequences of effective-history. While the logic of question and answer contains 
the idea that a real question is one that must 'arise', and that this question can only be asked if it is 
based on prior knowledge, as we sa" in the previous chapter, he applied his logic to specific 
problems of historical reconstruction. This limited its scope to the historian who asks the 
questions. obscuring the role tradition has in determining the questions asked. Yet together with 
55 A. 97. 
56'Notes on the History'. dep. 1 JI2. 
57'Notcs on the History'. dep. 1312. my emphasis. 
58Romal1 Britain and the English Settlements. 252. my emphases. 
the evidence of Chapter 1 and that given immediately above. Collingwood's appeal to the idea 
that motion is not relative to an observer but relative to a reference point which includes the 
observer, provides strong evidence against the accusation of subjectivism. The fundamental point 
here is that Collingwood saw that humanity makes history in circumstances it has not made. 
Furthennore, it is feasible that Collingwood held the idea that when understanding takes place it 
will always be a different understanding. Because the continuity of tradition is unconscious, any 
modification in fundamental ideas, which corresponds to asking new questions, \\ ill not be 
consciously devised "but created by a process of unconscious thought" . 59 
In the final analysis, Collingwood's doctrine of the self-knowledge of mind does not 
acquiesce in the idea that consciousness and object are identical. On the one hand, the principle of 
incapsulation is the theory that secures this, while on the other, the continuity of an unconscious 
tradition ensures that the questioner only makes conscious what was already given. I have 
demonstrated that the principle of incapsulation bears a similarity to Gadamer's principle of the 
'fusion of horizons'. What I now want to do is indicate two other places where Collin~'ood 
displays this idea. It will be obvious from what I have just said that Collingwood's explicit 
statement of this idea is rather sparse. However, explicit statements, whether few or many, must 
be seen in the context of their interpretation. It is the doctrine of the self-knowledge of mind that, 
I believe, is able to provide this interpretative framework. 
In the lecture on re-enactment in The Idea of History Collingwood demonstrates that 
thought, where it studies the act of thinking itself, is "able to study past acts of thinking and 
compare them with the present act."60 Now in the case of thinking about a feeling there is a 
difference. "The actual past anger of which I am thinking is past and gone; that does not reappear 
... The gap of time between my present thought and its past object is bridged not by the survival 
or revival of the object, but only by the power of thought to overleap such a gap."61 This makes 
more sense of Collingwood's criticism of Dilthey that Gadamer believes to be very disappointing. 
Collingwood criticizes Dilthey for converting history into psychology.62 Now psychology, in 
Collingwood's view, is the science of feeling. 63 It is evident, therefore, that Collingwood criticizes 
Dilthey for conceiving historical understanding as an achievement of contemporaneity with the 
past: i.e. for thinking that the historian must overcome temporal distance. Collingwood calls this 
'overleaping' a function of memory, which can be equated with (historical) consciousness as he 
does when talking about enrichment. This consciousness is, in other words, a consciousness of 
temporal distance and as such forms perhaps only one half of understanding. If, on the contrary. 
59 Fssa..v on .\ !t'laph\·sics . .tS. n. 
60TH. 293. 
61 IH. 293, m~ emphasis. 
621H 171 
6.lEM, 106-11. 
what is thought about is a past activity of thought, "the gap is bridged from both sides". 64 
Collingwood comments: 
historical knowledge is that special kind of memory where the object of present thought is past thought. 
the gap between present and past being bridged not only by the power of present thought to think of the 
past, but also by the power of past thought to reawaken itself in the present. 65 
It is evident from this that Collingwood does recognize that understanding is, in Gadamer's 
words, a 'fusion of horizons'. Furthermore, in the same section of the lecture Collingwood 
appears to give some indication that by 'bridging the gap from both sides' he realizes that 
understanding changes. He comments that whereas in memory (one horizon) the past is a mere 
spectacle, in history (two horizons) the past is re-enacted in present thought. "So far as this 
thought is mere thought, the past is merely re-enacted. "66 The use of , re-enact ed' here appears to 
be a synonym for 'repeated'. But he goes on to say that "so far as it is thought about thought, the 
past is thought of as being re-enacted, and my knowledge of myself is historical knowledge. "67 In 
the Autobiography he provides a clue to this emphasis on development when he states that 
knowledge from a dead past is useless to present action: "because, since history never exactly 
repeats itself, the problem before me now is never sufficiently like the problem described by my 
authorities to justify me in repeating the solution which then succeeded, or avoiding that which 
then failed. "68 Here again, it is not the past in itself that is important, but the interaction of past 
and present which produces appropriate action. 
The second example of Collingwood's sensitivity to the idea of a fusion of two horizons 
is found in his moral philosophy lectures from 1940. In the context of a discussion of duty. 
Collingwood states: "His [the historian's] consciousness is a consciousness not only of his subject 
in the past, but of his situation and activity in the present. "69 The emphasis on duty is important, 
because it shows that, like Gadamer, Collingwood recognizes that the historian's understanding of 
the past is itself an event.70 That is to say, because consciousness of duty is consciousness "that 
this and nothing else is what we can dO"71, the historian's understanding is a development of past 
understanding. This is put clearly in the following: " ... eyery historian is conscious not only of 
I the past]: he is also conscious that his 0\\ n interpretation or reconstruction or view ... is itself an 
641H. 293. 
65IH.294. 
66IH.293. 
671H, 293. my emphasis. 
68A. 99f. 
69'Goodness'. Bodlcian. dep. 8. 7.t. 
70 llUnderstanding itsclfproyed to be an cyenl ... " TM. 276. 
71 'Goodness.' Bodleian. dep. 8. 77. 
historical event. It is a unique view: a vie\\ which could only be taken now ... "72 It has become 
obvious that these explicit statements of what Gadamer calls a 'fusion of horizons' do not exist 
apart from the doctrine of the self-knowledge. 
It is this doctrine that enable him to show that re-enactment is the telos of understanding. 
"So long", he says, "as the past and present are outside one another, knowledge of the past is not 
of much use in the problems of the present. "73 It is the tendency to objectify the past and the 
present that prevents understanding. Like Gadamer, he recognizes that a rejection of the historical 
'object' allows past and present to form a unity in which the interpreter understands both. "The 
past and present are not two objects: the past is an element in the present, and in stud~ing the past 
we are actually coming to know the present, not coming to know something else which will lead 
us on to know or to manipulate the present. "74 This is a clear echo of Gadamer's principle of the 
'fusion of horizons'. Understanding, in other words, does not terminate with knowledge of the past 
in itself; rather, from this perspective, knowledge of the past is but one phase in the act of 
understanding. Collingwood sees, therefore, that understanding is only complete in its application 
to present action: "we study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are 
called upon to act. Hence the plane on which, ultimately, all problems arise is the plane of 'real' 
life: that to which they are referred for their solution is history. "75 As with Gadamer, 
Collingwood recognizes that true understanding must involve development. This is a consequence 
of their projective understanding of being. 
The focus on the concept of process that I have sought to pursue is important, because it 
highlights the radical nature of Collingwood's understanding of being. It gives his thought its 
cutting edge and perhaps is what MacKinnon attempts to grasp when he says that Collingwood 
more than most philosophers belongs to the twentieth century.76 The rapprochement between 
nature and history that Collingwood pursued, distinguishes him from the German school of 
Verstehen. Historical being, in Collingwood's view, does not have to be distinguished from 
natural being in order to give an epistemological justification to the methodology of history. 
Rather, both modem physics and modem history are characterized by a projective understanding 
of being. If the concept of process is taken seriously. in other words, re-enactment is no more a 
mere logical concept than it is a methodological concept. It must possess those characteristics of 
development that are proper to understanding. 
n'Goodness.' Bodleian, dep. 8. 7~. 
73 A. 100. 
74'Lectures on the Philosophy of History' 1926, 406. 
75A,II~. 
76" ... he belonged more intimately than most philosophers to the twentieth century. and the problems in 
respect of which he urged Socratic self-scrutiny were those he believed lay at the heart of the spiritual 
experience of his contemporaries. "MacKinnon. 'R. G. Collingwood', 174. 
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( II ) 
A Re-description of Relativity 
§ 1. Dialectical Development and the Problem of Progress 
by progress I mean a change always leading to something new, "ith no necessary implication of 
betterment. 77 
From Chapter I we have learned that the essay on Method grew out of Collingwood's lectures on 
moral philosophy. This is why the Socratic dictum - "in philosophical inquiry what we are trying 
to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know better 
something which in some sense we knew already"78 - is central to the whole book. It follows that, 
since the process is both a unity and contains all which is necessary for understanding, this 
understanding will be characterized as a movement from the implicit to the explicit. When we 
come to know something which in some sense \\c knew already. in other words, wc do not comc 
"to know it better in the sense of coming to know more about it, but [cornel to knO\\ it better in 
the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way - actually instead of potentially, or 
explicitly instead of implicitly. "79 
To a certain extent, the idea of development is secure. It is not quite correct, thereforc. to 
see in this development simply an echo of Schleiermacher's doctrine that 'we understand an author 
better than he understood himself. In Schleiermacher's vision this only makes conscious what is 
already contained (but unconscious) in a work as it always is. "He sees", according to Gadamer. 
"the act of understanding as the reconstructive completion of the production. "80 Collingwood 
implicitly rejects this when he says that we do not come to know 'more about it, but come to 
know it in a different and better way'. By rejecting the tendency towards objectification 
Collingwood allows difference to inhabit the process. Yet he does not escape the problem 
completely. because as I have shown in Chapter 1, he qualifies this 'difference' with an emphasis 
on dialectical progress. In qualifying this development with the idea that we come to know what 
we knew already in a better way, he betrays the emphasis on superior understanding. 
In this respect, the absence of a scale of forms analysis in Collingwood's historical work 
is significant. As I sought to emphasize, the recognition of pluralism provides a valid point of 
distinction between dialectical progress and historical progress. In what follows I shall attempt to 
demonstrate this. 
nIN. 14. 
7REssay on Philosophical.\lethod. 11. 
79EPM. II. 
!WTM.169. 
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In the section of The Idea of History entitled 'Progress as Created by Historical Thinking' 
Collingwood rejects both the idea of a single historical progress leading to the present and 
Spengler's doctrine of historical cyc1es.81 Rather, progress in historical understanding is relative 
to a comparison between two historical systems of thought that are not merely successive but 
continuous. (This argument is of course identical to that put forward in the manuscript 'The 
Function of Metaphysics in Civilisation' canvassed in Chapter 1.) Furthermore, in order to judge 
whether progress has taken place the historian must have equal insight into both. Such conditions. 
however, show Collingwood's agnosticism with regard to dialectical progress when applied to 
history. In the first place one cannot on this view have equal insight into historical periods taken 
as a whole: "For the historian can never take any period as a whole. "82 Secondly, one cannot 
judge progress by asking which period comes nearer to the way of life or solution that is 
acceptable to oneself. "By re-enacting the experience of either in his [the historian's] 0\\ n mind he 
has already accepted it as a thing to be judged by its own standards: a form of life having its O\\n 
problems, to be judged by its success in solving those problems and no others. "83 There is, in 
other words, no one standard available by which to judge the progress of either. But this does not 
lead to complete incomensurability~ both systems of thought are related in a continuous 
development. Thus Newtonian physics is a coherent account of reality in so far as it solves its 
own problems. However, in the present certain aspects of Newtonian physics appear to lose their 
grasp upon reality and stand in need of revision. Einstein makes an advance on Newton by 
solving these problems. This is a "partly constructive and positive and partly critical and 
negative"84 development. Yet this criticism of Nc\\ton is unrelated to the solution of his own 
problems~ rather, it is related to the subsequent problems that have arisen out of the relation 
between Newtonian physics and reality. 85 
The emphasis on the 'subsequent problems' that have arisen is what Colling""ood had in 
mind when he used the phrase 'unconscious thought'. Now he did not believe that history 
advanced by a 'cunning of reason' understood in terms of something outside humanity. Hegel. hc 
says, sometimes "seems to personify reason into something outside human life, which brings 
about through the agency of blind and passionate men purposes which are its purposes and not 
theirs. "86 Rather, 'unconscious thought' is best understood as 'effective-history'; as that which 
811H. J28. For his specific views on Spengler see, 'Oswald Spengler', 'The Theory of Historical Cycles' 
and IH. 181-83. 
821H. 327. 
83IH.329. 
84IH. :rq. 
x~Collingwood gives the following example from Greek philosophy. "Aristotle's philosophy would mark 
a progress on Plato's. granted that by that new step Aristotle sacrificed nothing that Plato had 
achieved ... " IH. 333. 
86IH. 116f. 
136 
takes place outside our conscious horiwn. The purpose of historical thought is to make what is 
unconscious (implicit) conscious (explicit). In the first place this is done by studying the past. 
"Newton lives in Einstein in the way in which any past experience lives in the mind of the 
historian, as a past experience kno\\TI as past."87 Because Nev,ton's theory is kno\\TI as past this 
creates the tension between past and present and occasions the need for new understanding. That 
is to say, the tension between past and present testifies to the operation of effective-history. In 
relation to this, the section in The Idea of History on Hegel and Marx in which Collingwood 
describes the nature of an Hegelian Idea is important. Such an Idea is 
a thought, a conception of man's life held by man himself and thus akin to a Kantian category. but a 
category historically conditioned: a way in which people come to think at a certain time. and in 
accordance with which they organise their whole life, only to find that the idea changes by a dialectic oj" 
its own into a different idea and that the manner of life which expressed it will no longer hold together. 
but breaks up and transfonns itself into the expression of a second idea which replaces the first. 88 
This passage comes from The Principles o/History written by Collingwood in 1939. It is 
plausible that, due to its temporal proximity to the Metaphysics and the resonance with absolute 
presuppositions, the emphasis on dialectic throws added light on the notion of unconscious 
thought. Thus, the attempt at a new understanding includes the operation of this unconscious 
thought or dialectic. In other words, Einstein's new theory, while it includes Ne\\ton's as part of 
its own, also solves contemporary problems brought about by the operation of history. That is to 
say, this fusion of horizons bet\veen past physics and present physics is what Einstein brings 
about, but this does not exclude the operation of unconscious thought. It follows from this that 
the theory of Einstein is an advance on Newton's in so far as it is more appropriate to the present 
situation. The operation of unconscious thought annuls the emphasis on superior understanding, 
because in the case of Einstein, his theory, while formed under the influence and going beyond 
Newton's, is only appropriate to the facts of the present situation. In this sense, like all historical 
understanding, it is unique (an event). If this were not the case, and Newton and Einstein ask 
themselves the same question, then we should say that Einstein was more a genius than Ne\\ton. 
But this ignores the operation ofhistory~ Ne\\ton. in other words, was not a half-developed 
Einstein. 
Collingwood's move towards a more pluralistic understanding of progress, in this 
instance, has less to do with complete relativism, and more to do with a rejection of the notion of 
superior understanding. In the Autobiography he gives the example of political theory. "Take 
Plato's Republic and Hobbes's Leviathan, so far as they are concerned with politics. Obviousl~ 
the political theories the~ set forth are not the same. But do they represent two different theories 
87IH. :n~. 
88IH. 122. 
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of the same thing? ... No; because Plato's 'State' is the Greek 7tOA.lS, and Hobbes's is the 
absolutist State of the seventeenth century ... What even the best and \\ lsest of those who are 
engaged in politics are trying to do has altered. Plato's Republic is an attempt at a theory of one 
thing; Hobbes's Leviathan an attempt at a theory of something else. "89 Though his point is 
overdone, this is not thorough-going relativism. There is a connection between the two things. but 
it is not the kind of connection the 'realists' expected it to be. "Anybody would admit that Plato's 
Republic and Hobbes's Leviathan are about two things which are in one way the same thing and 
in another way different. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the kind of sameness and the 
kind of difference. The 'realists' thought that the sameness was the sameness of a 'universal', and 
the difference the difference between two instances of that universal. But this is not so. The 
sameness is the sameness of an historical process, and the difference is the difference between one 
thing which in the course of that process has turned into something else, and the other thing into 
which it has turned. "90 In the light of such evidence, the progress that Collingwood speaks of is 
not a superior knowledge of something. It cannot be resolved into a scale of forms analysis. 
Speaking of the concept of 'plot' in history he writes: "Now such a course of events may be truly 
called a progress because it is a going forward; it has direction. everything in it proceeds out of 
what has gone before and could not have happened without the occurrence of its past ... [b Jut 
though history is in this sense a progress and nothing but a progress, it cannot be so in any other 
sense. No one of the phases through which it moves is any better, or any worse, than any of the 
others ... "91 History is, therefore, characterized as a change without betterment. This can be 
called a progress only in so far as it is more appropriate to the present situation. I hope to bring 
out the fruit of this idea in what follows. 
§ 2. The Logic of Question and Answer: The Rejection of Permanent Problems 
To [Collingwood] the realists were men who were running away from the critical problem; they sought 
some point at which men could give an unconditional validity to their commerce with the real.92 
In Part I we saw that both Bradley and the 'realists' shared the doctrine that mind is immediate 
experience. This meant that both understood 'thought' to be separate from experience. In other 
words, Bradley and the 'realists' believed that immediacy (feeling or emotion) was divorced from 
mediacy (thought or knowledge). Collingwood rejects this divorce and shows that it appears 
plausible only because the Idealist coherence theory of truth and the Realist correspondence-
theory assume the 'propositional principle'. In The Principles of Art this is given as the 
89 A. 61f. 
90 A, 62. 
91Collingwood. 'The Theory of Historical Cycles'. 86f. 
92MacKinnon, 'R. G. Collingwood'. 171. 
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"assumption that, among the various 'sentences' ... there are some which. instead of expressing 
emotions, make statements. "93 Such a principle is able to separate experience from the unity of 
'pure thought' whose truth can then be held up for testing.94 
The idea that truth is a quality pertaining to propositions of 'pure thought' that are 
isolated from experience makes sense of the idea of permanent problems. The history of 
philosophy is seen as an account of different answers to the same set of questions. In other words, 
those philosophers that are recorded in our history, are those who have had the intelligence to 
surmount their historical situation and ask eternal questions.95 These philosophers go wrong only 
in so far as, now here now there, they were unable to lift themselves clean out of their context. In 
other words, the best work of these philosophers remains valuable to the present in spite of its 
historical character. 
Collingwood responded to such an account with his well-known logic of question and 
answer. Yet it is important to show the relation between this logic and the criticism of the 
'propositional principle', because many interpreters of re-enactment attribute the essence of the 
'propositional principle' to the exercise of re-thinking. The argument goes that Collingwood treats 
thought as if it were 'pure thought' devoid of any context or experiential element. This leads to the 
idea that re-enactment is an atemporal rather than transhistorical condition of historical 
knowledge. On the contrary, Collingwood championed the idea that intellect or pure thought 
could not be divorced from emotion or experience. In The Principles of Art he states: "Language 
in its original imaginative form may be said to have expressiveness ... Language in its 
intellectualized form has both expressiveness and meaning. As language, it expresses a certain 
emotion. As symbolism, it refers beyond that emotion to the thought whose emotional charge it 
is. "96 In all language, then, including propositions, there is both logic (s~mbolism) and emotion 
(expression). Therefore, "the progressive intellectualization oflanguage" ... into scientific 
s~ mbotism ... "represents not a progressive drying-up of emotion, but its progressive articulation 
and specialization. We are not getting away from an emotional atmosphere into a dry, rational 
atmosphere~ we are acquiring new emotions and new ways of expressing them. "97 It follows that 
all propositions are expressed in language and therefore all propositions are expressions of 
experience. The main target of this argument is I. A. Richards distinction between 'scientific' 
language and 'emotive' language. Richards assumes there are two uses of language: "a statement 
may be used for the sake of the reference. true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific use 
93The Principles of Art. 260. 
94pA. 261. 
95"That is a question which all philosophers ask thcmsches sooner or later: the right answer to it. as 
giYcn by Plato or Kant or Wittgenstein. is .... " A. 71. 
96pA.269. 
97pA.269. 
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of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude produced 
by the reference it occasions. This is the emotive use oflanguage. "98 By contrast, as I have 
shown, according to Collingwood. language is not a tool used in different ways while remaining 
the same tool, but an activity. Language is, in other words. not a technical de\ice which exists 
apart from its use, but an artistic activity which, as it progresses, becomes more specialized while 
remaining artistic. While the division between the 'scientific use of language' and the 'emotive use 
of language' recommended by Richards reinforces the division between 'pure thought' and 
'experience', Collingwood resolves the duality of experience and thought into 'language'. This 
means that because language is the root of experience and concept formation one cannot divorce 
them when an attempt is made to determine the truth of a proposition. A. MacInt)Te. who, more 
than most appreciates and exemplifies Collingwood's o\\n approach to the history of philosophy, 
nevertheless criticizes Collingwood on exactly this point. "It is always possible and usually 
useful", MacIntyre writes, "to abstract both problem and solution, question and answer. from 
their particular context and examine matters of logic without too much reference to their actual 
history."99 And yet the whole point of the logic of question and answer is to deny the possibilit), 
of such a divorce. It must be kept in mind, however, that Collingwood was, at this point, involved 
in a polemic against the 'realists'. To the extent, therefore, that the logic of question and answer 
was a manifesto-like programme, Collingwood would always be prone to exaggerating 
tendencies. Such criticism nevertheless need not affect the main point: the appeal to a 
contradiction between two propositions is frequently a consequence of a failure to appreciate 
"two successive analyzes of a concept in process of transformation, between which there is no 
question of a choice. "100 
It is on this point that Collingwood criticizes Hegel. In a manuscript entitled 'Notes on 
Hegel's Logic', he points out that in the Encyclopaedia Hegel mistakenly separates Vorstellung 
98Richards. The Principles. cited in P A. 262, emphases in original. It is evident that Richards was 
influenced by Moore's idea of mind as immediate experience. This idea placed objectivity wholly within 
the self-existence of an 'object'. In other words, Moore's attempt to identify 'emotivism' with moral 
decision shows that he thought moral action was simply a form of subjectivism. In a critical note on the 
theory of correspondence Collingwood states: "truth = correspondence between what we think \\lth that 
about which we think. and error would be the absence of such correspondence. But this theory has 
implications which when closely examined. are rather alarming. Implies subjective world is a world of 
caprice and disorder - things done \\lthout reason." 'Central Problems in Metaphysics (April 1935)'. 
Bodleian. dep. 20/1. It is this disquiet, e:xpressed in the 'Realist' detachment of theory from practice and 
of 'pure thought' from 'emotion' or 'sense'. which allowed Collingwood. in a logically correct (yct 
perhaps unfair) move. to identify the Realists as "the propagandists of a coming Fascism" (A. 167). He 
was. in other words. demonstrating that the 'English Channel' was no defence against a logical 
correlation between emotivism and fascism. 
99MacInt)'fc . .-l Short History. 93. his emphasis. 
100..1 .. \'hort lIistory. 93. 
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and denken. lOl "Hegel thinks, like Plato, that we philosophise by getting rid of our senses instead 
of deepening them. "102 That is to say, like the 'realists', Hegel separates experience from thought. 
Collingwood puts this in logical terms when he says: "Hegel has no idea of an a priori s)nthesis 
of the symbol and meaning. "103 This has important consequences for Collingwood's 
understanding of contradiction. With Hegel he believed in the importance of contradiction, but the 
principle of correlation (between question and answer) enabled him to show that contradiction 
was a relative term. He denied "that two propositions might, simply as propositions, contradict 
one another, and that by examining them simply as propositions you could find out whether they 
did so or not. "104 Rather, no two propositions can contradict one another unless they are answers 
to the same question. It follows that in order to judge whether two theories contradict one another 
we should discover the meaning of the concepts involved. We cannot, then, say that two theories 
or propositions contradict each other absolutely. Whether Collingwood is right to criticize Hegel 
in this way is open to question; nevertheless, the critique has its basis in Hegel's idea that the 
development of rationality was characterized by the progressive drying-up of experience. We 
might say, with Cavell, that in Hegel's system reason prevents the deification of everything but 
itself.105 Such an idea gives Hegel's system the illusion of absolute knowledge. Collingwood, 
however, called this a lie and always insisted that philosophy ,,,·as only an interim report on how 
far consciousness had reached. 106 
With his logic of question and answer Collingwood is able to show that there are no 
permanent problems because there is no such thing as unconditional knowledge. Analysing Cook-
Wilson's doctrine that 'knowing makes no difference to what is kno\\n' he shows that it amounts 
to believing that if one can know that no difference is made to a thing e with the condition c, and 
also what e is like without condition c, it follows that one can compare them - which would mean 
that e can be knO\\TI unconditionally. 107 Rather, for Collingwood, each text or system of thought 
gains its character by subsumption within its historical situation. The strict correlation between 
question and answer means that a question is not a preliminary to the act of knowing but one half 
101Collingwood remarks: "philosophy [for Hegel] contains no Vorstellung element ... this is pure 
Platonism - dualism between thought and sense and superior dignity and difficulty of thought." 'Notes 
on Hegel's Logic'. Bodleian, dep. 1612, 2. 
102'Notes on Hegel's Logic'. 2. I am indebted to R. Peters, 'Collingwood on Hegel's Dialectic', for 
drawing my attention to this criticism of Hegel. In paragraph three of the Enzykloptidie Hegel 
comments: "Die Schwierigkeit liegt einesteils in einer Unflihigkeit, die an sich nur Ungewohntheit is!. 
abstrakt /.U denken, d. h. reine Gedanken festzuhalten und in ihnen sich zu bewegen ... Ein anderes aber 
is!. die Gedanken selbst unvennischt zum Gegenstande zu machen." Although he says it is difficult to 
think abstractly. it is clear that this is the aim of his logic. HegeL Enzykloptidie. ~ ). 
lO.l'Notes on Hegel's Logic'. 2. 
I04A, :n. 
105CaYcli. ,\lust We .\lean What We Say.? 325. 
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of a single process which ends in an answer. In other words, the truth of something cannot be 
ascertained without taking into account that the questioner is part of the process he is studying, 
and has his own place in that process. It follows that in order to understand a philosophical or 
literary text the question it purports to answer needs to be discovered. 
The emphasis on correlation is important, because it is related to the idea of 'appropriate' 
understanding or action. This is made clear if we move beyond the application of correlation to a 
single text. If we now think of the logic of question and answer as the structure of the historical 
process, we can relate the notion of correlation to action or present understanding. That is to say, 
the correlation between question and answer makes explicit a third element that Gadamer calls 
'fusion'. In this sense, the question (the past horizon) and the answer (the present horizon) give 
way to application. This application will always be different, because the historical process that it 
belongs to alters the situation. But to call this relativism does not touch the essence of what 
Collingwood meant to show by this correlation. This is only a negative judgement that arises out 
of the idea of superior knowledge. As I have already demonstrated in Chapter 1, Knox's citation 
of the passage about 'point of view' in history as evidence that Collingwood succumbed to a 
thorough-going relativism says more about Knox than Collingwood. Seen in the light of his 
attempted rapprochement between historical consciousness and duty, such statements reveal the 
necessity of relativity if each age is to meet its contemporary needs. 
Collingwood never acquiesced in a thorough-going relativism. He makes this clear when, 
in a passage from 1936 - the same year as the passage about 'point of view' - he writes: if the past 
were a natural process" [i]t would follow that the ways of thinking characteristic of any given 
historical period are ways in which people must think then, but in which others, cast at different 
times in a different mental mould, cannot think at all. If that were the case, there would be no 
such thing as truth." I 08 The past is not a natural process, in which the past dies in being replaced 
by the present, but an historical process, in which the past lives on in the present. As a 
consequence, the contextual limitations of a thinker are not defects. "So far from being a defect, 
they are a sign of merit~ they are most clearly to be seen in those works whose quality is of the 
best. "109 In this light, relativity becomes a positive concept in so far as the past remains 
important to the present, because the past answered its o\\n questions. 
If these systems remain yaluable to posterit)'. that is not in spite of their strictly historical character but 
because of it. To us. the ideas eXl'ressed in them are ideas belonging to the past; but it is not a dead past; 
by understanding it historically we incorporate it into our present thought and enable ourselves by 
developing and criticizing It to use that heritage for our own advancement. I 10 
108IH.225. 
\09IH.229. 
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The divorce between experience and 'pure thought' that the 'realists' pursued missed this 
completely; foc in the end, they believed that thinking about a subject made no difference to it. 
§ 3. The Development of Past Thought in Re-Thinking 
I have already shown that re-thinking is not a thesis about numerical identity. On the contrary, re-
thinking is conceptual. As a consequence, Ricoeur's idea that re~nactment is a thesis about 
numerical identity is simply wrong. However, in what follows, I want to demonstrate this by 
reiterating the 'conceptual' nature of re-thinking. Secondly, I shall argue that re~nactment is not a 
thesis about recovering the 'original intentions' of historical agents. 
In order to show that development is a necessary characteristic of re~nactment the 
problem I left partly unresolved at the end of Chapter 3 needs to be addressed. This problem was 
as follows: the discovery that re~nactment was a transcendental condition of history rather than a 
method appeared to strengthen the thesis that re~nactment is governed by the principle of 
numerical identity. While it makes room for historical inference, this interpretation shifts 
attention away from temporal distance towards a simple logical rendering of what it means to re-
think a thought. For example, historical reconstruction in R. Martin's vie" simply allows the 
historian to argue towards an identity with the past. III It is this understanding of identity that has 
influenced Ricoeur's interpretation of re~nactment.112 That is to say, what is re-thought by the 
historian is numerically identical with past thought. As Ricoeur puts it: "from the notion of an 
inside of an event, conceived as its 'thought', we can pass directly to the notion of reenactment as 
the act of rethinking what was once thought for the first time."I13 This idea of 'pass directly' 
echoes Gardiner's argument that thoughts are 'timeless entities'. In fact Ricoeur thinks re-
enactment is atemporal in the sense that it grasps a thought that does not change. I 14 The only 
difference is that, for Ricoeur, this is achieved through inference rather than intuition. I IS This 
interpretation would hold only if Collingwood believed that re-enactment were either a species of 
'acquaintance' or a variant on the doctrine of 'internal relations'. But Collingwood rejects both 
these interpretations. On the contrary, he is making a conceptual point. 
even thought itself, in its immediacy as the unique act of thought with its unique context in the life of an 
individual thinker, is not the object of historical knowledge. It cannot be re-enacted; if it could, time 
itself would be cancelled and the historian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over again 
in all respects the same. The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of thought in its 
III Martin, Historical Explanation, 61. 
112"In this respect Rex Martin's proposaL in Historical Explanation ... to bring about a rapprochement 
between reenactment and practical inference constitutes the most fruitful attempt I know to link 
Collingwood to the philosophy of history of Danto, Walsh. and above all von Wright." Ricoeur. TN 3, 
307 n. lol. 
I uTN J. lol5, my emphasis. 
II.tTN J. lol7. 
IIS"Imagination. practical inference. and reenactment have to be thought together" TN J. 307 n. lol. 
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individuality, just as it actually happened. What he apprehends of that individual is only something that 
it might have shared with other acts of thought ... 116 
Furthennore, Ricoeur interprets Collingwood's idea of the 'survival' and 'revival' of thought in a 
highly idealist manner. He states: "But what does 'survive' mean here'? Nothing apart from the act 
of reenactment. The only meaningful thing, in the final analysis, is the current possession of past 
activity." 117 In contrast, we have seen already that Collingwood understood the idea of the past 
living on in the present as equivalent to the continuity of tradition. I find it incredible that Ricoeur 
believes that Collingwood thinks survival and heritage to be "natural processes" .118 'Survival' 
pertains to the tradition of unconscious thought and 'revival' to the means of making this 
unconscious thought conscious. Heritage in the last resort refers to eve~thing that could not be 
achieved by one's own action. This implies that there is development in what is re-thought. It is 
evident that only a conceptual understanding of re-thinking can take account of the idea that what 
is re-thought is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. In the manuscript 'Notes 
Toward a Metaphysic' Collingwood illustrates his sensitivity to this: 
to call the French Revolution an objective historical fact does not imply that it really existed quite apart 
from the experience of the people who took part in it~ nor does it imply that in that experience the 
revolution appeared exactly as it appears to me in my historical study of it~ what is implied is that the 
French Revolution is an object of thought, or concept, which appears in different ways to the different 
persons into whose experience it enters. Everyone whether contemporary observer or historical student 
who has genuine knowledge of the French Revolution knows what it really and essentially was, that is, 
conceives its essence, and this essence is a concept which is public and objective. accessible to any 
thinking mind into whose experience it enters. 119 
In the light of such evidence, statements that appear to suggest that re-thinking is about a 
numerical, and therefore, time annulling identity receive their proper context. This is the case 
with the statement cited in Chapter 3 that "what we think is not altered by alterations of the 
context in which we think it" .120 I take this to be a conceptual statement which can be applied to 
the example of the French Revolution cited above. I suspect the problem interpreters have \\lth 
the concept of re-thinking results from a tendency to take it too literally. In an important 
unpublished manuscript Collingwood gives an account of re-thinking which shows that, for all its 
complexity, re-thinking what was once thought always goes beyond past thought. He comments: 
"there are not two butfour senses of thought: a) the act (VOllC;l(;) b) the object (vOllJ.1u) c) a 
peculiar kind of act \"hose object is an act (vollcrEroC; vOll(nc;) d) a peculiar kind of object which 
116IH. 303. 
117TN 3. 146. 
118TN 3. 146. 
119'Notes Toward a Metaphysic'. E. 34. 
120IH. 300. 
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is itself an act (vOll(ne; VOUJ.1EVll)."121 Now. in Collingwood's \iew. history is about 'c', an act of 
thinking about an act of thinking. However, this is not wholly the case because. as we can see 
from the example of the French Revolution, history does not rule out 'd'. Not only is the act of 
thinking peculiar, but also the object, because this is an act of thinking as well. Collingwood then 
goes on: "it is the peculiar character of this act that it does not contemplate its object. It is not 9£ 
Wptu. It alters the situation which it apprehends ... for the act in this special case absorbs the 
object into itself, makes it a factor in itself. But conversely any vOllcrEroe; vOllate; goes beyond its 
object. The mere re-thinking of a vOllate; is the transcending of that vOllcne; and the reduction of 
it to the status ofa factor."122 This last point about becoming a factor is what Collingwood 
means to point to with his principle of incapsulation. That is to say, re-thinking always refers to 
present thoughts and it is this aspect which shows that re-thinking always goes beyond past 
thought. Collingwood gives the example of William the Conqueror and Harold. "The thought of 
Harold, his view of the situation, is for Harold not afactor in the situation but the whole 
situation. When William knows what Harold is thinking, that thought ... is for William afactor 
and no more. It is an object to him: one of the objects about which he thinks: at the same time it is 
afactorial way in which he thinks, for he 'enters into' Harold's thought, thinks as Harold thinks, 
but thinks other things as well." 123 It follows that the historian must re-think the thoughts that the 
historical agent thinks. But to make it more complicated, while the historian re-thinks the whole 
situation of William, it remains only a factor in his total thought. The telos is reached in so far as 
the historian goes beyond William's situation by bringing it into a fusion, but not confusion, with 
his present thought. 
It is clear from this manuscript that re-thinking must go beyond the equation of history 
with original intention. By this I mean that history is not equivalent to the intentions of historical 
agents. Taking into account the previous chapter, it is evident that Collingwood's rejection of 
testimony drives the inquiry beyond the statement at hand. He rejected the idea that history 
corresponds to the testimony of agents or witnesses. Rather, the question asked is: "What does 
this statement mean? And this is not equivalent to the question What did the person who made it 
mean by if", although that is doubtless a question that the historian must ask, and must be able to 
answer. It is equivalent, rather, to the question What light is thrown on the subject in which I am 
interested by the fact that this person made this statement, meaning by it what he did mean""'l24 
Gadamer's quarrel with Collingwood centres on his claim that Collingwood does not distinguish 
the question of the meaning of an event from the question whether the event went according to the 
121'Notes on the History of Historiography' in van der Dussen.. HS. 179. Van der Dussen's pagination 
hereafter. 
I22Notes on the History of Historigraphy. 180. emphases in original. 
12JNotes on the History of Historigraphy, 180. emphases in original. 
124m. 275. my emphasis. 
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plan of the protagonists. 125 He has in mind the discussion of the Battle of Trafalgar in the 
Autobiography where Collingwood states: "Naval historians think it worth while to argue about 
Nelson's tactical plan at Trafalgar because he won the battle. It is not worth while arguing about 
Villeneuve's plan. He did not succeed in carrying it out, and therefore no one \\ill ever know what 
it was."126 Such a statement appears to suggest that Nelson's plan is the meaning of the Battle of 
Trafalgar. This is presumably reinforced when Collingwood says that history does not mean 
knowing what events followed what. It means looking at the events from the point of view of the 
agents involved. 127 But the point of this example is to show that the tactics of Nelson can only be 
discovered by studying the battle. That is to say, the point here is not simply to discover what 
Nelson meant to do, but to discover what he actually did. Thus, original typescripts of the coded 
orders are of no use, because intentionality in Collingwood's sense presupposes a completed 
action seen from the perspective of the historian. To accept testimony of Villeneuve's plan would 
be to admit that it is really the knowledge of the agent's intentions that wholly comprises 
historical knowledge. As he writes in The Idea of History: "the recognition that what happens in 
history need not happen through anyone's deliberately wishing it to happen is an indispensable 
precondition of understanding any historical process."128 Collingwood is adamant that the 
historian must grasp the thought of the historical agent, but this does not mean the inquiry ends 
with this. In Nelson's case, his thought was the whole of his situation; but in the case of the 
historian, re-thinking Nelson's thought is only one factor. The historian, in other words, re-thinks 
past thought in the present and knows this is what he is doing. As a consequence, re-thinking 
goes beyond a mere reconstruction. Re-enactment, in Collingwood's view, "is not a passive 
surrender to the spell of another's mind; it is the labour of active and therefore critical thinking. 
The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge 
and therefore, in re-enacting it criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects 
whatever errors he can discern in it. This criticism of the thought whose history he traces is not 
something secondary to the tracing of it. It is an indispensable condition of historical knowledge 
itself." 129 Rational explanation, in other words, does not simply refer to the past point of \ iew of 
the agent; rather, the historian must make the action intelligible in the present. 130 This is because 
125TM.334. 
126 A. 70. 
127 A 58 
128IH 48 
12')IH. 215. this mirrors Gadamer's statement: "a reconstructed question can never stand \\ithin its 
original horizon. for the historical horizon that is outlined in the reconstruction is not a truly 
comprehensivc one. It is. rather. included \\ithin the horizon that cmbraces us as the questioners \\ ho 
h:l\c respondcd to thc word that has been handed down" TM. 337. 
130This is akin to A. Danto's emphasis on 'narrative sentences' as retrospectivc descriptions of the past: 
"For the whole point of histoI! is not to know about actions as Witnesses might but as historians do. in 
connection with later cvents and as part of temporal wholes." Ana~vtical Philosophy. 183. his emphasis. 
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rational explanation does not depend on an agent's propositionally rehearsed calculation~ rather, 
the historian shows the appropriateness of the agent's 'reasons' for acting. Re-enactment is an 
achievement of the historian. Paradoxically. perhaps, he is suggesting that historical intention 
goes beyond what the agent intended. 
Yet it is precisely at this point where we discover the limit to the henneneutical scope of 
re-enactment. The accent on 'double intentionality' betrays Collingwood's resolve to reduce the 
field of historicity (i.e. what can be re-enacted) to human action. However, although double 
intentionality is evidently Hegelian in origin, it is important to see where the difference lies. While 
the coincidence between history and action together with the dialectical framework of his 
philosophy make an appeal to double intentionality inevitable, there is no resort on Collingwood's 
side to a Weltgeist. The whole point of Hegel's appeal to a second intention which escapes 
individual agents, in itself a valid and important feature of history. is to transfonn unintended 
consequences into a vehicle for the 'cunning of reason'. From the perspective of the Weltgeist, 
historical agents serve the higher purpose of the development of reason. By taking this second 
intention up into the Weltgeist, Hegel demonstrates his desire to abolish the contingent. Such a 
move, already dismissed by Collingwood as a theory of implication, 131 becomes an important key 
to Hegel's thought. On the one side it characterizes what Marx and his disciples found so 
attractive: we must renounce consolation in order to achieve reconciliation, 132 on the other it 
repeats itself in Hegel's appeal to the Absolute which abolishes experience in favour of certitude. 
In other words, the limit to the henneneutical scope of re-enactment is found not in an 
appeal to the Absolute of reflective philosophy, but rather in the restriction of historicity to 
human action which the thesis of double intentionality proposes to weaken. The accent on a 
second intention prevents the identification of re-enactment with the original intention of 
historical agents. Nevertheless, Collingwood's restriction of historicity to human action still 
confines re-enactment to the problem of understanding others through the expressions that others 
give of their conscious life. Collingwood, therefore, has one foot finnly planted in the subjective 
theory of interpretation which characterizes Romantic henneneutics, while at the same time 
surpassing Romantic henneneutics because of his appreciation of tradition. 
What is the reason for Collingwood's inability to extricate himself from Romantic 
henneneutics? It is obvious from Chapters 4 and 5 that we could explain this by reiterating 
Collingwood's preoccupation "ith the dictum that 'all history is the history of thought' and its 
application to the problems of historical reconstruction. Yet though a necessary element of such 
an explanation, this in itself is not sufficient to explain Collingwood's restricted vision in this 
matter. For at stake in the henneneutics of Gadamer is a concept of understanding which is about 
\3 1 See Chapter l. 13. 
U2See Ricoeur. TN 3. 197. 
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sharing in the communication the text gives us irrespecti\e of authorial intention and past 
context. The text, in Gadamer's view, is analogous \\lth the poem~ it is a self-sufficient world that 
carries a meaning within itself which always surpasses the conditions of its production. This is 
something altogether different from the unintended consequences of intentional action~ rather. it 
appeals to a concept of understanding that is irreducible to consciousness. Collingwood never 
declares this insight with sufficient conviction because, as I emphasized in Chapter 3, his 
reflections on language were never his main preoccupation. Despite the emphasis on tradition, 
'unconscious thought', and the concept of process, Collingwood is inclined to reduce everything 
belonging to the field of history to an expression of human consciousness. Intentionality rather 
than language obsesses him. In The Principles of History, for example, while evidence is given 
the form of language, the historian is interested in language only in so far as it reveals the 
intentions of historical agents. 133 It is true that in the same work Collingwood declares that 
historians are now beginning to "realize that the history of a thought has nothing to do with the 
names of the people who think it" 134, but regardless of the precise meaning of this expression the 
equation of language with consciousness is quite clear: "Language comes into existence \\ ith 
imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious level." 135 At best, therefore, re-enactment 
displays its kinship with the hermeneutics of Gadamer in so far as it restricts itself to 
hermeneutical reflection on the historicality inherent in historical research. In fact Collingwood 
never really argues for any other legitimate application of re-enactment. In itself this is quite 
enough. However, it cannot be applied as a 'universal philology' in the manner of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. The appeal to intentionality not only illustrates re-enactment's basis within 
historiography, but emphasizes the concept of explanation over Gadamer's concept of 
understanding. That is to say, re-enactment reconstructs a past event, understood as an 'individual 
action', and so short-circuits the appeal to a more poetic concept of understanding because 
understanding is anchored to the contingencies of a past reality. 
Continuing the criticism of re-enactment, we can now see that the accent upon rational 
explanation discloses the problematic of the idealist principle of identity. I deliberately played 
down the importance of this principle in order to dispose of the criticisms that re-enactment is 
about intuition and numerical identity. But all the same the idealist use of identity is at work. In 
Collingwood's view. rational explanation is possible only on the assumption that the problem at 
hand was solved. Thus, Nelson is a worth while figure of study because he succeeded in his 
action. Villeneuve. on the other hand, is not a figure worth bothering \\ith. As such only that 
which has succeeded is meaningful. This is a fertile principle in terms of the logic of question and 
LHpH. 45. 
1~4pH. 59. 
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answer in so far as it presupposes that a question can be recovered if we possess continuity in the 
fonn of tradition or a text etc. Yet thinking on the idealist identity principle gives no access to 
'other' history. The real possibility of a different meaning in history is ignored. It is exactly this 
type of history which is most suspect today; for underlying and outweighing its meritorious 
emphasis upon continuity, of itself a corrective to an excessive atomism of historical reality. is a 
decision to justify the status-quo. This prompts the question, 'Is the tradition we are carried 
within a force of illusion rather than the transmission of truth?' Such a question, which defines 
the terms of the polemic between Gadamer and J. Habennas, shall be explored in Part III. 
Yet irrespective of such criticism, there is another view of Collingwood's philosophy 
which offers the reader the opportunity to think of dialectic as a thesis about infonned action in 
the world rather than as an appeal to the idealist principle of identity. The fundamental assertion 
that 'the past lives on in the present' must be taken to mean that we must school ourselves in the 
past in order to act appropriately in the present. The dialectician does not think of the past in 
order to justify that past or his own philosophy, as Rorty would have us believe, rather the past is 
important to the present because the past forms the condition of our ability to face the facts of 
our situation. Past thought invests our present thought with effective force. Such an emphasis on 
creative bondage, on the conditions of intellectual innovation, immediately annuls any totalizing 
tendency and leads us to Collingwood's Metaphysics. I have seen no better description of what 
Collingwood was attempting to disclose in that book, now expressive of his philosophy as a 
whole, than Rowan Williams' account of Hegel's 'fundamental insight': "history is how we do our 
metaphysics, how we reflect on what we non-negotiably are and what are the conditions of our 
concept-formation. Not that history as record delivers to us a map of the constructions of the 
universe, or a comprehensive account of natural kinds or a compelling thesis about the nature of 
reference; but engagement with history lays bare for us the character of thinking as engagement, 
as converse, conflict, negotiation, judgement and self-judgement. "136 Thus, if Collingwood's 
philosophy is anything as a whole, it is not a system in any monistic sense, nor is it grounded in a 
Realistic or Aristotelian metaphysic, but it is, like Gadamer's philosophy, a "doctrine of human 
finitude" .137 
--_._--------
136Williarns. 'Between Politics and Metaphysics', 15, his emphasis. 
IJ7MacKinnon. 'R. G. Collingwood'. 17.f. 
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( III ) 
A Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness 
§ I. History and Henneneutics 
In Chapter 5 I offered a brief criticism of Collingwood's account of historical reconstruction from 
a henneneutical perspective. This ended by suggesting two possibilities: 1) either there is a 
dialectic between history and henneneutics or 2) henneneutics demands that history sever its links 
with the modern picture of the selfwhich inhabits the scientific concept of method. I now want to 
amend this by saying that it is not a question of an either-or dilemma, but rather that both 
possibilities should be realized. Yet before I outline the dialectic between history and 
henneneutics I want to make a few remarks about the status of the past in Gadamer's system. 
In Truth and Method, the individual, here understood as the past, is but a moment in the 
process of understanding. This brings forth Pannenberg's criticism which I mentioned in the 
introduction. The complaint that Gadamer's henneneutic avoids questions associated with 
historical factuality demonstrates Pannenberg's unease with a concept of understanding which 
cuts itself free of any past reality. This unease is, I think, expressive of the heart of the matter. In 
fact this distance between Pannenberg and Gadamer does, in my view. express itself as a 
dilemma~ for I find both positions equally seductive. 
On the one hand, while sympathetic to Pannenberg, I think his sort of defence against 
Gadamer, the defence of 'factuality', cannot be sustained. The appeal to an irreducible past is 
simply an appeal to the concept of dead matter, to the atom which exists entirely within its own 
place. Such a position is expressive of a "desire to bring the passing show to a halt, to secure it to 
immovable objects" which is something that "lies deep in the metaphysical tradition. "138 
Following the ontological priority of the concept of process in which being is fundamentally 
motion, such an irreducible past is unfounded. Thus regardless of past reality, the past must be 
related to present application in order to render the ontological ground on which it rests explicit. 
A failure in this regard signals an acceptance of Romantic henneneutics. Yet such a resort to 
Romantic henneneutics is evidently no defence against Gadamer, because his own henneneutic, 
in true Hegelian style, has already overrun it. 
On the other hand, however, in the wake of Heidegger does not Gadamer's appeal to 
being convert the past from a past reality to an ontology in toto? In the realm of ontology 
empirical questions, having no relevance. simply dissolve. But does this solve the problem of the 
past. or does it simply avoid questions about past reality? This is the crux of Pannenberg's 
criticism. Gadamer's concept of understanding appeals, in my vicw, to Heidegger's separation of 
l.H!Kcrr. The%gr. 62. 
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past reality from the ontological 'having-been-there'.139 Yet the realm of 'ha\ ing-been-there' which 
is so fruitful in terms of anti-subjectivism, does not do justice to the problem of the empirical 
trace so important to historical reconstruction. It is the trace which permits the historian to argue 
back from the imaginary to the real. It is true, as we shall see, that Gadamer does recognize the 
importance of historical work, but the tendency is always towards a self-sufficient philology 
which is evident most clearly in the abrupt transition in Truth and Method from history to 
linguisticality . 
It does therefore appear as if it is possible to make a valid distinction within 
hermeneutics between the type of understanding characteristic of historical work and a more 
'philological' understanding envisaged by Gadamer. This does of course echo the distinction in 
scope between Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment and Gadamer's 'universal philology'. 
While, therefore, the appeal to the ontological priority of being over a subjective epistemology is 
a real advance, we must avoid 'canonizing' ontology to such an extent that it is given free rein to 
obliterate the empirical element proper to historical work. 
In speaking of a dialectic between history and hermeneutics I am referring to both an 
essential relationship and to a tension without recourse to open conflict which exists between the 
two. But this categorization is not adequate, because the dialectic does not really contain 
hermeneutics but only its various incarnations. If, for argument's sake, we assume the 
universality of Gadamer's hermeneutics, then, on a reading of Truth and Method, art 
historiography, and linguisticality are its three (principle) modes. Yet this does after all give a 
place to a dialectic between history and hermeneutics, because each mode can be considered 
independently and in succession. But more decisively, an independent analysis of history is 
justified in so far as modem historical method was forged by the same tools which shaped the 
revolt against 'unfounded reason' (tradition). This suggests that there really is something different 
about history, making it irreducible to hermeneutics. Gadamer might seem to offer hope of this 
when, by including historical method within hermeneutics, he recognizes that, while it grew, so to 
speak, by devouring its authorities, the critical impulse is not to be abolished, simply displaced. 
But the displacement of criticism, achieved in the transference of autonomy from the historian to 
the text (tradition), is a radical step~ for it inextricably binds historical method to hermeneutics. 
Taken in themselves, at a high level of generality, there is a real difference between history and 
hermeneutics~ but this difference, while important, can only be sustained if we reject the 
ontological priority of hermeneutics. 
Starting from the position of a dialectic between history and hermeneutics, we can see 
that they can be distinguished by their respective programmes. While the historian reconstructs a 
139" A Dasein which no longer exists, however, is not past in the ontologically strict sense: it is rather 
'ha\"ing-bcen-therc'." Heidegger, Being and Time, 432. 
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past which does not now exist. the inquiry always moving towards a reconstructed whole, 
Gadamer presupposes the whole as a world of and to itself. So conceivaL it is Gadamer's use of 
this aesthetic that creates a hiatus between history and hermeneutics. For is this emphasis on the 
self-presentation ofa text not an echo (in secular terms) of Bultmann's theology? 
To understand ... does not mean primarily to reason one's way back into the past but to have a present 
involvement in what is said. It is not really about a relationship between persons. between the reader and 
the author, ... but about sharing in the communication that the text gives us ... The understanding of 
something written is not a reproduction of something that is past, but the sharing of a present 
meaning. 140 
The stress upon self-presentatio~ upon an aesthetic whole, short -circuits the work of 
reconstruction. It is on this point that the stark contrast between Collingwood and Gadamer is 
disclosed. While Collingwood, for example, places archaeological remains at the centre of his 
inquiry, they are problematic for Gadamer: "Only in an extended sense do non-literary 
monuments present a hermeneutical task, for they cannot be understood of themselves. "141 This 
appeal to the self-evident, so alien to historical reconstruction, reveals the different attitude to 
authority that exists between Collingwood (qua historian) and Gadamer. Collingwood's use of 
'authority' is clearly derogatory. The reduction of history to the testimony of 'authorities' depends 
upon not using one's reason at all. This is a clear echo of Descartes' methodic doubt. 142 In 
contrast, Gadamer wants to rehabilitate the concept of authority. No longer must it be equated 
with blind obedience~ rather, it must be seen in the context of legitimate prejudices. 
This is a (re)discovery of the first order~ and like the work ofWittgenstein, Gadamer's 
hermeneutic delivers us from the yoke of absolute autonomy . Yet on the grounds of the limited 
dialectic between historical reconstruction and hermeneutics that I have sketched, questions come 
crowding in: 'Is this discovery meant to effect a revolution in scientific method?' 'Are \\c meant to 
suppose that the historian should give up historical work because it is parasitic upon a Cartesian 
ego?' In other words, if the paradigm of self-understanding has moved from autonomy towards 
creative dependence, is it still legitimate to pursue practices which do not, as it were, address 
themselves to contemporary problems but are, in effect, part of the problem of 'modernity") Such 
concerns betray a belief that in order to preserve its very nature it is necessary for history to stand 
outside hermeneutics. Here of course the seductive capacity of Enlightenment notions of 
autonomy and authority reveal themselves. By presupposing the Enlightenment's appeal to 
universal autonomy. the limited dialectic between history and hermeneutics cannot conceive of 
authority in any but a derogatory way. As Ricoeur declares: why "is it so difficult for us to 
140TM. 353f. 
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conceive of a dependence \\ ithout heteronomy? Is it not because we too often and too quickly 
think ofa will that submits and not enough ofan imagination that opens itself?"I.B This 
heightened sense of autonomy obscures the distinction between historical and positivisitic method. 
because it necessitates a divorce between history and hermeneutics. But the logic of question and 
answer makes this unnecessary; for while positivism wants to extinguish prejudice to let the past 
speak, Collingwood's logic works on the assumption that knowledge is obtained by asking the 
questions which 'arise'. It is true that Collingwood was himself somewhat seduced by the 
Enlightenment notion of autonomy. But he saw more clearly in the Metaphysics that to ask is 
always to respond to something already given. Again, further reflection would have removed 
from his 'imaginary picture of the past' any suggestion of subjectivity, bringing to light Ricoeur's 
emphasis on an imagination that opens itself. This reflection, however, need not go beyond the 
bounds of Collingwood's work, for it is easy to derive such an implication out of what he said. 
The concept of 'scientific' history, therefore, can be said to be 'post-critical' in the further (and 
proper) sense that it presupposes narrative unity. 
Assuming the ontological priority of hermeneutics changes its relationship to history. As 
a universal aspect of philosophy, and not "a mere subordinate discipline \\ithin the arena of the 
Geisteswissenschaften" , 144 hermeneutics becomes the ground of history. One of the central aims 
of Truth and Method is to confirm this universal aspect by demonstrating, in the wake of 
Heidegger, that tradition binds the historical consciousness to things already said and preserves 
(bewahrt) the possibility of our hearing it. Thus. 'effective-history' becomes a synonym for what 
is handed down, a self-presenting tradition, which makes possible the goal of hermeneutics: the 
equation of understanding with truth. Gadamer universalizes Dilthey's concept of 
understanding145 by making authority, tradition, and language, with their separate but similar 
conceptions of the unfounded, into 'primordial' terms. Autonomy is, therefore, taken away from 
the subject in the universal sense understood by the Enlightenment, and given to the self-
presenting tradition. Consequently, before the historian is in a position to judge tradition he finds 
himself situated in an order of meaning and of possible truth. As Gadamer declares: "At any rate 
understanding in the human sciences shares one fundamental condition \\ ith the continuity of 
traditions, namely, that it lets itself be addressed by tradition."146 Yet because that which is 
handed dO\-'n presents truth claims the historian must use his method to assess these claims. In 
other words, the act of historical research itself is both critical and a transmission of tradition. 147 
This abolishes the abstract antithesis between tradition and historical research which determines 
\.HRicoeur, EssG.l'S on Biblical Interpretation. (ed.) L. SMudge. ll7. cited in Lash. The Beginning. 88. 
144Gadamer. Philosophical Hermeneutics. 19. cited in Lash. Theologv on the Way. 22-l n. 53. 
145Gadamer. 'Rhetoric. Hermeneutics. and the Critique of Ideology', 275. 
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the limited dialectic between history and hermeneutics. I-t8 Historical research, from the 
perspective of the 'universal', is simply hermeneutics. 
By enveloping the critical aspect of historical research within an anti-subjectivist appeal 
to tradition Gadamer reverses the priority of method. This is important to recognize, because the 
limited dialectic between history and hermeneutics generates an either-or dilemma: either 
criticism or acceptance of a self-sufficient text. But Gadamer does not want to abolish historical 
method. Rather, he wants, in a 'post-critical' manner, to give a secondary role to historical 
reconstruction. By this step he is attacking not critical research, but the positivistic idea of a 
'judging' consciousness unrestrained by any prejudices. Hermeneutics demands, he declares, "a 
sharpening of the methodological self-consciousness of science", 149 by which he means that the 
practitioners of Wissenschaft must become more conscious of their O\\TI prejudices. In other 
words, by transferring the principle of universal autonomy from the historian to tradition 
Gadamer does not annul autonomy outright. On the contrary, the historian displays the autonomy 
proper to his discipline (regional autonomy) when he works with individual sources. For each 
text, while part of a transmitted tradition, is at the same time "an historically intended separate 
object"150 open to critical scrutiny. Thus, while work with the sources is an extension of the 
principle of methodic doubt history should not be criticized for this. 
It is true, however, that Gadamer's goal of a "constantly self-renewing 
contemporaneity"151 shows that art is his model for hermeneutics. This ontological model is 
always in danger of obliterating the empirical element, because its dominium denies the 
distinction between historical reconstruction and a poetics. This may provide a rationale for those 
who seek an outright rejection of the Enlightenment, but such conservatism must not be allowed 
to affect historiography in the sense of the historian's work with the sources. Were that to happen, 
the necessary distinction between textual interpretation and reconstruction would be obliterated. 
That is to say, history's attempt to discover what the text bears witness to would give way to a 
simple rendering of the meaning of the text for the present. 
§ 2. Tradition and the Critique of Ideologies 
At stake in the polemic between Gadamer and Habermas is the question of the universality of the 
hermeneutical phenomenon. Starting from the linguisticality of being whereby language is both 
the medium and register of all understanding, Gadamer proposes the thesis that societal tradition 
perpetuates itself in terms of this linguisticality. Tradition becomes a s~non~m for language in so 
far as understanding is made possible through the preservation of an order of meaning which 
148TM. 251. 
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projects a truth claim. The anti-subjectivist appeal to tradition receives its power at this point, 
because in order to judge (criticize) we must first accept tradition. We must in fact presume the 
truth (Fur-wahr-halten) of that which comes to us in order to understand. Gadamer thereby 
rejects the antithetical relationship between authority and reason promulgated by the 
Enlightenment. 
It is here that Habermas' critique of ideologies sees a limit to the universality of 
hermeneutics. While Habermas has integrated the hermeneutical reflection of Truth and Method 
into his own criticism of the social sciences, he denies hermeneutics' claim to universality on the 
grounds of an appeal to the antithetical relationship between authority and reason. After 
discussing the extent to which scientific theories have a prelinguistic foundation, he makes a 
distinction between reflective activity within language and the activity of language itself 152 
Whereas Gadamer's hermeneutics attempts to eliminate false prejudices which originate within 
language, Habermas' appeal to a critique of ideologies ('depth-hermeneutics') attempts to 
eliminate systematic distortions which originate with language itself Habermas therefore 
presupposes a theory of language as a whole, namely, a theory of communicative competence153 
which reaches, so to speak, behind a hermeneutical understanding that "begins, in each case, from 
a preconception defined by the tradition which is formed and altered within linguistic 
communication."154 This reflection throws light on an important distinction between a 'prejudice' 
and an 'ideology'. Ideology is not the same as prejudice. An ideology is not an implicit influence 
upon understanding; rather, it articulates a claim by disguising itself as a truth-claim. It is the 
counterfeit of truth. Such a distinction, in Habermas' view, makes it impossible for Gadamer's 
hermeneutics to disentangle truth from distortion. For whereas hermeneutics has a normative 
function in discarding prejudices that prevent understanding, it cannot but repeat a systematic 
distortion because it is enclosed within the walls of that distortion. 
The purpose of this argument is to show that hermeneutics' claim to universality finds its 
limit in the language systems of science where 'correct usage' is defined by a theory of 
communicative competence and not the rhetoric of hermeneutics. Thus the appeal to a 
prelinguistic foundation (itself left unproven) signals Habermas' belief that tradition must submit 
itself to the law of the better argument. This of course allows the critic of ideology to stand 
outside the hermeneutical phenomenon, because systematic distortions can "be 'understood' 
without involvement in the hermeneutical problematic."155 
152Habcrmas. 'On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality'. 300ff. 
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As it stands, Habennas' argument appears very plausible indeed. E "en though it is founded on 
principles wholly opposed to those argued in the present work, the distinction between a prejudice 
and an ideology is a permanent gain. We must, therefore, concede that Habermas' appeal to 
ideology takes us further than Gadamer's appeal to prejudice. However, at stake in the present 
inquiry is the incorporation of 'ideology' into a hermeneutics of historical consciousness. Such an 
aim is achieved once the limitations of the critique of ideologies are revealed. 
Habermas' argument begins from a materialist critique of an essentially Hegelian appeal 
to an "ontological priority of linguistic tradition over all possible critiques."156 In Habermas' 
view, a sole emphasis on a linguistic tradition ignores the material conditions of labour and 
domination, and "ties itself to the idealist presupposition that linguistically articulated 
consciousness determines the material practice of life. "157 This is of course a clear echo of 
Marx's quarrel with Hegel. 158 According to Habermas', Gadamer converts Hegel's famous phrase 
'the real is the rational' (or more correctly in German, "Was vemunftig ist das ist wirklich. und 
was wirklich ist, das ist vemiinftig" 159) into his own equally famous phrase "being that can be 
understood is language" .160 But while Part III of Truth and Method gives a rather one-sided 
exposition of the universal character of linguisticality, in subsequent work Gadamer shows that 
the ontological priority of linguisticality "means simply that there is no social reality, with all its 
concrete compulsions, which does not also exhibit itself in a linguistically articulated 
consciousness."161 In other words, the pursuit ofa reality independent oflanguage is the pursuit 
of an unintelligible realm, one that we could never understand. Habermas might reply by 
suggesting that this is merely a circular argument~ but as Colling\\:ood suggests: "[h]ow can we 
ever satisfy ourselves that the principles on which we think are true, except by going on thinking 
according to those principles, and seeing whether unanswerable criticisms of them emerge as we 
work?" 162 
The appeal to ideological distortion over unconscious prejudice shows that Habermas 
finds it difficult to accept the limit imposed on the autonomy of the subject by Gadamer's resort 
to tradition. According to Habermas, tradition has a nullifying effect on criticism and prevents it 
from getting, so to speak, to the bottom of something. For while, according to Gadamer, we must 
concede authority to tradition in order to understand, Habermas' holds out the prospect that 
1560HCU.313. 
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linguisticality itself may be "the product of pseudocommunication." 163 Habermas is attempting to 
uphold the antithetical relationship between authority and reason by giving the critic of ideology 
the power to reach back into the origin of ' things-in-themselves'. His model for this is what he 
calls 'scenic understanding' which he derives from psychoanalysis. "Scenic understanding", 
Habermas declares, "is distinct from simple hermeneutical understanding by virtue of its 
explanatory power; it unlocks the meaning of specifically unintelligible expressions only insofar 
as it can also successfully reconstruct the original scene and thus bring to light the conditions 
responsible for the genesis of the difficulty itself. "164 He goes on in a manner reminiscent of 
Collingwood's 'outside-inside' metaphor, "The What - the meaningful content of the 
systematically distorted expression - cannot be 'understood' if the Why - the origin of the 
symptomatic scene in the conditions responsible for the systematic distortion itself - cannot be 
'explained' at the same time. "165 With this thesis he is, I think, making two related claims. 
The first claim can be split into two separate points. The appeal to 'scenic understanding' 
though basic to 'pathological' situations is reminiscent of Collingwood's emphasis on the 
explanation of an 'individual action'. The reconstruction of the original scene acts as a protest 
against an over-zealous appeal to ontology which is used (in this instance) to prevent successful 
explanation. Habermas' resort to 'scenic understanding' is deliberately intended to disclose the 
political character of the appeal to ontology. To reiterate an earlier point: ontology removes the 
empirical evidence from the scene. Consequently, that the event even happened can be denied. 
Secondly, and more radically, Habermas' is suggesting that in some cases true understanding is 
only reached if that which has come down to us in the form of tradition is rejected outright. He is, 
in other words, following the Enlightenment's principle of freedom from constraint: everything 
that prevents the realization of freedom must be rejected. But such a fact can be accommodated 
within hermeneutics without too much trouble if we assume that the ontology of linguisticality 
still forms the ground of a tradition. Such a point is, I believe, inadvertently conceded by 
Habermas when he assumes that an ideology possesses a meaningful content which makes it 
intelligible. The ontological conception of hermeneutics cannot, then, be completely ideological, 
because even an ideology rests on something that is not. But while he agrees ,"vith Gadamer that 
"every misunderstanding presuppose[s] the existence of something like a 'standing agreement',"166 
the affirmation of this agreement is so defined as to deny this inadvertency. The agreement, 
according to Habermas, is "guaranteed only by that consensus which might be reached under the 
idealized conditions to be found in unrestrained and dominance-free communication, and which 
1630HCU.314. 
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could, in the course of time, be affirmed to exist."167 In Habermas' 'lew, Gadamer fails to 
recognize this, and so is unable to distinguish between 'dogmatic acknmvledgement' and 'true 
consensus'. 168 The appeal to such a consensus clearly shows that Habermas distrusts tradition 
per se. Truth is essentially transcendent, in the future. It is to be anticipated. But on pain of 
falling into a 'negative dialectic' which projects itself into a unrealizable utopia, this consensus 
must search for evidence of truth already at work. As such the critique of ideologies can only be a 
critique of that which already exists; it must therefore assume a given. This makes the critic of 
ideology dependent upon an ontology . Yet this ontology is not the same ontology that supports 
tradition. This can be demonstrated by illustrating the importance of Gadamer's appeal to 
dogmatic acknowledgement. Such an appeal does not signify freedom from force (think. for 
instance, of Collingwood's description of tradition as a force). but rather freedom from negative 
force. Because he upholds the antithesis between authority and reason, Habermas is unable to 
distinguish betwcen different forms of force. Now. according to Gadamer, legitimate authority 
derives its life, "rnlot from dogmatic force, but from dogmatic acknowledgement." 169 This means 
that one concedes to authority a superiority in knowledge and judgement. Such acknowledgement 
is still 'force', because it is a rhetorical explication that convinces without being able to prove. 170 
This is anathema to Habermas, because his distrust of tradition pe r se discloses his belief in a 
primordial ontology of negativity over-against an ontology of positivity. 171 'Positivity' is entirely 
in the future. I am suggesting, in other words, that Habermas' unconstrained, dominance-free 
consensus, paradoxically. presupposes "an anarchistic utopia."I72 This can be remedied only by 
bringing the critique of ideologies into line with the ontology proper to hermeneutics. Such a 
move reveals Habermas' second claim. 
The appeal to 'scenic understanding' suggests that Habermas believes that by unmasking 
systematic distortion the critic of ideology gives agents a direct grasp upon reality. Yet our 
relation to reality is never one of direct participation. As Collingwood understood, we cannot 
think through our absolute presuppositions as they are in themselves; rather they themselves 
provide the means of thinking. Habermas implicitly concedes this when he assumes that ideology 
rcsts on something prior to itself. Therefore, even the critique of ideology must judge tradition 
from within the practices it encourages. Critical theory cannot determine the validity of a 
tradition as a 'theory', but it can criticize the complex of practices that determine what a tradition 
1670HCU. 313. his emphasis. 
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is. Consequently, we must broaden the meaning of 'prejudice' so that it includes ideology. This 
can be accomplished if ideology is interpreted dialectically; that is, both positively and negatively. 
Drawing upon Karl Mannheim's Ideologie and Utople Ricoeur argues that our relation to reality 
is mediated within the imaginary framework of ideology and utopia. 173 This at once undermines 
the tendency of critical theory to believe that unmasking ideology gives social agents a direct 
grasp upon reality. Before it has a distorting role, ideology has a constituting function. This 
brings it into line with an understanding of tradition. "Every authority. in fact, seeks to make 
itself legitimate." But "[t]he claim coming from the authority always contains more than the belief 
which is accorded this authority."174 It is this 'gap' between ideology and reality that opens up its 
pathological function and our ability to criticize it. Ideology attempts to cover over this gap by 
repeating itself, but in the realm of projective being this attempt unmasks itself This is because in 
its attempt to hold on to the past, ideology sees itself as always and already complete, and as such 
is unable to bear the weight of accumulated experience. Holding on to the past in this way 
converts it into a distorting ideology, because its perpetrators are unwilling to recognize 
development. In this respect, criticism is able to show that ideology, so to speak, 'keeps things as 
they are'. As a result, the critical question now becomes a question internal to tradition: not only 
one of "distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones by which 
we misunderstand" 175 but of distinguishing between positive and negative ideologies. 
Hermeneutics must, in other words, include within itself a critical theory of society if it is not to 
remain a mere bastion of the elite within that society. Consequently, voice is given among other 
things, to the 'history' of the dispossessed and forgotten. This reverses the emphasis on what is 
successful. No longer is something true because it is successful, but successful (successfully 
brought to memory) because it is true. 176 
But of course a sole emphasis on emancipatoI) praxis cannot encompass everything we 
need in order to speak the truth. Contrary to Habermas' polemic against tradition, we cannot 
escape from tradition; as Collingwood never tired of reminding us, the past lives on in the 
present. In this light, the tradition itself becomes the vehicle of criticism. The focus now shifts 
away from a progressive betterment of society towards the constant temptation of the present to 
betray the memory of the past. Tradition, in other words. can act as a subversive memory. This 
must not be understood as a Romantic theory about the remembrance of a lost eternity, or as a 
political statement about maintaining the status quo; rather. it is a theological thesis regarding the 
memory of a concrete past. Whereas critical theory tends towards a critique of the present 
17·~Ricocur. 'Imagination in Discourse', 3-22. 
174'Imagination in Discourse'. 17. 
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situation in the interests of a future without content, I want to emphasize a past that holds \\ithin 
itself the possibility of a content (a praxis) that the present is always tempted to forget. This 
praxis is a possibility, since it has been shown to us in the past. 
§ 3. Concluding Remarks 
This completes the investigation into the historical and hermeneutical dimensions of re-enactment. 
The emphasis on the historical side has many valid points that any attempted reconstruction of 
the situation of historical agents must take into consideration. Furthermore, re-enactment is 
consistent, within its historical intention, with post-Romantic hermeneutics. 
In the next chapter my aim is to emphasize the historical intention of re-enactment by 
bringing it into dialogue with Edward Schillebeeckx's concern for the historical Jesus. The focus 
falls on Schillebeeckx's desire to assign to Jesus' self-understanding a role in the interpretation of 
his life and death which other theologians, Bultmann to mention the most famous, would reserve 
for the early Christians. Such an approach is, I think, ideally suited to re-enactment. This focus 
will not ignore hermeneutics. On the contrary, I shall review Schillebeeckx's attempt to translate 
the tenns of Christ's divinity into the concept of universal significance. It is my belief that 
Schillebeeckx's christology with its historical concern set within a hermeneutical intention is 
adequate to the task of providing an example of re-enactment in a theological context. 
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CHAPTER SEVE:\ 
Appropriating Schillebeeckx: the Rejection and Death of Jesus 
Introduction 
As the chapter proceeds I shall demonstrate that Schillebeeckx's account of the rejection and 
death of Jesus is an excellent illustration of re-enactment. This in no way commits the following 
argument to an exclusive dependence upon Schillebeeckx exegetical conclusions. While I shall for 
the most part follow Schillebeeckx, I intend only to show that the structure of his account in its 
overall scope, is an excellent example of re-enactment. 
Part I offers a brief excursus on Schillebeeckx which is not meant as a summary of his 
vast theological oeuvre. My purpose is rather to provide sufficient knowledge of some of the 
basic ideas underlying his theology in order to take us forward. Following this I shall give an 
outline of his understanding of the place of historical research in christo logy . Unlike much recent 
New Testament exegesis from Bultmann onwards, Schillebeeckx wants to assign a much more 
creative role in the development of the Christian tradition to Jesus' o\\'n self-understanding. In this 
respect his approach mirrors Collingwood's emphasis on historical agency. 
The question to be faced in Part II is whether re-enactment, which is really after the self-
understanding of an historical agent, is an avenue of historical research that can be effectively or 
even possibly pursued. Bultmann and those who were influenced by him, argued that the attempt 
to derive Jesus' self-understanding from the gospel narratives was bound to fail because those 
narratives were confessional statements concerning the figure of Christ. While granting that the 
gospel narratives do not always lend themselves to bold and confident historical assertion, I shall 
argue that Bultmann's position is open to criticism on the grounds that it is based on certain prior 
theological assumptions which, in the light of an exposition of Bultmann's general approach, are 
unwarranted. 
Part III. which is composed of two sections, will present Schillebeeckx's account of 
Jesus' approach to his own death as an example of re-enactment. I have chosen the rejection and 
death of Jesus because it is here that Jesus' individuality as an historical agent comes into 
sharpest focus: in his approach to death the bond between intention and action is more fully 
disclosed. The statement 'Jesus set his face toward Jerusalem' pervades this whole section, my 
intention being to reveal the necessity of Jesus' o\\n self-understanding to the bearing of the story 
and its outcome. In the second section I shall connect this chapter \\ith the hermeneutical 
emphasis of the last by showing how Schillebecckx identifies Jesus' universal significance as the 
form in which, for today, the issue of his divinity is most effectively addressed. 
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( I ) 
An Interpretative Key to Schillebeeckx's Theology 
God's grace is not revealed either from above or from below, but horizontally, in the encounter of human 
beings with one another within our human history.l 
In order to appreciate the subtlety proper to such an assertion it is necessary to show that, in 
many respects, it is characteristic of a shift in Schillebeeckx's later theology. 
Without documenting it here,2 this shift can be characterized in general as a realization 
on Schillebeeckx's part that one cannot ever achieve, as he had earlier thought possible, a purely 
theoretical grasp of a totality of meaning. There was a tum in his thought, as it were, from an 
emphasis on theoretical participation in, to a practical anticipation of, universal meaning. 3 
Consequently, Schillebeeckx's theology is orientated to the future and eschatology, so that 
discipleship is a matter of anticipating this future as is indicated in the title of his book God the 
Future of Man, in Christian (liberating) praxis.4 Following the accent upon anticipation over 
against participation, Schillebeeckx identifies God, understood through the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus, with universal meaning so that God becomes, without being collapsed into, 
a synonym for 'future'. In this way words such as 'God' and 'transcendence' are envisaged as 
always ahead of human beings, in the future. This not only gives a social and political tenor to 
Schillebeeckx's understanding of salvation, but more importantly, 'places' transcendence on the 
horizontal horizon of experience. Schillebeeckx, then, has integrated into his theology of 
revelation the modem embargo against any spatial or hierarchical concept of a three-tier universe, 
of a world beyond and above this world of ours, by concentrating on the theme of the future. 
Such an emphasis on the 'horizontal' as opposed to a 'below' or an 'above' is carried over into the 
Christ volume in his appeal to the concept of 'reality': "where reality offers resistance to such 
outlines and implicitly therefore guides them in an indirect way, we come into contact with a 
reality which is independent of us, which is not thought of, made or projected by men. At this 
point \,"c have a revelation of that which cannot be manipulated, a 'transcendent' power, 
something that comes 'from elsewhere'. "5 It is evident that 'reality' for Schillebeeckx functions as 
a critical tool of any ideology, but also as the limit of the world, \\ithout any implication that 
there is a world 'beyond'. It is the limit in the sense that it is inexhaustible, because transcendent. 
1 Schillebecckx. Christ, 49. 
2For a useful summary of this shift see P. Kennedy, Schillebeeckx, 3-4, .t2-5 L 98-108. 
3Jesus. 618f. 
4 Although Schillcbeeckx never defines his use of 'praxis' it is clear that he means by it an indhisible 
interplay between an action and theory. Praxis must have a theoretical component in order to measure 
its legitimacy. Christian praxis is praxis of the kingdom. That is. a refusal, in the name of Christ of 
oppressive power at the same time as a life spent in service of the poorest and weakest in society. 
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independent, in the future. This is not the same as Kant's 'thing-in-itself which is understood as 
something outside the autonomous (invented) sphere of reason 6 Schillebeeckx refuses to look 
'outside' or 'beyond' to another world. Instead he looks for "a sense [of] the depth or the height 
within the direct encounter or the historical togetherness of human beings in the world"; "a 
perspective is opened up within the horizon of our experience on the meaning which cannot be 
reduced to the history of our projects ... and yet reveals itself in this very history of projects. ,,7 By 
refusing to place a limit on the world in terms of a purely autonomous sphere - which in itself 
presupposes a sphere outside8 - Schillebeeckx can appeal to what he calls the 'depth-dimension' 
of reality or again the 'surplus-vested-in-reality'. He rejects the Kantian emphasis on possible 
experience, because it holds that experience must conform to the conditions laid do", n in 
Newton's mechanics. In other words, certain experience, principally that which can be verified as 
real on a strictly empirical basis, is legitimate but everything else is simply interpretation: the 
non-believer trusts his experiences, whereas the believer builds castles on the same experiences. 9 
On this model, the theologian is relegated to fighting with the enthusiast, occultist, and therapist, 
over the scraps that fall from the physicist's table. By contrast, Schillebeeckx's emphasis on an all 
pervasive and inexhaustible reality means that God's grace or transcendence is brought into the 
field of human experience: "So the religious man also experiences grace; he does not just 
interpret it." I 0 This shows that the 'immanence of transcendence' is basic to Schillebeeckx's later 
theology: "the Deus. intimior intimo meo, that is, ... the creative God who in and via our human 
history takes absolute initiatives in a manner that transcends through immanence or through a 
wholly intimate nearness, cannot be measured ... by any kind of non-religious approach."lt 
Following the shift from theoretical participation to practical anticipation, priority is 
given to practice over theory, since it is in the former where the surplus-vested-in-reality can be 
experienced. Yet he does not reject the advance of natural science since the Enlightenment. 12 
Rather, he believes that reality is not exhausted by scientific analysis. Thus, when discussing the 
sphere of historical-critical method, he does not criticize this sphere as perhaps the logic of his 
position might suggest, but instead places it under the realm of the theoretical which as method is 
legitimate in itself. In its own sphere, the theoretical, historical method is legitimate; it is not 
reductionist as such, it rather asks limited questions and therefore receives limited answers. It 
6Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, 84. 
7Christ, 4X. 49, his emphasis. 
8Sradley. Appearance and Reality. 1. 110-15. 
9Christ, 54. 
lOChrist, 54. 
II.lesus. 654f. And again. "In linguistic terms. the concept of 'revelation' is a protest against the 
exclusiveness of language which is directly descriptive and assertive .. " Christ. 46. Of course behind the 
accent on the immanence of transcendence is the doctrine of creation. See God .rtmong Us, 91-102. 
I2See his 'Christian Obedience and its Pathology'. 
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only becomes reductionist if the questions asked are taken as adequate to reality as a whole. 
Therefore, in his Jesus book, Schillebeeckx actually uses historical method to disclose something 
of the nature of faith. The necessary silence about Jesus' ultimate identity that historical study 
displays, really does throw light on the limits of historical method. Yet this is not used in a 
negative fashion in order to prohibit the possibility that faith is related to history. such that faith 
must be something wholly private or subjective in character. Schillebeeckx does not adjudge 
historical-critical method 'methodologically atheist' which is what happened under the weight of 
the positivistic principle of analogy; rather, the truth-conditions pertaining to statements which 
involve the mystery of divine action do not lie open to historical research. Historical research is a 
necessary condition of such a statement's truth, but it can never be a sufficient necessary 
condition of its truth. Yet while the sufficient truth condition of divine action is not open to 
empirical methods, the resources of historical research are not an alternative to the resources of 
faith, but are those resources in their contingent and empirical form. 13 This of course follows 
from Schillebeeckx's emphasis on the immanence of transcendence which discloses the 
inexhaustible nature of reality. 
§ I. Following a Faith-motivated Historical Approach: a 'Theology of Jesus' 
Placing the Jesus volume in opposition to Bultmann made an account of the validity of the 
historical-critical method for christology necessary, because while Bultmann's influence was 
declining it had by no means reached its nadir. However, it would be wrong to suggest that 
Schillebeeckx was attempting to go back before Bultmann in a search for a pre-kerygmatic 
Jesus. 14 On the contrary, he demonstrates a remarkable sensitivity - something hardly present in 
Pannenberg's earlier work, Jesus-God and Man - to the importance of differing approaches to the 
gospel texts. It is such insight which provided the means for his assertion that taking an 
historical-critical approach to the gospels relativises the whole venture. 15 With such an insight I 
wholeheartedly agree. There is, in other words, no trace of a non-dogmatic Jesus in the gospels 
and neither is Schillebeeckx after such a Jesus. The idea that the historical approach is a relative 
procedure shows that it has no absolute status as 'the' method which exegetes must follow. In 
contrast. the early Christians, Schillebeeckx declares, discovered in Jesus "something that cannot 
be pinned down directly, on an empirical basis, but that to any open-minded person confronted 
with Jesus in a living community is going to present itself as something gratuitous, as 'given in 
evidence'" .16 This statement is careful to suggest that there is more to Jesus than what the results 
of historical research can tell us. Failure to heed such a remark. Schillebeeckx comments, runs 
DLash .. 1 .\/atter of Hope for this idea in a different context. 1 .... ·t 
14W. Kasper. 'Libera Ie Christologie'. 357-60. cited in Schillebeeck..x.lnterim Report. 29. I ........ n. 7. 
15Jesus ..... 0. 
16Jesus ..... 6. 
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the risk of converting the epistemological basis of historical method into an ontology, whereby 
'occurrent reality' (the course of historical events) is collapsed into 'historical method' (the job of 
the historian) so that 'reality' becomes equivalent to what the historian can say about it. I ! This 
necessitates not only the pursuit of other approaches, but a broader conception of history similar 
to that sketched in Chapter 5. Yet Schillebeeckx does not think that faith is a kind of gnosis 
which can get at facts unavailable to historical research; rather following the emphasis on the 
'surplus-vested-in-reality', faith can disclose the real significance of facts, which a purely 
historical assessment fails to discover. 18 Use of the phrase 'given in evidence' is suggestive of the 
belief that Christianity cannot rest, as Bultmann did, ultimately, have it rest, upon a purely 
autonomous kerygma. 
Fundamental to Schillebeeckx's approach is an attempt to relativize the abrupt 
discontinuity kerygma theologians had posited between Jesus and the Christ. The constraining 
power of what is nonnative does not reside solely in the kerygma but in the memoria Jesu. In 
other words, he is careful to show that his desire to demonstrate the continuity between 'Jesus' 
and 'Christ' is not meant as a way of seeking out a purely historical Jesus which can then be used 
as a stick with which to beat kerygma theologians or ecclesiastical authorities; rather. his purpose 
is, as it were, to trace the phenomenon of 'Jesus and his first believing disciples' as an occurrent 
reality and to construct a 'theology of Jesus' and not a 'pure' history of Jesus. It is such an 
approach which leads him to say that "[t]he only question ... is whether this concrete articulation 
[expression of salvation] is indeed partly determined by the concrete reality that was offered and 
came to them from Jesus, or derives solely from the socio-cultural context in which these people 
found themselves." 19 And this task, if successful. will constitute a re-enactment as Collingwood 
envisaged. By stressing a 'theology of Jesus' (rather than a christology) Schillebeeckx is pointing 
to two very important ideas: in the first place, history and empirical knowledge of the life of Jesus 
v.ith his disciples are present in the gospels, but present in the language of faith. So that even 
during his life it is the disciples' faithful response (or lack of it) to the life of Jesus that is 
important and subsequently reported. Secondly, the critical impulse so evident in the 'Quest for 
the Historical Jesus' is de-centred and the a priori assumption of that quest, that a removal of the 
so-called 'dogmatic superstructure' present in the New Testament would disclose the real 
historical Jesus, is undermined. In contrast. there is a sophisticated hermeneutic at work in 
Schillebeeckx's text which recognizes, and the phrase 'theology of Jesus' is the key to it, that any 
reality is articulated in models of thought which cannot simply be stripped away to reveal an 
historical essence or kernel which is somehow value free. The 'models of thought' used to express 
17JeslIs.68f. 
18Jesus, 68. 
19./cSII.'\,69. 
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the reality actually interpretatively disclose that reality so that it is a matter of 'translation' rather 
than a re-interpretation of a reducible essence. That is to say, one cannot ever go all the way 
do\\n and reach an essence, whether that be of a formal kerygma or a purely historical Jesus, 
which can then become the foundation of Christianity. But this does not nullify the critical 
impulse, it only displaces it. So Jesus of Nazareth is still the "constant anti-pole of the Christ-
confessing churches, even though this Opposite Presence - criterion and norm - can ncver be 
grasped per se but only apprehended in the process whereby the Christian churches let 
themselves be defined by Jesus. "20 The restraint of such a passage indicates Schillebeeckx's 
intention to do justice both to the believing community as the 'constant unitive factor'21 in 
interpretation - thus showing sensitivity to Bultmann's instincts if not his conclusions - and also to 
the fact that although mediated through the believing community, it is Jesus who is actively 
shaping the response in so far as it is done in an openness to the mystery present as the memoria 
Jesu in the Church. Thus the historical-critical approach is placed under the proviso that "the 
difficulty about reaching a scrupulous interpretation of Jesus ... is the orbit \\ithin which it has to 
be achieved. "22 Speaking theologically, then, the historical approach is set \\ ithin the scope of a 
'theology of Jesus', and as such it is "bounded, that is, put in its place or kept within its proper 
bounds, by a faith-directed interpretation."23 For Schillebeeckx this remains the only proper 
starting point. In essence, while in general the historical approach is engaged because on the one 
hand, the 'founder of Christianity' lived a particular life at a particular timc. and on the other, 
because one cannot simply ignore almost two thousand years of history, Schillebeeckx uses the 
historical-critical method in order to demonstrate that there is some measure of continuity 
between the historical Jesus and the Christ proclaimed by the Church which he concentrates into 
the theme of Jesus' self-understanding. He does not reject the Bultmannian emphasis on kerygma~ 
rather his whole approach attempts to provide historical content to the kerygma to prevent it 
assuming the character of an Ideengeschichte. It is Schillebeeckx's hope that tracing the 'life of 
Jesus with his first believing disciples' in a faith-motivated historical approach will open up the 
possibility of faith in Jesus-the-Crucified-and-Risen One to people who have ears to hear and 
eyes to see. That is to say, the believer will see God's saving action realized in Jesus' life, which 
without the material about Jesus recovered by the historical method would not be possible. "This 
then is the importance of the historical study of Jesus for making up, concretely, the content of 
faith"H 
20Jesus.76. 
21Je.,·us.52-7. 
22Jesus. 76. 
23Jesus. 71. 
24Jesus. 75. 
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Re-enactment Contra Bultmann 
§ 1. Excursus on Bultmann 
( II ) 
The greatest embarrassment to the attempt to reconstruct a picture of Jesus' character is the fact that 
we cannot know how Jesus understood his end, his death. 25 
This statement, which is derived from a one-sided Kerygma theology. reflects Bultmann's general 
approach to the question of historical research: such research is of no use where Jesus' theological 
significance is concerned. In contrast, Bultmann, following Dilthey and Heidegger, prefers to talk 
of the 'historicity of man', meaning man's consciousness of the relativity and finiteness of every 
historical creation, leading to the realization of existential freedom.26 In this respect, Bultmann 
searched the Gospels less for documents pertaining to the life of Jesus, and much more for 
primitive Christianity's eschatological interpretation of human existence.27 It is understandable, 
under such conditions, that Bultmann saw re-enactment less in terms of historical research and 
more in terms of historicity. While it can be said that the theme of historicity is an aspect of re-
enactment (this was after all demonstrated in the previous chapter), on the level of historical 
understanding, re-enactment mirrors exactly what Bultmann most fervently disallows. Re-
enactment stands for the historian's pursuit of the motives, intentions and actions of historical 
agents in order to advance an explanation of an historical event. Nevertheless, do not the 
gospels present a difficulty in this respect? The gospels are not texts written by Jesus, so perhaps 
're-thinking the thoughts of Jesus' is not possible in the sense in which a person's motives, 
intentions, and purposes are re-enactable through a reading of his O\\TI text. 28 But a re-enactment 
can be achieved, which does not absolve the process of difficulty, if the inquiry loosens its 
reliance on explicit testimony, and the semantic rather than psychological nature of re-enactment 
is kept in mind. 
The purpose of the following is to show that Bultmann's one-sided interpretation of re-
enactment found in his Gifford Lectures (1955) and influential in the work ofD. Nineham and 1. 
Macquarrie, is the result of his general approach to the New Testament. The divorce between 
historical research and historicity mirrors the dualism that Bultmann exploited throughout his 
work in the interest of his particular understanding of faith. After exploring the main features of 
25Bultmann. 'The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus'. in (ed.) C. E. Braaten. The 
/listorical Jesus. 23. 
26Bultmann. History and Eschatology. 
27Pannenberg. 'Kerygma and History. 87. 
28The nature of the NT texts cannot. according to lain NicoL "disclose thoughts of Jesus, let alone 
permit us the luxury ofre-thinking them or re-enacting them." 'History and Transcendence', 77L Joseph 
Fitzm)cr. 'Belief in Jesus Today'. Both cited in Hogan. Collingwood. 156f I suspect. however. that both 
. . 
writers take re-thinking too literally 
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Bultmann's theology, I shall move on to a specific but brief analysis of his Gifford Lectures, 
showing how Nineham and Macquarrie follow him into error. The first two sections of this part 
will argue that Bultmann's belief that we have no access to Jesus' self-understanding is simply an 
unwarranted a priori, with the added demonstration that his interpretation of re-enactment is 
weighted too heavily in terms of historicity over against historical explanation. This leaves the 
final section free to counter the assumptions of Bultmann's approach by demonstrating a much 
stronger historical intention on the part of the New Testament, together with a correlation 
between Collingwood and Schillebeeckx. on the question of access to Jesus' self-understanding. 
For Bultmann historical judgements with regard to Jesus' theological significance are 
superfluous, because he presupposes that everything necessary is contained in a self-sufficient 
kerygma. This follows from the implicit assumptions of Formgeschichte which sought to assign 
to the early Christian communities the major role in shaping the figure of Christ without any 
accompanying historical concern for the life of Jesus. Yet this is a false view, because while there 
is no Jesus without kerygma there is no kerygma without Jesus. It is true that Bultmann realized 
this,29 and did not follow M. Kahler, who in his book The So-Called Historical Jesus and the 
Historic, Biblical Christ laid the foundations for the tendency of P. Tillich, arguably closer to 
Kahler than Bultmann, to demonstrate a complete indifference with regard to history. 30 Yet 
Bultmann was solely interested in 'the that' (das Dass) rather than 'the what' (das Was) of Jesus' 
earthly life. In other words, all content is to be ascribed to the kerygma of the early Christians. 
Such an understanding, to be found in his early essay on the significance of the historical Jesus 
for Paul,31 was given later expression in his now famous assertion that "the message of Jesus is a 
presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself."32 
This is a systematic expression of the conclusions reached by Formgeschichte following the 
collapse of the 'Quest for the Historical Jesus'. 
In the wake of the failure of , Life -of-Jesus' research it da\\ned upon theologians that the 
gospel texts were not biographies of a person called Jesus of Nazareth that were concerned with 
details of personality. but confessional statements about the salvific import of this figure. 33 This 
29"1t is '" obvious that the Kerygma presupposes the historical Jesus, however much it may have 
mythologized him. Without him there would be no Kerygma." 'The Primitive Christian Kerygma', cited 
in (ed.) Braaten. The Historical Jesus, 18. 
30Tillich's scepticism can be gauged by the fact that he accuses Bultmann of attempting to construct a 
picture of the historical Jesus, Systematic Theology 2, 122. See also Tillich's discussion of the possibility 
that Jesus never li,"ed. l30f. 
.HBuitmann. Faith and Understanding L 220-46. 
UBuitmann, Theologv of the Yew Testament, L 3. 
n"No attempt is here made to render Jesus a historical phenomenon psychologically e:\.-plicable, and 
nothing really biographical ... is included .. " Interest in the personality a/Jesus is excluded ... We can 
now know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the early Christian sources 
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discovery, coupled with the idea, itself a consequence of the failure of the Quest, that history can 
at best only reach probability in its results, made the focus on the confessional nature of the 
gospels inevitable (which is not a bad thing in itself). Such an attitude to history was held, 
Collingwood declares, because the historian was "still worried by the fact that however much 
information we have concerning a given period we still might obtain more, and this more might 
modify the results already thought secure. Hence", it was argued, "all historical knowledge is 
uncertain. "34 The failure to realize that the historical problem is a present problem, not a future 
one, the failure to see that the word 'truth' has no meaning for the historian unless it means 'what 
the evidence obliges us to believe', meant that 'faith' had to find a basis in something other than 
history. The 'flight into faith', the search for a 'storm-free' zone insulated from criticism became 
Bultmann's refuge. Furthermore, the conception of historiography prevalent at the time of 
kerygma theology aimed to give validity, through the use of a positivistically understood principle 
of analogy, to those events which are the same as experienced in the present. Yet the biblical 
witness does not deal with general religious truths but with very particular acts of God. Thus 
Bultmann and other kerygma and dialectical theologians defined their position against such an 
approach, but (and this is crucial) also identified history in toto with the particular understanding 
of critical history prevalent at the time. 
These conclusions can be seen as 'starting-points' of Bultmann and K. Barth's theology. 
Yet each derived different conclusions as to the way forward, and this is most clearly evident in 
their different ways of 'reading' the gospels. For Barth the failure of the liberal quest meant that 
the gospels presented a concrete picture of Jesus irreducible to critical methods. Barth sought to 
show that treating the gospels as historical sources deflected from their normative function as 
witness. Yet it is arguable that Bultmann saw Formgeschichte as particularly suited to bring out 
the peculiar confessional nature of the gospels. Following the discovery that the gospels were 
composed of small isolated units (pericopae) which were later woven into a narrative, Bultmann 
found it difficult to imagine that the early Christians had intended to preserve biographical 
elements of Jesus' life. Rather, Formgeschichte is not simply a process of description and 
classification of differing narrative and confessional genres, but an attempt to establish the Sitz 
im Leben of individual pericopae in relation to the preaching and worship of the primitive 
church.35 The process of Formgeschichte was peculiar, in so far as it made the biblical witness 
to Christ the object of historical investigation: this meant that from an historical perspective the 
event remained obfuscated.36 On such an assumption the search for an historical Jesus seemed 
show no interest in either. are more fragmentary and often legendary ... " Bultmann. Jesus and the Word. 
n. 14. his emphasis. 
HCollingwood. The Idea a/History. 180. Collingwood is discussing Meyer. the German philosopher. 
35Bultmann. The History of the Synoptic Tradition. 3r. see Thiselton. The Two Horizons. 221. 
36Panncnbcrg. 'Kerygma and History'. 86. 
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hopeless. This makes BuItmann a somewhat unlikely figure to deliver lectures on 'History and 
Eschatology' except when it is realized that he brings Geschichte into line with his understanding 
of eschatology. 
The emphasis upon the 'preached Christ' is cemented by Bultmann's interweaving of 
epistemology with his Lutheran inheritance. While Bultmann agreed with Barth on the principle 
that God represents the total annulment of man, hence placing liberal theology under Divine 
judgement, Bultmann retained the liberal attachment to Neo-Kantian epistemology because it 
spoke directly to his understanding of the Lutheran distinction between 'works' and 'faith'. 
Following W. Herrmann and perhaps Kahler,37 Bultmann placed everything which sought, as he 
saw it, to make faith in Christ a human work - the attempt to base faith upon an objective cvent 
or on historical research into Jesus - under Justification by works'~ while his O\\TI position of 
'justification by faith' sought to place faith in the Christ of the worshipping community. Thus 
what becomes important for Bultmann is not any objective past-history (Historie) but history that 
is significant for the present (Geschichte). In other words, the event of God in Christ is not to be 
mistaken for an event which can be dealt with on the plane of the horizontal where "to know is to 
objectify in accordance with the principle of law, "38 because this treats Christ as an object 
alongside other objects~ but is to be understood as faith in a present 'event' (Ereignis) in the 
bcliever's own life. This is clearly evident in the following: "To believe in the Cross of Christ does 
not mean to concern ourselves ... with an objective event ... but rather to make the cross of Christ 
our own, to undergo crucifixion with him. "39 Such an emphasis, irrespective of existentialism, 
clearly owes something to the liberalism Bultmann inherited from Herrmann in so far as he 
refuses to allow faith a basis in an assent to doctrine or authority other than the Word disclosed 
in Christ. Ultimately, of sole importance is access to the kerygma which is given to the believer 
via the process of Formgeschichte and demythologising leading to an Ereignis in the believer's 
life. Therefore, while it is true that Bultmann has in view the Barthian idea of 'unbelief, albeit 
clothed in the Lutheran language of 'works', his preference for Neo-Kantian epistemology 
discloses his dependence on one side of a dualism which cannot, in my view, bear the weight that 
is placed upon it. 
Bultmann is using the dualism inherent in Neo-Kantian epistemology to disclose 
something of the nature of faith in what amounts to a peculiar 'anti-foundationalist' ecclesiology. 
Demythologizing, Bultmann declares, "carries this doctrine [justification by faith] to its logical 
conclusion in the field of epistemology. Like the doctrine of justification it dcstroys evcry false 
]7Thiseiton. The 1\m Horbms. 205-26. 
38Johnson. The Origills of Demythologizing. 50. cited in Thiselton. The Two Hori:o!1s. 210. 
39Bultmann. Kerygma and .\~lIth 1. 36. 
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security ... Security can be found only by abandoning all security."-lU Bultmann identifies faith 
with the interpretative side of the dualism over the 'objective' side that is identified \\ith 'works'. 
This then gives him the confidence to say, "I calmly let the fire [of historical criticism] bum, for I 
see that what is consumed is only the fanciful portraits of Life-of-Jesus theology. and that means 
nothing other than 'Christ after the flesh' ... But the 'Christ after the flesh' is no concern of ours. 
How things looked in the heart of Jesus I do not know and do not want to know. "41 In this way 
historical research into the events of which the kerygma speaks is made a mark of unbelief. 
Instead, because Formgeschichte reflects the nature of the gospel texts, one must be satisfied 
with faith in the kerygma understood as something entirely inaccessible to the then current 
understanding of historical reality via the positivistic principle of analogy. Yet such a radical 
dualism, seen in his definite preference for Geschichte over Histone, Ereignis over the 'objective 
event', kerygma over history, and the present over the past, paradoxically makes the transcendent 
dependent upon the subjective. That is to say, "if the meaning is not there in the events to be 
discovered, but rather is brought to the bare events by faith, so that only for faith can they be said 
to have this or that meaning, then the question of content is delivered over into the individual's 
subjectivity and its arbitrariness. "42 On this view, the radical transcendence of God is only 
another name for the radical trust of faith in its own autonomy understood as an act of decision. 43 
The problem is that Bultmann's dualism is caught in a positivist trap, he can see no way round 
the Neo-Kantian problem of 'objectification' except to take flight from it into an Ereignis which 
insulates the faith within an autonomous ecclesiology founded upon devotion. He not only holds 
to a thorough-going dualism between nature and history (the concept of process secured 
Collingwood against this), he also has a dualistic concept of history. On the one hand, there is 
40'Bultmann. Kerygma and Afvth 1,210-11. 
4lBultmann. Faith and Understanding 1. 132, my emphasis. 
42M. Westphal, 'Hegel, Pannenberg', 276-93 . 
. HHeidegger's concept of 'decision', which Bultmann borrows. is representathe of the 'philosophy of 
crisis'; a 'movement' of thought, at once nationalistic and anti-democratic, which demanded 
revolutionary change. It is an expression of the search for the true Germanic Spirit as against Western 
decadence, liberalism. individualism, mechanism. It is a concept that lacks content and instead calls for 
a decision whose only value is revolution per se. It is understandable, then, that Bultmann's adoption of 
Heidegger's terminology provides the interpreter with a key to Bultmann's own \'ision of the 'theology of 
crisis'. That is to say, the essential point is that revolution per se defines the character of his theology. 
As 1. Moltmann asserts: "with the theology of the Word of God is associated a programmatic opposition 
to that theology which begins with objects and elements present in human beings and their world. \\ith 
religion or religious experience. history or sa\ing facts." (Cited in Scholder, Requiem. 43£.) So that 
Barth's famous 'No' is turned by Bultmann into a radical programme to carve out an autonomous. self-
sufficient Ekklesia taken out of the stream of history (as symbolised by 'critical history'. the culture of the 
nineteenth century and the crisis of Weimar), and an\' attempt to overcome this crisis which means 
. . 
using the methods of the 'Yes' was only an attempt to escape this judgement. On this "iew theology is 
itself in danger ofl>ecoming identified with the Germanic Spirit. Friedrich Gogarten is. I suspect guilty 
of this: Barth certainly not. Bultmann's position is ambiguous. 
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'authentic' knowledge of the real historical event which corresponds to Geschichte, and on the 
other, 'inauthentic' secondary historical knowledge, that of bare objective fact. 44 The unresolved 
problem of integrating these two poles means Bultmann is in danger both of restricting God's 
action in history to the level of interpretation rather than event, and of treating historical fact as 
one thing and the believer's knowledge of it as another. 
It is evident that the problem of 'objectification' and its ensuing dualism forced Bultmann 
to place more weight on interpretation over event, on the present over the past. and such themes 
then become distilled via Bultmann's Gifford Lectures in Nineham and Macquarrie's 
interpretation of re-enactment. 
§ 2. The Theological Interpretation of Re-enactment 
It is important to note that there has been no use of the doctrine of re-enactment within a 
theological context that is adequate to Collingwood's own understanding. 
In his early work, collected together in volume one of Basic Questions in Theology, 
Pannenberg appropriates Collingwood's understanding of the historical imagination in order to 
criticize the principle of analogy at work in critical history after Troeltsch. He employs 
Coli ingwood's idea of an 'imaginary picture of the past' both as a postulate of universal history 
(as a principle of continuity and coherence) and as a principle against an a priori use of analogy 
that suggests that 'dead men don't rise'.45 His appeal is made in order to demonstrate that thc 
resurrection was an historically accessible event. Collingwood's criticism of positivism provides 
Pannenberg with the means to bridge the gap between event and interpretation through which he 
offers a theonomous rather than autonomous account of history. But this means, according to H. 
Burhenn, that his conclusions "are no longer simply historical" .46 Pannenberg, then, uses 
Collingwood's arguments against positivism in order to place theological presuppositions within 
historical method. In other words, Pannenberg's programme is an audacious attempt to eradicate 
not only the dualism between historical method and faith in critical history after Troeltsch, but. it 
seems, the real tension between history and faith, in order to show that historical research of itself 
can reveal the revelatory status of the resurrection. I am certain that Collingwood would have 
accused Pannenberg of committing the 'Fallacy of Swapping Horses' in so far as he is attempting 
to answer questions with one 'method' that require another .. n Furthermore. Pannenberg is 
selectivc in his use of Collingwood. In his desire to focus on the resurrection as an historical 
event, he appropriates parts of Collingwood's historical method ",ithout mention of the central 
importance of the doctrine of re-enactment. 
44H. Ou. Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte. 10. cited in Thiselton. The Two Horizons. 2~6. 
45Pannenberg. Basic Questions Vol. 1: Hogan. Collingwood. 182-97. 
46H. Burhcnn. 'Pannenberg's Argument'. 378. 
47Collingwood. The Sew Leviathan. 2. 66-2. 74-. 
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I find the attention that Bultmann gives to Collingwood in his Gifford Lectures somewhat 
surprising. Read any of Bultmann's other writings and, to my knowledge, no other reference to 
Collingwood will be found. So when Bultmann declares, "The best that is said about the 
problems of history is, in my view, contained in the book of R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of 
History"48 it must be remembered that he is speaking to a British audience. Along similar lines 
Jaspers' contention that Bultmann made Christianity dependent upon Heidegger49 struck a nerve. 
and if it did not force Bultmann to focus on Collingwood, it at least provided him \\ith a motive, 
when the time came, to find another voice which he saw as different yet compatible. So while it is 
true to say that Bultmann remains re-enactment's principal theological advocate,50 his use of this 
concept is in no way exemplary. In fact Bultmann's interpretation is so influenced by the 
assumptions I sketched above that he gives an exclusively one-sided account of re-enactment in 
terms of historicity rather than historiography. 
The principal point to be gained from Bultmann's Gifford Lectures is that "Jesus Christ 
is the eschatological event not as an established fact of past time but as repeatedly present, 
addressing you and me here and now in preaching."51 Such an emphasis, which echoes the 
presentation of Bultmann's theology already given, is anticipated by showing how St. Paul works 
out the consequences of the idea that Christ is the end of history. Bultmann comments: "this hope 
r of salvation] is conceived in terms of the individual. Paul no longer looks into the history of 
peoples and the world nor into a new history. For history has reached its end, since Christ is the 
end of the law (Rom. x. 4)."52 Here Bultmann makes a (false) parallel between law and history.53 
For Bultmann historical research corresponds to law, which mirrors his rejection of 
'objectification' in Neo-Kantian epistemology. As a result, not history but eschatology is the 
origin of the New Testament kerygma. This allows the kerygma to achieve autonomy over 
against its historical basis; for since the basis of the kerygma is concentrated in the resurrection 
of Jesus, the attempt can be made to set this event in opposition to all other history as an 
eschatological event because it is inaccessible to historical method. 54 This opens the way for the 
-l8Bultmann. HE, 130. While he thought highly of Collingwood it is significant that when Collingwood 
diverged from Heidegger. in not stressing that self-knowledge was "consciousness of responsibility over 
against the future," Bultmann was quick to criticise him. HE, 136. 
49Macquarrie. The Scope, 163. 
50Hogan. Collingwood, 156. 
51HE, 151f. 
52HE, ·n. my emphases. 
53Panncnberg states: "But this parallel is not convincing. Law and history arc not comparable for Paul. 
Hc is concerned with the question of whether the law or the promise controls history (Rom. ~: Gal. 3)." 
'Redemptive Evcnt and History', 36. Furthermore. the solus Christus principle i.e. 'Sah'ation lies in no 
other' (Acts ~. 12) refers not to an individualistic cmphasis on justification by faith. but to an 
ecclesiological emphasis on belonging to the 'body of Christ'. 
54Panncnberg. 'Kerygma and History'. 87. 
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emphasis on historicity as a correlate of eschatology. Bultmann comments: "But although the 
history of the nation and the world had lost interest for Paul, he brings to light another 
phenomenon, the historicity of man, the true historical life of the human being, the history which 
every one experiences for himself and by which he gains his real essence. "55 Bultmann's 
interpretation of re-enactment in terms of historicity follows from such an emphasis. 
As I have indicated already (and against Jasper Hopkins), Bultmann's Gifford Lectures 
do not err "so egregiously in their interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy ofhistory"56 when 
they take up the theme of historicity. Rather, I follow Macquarrie who shows that the 
'existentialist' label in its broadest sense - the sense \vhich comes from Collingwood when he says, 
"[t]he historian's thought must spring from the organic unity of his total experience, and be a 
function of his entire personality with its practical as well as its theoretical interests" 5 7 - is not 
alien to Collingwood's approach. 58 Yet be that as it may, Bultmann's interpretation of re-
enactment is still a one-sided venture which leads to misleading consequences. 
In the process of what is little more than a presentation of a string of quotations from The 
Idea of History, Bultmann fastens upon Collingwood's overcoming of positivism and the 
emphasis on self-knowledge as the two basic factors that are compatible with his understanding 
of historicity. The erosion of the dualism between the subject and object provides the means of 
Bultmann's divorce between historical research and historicity. Collingwood expresses this by 
saying: the object of historical knowledge is "not a mere object, something outside the mind which 
knows it: it is an activity of thought, which can be known only in so far as the knowing mind re-
enacts it and knows itself as so doing. "59 However, the fact that, for Bultmann, the object of 
history is not independent of the mind which contemplates it, shows he has the kerygma in view, 
rather than an objective historical event. He goes so far as to say that Collingwood's 
understanding implies that "the relation of subject and object which is characteristic for natural 
science has no value for historical science. "60 There is loss as well as gain here. Bultmann's 
account is plausible in so far as he follows Collingwood in the anticipation of themes found in 
Gadamer's Troth and Method. The idea that historical knowledge is itself an event, and that the 
55HE .n , . 
56Hopkins, 'Bultmann', 233. 
57IH, 305. cited by Bultmann. HE, 133. 
58"The designation rexistentialist] is a very loose one. The three thinkers who seem to have had the 
greatest influence on Bultmann's view of history, Wilhelm Dilthey. Martin Heidegger, and R. G. 
Collingwood, are ,cry diverse: the existentialist label is not applicable simpliciter to anyone of them ... 
We can onlv say that they show a certain affinity in their several approaches to the problems of history, 
...... .. 
and since this affinity centres on the relating of history to the historical existence of the historian 
himself, we find it convenient to speak of an 'existentialist' approach to history." Macquarrie, The Scope, 
S I. my emphasis. 
59TH, 218: Bultmann. HE. 119. 
60HE. 133. 
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historian is part of the process he is studying, revealing the relati\;ty of his situation. are 
fundamental to Bultmann's appropriation of Collingwood.61 Yet Bultmann is using historicity as 
a substitute for historical method. His real concern is knowledge of self rather than knowledge of 
the past. That is to say, he is criticising the idea that history is an objective representation of a 
past reality in favour of the 'event' of present self-understanding. This is echoed in the fonn-
critics' emphasis on Sitz im Leben which does not express reality as such, but the meaning reality 
has for the individual Christian.62 Bultmann's criticism of this tendency is understandable in so 
far as he is following the understanding of history current in his time, but it led him to equate this 
tendency with history in toto. Thus, by dissolving the distinction between the subject and object 
what remains is simply the new reality of the present self. The exegete, in other words, might 
think he is investigating a past reality, but he is really presenting his own self-understanding. 
While there are obvious points of contact with Collingwood, absent from Bultmann is the 
necessary connection of re-enactment with the explanation of a historical as opposed to 
eschatological event, something which upholds the 'otherness' proper to the past and discloses the 
validity of the subject-object relation for historical science. 
The appeal to self-knowledge cements the emphasis on the present self by bringing the 
idea of the individual to the fore: self-knowledge corresponds to the fact that in "knowing his 
situation the individual knows himself. "63 In this way, Bultmann uses Collingwood as a means to 
show that historicity can, on the basis of his tendentious interpretation of Pauline eschatology, 
give the individual believer access to the 'preached Christ' since this method is above time and 
history. He quotes Erich Frank approvingly in this regard: " ... history comes to its end in the 
religious experience of any Christian 'who is in Christ'. In his faith he is already above time and 
history ... In his faith the Christian is a contemporary of Christ, and time and the world's history 
are overcome. "64 It is little wonder that the theme of the annulment of time, already so much part 
of the misplaced criticism of Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment, becomes central to its 
theological use. Furthennore, the attempt to dissolve the distinction between subject and object is 
clearly what Bultmann has in mind when he emphasizes the importance of self-understanding. 
The fonncr idea is a feature of Nine ham's account of re-enactment, while the latter idea features 
in the work of Macquarrie. 
61 "From this it follows that historical knowledge is itself a historical event ... within which the historian 
himself is inten\"oycn as well as the object he endeavours to know" HE. 133. 
62Sec Kasper's The God for the connection between linguistic philosophy and Formgeschichte. 91. 
6]HE. 135. 
64HE. 153. 
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Nineham's enduring concern has been with the problem of the 'culture gap' between the past and 
present disclosed by the development of historical consciousness.65 The central issue for Nineham 
is how an exegete's interpretation of the New Testament is to remain faithful to the original 
meaning of the text. The mistake which he berates exegetes for making in this regard is their 
reading of the past through the presuppositions of the present. He therefore ad" ises, as the central 
task of the New Testament exegete, the 'passing over' into the experience of early Christianity in 
order to give full weight to the 'pastness of the past', in order to disclose its meaning on its 0\\ n 
terms.66 Only after this is accomplished is it possible to deal with what is revealed on our own 
terms.67 Now the use of 'passing over', a favourite metaphor borrowed from 1. S. Dunne's book 
The Way of All the Earth, accentuates Nineham's problematic of the 'culture gap'. That is to say, 
Nineham's belief in a gulf of temporal distance between the past and present necessitates the 
attempt to 'pass over' this gulf and enter the past, i.e. annul temporal distance by a process of re-
enacting the past as past. 68 This is a clear misinterpretation of re-enactment because the 
important idea of the continuity of tradition is not reached. Such an interpretation relies on an 
atomic-like past which can be understood only if the exegete achieves complete contemporaneity. 
This interpretation is, therefore, a species of Romantic hermeneutics. Nineham is so fixated upon 
the 'culture gap' that he sees distinct cultures as hermetically sealed units. Each culture's 
expression of reality, while peculiar to it, is peculiar in the further sense that the presuppositions 
of each culture determine their form of reality. Thus, Nineham arrives via a reading of Troeltsch, 
Bultmann and a misreading of Collingwood, at ideas encouraged by Bultmann's doctrine of 
demythologizing. 
For his part, Macquarrie exploits Bultmann's attempt to dissolve the distinction between 
subject and object to give an account of the Atonement using Collingwood's 'outside-inside' 
metaphor as a methodological tool to achieve this. His argument is as follows: "Considered 
objectively, from the outside, how could a past event, such as the crucifixion of Jesus, be 
regarded as also an atonement which is still efficacious today? ... if we seek to understand this 
event from the inside - by thinking ourselves into it, by participation - ... then its character as 
atonement becomes clear. For is it not the case that the Christian who gets inside this event - by 
being 'crucified with Christ' - ... experiences the event as the attaining of wholeness, as an 
atonement?"69 In one respect this is quite legitimate in so far as it is not knO\\ ing what people did 
but understanding what they thought that is, for Collingwood, the proper definition of the 
65See Nincham. Explorations and The Use and Abuse of the Bible. For critical notices on Nineham's 
position see Thisclton. The Two Horizons: Lash. Theologv on the /I·ay. 75-92. 
66Nineham. Explorations. 162-65. 
67Erplorations. 186. 
68E'xplorations. 164f. 
69Macquarrie. The Scope. 84. 
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historian's task. But Macquarrie's way of putting the question reveals that the significance of the 
cross is for him something 'regarded as an atonement'. The question is Were the authors of the 
New Testament right to make this claim?', and this is not a purely historical question.7o The 
exegete, as an historian, cannot answer this question ifhe is to do full justice to its truth-
conditions~ it can only be affirmed or denied in faith. Following Collingwood's thesis of 
'subjective rationality' all the historian can do is show that certain people believed the cross was 
an atonement. This shows that ambiguity is an inescapable part of the historical process. History 
is always, and quite rightly, open to different interpretations. Yet Macquarrie's over extension of 
the 'outside-inside' metaphor, by which he turns it into a methodological tool in order to retrieve 
facts unavailable to historical research, eradicates the ambiguity proper to the realm of history. 
Furthermore, he has placed the metaphor outside its appropriate 'category' - its role in historical 
explanation. It is evident that the source of this transgression derives from Bultmann's emphasis 
on historicity, which bypasses the real contingencies of past reality in the interests of an 
eschatological event. 
§ 3. The Historical Intention of the Early Christian Communities 
the kerygma is itself meant, on the ground of its own self-understanding. to refer to the past events 
involving Jesus.71 
Leaving behind the dualism that coloured Bultmann's theological approach and which allowed 
other exegetes to formulate the problem of tradition along the dualistic lines of a 'Jesus tradition' 
and 'kerygma tradition' or 'history' and 'kerygma',72 Schillebeeckx is adamant that there is no 
tradition without Jesus or kerygma: "kerygma and a concern with Jesus of Nazareth go hand in 
hand from the very outset. "73 Furthermore, rather than posit a single kerygma based in Jerusalem 
and spreading outwards, the available evidence leads Schillebeeckx to conclude that there existed 
a variety of local Christian communities, differentiated in terms of culture and social setting, 
70In reply Macquarrie might refer to Collingwood's assertion, "Nothing could be a completer [sic] error 
conccrning the history of thought than to suppose that the historian as such merely ascertains 'what so-
and-so thought', leaving it to some one else to decide 'whether it was true'." IH, 215f. But this example 
does not apply to the problem in yiew. It is rather a criticism of the positivism in the work of an 
historian like Ranke who refused to judge the facts, which he summed up in the phrase wie es eigentlich 
gewesen. (see IH. 126-33). It follows that the historical question concerning the revelatory status of an 
eyent does not touch its truth-condition in the fullest sense. In this context the historical question is of 
thc form, 'Why did such-and-such believe in the rC\'elatory status of this historical cyent?' This is clearly 
different from the question 'Were they right to belicye this?' where 'right' means 'does it haye revelatory 
status?' On purely historical grounds it is impossible to point to any self-c\idcnt basis for an affirmatiYe 
answer to this question. 
7IJesus,72. 
72Jesus, 678 n. 25 
7'~Jesus, 82. 
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which presented their own Christological confession v.ith a corresponding historical interest in a 
particular aspect of Jesus' life: a Parousia Christology showing an interest in Jesus as 
'Eschatological Prophet'~ a Solomonic Son of David Christology \\ith an interest in Jesus' 
miracles; a Wisdom Christology with an interest in Jesus' wise sayings~ a Crucified-and-Risen 
Christology showing an interest in Jesus' passion and crucifixion.74 While these various 
christological confessions, concentrating as they do on particular aspects of Jesus' life, exhibit a 
restricted field of historical vision, Schillebeeckx declares, quite rightly. that the burden of proof 
rests with those who would argue for a later process of shaping by the early church rather than 
those, like himself, who are prepared to 'derive' Jesus from certain sayings and acts of his 
recorded in the New Testament.75 Such an argument is not meant to establish that the record of 
Jesus' sayings and actions is an historically exact record of events, this would run contrary to the 
whole tenor of Schillebeeckx's approach, i.e. a 'theology of Jesus'. Yet such insight enables 
Schillebeeckx to relativize the dualism Formgeschichte encouraged between historically authentic 
facts about Jesus and kerygma. Accordingly, he makes use of a distinction between historically 
authentic material about Jesus ('authentic matter of fact'), and historically unauthentic material 
about Jesus which is nevertheless true in substance to Jesus' basic message ('authentic Jesus'). 
The purpose of this very important distinction is to show that we can learn about Jesus even from 
historically unauthentic material, because it sometimes exhibits a real continuity with Jesus' basic 
message. Thus, Schillebeeckx agrees with G. Schille when he says that "it is not form but 
substance that ties a logion to its point of origin. "76 The emphasis upon 'substance' is a clear sign 
that Schillebeeckx, like Collingwood, is attuned to the merits of a 'post-critical' use of explicit 
testimony, especially when it is deemed historically unauthentic. 
§ 4. The 'Picture of Jesus' as the Basis for the Inference Concerning Jesus' Self-understanding 
The failure to move beyond the immediately given was a feature of the negative use of testimony 
practised in critical history. As Collingwood demonstrated in his fable of John Doe, the critical 
historian loses interest in the statement of a witness when the statement proves to be unauthentic. 
Furthermore. a statement is read on the understanding that what it does not tell the historian in so 
many words he can never find out from it at all.77 Applied to the New Testament, such a 
programme contributed to the general erosion of dogma. A. von Harnack's belief that "the 
Gospel, as Jesus proclaimed it, has to do with the Father only and not \\ith the Son," led in his 
judgement to a denial of the Trinitarian character of God.78 What is lost sight of here is that 
74Jexus. 81-85. ~03-438. 
75Jesus. 83~ A. W. Mosley. 'Historical ReJX>rting'. 
76 Jesus. 98. 
77IH. 269. 
78Harnack. What is Christianity. 1~~. cited in Galvin. 'From the Humanit)' of Christ'. 263. 
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historical judgements are tested against notfounded upon the sources. The critical historian. in 
other words, has not sufficiently reflected on the fact that historical research is driven by the 
correlation between the questions asked and the possible answers that these questions imply. 
Once this step is taken, testimony is decentred and placed within a logic of question and answer. 
Thus while the critical historian says 'There is nothing in such-and-such a statement about such-
and-such a subject', the post-critical historian replies, 'Do you not see that in this passage about a 
totally different matter this subject is implied?' It follows that it is the question asked which in 
many respects determines the evidence used in historical enquiry. The narrowness of the critical 
treatment of testimony is revealed if we ask, 'On what grounds is the critical inference based?', 
and the answer is: 'It is based on the idea that only explicit statements are legitimate vehicles of 
historical fact.' 
By contrast, Schillebeeckx realizes that the presence or absence of explicit Christo logical 
statements cannot by themselves justify an inference. As Collingwood demonstrated in his 
Inaugural, if the historian convinced himself by a study of the evidence that Bacon wrote the 
plays of Shakespeare, and he were to find an autograph document confessing the fact, he would 
by no means have verified his conclusion. A ne\\ question arises as to the document's 
authenticity.79 Explicit statements only become history within a framework of meaning, and this 
framework, this criterion of the historian's inference, is the coherence of his construction. This 
point has two aspects to it. 
In the first place, both Collingwood and Schillebeeckx argue for a 'post-critical' history 
which surmounts the purely empirical question, i.e. 'Did such-and-such an event happen or not?' 
and realize that within the intention that goes with history proper - history as not knowing what 
events followed what, but knowing what people thought (their intentions and purposes) - the 
question to ask of a statement is not whether it is true or false, but what it means. 80 Thus, the 
primary question should not be, for example, 'Did Jesus actually perform these miracles'). but: 
What is it they signify, what are people wanting to say when they relate or report such miracles 
of Jesus?'81 Only after this question has been asked can the question of historical authenticity be 
broached. 82 Such an approach is much broader than a critical approach like Formgeschichte 
which tended to leave unauthentic statements on one side, creating a unique but vacuum-like 
Jesus bereft of any narrative identity. Instead, by concentrating upon how Jesus came across to 
those who encountered him - as someone who 'goes about doing good' - it is Jesus' own behaviour 
which is fundamental to a post-critical approach. In fact, both Collingwood and Schillebeeckx's 
79IH, 2·B. 
801H 260' Schillebceckx. Jesus. 76-80. 
81Jesus. 79. 
82Noticc that this was the approach that Collingwood followed in his lectures. Autobiography. 27. 
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resort to post-critical history can be interpreted as a move to a narrative approach over-against a 
sole emphasis on critical methods that have an extremely narrow field of application. 83 
The second aspect important to narrative coherence is what Collingwood calls the 
historian's 'imaginary picture of the past'. As we have seen from chapter five, such a 'picture' 
corresponds to a narrative which incorporates everything that leads to a coherent and continuous 
account, an account "which is partly a narrative of events, partly a description of situations, 
exhibition of motives, analysis of characters. "84 An emphasis on narrative coherence enables the 
use of historically unauthentic material, giving credence to Schillebeeckx's programme of 
distinguishing between 'authentic Jesus' and 'authentic matter of fact'. In other words, even 
material which has proved historically unauthentic, for example the fact that Jesus never referred 
to himself as the 'Son of God' can nevertheless, after exploring what he did and said, be ShO\\11 to 
be 'authentic Jesus', that is, faithful to the truth surrounding his person. Thus the basic idea of 
Schillebeeckx's approach, in conscious opposition to Bultmann's denial that we have no access to 
Jesus' self-understanding, comes down to the fact that the justification of an inference concerning 
that self-understanding depends upon the interplay between the construction of a 'picture of Jesus' 
and what can be called implicit or 'indirect' evidence. With regard to the latter, Schillebeeckx 
declares, "[a]ctually this fits well with the anthropological insight that, whether for himself or for 
others, it is only in his actions that a man is finally to be understood. For although Jesus never 
posited himself ... as the second subject of his proclamation, in the business that occupied him 
and with which he identified himself, he also revealed his self-understanding."85 Such an 
argument provides cause enough to overcome Bultmann's assumption, which in itself is 
theological as opposed to historical, and brings Schillebeeckx into line with Collingwood. By this 
I am referring to Collingwood's dictum that 'mind is what it does' which I sought to align with the 
analytical emphasis on an agent's behaviour over-against any accent upon an occult mental state. 
Furthermore, in a very brief and little noticed, but nonetheless important passage from The Idea 
of History, Collingwood criticizes Bradley for stopping short at the point where he claims that the 
historian can 're-enact' the statement of a v~itness, thus making this statement one's O\\n. There is 
another step, according to Collingwood, whereby "the historian re-enacts in his O\\TI mind not 
only the thought of the witness but the thought of the agent whose action the witness reports."86 
To such a task we now tum. 
83See Jesus. 81-98. 
84IH.245. 
85Jesus. 258. 
861H. 138. my emphasis. 
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( III ) 
'He Set His Face Toward Jerusalem': Re-enacting Jesus' Approach to Death 
§ I. Introduction 
In the following section I shall show that Schillebeeckx's account of the rejection and death of 
Jesus is, in essentials, an excellent example of re-enactment. Yet in order to avoid presenting an 
account that lacks the necessary narrative qualities of continuity and coherence, I shall follow the 
structure of Schillebeeckx's account, leaving an appeal to the fonnal model of re-enactment 
implicit. The aim is not to present the model of re-enactment as a rigid structure which is simply 
fleshed out by Schillebeeckx's account; the relationship between the 1\\"0 can never be that of an 
explicit structure which is then embellished by narrative ornamentation; the historian never works 
in such a way. By contrast, if re-enactment is what always happens when the historian is 
investigating the role of an historical agent, that is, if the narrative is the re-enactment, then the 
aim is to follow the constructed narrative, in this case Schillebeeckx's account, in order to make 
the implicit use of re-enactment explicit. In other words, it matters little whether Schillebeeck.x is 
conscious of the doctrine of re-enactment or not; because if he is constructing a narrative 
involving an analysis of an agent's motives and purposes (and of course it is my contention that 
he is), then re-enactment is what he is doing. 
After I have demonstrated, in the next section, that Schillebeeckx's account of Jesus' 
approach to death is an example of re-enactment, I shall add a few remarks about Schillebeeckx's 
understanding ofhenneneutics. My aim is to connect the main argument of this chapter which 
follows the structure of Chapters 2-5 to what was said about re-enactment in Chapter 6. Here the 
focus will be on Schillebeeckx's appeal to the concept of 'universal significance' as the tenn which 
most effectively addresses the issue of Christ's divinity. 
§ 2. The Death of Jesus, Viewed in the Context of his Earthly Life 
What is overlooked here is that while there certainly is a 'breakage-point' [between Jesus on this earth 
and Christ in the preaching of the Church], it is to be located within the ministry of the historical Jesus. 
in thc resistance to him and the rejection of his message. And the insistent question arising out of this is 
whether that rejection, as a broad fact of Jesus' earthly life, did not give him occasion in one way or 
another to interpret his approaching death prior to the event. 87 
Such a judgement, expressive not only of a conscious opposition to Bultmann but to the school of 
the 'New Quest for the Historical Jesus', is made by Schillebeeck.'I. in order to suggest that the life 
and death of Jesus is all of a piece. achieving its unity in Jesus' radical confidence in the Father. 
whatever the empirical and historical circumstances might be. The death of Jesus is not an 
87Jeslls. 29 ... 
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isolated event; rather, "he died just as he lived, and he lived as he died. "88 The rejection, as a 
broad fact of Jesus' life, provides, in Schillebeeckx's view, the terms of reference for both the 
historical and christological problem. That is to say, placing the emphasis on the rejection of 
Jesus, thereby indicating that the problem does not arise only with Jesus' death, means that "the 
fundamental tenets of soteriology are established by developing the implications inherent in the 
call to follow after Jesus rather than by way of a developing reflection on the saving significance 
of Jesus' death as such. "89 The emphasis on discipleship, which in itself is evidence of the 
hermeneutic accent in Schillebeeckx's account, highlights the importance of Jesus' self-
understanding to the argument. Yet this is not to appeal to a quietism \\"hich would seek to nullify 
the legitimate distinction between Jesus' acceptance of God's will, 'Not my will but your will be 
done' (Mk. 14.36), and Jesus' evaluation of the purpose of this will: for in spite of the "lethal 
threat posed by 'official Jerusalem', [he] deliberately and of set purpose made his way to that 
city."9o So that "[h]owever much conditioned in part by historically concrete situations," 
Schillebeeckx declares, "it is an individual's capacity actually to 'make history' that provides us 
with a hermeneutic key to the understanding of his identity."91 Like Collingwood, the emphasis on 
agency leads Schillebeeckx to recognize 'the explosive historical force'n of the life of Jesus 
which, as an irreducible fact, confronts those scholars who seek to reduce the earthly reality of 
Jesus to a presupposition of kerygma tic theology. If the question of discipleship is the central 
issue, then appeal to Jesus' self understanding is unavoidable, in so far as that self-understanding 
is disclosed via the manner of his own life and approach to death. The task, then, is to reflect 
upon Jesus' journey to Jerusalem in order to reveal the motive behind Jesus' voluntary act of 
suffering and death. 
§ 3. Jesus in Face of his Approaching Death: Elements of his Self-understanding 
There are, according to Schillebeeckx, two basic factors that provide a prism through which 
Jesus' situation at the time of his death can be viewed. The first is Jesus' consciousness of being 
the 'latter day prophet' like Moses (Deut. 18: 15), and the second is his extraordinary use of the 
word Abba in speaking of God. Both these factors, in conjunction with his historical rejection, 
combine in Jesus' decision to go up to Jerusalem. 
One of the basic tenets of the book Jesus is that the first Christian interpretation of Jesus 
in the period before the New Testament was the conception of the eschatological prophet like 
88Jesus. 306. 
89p. Phillips. 'Schillebeeckx's Soteriological'. 76. 
?OjesIJs. 298. 
9IJ('slis. 19. 
92j('sIJs. 65~. 
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Moses.93 This conception was not simply a post-Easter affirmation, but has its source in Jesus' 
own self-understanding. So that it not only provides the continuity between the earthl~ Jesus and 
the Christ proclaimed by the Church,94 but the accent upon the prophetic self-awareness of Jesus 
sheds light on the fact of his rejection. Furthermore, the inherent critical edge to a prophetic role 
acts as a protocol against any triumphalism or any premature divination of Jesus in the Church.95 
F or the Deuteronomic tradition Moses is the mediator between God and the people (Deut. 
5.5); at the same time he is a suffering mediator, because he suffers for his people Israel (Deut. 
9.15-19; 9 .25-29). Yet he is set apart from the 'other prophets' because unlike them, to \\hom 
God speaks in visions and dreams, 'he is entrusted with all my house. With him I speak mouth to 
mouth' (Num. 12.6-8), 'face to face, as a man speaks to his friend' (Ex. 33.11). Schillebeeckx 
finds clear signs of the tradition of the eschatological prophet in the earliest (Mark) gospel and 
the latest (John), in Stephen's speech in Acts and in Q. Furthermore, all the gospels present the 
theme: Jesus is a prophet, but not like the others (but see esp. Mk. 6.14-16 and 9.2-9). It is clear 
to Schillebeeckx that this tradition has a place in the historical reminiscence of Jesus' life in so far 
as his words and deeds provoked strong reactions on the part of the people. There was something 
extraordinary about Jesus (see Mk. 3.21) which gave rise to a diversity of opinion which 
Schillebeeckx concentrates into the theme of whether Jesus was 'of the devil' - the 'anti-christ' -
(Mk. 3.22; Mt. 12.24; Lk. 11.15; In. 7.20)96 or possessed by the Spirit of God - a prophet (Lk. 
7.18; In. 8.48-50).97 To be a prophet like Moses, but greater, has obvious consequences for 
Jesus' own attitude towards the Torah. This is not to say that Jesus thought of himself as a new 
lawgiver, that would be contrary to the facts; rather in line with, but all the same independent of, 
the Graeco-Jewish ideas of the prophet of the latter days as the 'true teacher of the Law', Jesus' 
consciousness of being a prophet places the emphasis on the rule of God, which prompts him to 
stand up for the poorest and weakest but also to liberate the people in general from a constricting 
view of God as enshrined in the orthodox practice of the la\\98 Schillebeeckx concentrates this 
emphasis in a brief account of Jesus' cleansing of the Temple in order show that this incident 
throws light on his prophetic consciousness and the question of his authority. The cleansing of the 
temple "was a prophetic act, intended by Jesus to engender penitence and the conversion of Israel, 
in the 'latter days'. It \vas in no sense therefore a radical assault on Temple or cult, still less a 
9~Jesus. 274-282. -l75-480: IR 64ff. 
94Jesus, 479: IR 67. 
95 11This original view of Christ as prophet. a concept which does not make other honorific titles 
superfluous. has almost vanished from our Christian preaching. Therefore Christ can be made into a 
heavenly icon. moved so far on the side of God. who himself has already yanished from the world of 
men. that as a prophet he loses all critical force in the world. II IR 66. 
96See Jesus. 274-82. esp. 276[ 
97Jeslls. 475. 
98Jeslls. 229-56. 
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solemn and direct 'messianic' proclamation discarding the Je\\ish cult in favour of an 
eschatological universalism that would open up the Temple to all nations. It has nothing to do, in 
fact, with a Temple purification; the scene takes place in the Temple courtyard. "99 Yet while 
Schillebeeckx is alive to the explosive and fateful political consequences of such action, his real 
concern is with the equally historical fact of Jesus' general rejection. 100 Thus, unlike some 
contemporary exegetes, 101 he is not primarily after an answer to the question Why was Jesus 
killed?' This is shown in his desire to place the cleansing of the Temple in the middle of Jesus' 
ministry, taking away the immediate motive for Jesus' crucifixion which is common to the 
Synoptics. 102 This at once illustrates the centrality of Jesus' own self-understanding to 
Schillebeeckx's account in so far as the fact of rejection - a rejection of Jesus' message, hence his 
conception of discipleship - provides the historical motive for his concentration on a more 
intimate group of disciples. 103 
This latter accent upon a general rejection of Jesus echoes the other major element of the 
conception of the eschatological prophet. There is no hint within this conception of an emphasis 
upon a Davidic messiah centred around a ruler-figure. When popular ideas of 'kingship' come 
into prospect, Jesus either compares his destiny with that of a prophet (Lk. 11.49-52) or with the 
'Twelve' withdraws from the scene (Mk. 6.30-31; Mt. 14.22: Lk. 9.10-17; In. 6.15). signalling 
his reticence with regard to such ideas and his gradual consciousness of rejection. Historically 
speaking, Jesus is dismissive towards 'house of David' messianism and speaks of the son of man 
as the coming judge of the world. 104 It seems likely therefore that by holding out the prospect of 
suffering, the exact opposite of a triumphalist and political messiah of the Davidic line, Jesus 
gradually alienated the people in general and was not simply opposed by 'official' circles within 
Judaism. 105 It is clear that, generally speaking, Jesus appears to enjoy popularity only so long as 
no danger threatens. 106 Schillebeeckx believes that historical reminiscence concerning the 
rejection of Jesus lies behind the statement 'Blessed is he who takes no offence in me' (Luke 7.23; 
Matt. 11.6). In other words, conscious of his prophetic role as mediator between God and the 
99Jesus, 2~~. 
lOo"If one wants to establish a theology of Jesus ... which is concerned primarily "ith his life, message 
and ministry, then the rift which contact ,,~ith Jesus engendered within the Jewish community of his day 
must hayc a fundamental place within it." Jesus, 295. 
lOlE. Rivkin, U'hat Cruc~fied Jesus? 
\02 "Thus in the tradition qua history, this event is not associated with the solemn entry into Jerusalem." 
Jesus, 2~3. 
lO3''This change in apostolic strategy was apparently the outcome of a growing experience of failure 
where his preaching in Galilee was concerned." Jesus, 296. 
lO4The popular reaction to Jesus and Jesus' own response to this reaction is summed up well in the 
incident at Caesarea Philippi esp. Mk. 8: 31-33. 
lO5"it would seem from the Q tradition that the rejection of Jesus' message extended beyond these 
schematic categories," i.e. 'the Pharisees and Herodians' and 'the high priests and Scribes'. 
106,Jesus, 296. 
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people, as one who brings a definitive message which applies to the whole of history. 
Schillebeeckx declares that "Jesus realize[d] that his mission in Galilee had broadly speaking 
failed and that, convinced of the rightness and urgency ofit as he was, he ... look[ed] for a 
different outcome, with before him the possibility of total failure." I 07 Such a judgement, which 
focuses, as I have indicated, on Jesus' self-understanding, discloses a theme basic to historical 
agency: contrary to the interpretation which sees Jesus as a pacifist or as a believer in non-
violence whatever the circumstances, which seems to fuel the idea that Jesus' acceptance of the 
Father's will can be used as a device sufficient to make sense of his death, such that Jesus is 
presented simply as the victim of other peoples' attempts to get rid of him. the initiative 
throughout is with Jesus except when he chooses to surrender it. 108 Yet the question is: ''Whence 
does Jesus obtain the unconditional assurance of salvation to which his message of God's coming 
rule as final well-being for men so positively testifies?" 109 In other words, what is it in Jesus' 
experience that affords him the opportunity to exercise the initiative, to hold to the idea that in 
spite of or perhaps through his rejection, his death. he would be vindicated? Schillebeeckx points 
to an 'answer' to this problem in his emphasis on Jesus' Abba experience. 
Schillebeeckx makes explicit reference to the fact that the emphasis on the 'eschatological 
prophet like Moses' through which the idea that God speaks to Moses 'face to face 'as a man 
speaks with his friend' is predicated on Jesus, can be connected intrinsically with Jesus' 
experience of 'Abba'. 11 0 That is to say. Jesus has a special experience of God which is 
historically exceptional. However, the experience of God as 'Abba' does go deeper than a purely 
prophetic consciousness (it does not necessarily go beyond the conception of 'eschatological' 
prophet, since Schillebeeckx unites this idea with the Abba experience in order to provide the 
basic stratum of the 'systematisation' of Jesus' true identitylll). In fact the depth of this 
consciousness goes beyond anything that could justify Jesus' proclamation of the coming rule of 
God. So the source and foundation of his public ministry must be sought in his Abba experience. 
"Out of his Abba experience Jesus is able to bring to a man a message of a hope not inferable 
from the history of our world, whether in terms of individual or socio-political experiences -
although the hope will have to be realized even there. "112 This consciousness of Abba on Jesus' 
part cannot be authenticated on historical grounds - the question Was Jesus right to understand 
I07Jesus, 298. my emphasis. 
108See Harvey, The ,\lorals of Jesus, 5-l-7. 97-10 l. 
109Jesus.267. 
11OIR. 73. The significance attached to Jesus' Abba-experience has been questioned in some quarters. 
notabh b, James Barr in his article. 'Abba Isn't Daddy'. Eyen though Schillebecckx might be \\Tong in 
his as~es~ment of the Ahba-experience it does not diminish the fact that his account as a whole is an 
excellent illustration of re-enactment. 
III See IR. 73 and Jesus. 652-69. 
112Jesus.268. 
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himself thus?' is not an historical question - but that Jesus thought of himself as ha\ing an 
intimate relationship with God as Father is a fact of history difficult to discount. As such it 
confinns Collingwood's emphasis on the importance of what I have tenned 'subjective rationality'. 
From this brief account of Jesus' self-understanding it is clear that, follO\\ing his 
consciousness of the general failure of his mission in Galilee, he deliberately made for Jerusalem. 
It is difficult to reconstruct anything like the correct chronology of this movement from Galilee to 
Jerusalem; the gospels may be, in Schillebeeckx's view, simply a schematic version of a gradual 
process. However, that Jesus did go up to Jerusalem as a consequence of general failure, and 
despite the lethal threat posed to him, is historical fact. There are indications of this realization in 
the gospels, which, while perhaps post-Easter reflections, do have their roots in the historical life 
of Jesus. Matthew's uno 'to'tE - 'From that time on, Jesus began to show his disciples that he 
must go to Jerusalem' (16.21) - and Luke's 'When the days drew near for him to be taken up, he 
set his face to go to Jerusalem' (9.51) preserve, I suspect, the general mood of incomprehension 
on the part of the disciples as to the action of their master. Is there some purpose which we can 
discern, on the part of Jesus, that may transfonn the supposedly objective viewpoint that Jesus 
was committed to a wholly incomprehensible self-destructive course? Was there, so to speak, any 
method in his madness? 
§ 4. The Question of Jesus' Own Interpretation 
As Jesus was no fanatic - and that is quite certain from what we know about him - then from a particular 
moment in his career he must have rationally come to terms "ith the possibility. in the longer term the 
probability and in the end actual certainty of a fatal outcome. 113 
The rejection of his message and the prospect of Jesus' personal rejection could hardly, as 
Schillebeeckx's declares, have constituted a meaningful event in itself. Yet this is not the whole 
story. While the situation seemed hopeless, if one takes seriously Jesus' own principles and 
beliefs, then the historian must give a place to Jesus' radical confidence in God as detenninative 
of his action. In other words, from such a standpoint the fundamental point at issue is not to see 
how the situation detennined what was to be done, but how the situation is understood by the 
agent. We must ask 'hov~ did Jesus come to grips with the 'hard facts' of the situation as he 
conceived them?' As Schillebeeckx has it, "Jesus himself was faced with the concrete task of 
reconciling the historical eventuality of his violent death \\ith the assurance of his message about 
the approaching kingdom of God. "114 It is clear that such an approach is not awash \\ ith the 
explicit historical facts in which Schillebeeck.x's account can be anchored. Nevertheless, there are 
suggestive clues, that. when woven into the context of Schillcbeeckx's account give a continuous 
1 13Jesus. 101. 
11 4Jeslis. 302. 
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picture, one that makes sense. In this way, Schillebeeckx aims at making his account a coherent 
whole, in which the character of Jesus acts in situations in the only way he can act, and in which 
we cannot imagine him acting otherwise. 
He begins the account of Jesus' understanding of his own death with the logion of 
unconditional readiness to serve from Mk. 10.45 and Lk. 22.27. This, according to 
Schillebeec~ forms a very early soteriological motif whereby the early Christians, in the light of 
their liturgical practice, ascribe Jesus' self-giving to the point of death as an act of loving sen ice 
that procures salvation. 1 15 Following the existence of this soteriological motif, which is some\vhat 
alien to his own approach which focuses on Jesus as the eschatological prophet, Schillebeeckx 
asks the question: "Did the earthly Jesus himself envisage his death as a 'service performed out of 
love' and hint at all at this meaning of his death while still living on earth?" 1 16 At first sight, it is 
perhaps confusing that Schillebeeckx appeals to the soteriological motif of Mk. 10.45 in order to 
account for Jesus' self-understanding concerning his death; for the basic tenor of his approach is 
to say that there is " ... no intrinsic significance to Jesus' death 'in itself ... "117 However, while 
recognising the expiatory nature ofMk. 10.45, Schillebeeckx in fact focuses upon the exhortation 
to service and leaves on one side the emphasis on 'ransom' (lytron), because he is at pains to 
avoid any idea that Jesus' death was, in the earliest tradition, understood as a sacrifice. As a 
result, he is reluctant to attribute to Jesus himself any understanding of the saving significance of 
the death he was about to undergo. I 18 It is evident that Schillebeeckx, certainly at this point, no 
longer trusts Mark as the most reliable source. We can, therefore, take our distance from him in 
this respect. I 19 However, whatever the argument (and it is not to my purpose to pursue it), it is 
clear that the source of Schillebeeckx's approach is the emphasis on the centrality of Jesus' 
general rejection in his life as opposed to Christian interpretation of the death as an isolated 
event. So following the accent on service, he places the Last Supper within the broader context of 
the life of Jesus as a whole, "by whom salvation imparted by God is tendered under the sign of 
the fellowship meal. "120 Here the key is Schillebeeckx's idea that follO\\1og the rejection, Jesus 
\\5Jesus, 303-06. 
116Jesus 306 ,- . 
117Jesus, 282. 
I 18"One is bound to sa\' that in fact no certain logion of Jesus is to be found in which Jesus himself 
might be thought to ascribe a salvific import to his death." Jesus, 310. 
11 9Such a refusal to accept the sacrificial element in the death of Jesus has led MacKinnon to assert that 
Schillebeeckx displays a marked agnosticism with regard to the soteriological significance of Jesus' 
death. On the basis of MacKinnon's remarks, Phillips argues that Schillebeeckx's account while 
unprepared to make good the distinction between expiation and propitiation, thus making any appeal to 
sacrifice problematic, can in fact be harmonized "ith a soteriological emphasis on the basis of an appeal 
to C. K. Barrett's claim that the true background of ~vtron is to be found in the Hebrew noun kapparah 
(expiation). See, MacKinnon, 'Edward Schillebeeckx' Christology': Phillips, 'Schillebeeck:x's 
Soteriological'; Barrett, 'Mark 10. -lS'. 
120 Jesus, 307f. 
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focused upon a more intimate group of disciples, so that what Jesus offers in the tradition of the 
Last Supper via his continuing fellowship is the true model of service or discipleship. 
From the emphasis upon the intimate group of disciples, Schillebeeckx finds it hard to 
believe that "bearing in mind the concern he is known to have had for his friends, that even in his 
last days Jesus would have said nothing at all to his disciples about his approaching ,iolent 
death ... As a matter of history, therefore, we must take seriously the likelihood that during the 
final meal with his friends Jesus will have said or done something to ensure that when he was 
dead his intimate disciples would not fall for good into despair and disillusion." 121 As is 
characteristic, Schillebeeckx discounts any patently obvious discussion of the matter. bearing in 
mind Jesus' refusal to make himself the second subject of his preaching. Here perhaps is a further 
clue to his reticence in regard to the emergence of a soteriological motif from Jesus himself. 
There is, according to MacKinnon, a sense in which it belonged to the very substance of Jesus' 
self-understanding that its subject must await the disclosure of its ultimate secret by the 
Father. 122 The 'picture of the past' that Schillebeeckx is creating cannot, then. if it is to be a 
continuous and coherent picture, hold that Jesus simply left his disciples completely in the dark, 
nor can it hold, knowing what we do know about Jesus' reticence concerning himself, that Jesus 
indicated that his death would be either a mamT's death or a cultic sacrifice. 
The gospel accounts of Jesus' blessing of the bread and cup during the Last supper, 
although overlaid by later eucharistic practice, display as their central core certain recollected 
facts of history. 123 Schillebeeckx shows that there is a Pauline-cum-Lucan tradition (Lk. 22.20a~ 
I Cor. 11.25) and a Marcan one (Mk. 14.24~ Mt. 26.26-28). The Pauline-Lucan tradition can be 
summarised thus: 'This cup, now proffered, affords a share in the new covenant promised by the 
prophets, which comes about thanks to my martyrdom.' By contrast in the Marcan tradition the 
renewing of the covenant comes about by interpreting Jesus' death as a cultic sacrifice in the light 
of Exod. 24.8: 'This is my blood of the covenant.'124 Both these passages have been influenced by 
liturgical practice and so are post-Easter in origin. Yet in both Luke (22.18) and Mark (14.25) 
Schillebeeckx, following F. Hahn, detects an older vein, which according to Hahn belongs "to the 
primeval rock of the tradition": 125 'Truly I say to you, I shall not drink again of the fruit of the 
vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God' (Mk. 14.25). The passage itself. in 
Schillebccckx's view, contains two elements: (1) a main feature of the meal is the announcement 
by Jesus that it is a farewell meal to his disciples. It is the very last cup that Jesus will share with 
his friends~ (2) Jesus offers with it the prospect of fellowship renewed in the kingdom of God. 
12IJesus.307. 
122'Edward Schillcbeeckx' Christology'. 212. 
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The first clause about not drinking again forms, according to Schillebeeckx. the historical core of 
this tradition, while the 'until the day when ... ' is secondary. 126 Thus, despite Israel's rejection of 
the last prophetic offer of salvation made by God, Jesus, face to face \'with his death, continues to 
offer his disciples the cup of fellowship: this shows Jesus unshaken assurance of salvation, so 
that the addition of the 'until' clause, albeit secondary, is simply a way ofmaking explicit the 
concrete situation. 127 In other words, the offer of the cup of fellowship. in face of approaching 
death, still makes perfect sense to Jesus; "he has come to proper terms \\ith his death. which he 
evidently does not feel to be an absurd miscarriage of his mission. II 128 
In view of the emphasis on service, which passages linked to the Last Supper tradition 
confirm - 'If anyone would be first, he must be last of all and servant of all' (Mk. 9.35) - and 
which reflect Jesus' fundamental attitude to life, it is clear that by continuing to offer the cup in 
face of death, Jesus persisted to the end in loving service. He did not ascribe any salvi fie import 
to his death as such; rather, there is no getting round the historical fact that Jesus offers the cup 
of fellowship to his disciples as a token that he is not just passively allowing death to overcome 
him but has actively integrated it into his total mission. He understands and is undergoing his 
death as a final and extreme service, and he communicated this self-understanding to his intimate 
disciples under the sign of extending to them the cup of fellowship. 129 Thus, according to 
Schillebeeckx, "[g]iven all this, the fact that it is impossible to find a verbum ipsissimum or 
authentic saying of Jesus that tells us how he regarded and evaluated his death (excepting ... Mk. 
14.25a ... ) is really irrelevant. Jesus' whole life is the hermeneusis of his death."l30 Here, in other 
words, Schillebeeckx places the emphasis upon the picture of the past that he is presenting, 
making an appeal to an explicit statement from Jesus superfluous: there is no need of an explicit 
statement because the interplay between intention and action outweighs any appeal to direct 
testimony. 
One can hardly eliminate from Mk. 14.25a the historical suggestion on Jesus' part that 
fellowship with Jesus is stronger than death. l31 The historian, then, placing the emphasis upon 
\"hat I have called the 'subjective rationality' of the agent must present the difficult conclusion, 
perhaps the paradox, that for Jesus the experience of total historical failure and at the same time 
a passionate belief in God's care of man is no contradiction. l32 Jesus' belief that his death was 
simply an extension of his mission is then a fact preceding Easter. So Schillebeeck.x concludes, in 
126Jesus, 309. 
1'27Jesus. 309. 
128Jesus. 309. 
129.Jesus. 11 I. 
13oJesus. 111. 
lJ IJesus. 310. 
132Jesus. 110. 
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what is perhaps the most important statement of the whole book: " ... even prior to Easter Jesus is 
sa)ing, in effect at any rate, that the 'Jesus affair' is to go ahead. This is not just a vision born of 
faith and based solely on the disciples' Easter experience: it is his self-understanding that creates 
the possibility and lays the foundation of the subsequent interpretation by the Christians ... That 
Jesus was right in understanding himself thus and was on to the truth when he saw his death as 
being somehow tied in with his mission to offer salvation cannot of course be legitimated as a fact 
of history; it can only be dismissed or accepted in faith. But that he did so is a/act o.fhistory 
hard to deny. II 133 
§ 5. Displaying the Rationale of Jesus' Action 
It is evident from the above that Schillebeeckx has matched Jesus' action ",ith his beliefs about 
the situation in which he stands. In other words, Schillebeeckx has sho\\TI that Jesus' action is 
appropriate to the situation and therefore really does explain the action. Any alternativc actions 
that might be put forward would not, in Schillebeeck ..... 's ,ic". measure up against Jesus' reasons 
as indicated by the evidence. Some of the alternative courses of action that Schillebeeckx may 
have or did consider are as follows: 
In the first place, to suggest that Jesus did eve~thing in his power to escape a ,iolent 
death appears to controvert all the evidence. It is not consistent \\ith his attitude to life. He was 
rather an extremely disturbing figure who openly provoked conflict and ,iolence. "One would 
have to declare Jesus something of a simpleton", Schillebeeckx declares. "if it were maintained 
that he went up from Galilee to Jerusalem in all innocence, \\ithout any idea of the deadly 
opposition he was to encounter there. II 134 In other words, despite the growing certainty that his 
message had failed, and that he himself was in mortal danger, he deliberately made for Jerusalem. 
This is not the action of someone who wants to avoid death at all costs. 
Perhaps then Jesus both \\illed and sought after his death as the sole possible way of 
realising the kingdom of God? This \\ould mean that there was an "element of play-acting about 
his commitment to his message of metanoia and the rule of God. II 135 Furthermore, this ignores 
the historical fact that death only comes into prospect after the failure of his mission. In other 
words, Jesus has the initiative throughout; but this does not imply that he was set on one course 
of action. Rather, having the initiative enabled him, in conjunction \\ith his steadfast belief in 
God, to face the facts of his situation as it changed. His situation being what it was, afforded him 
a motive to embrace his approaching death in a free and deliberate act so as to incorporate his 
very death into his life of loving senice. 
U~Jesu.\. J 12. my emphasis. 
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Finally, following the reasons he had for taking the course of action he did, I mention here his 
love for an intimate group of disciples; it is inconceivable, as Schillebeeckx so rightly suggests, 
that Jesus would have simply gone to his death without a word to his friends. As Schillebeeckx 
presents it, behind the events leading up to and the eventual death of Jesus, there lies the 
recognition that however catastrophic to the disciples, the outcome was not only foreseen by 
Jesus but incorporated into his self-understanding. So it must be said with Schillebeeck:x: "If \\e 
ask whether the disciples can be thought to have grasped what Jesus was getting at prior to the 
whole event of Easter, the answer must be on the negative side. But after the first shock of his 
dying, the memory of Jesus' life and especially of the Last Supper must have played a vital role in 
the process of their conversion to faith in Jesus as the Christ ... "136 
It is evident from this account that Schillebeeckx's portrayal of Jesus' rejection and death 
conforms with Collingwood's understanding of re-enactment. In fact the conclusion that I comc to 
is quite simple: re-enactment is the name for the historian's creation of an historical narrative 
involving the investigation of an historical agent's intentions and purposes as he pursues action 
appropriate to his situation. Re-enactment is, so to speak, what always happens when we want to 
give an account of an historical agent's action. 
§ 6. Schillebeeeckx and the Hermeneutical Translation of Christ's Divinity 
Christians are 'an open letter from Christ, "Titten not on stone tablets but in and through their lives' (II 
Cor. 3.2t). 
Schillebeeckx's turn to hermeneutics, in which I include the practical-critical hermeneutics of 
'critical theory', is part of a fundamental shift in his thought, already documented, from 
theoretical participation to practical anticipation. In this respect, Schillebeeckx's appeal to 
hermeneutics is part of his belief that no text or dogma is intelligible as a self-sufficient totality 
valid for all times (thus discounting any biblical or dogmatic literalism); rather, the text or dogma 
cannot be understood apart from its own historical context and in its relation to contemporary 
modes of experience. He recognizes, in other words, the 'two horizons' of interpretation. It is 
clear, however, that along with the hermeneutics of Gadamer, which he commends for its 
rediscovery of tradition but following Habermas, criticizes for its failure to see that "tradition 
cannot criticize itself", 137 he integrates the practical-critical hermeneutics of 'critical theory' in 
order to unite the emphasis on the historicity of interpretation \\ith the stress upon active 
engagement. 
136Jesus.112. 
137Schillebccckx. The Understanding. 103. 
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The question is not whether we know better than the faithful of earlier times. The question is what in 
view of the new models of thought and experience. we must do, here and now. to preserve a li\ing faith 
which in this age and because of its truth has relevance for man, his community and society. 138 
Following his philosophical-theological shift Schillebeeckx sought to investigate ane\\. \\ith fresh 
presuppositions, the problem of the relation between the universal and the particular. 139 In other 
words, Part Four of Jesus in particular is an attempt to show how an historical man, Jesus of 
Nazareth, who was bo~ lived and died in Palestine during the first decades of the first century, 
is at the same time the pre-eminent manifestation of God for all people at all times. 
Rejecting theoretical participation in favour of practical anticipation. which of itself 
highlights the problem of relativity, allows Schillebeeckx to show that "total meaning can only 
come about in an historical experience. "140 Schillebeeckx, then, places Jesus of Nazareth at the 
intersection of total meaning and historical relativity. Thus he says that "the distincti\e identity of 
Jesus must be found in his identification with all men - and that, of course, in the context of his 
identification with the cause ofGod."141 Such a sustained emphasis on the problem of the relation 
between the universal and the particular has led MacKinnon to suggest that belief in Jesus' 
universal significance provides Schillebeeckx with contemporary terms of reference in \\ hich for 
men and women today the issue of his divinity is most effectively addressed. 142 MacKinnon 
teases out what he detects via the application of the category of disposition. That is to say, 
"significance, if applicable to Jesus in Schillebeeckx' sense, must belong to him, and not simply 
enjoy the status of a quality that we impose upon him in thought and mediation, by use of free, 
unfettered, imaginative activity ... "143 Universal significance, then, is not an occurrent 
characteristic whereby significance is imposed, but a dispositional characteristic which speaks of 
Jesus' identity. 144 I think that, as a contemporary translation of Jesus' divinity, MacKinnon is 
right to point to Schillebeeckx's use of the category of universal significance. In fact, it is clear 
that 'universal significance' can be used as a synonym for God, because, follo\\ ing the accent 
upon its anticipation through historical action or experience, universal meaning is always ahead 
of human beings, in the future. It is evident that by 'universal significance' Schillebeeckx means 
to point not to the generality of Jesus, his availability, as it were, but to the fact that we are 
confronted with God's-being-God in Jesus' being-as-man. The meaning of Jesus' universal 
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significance can, in other words, be translated as "transcendence lies in [Jesus'] human 
experience". 145 
It is necessary at this point to broaden these remarks somewhat. On the basis of his 
theological anthropology Schillebeeckx insists that just as every creature e\ inces, despite its 
unity, a duality of an aspectual kind - completely of 'itself and in being so completely 'of God' -
so does Jesus (in, it is true, a special way), since his humanity is the measure in \\hich the divine 
appears, for God is nowhere accessible except in his created manifestations. 146 Here the emphasis 
is on the 'immanence of transcendence' which appeals to the referential nature of such 
experience. Thus: "this experiential content contains an intrinsic reference to what makes this 
experience possible and is not constituted by the experience itself. "147 This methodological point 
is basic to Schillebeeckx's understanding and is concretely applied when he asserts: "Jesus' unique 
turning to the Father in absolute priority is 'preceded' and supported by the absolute turning of the 
Father to Jesus. "148 Jesus therefore, while revealing the Father also vcils him, because his 
absolute grounding in the Father is always expressed in human experience (which is just a way of 
saying that Jesus' transcending humanity is always infinitely inadequate to God's divine 
transcendence). In the same way, Jesus' openness to the Father, his unique being-for-all (others). 
is expressed by his preferential option for 'the outcast and sinner': hc has. in other words. 
universal significance because he is partisan. 149 
By positing the locus of transcendence (divinity) within the humanity of Jesus - so 
focusing on Jesus' human transcendence - Schillebecckx refuses any talk of 'union', whieh in itself 
is dangerously dualistic - humanity and divinity - preferring to talk of "two total aspects: a real 
humanity in which 'being of God', in this case 'being of the Father', is realizcd." I 50 This is vel) 
important, because it means that, following S. Sykes,151 Schillebeeckx treats the declaration that 
Jesus is 'truly man' not as an ordinary human statement but as a faith utterance just as much as 
Jesus is 'truly God'. Yet this is not simply to shift the focus of Christo logy from a faith utterance 
about divinity to one about humanity; it is, rather, a realization on Schillebeeckx's part that 
being-as-man cannot be defined a priori and set \\ithin predetermined boundaries - this much 
follows from the accent on the 'immanence of transcendence' - but should be characterized as an 
'open form of being' not admitting of any predetermination by Nature. I 52 Such a judgement sits 
well with Collingwood's stress on 'appropriate action' as it was presented in Chapter 4. It was 
145( 'hrist. -l8. 55. his emphasis. 
I 46Jesus. 652-69. 
147rhrist. 55. 
H8Jesus. 666. 
149Church 178 
150JeslIs.655. 
I ~ I Sykes. 'The Theology of the Humanity of Christ.' 
I ~2Jesus. 65-l. 
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affirmed there that the claim to finality on behalf of Enlightenment anthropology, the claim to 
understand the other person in advance, diminished the unique selfhood of that other person. By 
contrast, the assertion that appropriate action is the criterion for the assessment of personal 
identity prohibits the application of a predetennined understanding of human nature to the 'other'. 
The theologian can, therefore, approach the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth in terms of his 
'subjective rationality': that is, Jesus' human nature, and following Schillebeeckx, his 'being-of-
the-Father', can be disclosed from an account of his appropriate actions rather than from our 
more mundane understanding of 'to be expected' (characteristic) actions. The theologian, then, 
must avoid a kind of amalgam ofa God-man, and focus rather on Jesus ofNazareth~ and "from a 
position of 'open knowledge' of what 'being man' properly means, and likewise what 'being God' 
means" learn from him the real content of both - "and that precisely through their interrelation as 
manifested in Jesus. "153 
Speaking in this way means that Schillebeeckx's refusal, and rightly so, to claim to know 
the limits of 'being-as-man', enables him to pass from an emphasis on 'humanity' to 'divinity' 
without assuming any problematic dualism or spatial notion which he detects in talk of a God-
man. Rather, he speaks of the transfer in Jesus of the epicentre of his life to God, the Father. This 
centre, though, is not outside Jesus~ this, 'greater than I' (In. 14.28), is actually intimior intima 
meo, so that it "constitutes Jesus' being-as-man in his deepest subsistence as himself." 154 Yet this 
does not mean that Sehillebeeckx advocates a language whieh captures both the being-as-man 
and being-as-God. Rather, there is a real humanity. which can in itselfbe affirmed on purely 
secular terms as 'human being\ but in the Christian language of faith there is also the affirmation 
that Jesus is entirely 'of God' where 'of God' "affirms the totally unprecedented depth of Jesus' 
experience (of himself as gift of God, the Father)" from which the Church proceeded to call Jesus 
'the Son of God' to indicate "the constitutive relation of this human person to the Father."155 In 
other words, starting from 'being-as-man', albeit 'being-as-man' as an 'open form of being', and a 
reflection on creatureliness as the grounding of our 'being-as-man' in God, 156 Schillebeeckx, on 
the basis of the history of Jesus whose source is the Abba experience, makes an important 
distinction between our 'being-as-man' and Jesus' 'being-as-man' in order to assert something 
about Jesus' unique relationship to God. That is to say. Jesus has his 'being a human person', and 
is this person qua human being thanks to his constitutive relation to the Father, whereas we hm c 
our 'being a human person' (qua human being), thanks to our essential relation to the creator-
153Jesus, 604. his emphasis. 
154Jesus, 655. 
155Jesus.655. 
156"It should be cvident ... that for the religious language which none the less rccognilcs and approves 
the distinctive character of non-religious language. this bcing-a-person. already 'given' as somcthing 
separate from his 'being of the Father'. is nowhere ever postulated." Jesus. 656. 
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God. "For Jesus this implies that his relation to the Father makes him in his humanity Son of 
God."157 
While Schillebeeckx's account is very subtle, MacKinnon, who perhaps can be 
characterized as the inquisitor par excellence of suspected subjectivism., understood in this 
instance in terms of an erosion of the ontology of relations, does detect in his work a hint of a new 
style of adoptionism. 158 How this might be characterized MacKinnon does not say. but his 
criticism suggests that 'universal significance' could be understood as something which is 
bestowed on Jesus. 159 This would be like interpreting the statement 'the Word became flesh' (In. 
1 . 14) in terms of an historical process - 'the flesh became Word' - so that the emphasis is placed 
on what Jesus becomes. 160 Schillebeeckx, however, expressly denies any accent on the 
'assumption of Jesus into the Logos'. 161 The embargo on setting predetermined limits to being-as-
man short-circuits any such idea. Furthermore, on the basis of Schillebeeckx's theological 
anthropology it is difficult to accuse him of adoptionism in so far as human being itself is 
grounded in the creative act of God. So, on a higher level, as it were, in his humanity, Jesus is so 
intimately 'of the Father' that by virtue of this very intimacy he is 'Son of God'. This is not 
adoptionism because this intimacy, albeit inescapably anthropomorphic, was vested not in 
himself but in God the Father. 162 
In this respect, the Abba-experience becomes the key which points a\\ay from an 
emphasis upon adoptionism towards a conception of divine invitation made concrete in the person 
of Jesus. 163 That is to say, according to Schillebeeckx, while in the order of the genesis of 
christological knowledge soteriology precedes christology,164 in the order of reality, the personal 
identity of Jesus precedes soteriology.165 Hence, irrespective of the problem of contingency - that 
without our affirmation that he is the Christ, Jesus would not be the Christ - 'christology' 
precedes soteriology. Yet the priority given to a 'theology of Jesus' (hence soteriology) in Jesus 
discloses Schillebeeckx's belief that only via the mediation of phenomenology is ontology 
possible. 166 While, then, he is not attempting to follow O. Cullmann in a 'functional' christology 
whereby the role that Jesus plays exclusively defines his identity, leaving the question what he is 
157Jesus, 656. 
158'Edward Schillebeeck.:x' Christology', 216. 
1591 am at this stage assuming the deeper reflection on universal significancc that 1 havc reviewed. 
160Lash, A .\fatter of Hope, 144-. 
161Jesus, 655f. 
162Jesus, 658. 
] {)]For much of this paragraph I am indebted to MacKinnon's 'Substance in Christology - a "cross-
bench" view'. 
164Jesus, 546-50. 
16~IR 95. 
166This is not original of Schillebecck:x. both Husserl, and especiall~ Heidcggcr ("only as 
phenomenology is ontology possible", Being and Time, 60) stand as his forerunners. 
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apart from this role to the status of suggestio falsi, Schillebeeckx fastens upon the work of Jesus 
(the kingdom of God) in order to show that, through this work, Jesus is the historical individual 
through whom God has identified himself \\1th the world, and further, that this is only possible 
through the realization in Jesus' person of a total receptivity. I am at present drawing upon 
MacKinnon's reflections on the principle of receptivity in order to bring out what I think 
Schillebeeckx's is after. It is via the phenomenon of 'receptivity', explored in his attention to the 
Abba-experience, that Schillebeeckx discloses the ontological ground of Jesus' person, i.e. his 
identity apart from his work. 167 Thus the suggestion of adoptionism is removed when the notion 
of Jesus' diakonia is identified with the continuous offer on the part of the Father made visible in 
the life of the Son. In this invitation made concrete, Schillebeeckx is drawing upon ideas 
suggested by the term homoousion. Thus, Jesus' divinity, understood as a real humanity in which 
'being of God' is disclosed is not a theoretical principle, but, according to Schillebeeckx, a salvi.fic 
experience which, in the light of Jesus' own life, characterizes Christian discipleship in ever 
changing historical situations. 168 
§ 7. Concluding Remarks 
The following remarks, though brief, are given in place of a formal conclusion, because it was 
always my intention that the present chapter should stand as the conclusion to the thesis as a 
whole. I do not intend to reiterate all the major points of the thesis since this would be tiresome; 
rather I aim simply to focus on what I take to be the central issue, namely. how Collingwood's 
understanding of historical reality complements a particular theological emphasis. 
On the evidence of the present chapter it is clear that Schillebeeckx's account of the 
rejection and death of Jesus provides an excellent illustration of Collingwood's doctrine of re-
enactment. In particular, Schillebeeckx's desire to give a much more creative role in the 
development of the Christian tradition to Jesus' own self-understanding mirrors the emphasis 
Collingwood thought paramount in historical work. As we saw in Chapter 5, from an early date 
Collingwood knew exactly what was at stake: "the real Jesus held definite beliefs about God and 
himself and the world: his interest was not historical but theological. By considering him as a 
mere fact of history, instead of also an idea in theology, we may be simplifying our task, but we 
are cutting ourselves off from any understanding and sharing of his consciousness." 169 With 
Schillebeeckx (and the later Collingwood) we may want to convert the emphasis on consciousness 
167However, it is Schillebeeckx's belief that one cannot ever separate the 'phenomena' ('from below') 
from the 'ontological' ('from above'). both disclose the other. Hence his impatience with proceeding 
'from below' and 'above' understood as mutually exclusive procedures Sec Christ. ~~2 
168"The patristic and indeed the whole Christian tradition has always attempted to define the actual 
person of Jesus in temlS of the purport of the salyation brought by him." Jesus. 657. 
169Colhngwood. Religion and Philosophy. ~3. 
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to 'self-understanding', thereby annulling any suggestion of psychology in favour of semantics, 
but what is beyond doubt is that both writers agree on the necessity of Jesus' self-understanding 
to the bearing of the story and its outcome. Here of course, in the necessity of agency. lies that 
which is fundamental. Thus, irrespective of their systematic intentio~ an intention which of its 
nature takes away the shock of historical reality, the resort to agency to which both Collingwood 
and Schillebeeckx appeal discloses not only those 'explosive historical forces' I have spoken 
about, but witnesses to the discontinuity between Christian reality and a metaphysical idealism 
masquerading as a kerygmatic 'theology of the institution'. Furthermore, to the extent to which 
hermeneutics justifies an emphasis on a self-sufficient ontology, a counter-balance must be found 
in an agency that rescues the history of Jesus from a deadening domestication. In this way. 
agency can disclose the subversive nature of Jesus' history and recover for us the true meaning of 
the phrase 'the freedom of the gospel'. 
Collingwood is, therefore, uniquely placed to speak to the present theological situation. 
On the one hand, the hermeneutical basis of his thought finds echoes in the present emphasis on 
ecclesiology in Anglo-American theology. The appeal to tradition via the thesis of absolute 
presuppositions discloses the essentially anti-subjectivist basis for life together as Ekklesia. 
Together with Wittgenstein and Gadamer, Collingwood's semantic picture of mind, and his 
realization that we must accept tradition before we can criticize it means that theologians can re-
discover their essential creatureliness by 'going to school' with Collingwood. On the other hand, 
however, Collingwood's stress on agency acts as a resource that the theologian can use in order to 
counter the temptation to which Christian theology is continually suspect - that of withdrawing 
into ecclesiological security. It is perhaps ironic that such an emphasis on historical agency yields 
one of Barth's fundamental insights: religion "forgets that she has a right to exist only when she 
continually does away with herself. "170 But as if to witness to the explosive force of historical 
agency those who understood Barth's insight (re-)enacted the church struggle. 
170J3arth. The Word a/God and the Word oj.\fan. 67. cited in Scholder. Requiem, 71. 
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